

AFGHANISTAN — **AT WAR** —

**From the 18th-Century Durrani Dynasty
to the 21st Century**

Tom Lansford, Editor

Afghanistan at War

Afghanistan at War

FROM THE 18TH-CENTURY DURRANI DYNASTY
TO THE 21ST CENTURY

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Contents

Guide to Related Topics, xiii

List of Primary Documents, xix

Preface and Acknowledgments, xxi

Introduction, xxv

Chronology, xxix

A–Z ENTRIES

Afghan Army, History, Forces,
and Tactics, 1

Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), 4

Afghan War (2001–), 7

Afghanistan, Border Disputes, 10

Afghanistan, Climate and
Geography, 12

Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups, 14

Afghanistan, Nationalism, 18

Afghan-Pakistani Border
Raids (2002–), 19

Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars)
(1748–1837), 20

Afghan-Soviet Nonaggression
Pact (1931), 22

Afghan-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship (1921), 23

Afridi (Khyber) Tribe, 24

Airborne Units and Tactics, 25

Aircraft, Types and Tactics, 27

Al Qaeda, 30

Ali Masjid, Battle of (1878), 33

Amin, Hafizullah, 34

Andropov, Yuri, 36

Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809), 37

Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1905), 38

Anglo-Afghan War: First
(1839–1842), 40

Anglo-Afghan War: Second
(1878–1880), 43

Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919), 47

Anglo-Marri Wars (1840, 1880,
and 1917–1918), 49

Anglo-Russian Boundary
Commission, 51

Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 52

Antiaircraft Missiles, 55

Arghandab, Battle of (1987), 56

Armored Vehicles, 57

Artillery, Cannons, and Mortars, 61

Auchinleck, Sir Claude, 63

Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of, 64

- Avitabile, Paolo, 66
- Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty Organization), 67
- Bagram Air Base, 68
- Bala Hissar, 69
- Barakzai, 70
- Barno, David W., 71
- Bearden, Milton, 72
- Berntsen, Gary, 73
- Bhutto, Benazir, 74
- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 75
- Bin Laden, Osama, 76
- Blair, Tony, 80
- Blood, General Sir Bindon, 81
- Bolan Pass, 83
- Bonn Agreement (2001), 84
- Brezhnev, Leonid, 85
- British Cantonment, Kabul, 86
- British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics, 87
- Browne, Sir Samuel (Sam), 90
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 90
- Buddhas of Bamiyan, 91
- Burnes, Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”), 92
- Bush, George H. W., 93
- Bush, George W., 94
- Carter, Jimmy, 103
- Carter Doctrine, 107
- Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N., 108
- Cavalry and Cavalry Tactics, 109
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 112
- Chamberlain, Sir Neville Bowles, 114
- Chernenko, Konstantin, 115
- Churchill, Sir Winston, 116
- Civil Military Operations, 117
- Civilian Casualties, 119
- Clinton, Bill, 120
- Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–), 122
- Cold War (1947–1989), 124
- Communications in Military Operations, 125
- Cordovez, Diego, 127
- Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998), 127
- Damghan, Battle of (1729), 133
- Dargai Heights, Battle of (1897), 134
- Deobandi School, 135
- Disraeli, Benjamin, 135
- Dobbins, James, 136
- Dost Mohammad, 137
- Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 140
- Drone Strikes, 142
- Dubs, Adolf “Spike,” 143
- Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer, 144
- Durand Line, 146
- Durrani, Ahmad Shah, 147
- Durrani, Mahmud Shah, 148
- Durrani, Shuja Shah, 149
- Durrani, Timur Shah, 150
- Durrani, Zaman Shah, 151
- Durrani Empire (1747–1818), 152
- Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 155

- Elphinstone, William George Keith, 156
- Embassy Bombings (1998), 157
- Franks, Tommy, 159
- Frontier Corps, 160
- Gailani, Pir Sayyid Ahmad, 163
- Gandamak, Battle of (1842), 164
- Gandamak, Treaty of (1879), 166
- Gates, Robert Michael, 170
- Geneva Accords (1988), 171
- Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf, 174
- Ghazni, Battle of (1839), 175
- Ghilzai, 176
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 177
- Great Game, The, 179
- Gromov, Boris, 181
- Gromyko, Andrei, 182
- Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, 183
- Gul, Hamid, 184
- Gulabzoy, Sayyed Mohammad, 185
- Gulnabad, Battle of (1722), 186
- Haig, Alexander, 189
- Haq, Abdul, 190
- Haqqani, Jalaluddin, 191
- Haqqani Network, 192
- Harkay ul-Mujahideen* (HuM), 194
- Harlan, Josiah, 195
- Hazara Uprisings (1888–1901), 196
- Hazaras, 197
- Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 198
- Helmand Valley, 199
- Helmand Valley Project, 200
- Herat, Siege of (1837–1838), 201
- Herat, Uprising (1979), 202
- Hostages and Kidnapping, 203
- Hotak, Mir Wais, 205
- Hotaki Empire (1709–1738), 205
- Humanitarian Aid Operations, 206
- Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 209
- India, Relations with Afghanistan, 210
- Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan, 212
- International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 213
- Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan, 214
- Iraq War (2003–), 215
- Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*), 218
- Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*), 219
- Islamic Revolutionary Movement (*Harakati Inqilabi Islami*), 220
- Islamic Society (JIA) (*Jamiat-e Islami*), 221
- Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, DAESH), 222
- Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*), 223
- Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan*), 224
- Jagdalak Pass, 227
- Jalalabad, Battle of (1989), 227
- Jalalabad, Siege of (1842), 228
- Jamrud, Battle of (1837), 229
- Kabul, Retreat from (1842), 231

- Kabul, Siege of (1996), 233
- Kabulov, Zamir, 235
- Kalakani, Habibullah (*Bacha-i Saqao*), 235
- Kandahar, Battle of (1880), 236
- Karmal, Babrak, 237
- Karzai, Hamid, 239
- Kazemi, Syed Mustafa, 243
- Khalis, Mohammad Yunus, 244
- Khan, Abdur Rahman, 245
- Khan, Amanullah, 247
- Khan, Habibullah, 249
- Khan, Jan Mohammed, 250
- Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar, 251
- Khan, Mir Masjidi, 252
- Khan, Mohammad Akbar, 253
- Khan, Mohammad Hashim, 254
- Khan, Mohammad Ismail, 255
- Khan, Mohammad Yakub, 256
- Khan, Mohammed Daoud, 258
- Khan, Nasrullah, 259
- Khan, Shah Mahmud, 260
- Khan, Sher Ali, 262
- Khistmand, Sultan Ali, 263
- Khost, Sieges of (1980–1989), 264
- Khost Rebellion (1924–1925), 265
- Khyber, Mir Akbar, 266
- Khyber Pass, 267
- Landmines, 269
- Lockhart, Sir William, 270
- Loya Jirga, 271
- Lytton, Edward Robert Bulwer, First Earl of Lytton, 272
- Macnaghten, Sir William Hay, 275
- Madrasahs, 276
- Maiwand, Battle of (1880), 277
- Malakand Field Force (1897), 279
- Maratha Empire (1674–1818), 281
- Marja, Battle of (2010), 282
- Massoud, Ahmed Shah, 283
- Mazari, Abdul Ali, 285
- McChrystal, Stanley, 286
- McNeill, Dan K., 287
- Metcalf, Charles, 289
- Mohan Lal, 290
- Mohaqeq, Mohammed, 291
- Mohmand Campaigns, 291
- Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah, 293
- Moorcroft, William, 294
- Mughal Empire (1526–1857), 295
- Muhsini, Ayatollah Asef, 297
- Mujahideen, 297
- Musharraf, Pervez, 300
- Nadiri, Sayyid Mansur, 305
- Najibullah, Mohammed, 305
- Narcoterrorism, 307
- Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–), 308
- National Fatherland Front (*Jabha-yi Milli-yi Padarwatan*), 310
- National Front of Afghanistan (*Jabhe Melli*), 310
- National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*), 311
- National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan*), 312

- National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*), 313
- Nawaz Sharif, Muhammad, 314
- 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–), 315
- Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations, 321
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 322
- Northern Alliance, 324
- Nott, Sir William, 325
- Nur, Atta Mohammad, 326
- Obama, Barack, 329
- Omar, Mullah Mohammed, 333
- Operation Anaconda (2002), 336
- Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014), 337
- Operation Storm 333 (1979), 341
- Operations Red Wings I, II, and Whalers (2005), 342
- Opium Poppy Production, 343
- Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan, 347
- Panipat, Battle of (1761), 350
- Panjdeh Crisis (1885), 351
- Panjshir Campaigns (1980–1985), 352
- Pashtunization, 354
- Pashtuns (Pushtuns), 355
- Pashtunwali (Pukhtunwali), 356
- Peiwar Kotal, Battle of (1878), 357
- People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 358
- Peshawar, Treaty of (1855), 360
- Peshawar Accords (1992), 362
- Petraeus, David, 363
- Pollock, Sir George, 364
- Popalzai, 365
- Pottinger, Eldred, 366
- Pottinger, Sir Henry, 367
- Precision-Guided Weapons, 368
- Psychological Operations in Afghanistan, 370
- Qala-i-Jangi, Battle of (2001), 373
- Qizil-Bash, 375
- Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 377
- Rabbani, Mullah Muhammed, 378
- Raj, British (1858–1947), 379
- Ranjit Singh, Maharaja, 380
- Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919), 382
- Reagan, Ronald W., 385
- Reagan Doctrine, 387
- Richards, Sir David, 388
- Rifles, Light Arms, and Machine Guns, 389
- Roberts, Sir Abraham, 391
- Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleigh (Lord), 392
- Rodionov, Igor, 394
- Roos-Keppel, George Olaf, 395
- Rumsfeld, Donald, 396
- Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan, 399
- Rutskoi, Alexander, 402
- Saidullah (“Mullah Mastun”), 405
- Sale, Florentia, 406
- Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”), 407
- Saragarhi, Battle of (1897), 408

- Sarandoy, 409
- Saur Revolution (1978–1979), 410
- Sayaf, Abdurab Rasul, 411
- Schroen, Gary, 412
- Security Firms and Defense Contractors, 413
- Shah, Mohammed Nadir, 414
- Shah, Mullah Ahmed, 415
- Shah, Nadir, 416
- Sherpur, Battle of (1879), 419
- Shevardnadze, Eduard, 420
- Shultz, George, 422
- Shutargardan Pass, 423
- Sokolov, Sergey, 424
- Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), 424
- Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics, 429
- Special Operations Forces, 431
- State Information Service (KhAD) (*Khidamat-i Ittilaat-i Dawlati*), 432
- Stewart, Sir Donald, 433
- Stoddart, Charles, 435
- Takur Ghar, Battle of (2002), 437
- Taliban, 438
- Taliban, Forces and Tactics, 441
- Taliban Insurgency, 443
- Tanai, Shahnawaz, 446
- Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 447
- Tarzi, Mahmud, 449
- Tarzi, Soraya, 450
- Terrorism, 450
- Tirah Campaign (1897–1898), 454
- Tomsen, Peter, 457
- Tora Bora, Battle of (2001), 458
- Transport and Logistics, 459
- United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan, 463
- United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan, 468
- United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–), 469
- United States, Relations with Afghanistan, 471
- Urgun, Siege of (1983–1984), 475
- Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich, 475
- Varennikov, Valentin, 477
- Victory Organization (*Sazman-i Nasr*), 477
- Vitkevich, Ivan Viktorovich, 478
- Wahhabism, 481
- Wanat, Battle of (2008), 482
- Warburton, Sir Robert, 483
- Wardak, Abdul Rahim, 484
- Warlords, 485
- Wilson, Charles Nesbitt, 488
- Women, Role in Combat, 489
- World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918), 490
- World War I and Afghanistan, Turko-German Missions (1914–1918), 492
- World War II and Afghanistan (1939–1945), 493
- Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich, 495
- Zahir Shah, Mohammed, 497

Zawahiri, Ayman al-, 498

Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986), 499

Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad, 501

Recommended Resources, 503

About the Editor and Contributors, 509

Index, 515

Guide to Related Topics

Battles and Military Campaigns

Afghanistan, Border Disputes
Afghan-Pakistani Border Raids (2002–)
Ali Masjid, Battle of (1878)
Arghandab, Battle of (1987)
Damghan, Battle of (1729)
Dargai Heights, Battle of (1897)
Gandamak, Battle of (1842)
Ghazni, Battle of (1839)
Gulnabad, Battle of (1722)
Hazara Uprisings (1888–1901)
Herat, Siege of (1837–1838)
Herat, Uprising (1979)
Jalalabad, Battle of (1989)
Jalalabad, Siege of (1842)
Jamrud, Battle of (1837)
Kabul, Retreat from (1842)
Kabul, Siege of (1996)
Kandahar, Battle of (1880)
Khost, Sieges of (1980–1989)
Khost Rebellion (1924–1925)
Maiwand, Battle of (1880)
Marja, Battle of (2010)
Panipat, Battle of (1761)
Panjdeh Crisis (1885)
Panjshir Campaigns (1980–1985)
Peiwar Kotal, Battle of (1878)
Qala-i-Jangi, Battle of (2001)
Saragarhi, Battle of (1897)
Saur Revolution (1978–1979)
Sherpur, Battle of (1879)
Takur Ghar, Battle of (2002)

Tirah Campaign (1897–1898)
Tora Bora, Battle of (2001)
Urgun, Siege of (1983–1984)
Wanat, Battle of (2008)
Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986)

Economic Development and Nation Building

Civil Military Operations
Civilian Casualties
Deobandi School
Helmand Valley Project
Nation Building and Economic
Development in Afghanistan (2001–)
Opium Poppy Production

Empires

Durrani Empire (1747–1826)
Hotaki Empire (1709–1738)
Maratha Empire (1674–1818)
Mughal Empire (1526–1857)
Raj, British (1858–1947)

Ethnic Groups

Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups
Afridi (Khyber) Tribe
Barakzai
Ghilzai
Hazaras
Mohmand Campaigns
Pashtunization
Pashtuns (Pushtuns)

Popalzai
Qizil-Bash

Geography

Afghanistan, Climate and Geography
Bolan Pass
Durand Line
Helmand Valley
Jagdalak Pass
Khyber Pass
Shutargardan Pass

Governmental and International Organizations

Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Harkay ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
Humanitarian Aid Operations
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Loya Jirga
Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan

Ideologies and Philosophies

Afghanistan, Nationalism
Great Game, The
Pashtunwali (Pukhtunwali)
Raj, British (1858–1947)

Individuals

Military Leaders

Auchinleck, Sir Claude
Blood, General Sir Bindon
Browne, Sir Samuel (Sam)
Chamberlain, Sir Neville Bowles
Elphinstone, William George Keith

Franks, Tommy
Gromov, Boris
Haqqani, Jalaluddin
Lockhart, Sir William
Massoud, Ahmed Shah
McChrystal, Stanley
McNeill, Dan K.
Nott, Sir William
Petraeus, David
Pollock, Sir George
Richards, Sir David
Roberts, Sir Abraham
Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleigh (Lord)
Rodionov, Igor
Roos-Keppel, George Olaf
Rutskoi, Alexander
Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”)
Sokolov, Sergey
Stewart, Sir Donald

Political Leaders, Officials, Diplomats, and Warlords

Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of
Avitabile, Paolo
Barno, David W.
Bearden, Milton
Berntsen, Gary
Bin Laden, Osama
Brzezinski, Zbigniew
Burnes, Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”)
Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.
Cordovez, Diego
Dobbins, James
Dostum, Abdul Rashid
Dubs, Adolf “Spike”
Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer
Elphinstone, Mountstuart
Gailani, Pir Sayyid Ahmad
Gates, Robert Michael
Gromyko, Andrei
Gul, Hamid
Gulabzoy, Sayyed Mohammad
Haig, Alexander
Haq, Abdul

Harlan, Josiah
 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin
 Kabulov, Zamir
 Kazemi, Syed Mustafa
 Khalis, Mohammad Yunus
 Khan, Jan Mohammed
 Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar
 Khan, Mir Masjidi
 Khan, Mohammad Akbar
 Khan, Mohammad Ismail
 Khyber, Mir Akbar
 Lytton, Edward Robert Bulwer, First Earl of
 Lytton
 Macnaghten, Sir William Hay
 Mazari, Abdul Ali
 Metcalfe, Charles
 Mohan Lal
 Mohaqeq, Mohammed
 Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah
 Moorcroft, William
 Muhsini, Ayatollah Asef
 Nadiri, Sayyid Mansur
 Nur, Atta Mohammad
 Omar, Mullah Mohammed
 Pottinger, Eldred
 Pottinger, Sir Henry
 Rabbani, Mullah Muhammed
 Rumsfeld, Donald
 Saidullah (“Mullah Mastun”)
 Sale, Florentia
 Sayaf, Abdurab Rasul
 Schroen, Gary
 Shah, Mullah Ahmed
 Shevardnadze, Eduard
 Shultz, George
 Stoddart, Charles
 Tanai, Shahnawaz
 Tarzi, Mahmud
 Tarzi, Soraya
 Tomsen, Peter
 Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich
 Varennikov, Valentin
 Vitkevich, Ivan Viktorovich
 Warburton, Sir Robert

Wardak, Abdul Rahim
 Wilson, Charles Nesbitt
 Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich
 Zawahiri, Ayman al-

Rulers and Monarchs

Amin, Hafizullah
 Andropov, Yuri
 Bhutto, Benazir
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali
 Blair, Tony
 Brezhnev, Leonid
 Bush, George H. W.
 Bush, George W.
 Carter, Jimmy
 Chernenko, Konstantin
 Churchill, Sir Winston
 Clinton, Bill
 Disraeli, Benjamin
 Dost Mohammad
 Durrani, Ahmad Shah
 Durrani, Mahmud Shah
 Durrani, Shuja Shah
 Durrani, Timur Shah
 Durrani, Zaman Shah
 Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf
 Gorbachev, Mikhail
 Hotak, Mir Wais
 Kalakani, Habibullah (Bacha-i Saqao)
 Karmal, Babrak
 Karzai, Hamid
 Khan, Abdur Rahman
 Khan, Amanullah
 Khan, Habibullah
 Khan, Mohammad Hashim
 Khan, Mohammad Yakub
 Khan, Mohammed Daoud
 Khan, Nasrullah
 Khan, Shah Mahmud
 Khan, Sher Ali
 Khistmand, Sultan Ali
 Musharraf, Pervez
 Najibullah, Mohammed
 Nawaz Sharif, Muhammad

Obama, Barack
Rabbani, Burhanuddin
Ranjit Singh, Maharaja
Reagan, Ronald W.
Shah, Mohammed Nadir
Shah, Nadir
Taraki, Nur Muhammad
Zahir Shah, Mohammed
Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad

International Relations

India, Relations with Afghanistan
Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan
Nation Building and Economic
 Development in Afghanistan (2001–)
Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan
Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with
 Afghanistan
United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations
 with Afghanistan
United States, Relations with Afghanistan

Military Forces and Tactics

Afghan Army, History, Forces, and
 Tactics
Airborne Units and Tactics
British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics
Cavalry and Cavalry Tactics
Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–)
Communications in Military Operations
Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and
 Sudan (1998)
Drone Strikes
Frontier Corps
Malakand Field Force (1897)
Mujahideen
National Front of Afghanistan
 (*Jabhe Melli*)
Security Firms and Defense Contractors
Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics
Special Operations Forces
United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–)
Warlords
Women, Role in Combat

Military Operations

Operation Anaconda (2002)
Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014)
Operation Storm 333 (1979)
Operations Red Wings I, II, and Whalers
 (2005)
Psychological Operations in Afghanistan
Special Operations Forces

Military Weapons, Logistics, and Vehicles

Aircraft, Types and Tactics
Antiaircraft Missiles
Armored Vehicles
Artillery, Cannons, and Mortars
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
Landmines
Precision-Guided Weapons
Rifles, Light Arms, and Machine Guns
Transport and Logistics

Places

Bagram Air Base
Bala Hissar
Bolan Pass
British Cantonment, Kabul
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility
Helmand Valley
Jagdalak Pass
Khyber Pass
Shutargardan Pass

Policies and Doctrines

Carter Doctrine
Reagan Doctrine

Political and Military Groups

Islamic Movement of Afghanistan
 (*Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*)
Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*)
Islamic Revolutionary Movement (*Harakati*
 Inqilabi Islami)
Islamic Society (JIA) (*Jamiat-e Islami*)

Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen
(Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan)
 Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan*)
 National Fatherland Front (*Jabha-yi Milli-yi Padarwatan*)
 National Islamic Front of Afghanistan
(Mahaz-i Milli Islami)
 National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan
(Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan)
 National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*)
 Northern Alliance
 People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
 (PDPA)
 Sarandoy
 State Information Service (KhAD)
(Khidamat-i Ittilaat-i Dawlati)
 Taliban Insurgency
 Victory Organization (*Sazman-i Nasr*)

Religion

Buddhas of Bamiyan
 Madrasahs
 Wahhabism

Territorial Disputes

Afghanistan, Border Disputes
 Afghan-Pakistani Border Raids (2002–)
 Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars)
 (1748–1837)
 Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842)
 Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880)
 Durand Line
 Herat, Siege of (1837–1838)
 Panjdeh Crisis (1885)

Terrorism

Al Qaeda
 Embassy Bombings (1998)

Haqqani Network
 Hostages and Kidnapping
 Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, DAESH)
 Narcoterrorism
 Taliban
 Taliban, Forces and Tactics
 Terrorism

Treaties and Pacts

Afghan-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (1931)
 Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (1921)
 Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809)
 Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1905)
 Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty Organization)
 Bonn Agreement (2001)
 Gandamak, Treaty of (1879)
 Geneva Accords (1988)
 Peshawar, Treaty of (1855)
 Peshawar Accords (1992)
 Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919)

Wars

Afghan Civil War (1989–2001)
 Afghan War (2001–)
 Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars)
 (1748–1837)
 Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842)
 Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880)
 Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919)
 Anglo-Marri Wars (1840, 1880, and
 1917–1918)
 Cold War (1947–1989)
 Iraq War (2003–)
 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan
 (2001–)
 Soviet Invasion and Occupation of
 Afghanistan (1979–1989)
 World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918)
 World War I and Afghanistan, Turko-
 German Missions (1914–1918)
 World War II and Afghanistan (1939–1945)

List of Primary Documents

These primary documents, listed here in chronological order, are found at the end of the entry given underneath.

The Battle of Gandamak on January 13, 1842, as Described by Lady Florentia Sale
Follows **Gandamak, Battle of (1842)**

Treaty of Gandamak, May 26, 1879
Follows **Gandamak, Treaty of (1879)**

The Anglo-Russian Convention (Entente), August 31, 1907
Follows **Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907**

The Treaty of Rawalpindi (Treaty of Peace between Governments of India and Afghanistan), August 8, 1919
Follows **Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919)**

The Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, December 5, 1978
Follows **Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan**

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Follows **Bush, George W.**

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Follows **Obama, Barack**

Preface

On January 13, 1842, British soldiers at the besieged fortress of Jalalabad watched as a solitary, weary figure approached their gates. Assistant Surgeon William Brydon arrived at the garrison more dead than alive from a head wound. He was one of only a small number of survivors from an Anglo-Indian army that had retreated on January 6, from Kabul, some 90 miles (140 km) to the west. The retreating force numbered approximately 4,500 troops and an estimated 12,000 camp followers. The column had faced bitter cold and repeated raids and sniping by Afghan fighters. Their trail from Kabul was littered with those killed by the Afghans or the freezing cold. Earlier on that day, a small force of regular British soldiers had made a last stand at Gandamak. Including some British officers and wives who had earlier been taken hostage by the Afghans, only about 100 of the original force from Kabul survived the battle. The retreat and massacre of the Kabul garrison was one of the worst defeats in the history of the British colonial army.

Afghanistan's history has been one of war and conflict. Because it was strategically located along major trade routes, control over the territory that would become the modern state of Afghanistan was the goal of successive empires and world powers. The Anglo-Indian soldiers and civilians who died in January 1842 were part of an army that had

invaded Afghanistan in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), the first of three major conflicts between the Afghans and their imperial neighbors who sought to make Afghanistan a buffer state to protect the rich Indian colonies from their archrival in the region, Russia. Russia, after being transformed into the Soviet Union, would later take the place of Britain as an occupying force that through 10 years of brutal combat was unable to suppress the mujahideen, the Afghan freedom fighters.

The massacre at Gandamak, the later British defeat at the Battle of Maiwand in 1879 during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), and the intense insurgency of the mujahideen against the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), have fascinated students of military history and the general public and produced a rich literature on the wars and conflicts of Afghanistan. This body of work has dramatically expanded since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as scholars, military veterans, government officials, and other figures endeavor to analyze the complexities of Afghan culture and society in order to develop policies to end the country's long-running conflicts.

About This Book

Afghanistan at War: From the 18th-Century Durrani Dynasty to the 21st Century seeks

to contribute to that body of literature by providing readers with a useful reference tool to explore the conflicts of Afghanistan from its early founding in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani through the current conflict between the U.S.-led coalition and the Taliban and other militant groups. The entries provide readers with an appreciation of the importance of individuals, figures, tribal and ethnic differences, military technology and weapons, along with social factors and great power machinations in producing the chaos that has plagued Afghanistan for most of its modern history.

This encyclopedia offers readers a comprehensive selection of 317 alphabetically arranged entries on the individuals, groups, wars, battles, treaties, events, and weapons of Afghanistan's conflicts since 1747. Among other entries, the work includes a wide range of biographies of the notable people who have especially played a role in Afghanistan's military history of nearly the last 300 years. Articles on the wars of Afghanistan analyze the cause of the conflict and its short- and long-term impact on the country. Countries such as Great Britain (the United Kingdom), Russia (the Soviet Union), and the United States have separate entries on their relationship with Afghanistan. There are individual entries on weapons and the military forces involved in the various conflicts. Entries have been written by 48 scholars and writers, most of whom have taught military history or history at colleges and universities across the country, and who bring a broad and authoritative perspective to the book.

Fifteen primary documents, found at the ends of certain relevant entries, will enhance readers' understanding of events. Here, readers will find remarks by former Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai; statements from U.S. presidents Carter, Bush, and Obama; a

firsthand account of the 19th-century Battle of Gandamak by Florentia Sale, the wife of British Army officer Brigadier Sir Robert "Fighting Bob" Sale; as well as treaties and accords that officially ended various wars and disputes. (See the "List of Primary Documents" in the front of the book.)

Each entry has a "Further Reading" section that lists relevant sources used to create the entry and to provide more information on the topic. In addition, a selected bibliography of recommended resources at the end of the work provides readers with sources that were used to complete the entries and with works that amplify the entries through additional information.

For more access to the rich information in the encyclopedia, there are a number of helpful aids. Readers should make use of the work's chronology in the beginning of the book to help them follow the narrative of conflicts and easily follow the sequence of events. Readers can locate related entries by checking the list of entries arranged under broad topics at the beginning of the book in the section called "Guide to Related Topics." Additionally, every entry includes a "See also" section referring readers to other related entries, which endeavors to point out related material not otherwise referenced in the entry or that is analyzed in more detail in another entry. Finally, for greater access, the encyclopedia ends with a comprehensive index.

Technical Notes

Afghan names, titles, tribes, and places often have a bewildering variety of spellings. For instance, Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of the Durrani Empire and the early Afghan state, may alternatively be referred to as Ahmad Shah Abdali or Ahmad Khan Durrani. The Pashtun people who make up the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan

have been referred to variously as the Push-tuns or Pathans. The work is presented with an earnest effort to standardize the names of individuals, tribes, places, battles, and so forth with the most common contemporary usage, including use of punctuation. For non-Afghan figures, especially those numerous British soldiers, government officials, and adventurers, appropriate titles, including knighthood or other aristocratic designations, are utilized where appropriate. In addition, there is also significant disagreement on some dates, especially the birth date or year of early Afghan leaders. Early Afghan rulers generally adopted the title “emir,” and it was not until the reign of Amanullah Khan (1919–1926) that an Afghan ruler first adopted the designation “king.” Where appropriate, both metric and standard measurements are presented.

Casualty figures present another challenge. There are wide variations in the number of killed or injured from battles both in the past and present. Accounts of past battles were notoriously inaccurate. Victors often inflated the number of enemy killed or captured. Where possible, authors have used consensus figures of those killed or wounded.

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I would like to specifically highlight the contributions of Dr. Robert J. Pauly Jr. Bob has been a colleague and friend for many years, and he graciously joined the project at a late date and took on the responsibility for completing entries that had fallen by the wayside. Jack Covarrubias also went above and beyond what one would expect, especially in the midst of a career transition. My thanks go to Jorge Brown who accepted a number of entries that had been passed over by other authors. Such a labor would not have been possible without a range of sacrifices on the part of the people I love most, my wife, Gina, and my daughters, Ella and Kate. They have my deepest love and appreciation.

*Tom Lansford
Long Beach, Mississippi
April 4, 2016*

Introduction

In 2011, the conflict in Afghanistan surpassed the Vietnam War as the longest war in U.S. history. Through 2016, U.S. and allied troops continued to fight the Taliban and other insurgent groups in the country. The ongoing war reinforced the idea that Afghanistan was the “graveyard of empires,” a nation whose combination of rugged, inhospitable geography and warlike people have defeated, or at least fought to a draw, a succession of the world’s great powers, including both the British Empire and the Soviet Union. The region was also the birthplace of empires, such as the Hotaki Empire that briefly conquered Persia in the 1700s, and the Durrani Empire from which the modern state of Afghanistan is descended. Yet these two indigenous empires were torn apart because of infighting and civil wars, leading to the conventional wisdom that the martial Afghans bitterly fought one another for power and influence, but would quickly rally together to repel a foreign invader. The result has been a country wracked by conflict in the form of both internal and external wars. From 1793 to 1901, only 2 of 14 Afghan rulers ascended the throne peacefully.

The Durrani Empire was formally founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani (1722–1772) from the ashes of the Hotaki Empire. The Afghan leader fought a series of wars with surrounding powers to expand the

size and scope of his territory. Under his son and successor, Timur Shah Durrani (1748–1793), the empire began to decline in the face of advances by the Sikhs. When Timur Shah died, Afghanistan was plunged into a succession of civil wars over the throne among his sons and heirs. The instability temporarily ended in 1823 when Dost Mohammad secured the throne and launched the Barakzai dynasty.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan became part of the imperial rivalry for power and influence in central and southwest Asia between Great Britain and Russia. Britain sought to use Afghanistan as a buffer state to protect its Indian colonies. Russia sought to expand its territory southward in search of secure borders and a long-dreamed-of warm water port in the Indian Ocean. The imperial competition would be labeled the “Great Game,” a deadly struggle that came to include individual adventurers, corps of diplomats, and great armies.

Concern over Russian influence in Afghanistan prompted both the First (1839–1842) and Second (1878–1880) Anglo-Afghan Wars. Although the British won the majority of battles in both wars, they could not effectively subdue the Afghans, although London did gain control over Afghan foreign policy as a result of the second conflict. This, in turn, led to the Third Anglo-Afghan

War (1919) in which the Afghans finally gained full independence from the British. Throughout the 1800s, Russia's border moved southward until it came in contact with Afghanistan. Incidents such as the Panjdeh Crisis in 1885, in which Russian troops seized Afghan territory, demonstrated the will of Moscow to use force. The crisis almost brought Russia and Great Britain to war but was ultimately resolved peacefully.

Even as successive Afghan rulers strove to maintain their independence from foreign powers, they also endeavored to unify a fractious country that was divided along ethnic and religious lines. The mainly Sunni Pashtuns dominated Afghanistan's politics and provided the nation's monarchs and political elite. However, they were divided by tribal and clan allegiances, which persisted to the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001) and the contemporary conflict. Serious revolts by minority groups such as the predominately Shi'a Hazaras in the 1890s led to "Pashtunization," the broad effort to force cultural assimilation by the dominant Pashtuns. The Pashtuns themselves were divided by the British whose conquest of the Punjab and surrounding areas split the tribe into Afghan Pashtuns and Indian (and later Pakistani) Pashtuns.

The combination of internal and external conflict slowed Afghanistan's economic and social development. The nation remained neutral in World War I, mainly as a result of British pressure. However, Emir Habibullah Khan (1872–1919) was assassinated in 1919 by anti-British elites who had opposed neutrality. His ultimate successor and son, Amanullah Khan (1892–1960), would also be overthrown in 1929 during an insurrection by conservative tribal leaders opposed to his modernization reforms. Mohammed Nadir Shah restored the throne (1883–1933), only to be assassinated in 1933. His son,

Mohammed Zahir Shah (1914–2007), would be the last king of Afghanistan.

One of Amanullah's lasting legacies was the effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union as a means of balancing British power. Over the next 50 years, the Soviet Union steadily increased its influence in Afghanistan. Zahir Shah remained neutral in World War II and then reached out to the United States for aid and assistance, only to find successive U.S. administrations drawn increasingly to Pakistan as a strategic partner. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorated over opposing territorial claims (Afghanistan sought to reunite the Pashtuns under one country). By the 1960s, the Soviets had replaced the British as the main external influence in Afghanistan. A pro-Soviet communist party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was formed in 1965 and backed a 1973 coup that overthrew the monarchy. The new regime, led by Mohammed Daoud Khan (1909–1978), was deposed by the PDPA in 1978.

The new regime's efforts to remake Afghan society, including efforts to reduce the power of religious leaders and a highly unpopular land reform initiative, led to an insurgency by militants who came to be called the mujahideen ("religious fighters"). The growing insurrection and internal strife within the PDPA prompted the Soviets to intervene in December 1979. The Soviet occupation (1979–1989) was a complete failure. The Soviets and their PDPA allies were able to secure the major cities and towns, but were unable to control the countryside. The mujahideen established bases in Pakistan and with financial and military support from the United States and Arab nations, they conducted a brutal insurgency against the regime. The conflict created more than 6 million refugees and left more than 1

million Afghans dead. The rebellion also destroyed the country's infrastructure.

The withdrawal of the Soviets brought civil war, not peace. The PDPA regime held on to power until 1993, when the Soviets cut military and economic aid. Most of the mujahideen groups supported a coalition government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani (1940–2011). However, factions opposed to Rabbani fought the coalition, exacerbating the country's woes. Fighting prompted a new wave of refugees. In 1994, a new fundamentalist Pashtun grouping, the Taliban, emerged to challenge the Rabbani government and the dissident mujahideen. With Pakistani support, the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 and became the *de facto* government of Afghanistan, although only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the regime.

Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden (1957–2011), a former mujahideen who traveled from Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviets, found refuge with the Taliban after he was expelled from Sudan in 1996. Bin Laden established a series of al Qaeda training facilities and bases in Afghanistan. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States demanded the Taliban turn over bin Laden

for prosecution. The regime refused, prompting U.S. military intervention, beginning with airstrikes on October 7, 2001.

The U.S.-led coalition provided military aid and assistance to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, including air and missile strikes. By the end of November 2001, the Taliban had been overthrown. An international conference in Bonn, Germany, chose Hamid Karzai (1957–) as the interim president of the country (Karzai would be elected president in his own right in 2004 and reelected in disputed balloting in 2009). The U.S.-led forces failed to capture bin Laden and soon faced a growing insurgency led by the Taliban and al Qaeda. Like the mujahideen, the militants established bases in Pakistan and launched offensives into Afghanistan, retreating across the border to escape the coalition. In 2011, U.S. Special Operations forces found Osama bin Laden living in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and killed him in a firefight. In the current post-2001 conflict, the U.S.-led coalition faces many of the same obstacles as those that confronted the British and the Soviets. The coalition has been unable to completely suppress the insurrection, despite 15 years of combat and a significant amount of international aid.

Chronology

1700s			who ruled twice, 1801–1803 and then 1809–1818, and then a third son, Shuja Shah Durrani, who was also emir twice, 1803–1809 and 1839–1842.
1709	Hotaki Empire is formed by Mir Wais Hotak.		
1720	Mahmud Hotak invades Persia, defeating the Safavids and becoming shah of Persia in 1722.		
		1800s	
1738	The last Hotaki ruler, Hussain Hotak, is killed fighting against Nadir Shah, ending the empire.	1809	Signed on April 9, the Anglo-Afghan Treaty opens relations between Afghanistan and Great Britain.
1747	Ahmad Shah Durrani is named ruler of all Afghans by a Loya Jirga (“Grand Council”) near Kandahar, launching the Durrani dynasty.	1825	Englishman William Moorcroft dies on August 27 while extensively traveling through Afghanistan and the region.
1773	Timur Shah Durrani succeeds Ahmad Shah and moves capital of kingdom from Kandahar to Kabul.	1826	Dost Mohammad is named emir of Afghanistan, establishing the Barakzai dynasty.
1793	The death of Timur Shah Durrani on May 18 initiates a period of civil war between his sons that lasts until 1826. Zaman Shah Durrani reigns from 1793 to 1800, followed by another son, Mahmud Shah Durrani,	1837–1838	Afghans defeat the Persians at the siege of Herat.
		1839	The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) commences after Russian envoy Ivan Victorovich Vitkevich visits Kabul and the British

1839 (cont.)	government demands his recall. Dost Mohammad flees an advancing Anglo-Indian army in August 1839, and the British place Shuja Shah Durrani back on the throne. Dost Mohammad surrenders to the British in November 1840 and is sent into exile in India.		between Afghanistan and Great Britain.
		1857–1858	Afghanistan remains neutral during the Sepoy Rebellion.
		1878	The Russians dispatch a mission to Kabul in an effort to expand influence in the region during the height of the period of imperial rivalry with Great Britain known as the “Great Game.” Britain demands Afghan emir Sher Ali Khan receive a similar mission. When Sher Ali refuses, the British initiate the Second Anglo-Afghan War on November 21 with three separate columns.
1841	The British resident in Kabul, Sir Alexander Burnes, is killed by a mob on November 2, as Afghans unite behind Dost Mohammad’s son Mohammad Akbar Khan in a broad uprising against the British.		
1842	On January 6, the 4,500 Anglo-Indian garrison in Kabul begins to retreat along with some 12,000 camp followers after receiving assurances of safe conduct by Akbar Khan. The force faces repeated attacks and is massacred at the Battle of Gandamak on January 13. A new Anglo-Indian force dubbed the Army of Retribution invades Afghanistan and sacks Kabul in September. Meanwhile, Dost Mohammad is restored to the throne.	1879 February 21	Sher Ali dies while fleeing the British.
		May 26	Sher Ali’s successor, Yakub Khan, signs the Treaty of Gandamak, which grants Britain territory and control of Afghan foreign policy in exchange for an annual subsidy.
		September 3	The British resident in Kabul, Sir Pierre L. N. Cavagnari, and his garrison are killed by a mob of unpaid Afghan soldiers.
1855	The Peshawar Treaty (March 30) restores diplomatic relations	October 8	Anglo-Indian forces recapture Kabul. Yakub Khan abdicates four days later.

1880		1914–1919	Habibullah rejects overtures from the Central Powers and alienates a pro-German elite in Afghanistan by remaining neutral during World War I.
July 22	Abdur Rahman Khan is proclaimed emir of Afghanistan.		
July 27	The British are defeated at the Battle of Maiwand.		
September 1	The British win the Battle of Kandahar, ending the Second Anglo-Afghan War.	1919	
1885	Russian troops occupy the Afghan territory of Panjdeh, prompting British intervention and a new border agreement in 1887.	February 20	Habibullah is assassinated and is eventually succeeded by his son Amanullah on February 28.
1888–1893	A series of Hazara uprisings are defeated by Abdur Rahman’s army, although periodic rebellions continue until the 1900s.	May	The Third Anglo-Afghan War begins when Afghan forces launch a surprise, but failed, attack on Peshawar.
1893	The Durand Line is established as the border between Afghanistan and British-controlled India. Ethnic Pashtuns begin to move into areas settled by Tajiks and Uzbeks in northern Afghanistan in a program of Pashtunization.	August 8	The Treaty of Rawalpindi ends the Third Anglo-Afghan War.
1895	Abdur Rahman abolishes slavery.	1921	
1897–1898	Tribal unrest along the border between India and Afghanistan prompts military intervention by the British in the Tirah Campaign.	February 21	Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty is ratified, ushering in a growing period of Soviet influence in Afghanistan.
1900s		1924–1925	Khost Rebellion by conservative Pashtuns opposed to modernization is suppressed.
1901	Abdur Rahman dies on October 1 and is succeeded by his son Habibullah Khan.	1929	
		January 14	Amanullah abdicates in the face of a growing rebellion and goes into exile in India. His brother Inayatullah assumes the throne, but rules for only three days before also abdicating in favor of Tajik rebel leader Habibullah Kalakani.

October 13	Mohamed Nadir Shah’s forces capture Kabul. Nadir Shah is crowned king three days later. Habibullah Kalakani is captured, and then executed on November 1.	1953	On September 7, Mohammed Daoud Khan is appointed prime minister.
1933	Nadir Shah is assassinated on November 8. His son Mohammed Zahir Shah is crowned king of Afghanistan.	June 21	Daoud’s government signs a trade deal with the Soviets, allowing for the free passage of goods between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.
1934	Afghanistan joins the League of Nations.	1960s	
1937	The Treaty of Saadabad is signed on July 8 between Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.	1961	Continued friction along the border leads Pakistan to again close the border and suspend diplomatic relations with Afghanistan.
1939–1945	Afghanistan remains neutral during World War II.	1963	
1946		March 10	Afghan prime minister Daoud resigns his post. Zahir Shah assumes more control over Afghan government and launches a series of reforms, including granting new powers to the parliament.
May 19	Shah Mahmud Khan, an uncle of Zahir Shah, is named prime minister, replacing Hashim Khan.	May 28	Afghanistan and Pakistan reestablish relations and resume trade.
November 9	Afghanistan becomes a member of the United Nations (UN).	1964	New constitution approved by Loya Jirga. The new basic law allows freedom of speech and press and establishes a bicameral legislature.
1950	On July 18, the Afghan government finalizes a four-year trade deal with the Soviet Union.	1965	The pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is formed on January 1 by the consolidation of several smaller communist and Marxist parties.
1951	Pakistan imposes an economic blockade against Afghanistan following incursions by Afghan tribes into Pakistani territory.		

1967	The PDPA fractures into two wings, the hardline Khalq (“Masses”) faction, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, and the more moderate Parcham (“Banner”) wing under Babrak Karmal.	insurrection against the PDPA government.
1970s		
1973		
July 17	Muhammad Daoud Khan deposes Zahir Shah in a bloodless coup and assumes direct control of the Afghan government the following day.	
1977	The Soviet Union facilitates a reconciliation between the Khalq and Parcham factions, which begin planning a coup to overthrow Daoud. A new constitution is approved.	
1978		
April 17	PDPA Parcham founder Mir Akbar Khyber is assassinated, prompting a wave of antigovernment protests.	
April 28	Mohammed Daoud Khan is assassinated during the Saur Revolution, which installs a communist government in Afghanistan led by the PDPA.	
April 30	Nur Muhammad Taraki is named president of Afghanistan.	
May	The first mujahideen training camps are established in Pakistan as a growing number of Afghans join an	
1979		
February 14		Adolf (“Spike”) Dubs, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, is kidnapped and later killed in Kabul.
March 15		Rebellion against the PDPA government becomes widespread as antigovernment protesters seize Herat and the Afghan Army begins to disintegrate. Approximately 15,000–24,000 are killed in fighting and reprisals when government forces later retake the city.
July 3		President Jimmy Carter signs a secret presidential directive ordering U.S. funding for the mujahideen insurgents in Afghanistan. This serves as the genesis for the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Operation Cyclone.
September 14		Hafizullah Amin deposes Nur Muhammad Taraki as head of the Afghan government. Taraki is killed.
December 25		Soviet military forces begin to infiltrate into Afghanistan.
December 26		Osama bin Laden leaves for Afghanistan to join the mujahideen and fight against the Soviet occupation.
December 27		Soviet special operations forces depose and kill Hafizullah Amin. Babrak

December 27 <i>(cont.)</i>	Karmal becomes Afghan president, with the full backing of the Soviet government.		refugees to rise to more than 3 million.
1980s		January	Peshawar Seven begins to form as Pakistan agrees to provide funding for the mujahideen grouping.
1980		1982	Soviet troop levels in Afghanistan rise to approximately 120,000.
January 20	President Jimmy Carter says the United States will boycott the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics if the Soviets do not withdraw from Afghanistan within 30 days.	1983	
January 23	President Jimmy Carter enunciates the Carter Doctrine and announces economic sanctions against the Soviet Union in response to that country's invasion of Afghanistan. Carter also seeks \$30 million in aid for the mujahideen.	January 19	UN deputy secretary-general begins peace mission to end the war in Afghanistan.
		1984	U.S. provides approximately \$50 million in covert aid to the mujahideen by year's end.
September –October	Soviets launch First and Second Panjshir Offensives against mujahideen forces, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, in the Panjshir Valley.	April –September	Soviets' Seventh Panjshir Offensive occurs. It is the most costly in terms of casualties of all the Panjshir offensives.
November 4	Ronald Reagan is elected president of the United States over incumbent Jimmy Carter. Reagan wins on a campaign that highlighted the poor U.S. economy and security problems highlighted by the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.	1985	
		January 18	U.S. government increases aid to mujahideen, which reaches \$300 million by year's end.
		September	Mujahideen forces defeat Soviet-backed operation to capture Zhawar.
1981	Ongoing fighting causes the number of Afghan	December 31	Peace talks hosted by the UN in Geneva yield a preliminary plan by the Afghan government to effect the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The United

	States has already agreed to be a guarantor of a peace deal in Afghanistan.	bin Laden and other mujahideen.
1986		1989
February 28	Soviet and government forces begin offensive, which captures Zhawar on April 19. However, the Soviets withdraw quickly, allowing the mujahideen to recapture the area.	January 25 The United States closes its embassy in Kabul, followed by other Western powers, including the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.
April	The United States begins supplying the mujahideen with Stinger surface-to-air missiles.	February 15 The Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan as a result of the 1988 Geneva Accords.
November 24	Babrak Karmal is removed from power with the support of the Soviets. Mohammed Najibullah becomes the new Afghan president.	1990s
		1990
		March–April Afghan refugees that fled their country during the Soviet Union begin to return in large numbers under a program overseen by the UN.
1987		March 6 Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai launches an unsuccessful coup against the Najibullah government.
November 19, 1987–January 10, 1988	The Soviets and PDPA government troops lift the mujahideen siege of Khost in the last major military offensive directly involving Soviet troops.	1991
		February The United States ends military aid to groups in Afghanistan.
1988		December 15 The Soviet Union ends arms shipments to the Najibullah government.
April 14	The Geneva Accords, which pave the way for the Soviet withdrawal, are finalized. The agreements call for the Soviets to begin withdrawing troops on May 15.	1992
August	The al Qaeda (“the base” or “the foundation” in Arabic) terrorist organization is believed to have been formed in Afghanistan by Osama	June 24 Burhanuddin Rabbani becomes president of a coalition government after removal of the Soviet-backed government by mujahideen forces.

December	The UN establishes the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan to coordinate refugee return and resettlement.		in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 and wounding more than 4,000.
1994		August 20	U.S. forces launch cruise missile strike of al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in response to the August 7 embassy bombings.
January	Kabul is attacked by the forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rashid Dostum.		
November 5	The Taliban capture Kandahar, Afghanistan, marking the beginning of Taliban consolidation of control of the country.	1999	Opium production dramatically increases from 2,100 tons to 4,600 tons.
1996		February 2	U.S. demands extradition of Osama bin Laden from the Taliban. The Taliban refuse.
May	Hekmatyar joins Rabbani-led coalition against the Taliban and is appointed prime minister.	March	Taliban and Northern Alliance reach peace agreement, but it collapses in July.
August 25	Osama bin Laden declares war against the United States.		
September 27	The Taliban capture Kabul and effectively gain control of most of Afghanistan.	July 6	The United States imposes economic sanctions on the Taliban because of their refusal to extradite bin Laden.
1997		October 12	General Pervez Musharraf leads a military coup in Pakistan and takes control from the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
May 24	Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.		
1998		October 15	The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1267, which lists al Qaeda and the Taliban as terrorist organizations and places economic and military sanctions on both groups.
February 23	Osama bin Laden issues a fatwa, or religious decree, calling upon all Muslims to kill Americans and their allies.		
August 7	Al Qaeda conducts simultaneous truck bombings against the U.S. embassies		

2000s		diplomatic and political relations with the Taliban.
2000	Opium production continues to increase. By the end of the year, the UN estimates that Afghanistan is responsible for 75 percent of the world's opium.	
		October 7 The invasion of Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, begins.
		November 9 Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan is captured by coalition forces in a rout. The Taliban regime begins to collapse quickly.
2001		
March	Despite international condemnation, the Taliban destroy two ancient stone Buddhas at Bamiyan.	November 13 Taliban forces abandon Kabul.
September 9	Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance, is assassinated by al Qaeda.	NATO begins to develop contingency plans to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people once the Taliban are defeated.
September 11	Al Qaeda-sponsored coordinated terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States result in almost 3,000 deaths in the worst terrorist strike in history and the most damaging attack on the United States since the bombing of Pearl Harbor by Japan on December 7, 1941.	November 14 Jalalabad falls to the Northern Alliance.
		UN Security Council Resolution 1378 adopted demanding central role for the United Nations in Afghanistan.
September 12	UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 1368 denouncing the 9/11 attacks.	November 16 Mohammed Atef, a leading al Qaeda military strategist, is killed by coalition forces in Afghanistan.
September 14	Congress passes a joint resolution granting President Bush the authority to use military force against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.	December 5 "Bonn Agreement" between the UN, Northern Alliance, and other anti-Taliban Afghan factions.
September 25	Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates end	December 9 Kandahar, Afghanistan falls to coalition forces marking the end of the Taliban regime.

December 12	Coalition forces attack al Qaeda’s main headquarters at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.	March 20	U.S. begins military strikes against Iraq. The Iraq War shifts resources and the military focus of the United States away from Afghanistan.
December 20	UN Security Council Resolution 1386 adopted, forming the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).	April 10	Karzai appoints 33-member group to draft a new constitution. The group completes its work in November.
December 22	Hamid Karzai becomes the interim leader of Afghanistan.	May 1	President Bush announces the end of major combat operations in Iraq. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announces the end of major combat in Afghanistan.
2002			
March 1	Operation Anaconda, a major U.S.-led anti-Taliban campaign, begins in Afghanistan.	August 11	NATO takes command of ISAF and peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan.
July 6	Afghan vice president Haji Abdul Qadir is killed by gunmen believed to be affiliated with al Qaeda.	2004	
November 15	The U.S. Congress enacts legislation to provide \$2.3 billion in funds for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. In addition, \$1 billion is approved to support the NATO-led security force in the country.	January 4	A constitutional Loya Jirga approves a new constitution, which is signed into law by Karzai on January 26.
2003		April 3	An international conference of donor states pledges \$8.2 billion in reconstruction assistance for Afghanistan.
March 1	Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the planners of the September 11 and Bali attacks, is captured in Pakistan and extradited to the United States.	August 20	A yearlong, nationwide voter registration drive is completed in Afghanistan. More than 10.6 million are registered to vote amid Taliban and al Qaeda attacks.
March 19	President Bush approves Operation Iraqi Freedom. In an address to the nation, Bush announces military action against Iraq.	October 9	Hamid Karzai is elected president of Afghanistan with 55.4 percent of the

	vote against more than a dozen other candidates.	July 31	NATO takes command of the southern region of Afghanistan and takes command of military operations to displace the Taliban.
December 7	Karzai is inaugurated as Afghanistan's first freely elected president.		
December 31	By the end of the year, there are 18,300 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.	September 21	NATO leaders agree to take command of all security operations in Afghanistan.
2005			
February 10	NATO announces it will expand its role in Afghanistan.	November 8	Donald Rumsfeld resigns as U.S. secretary of defense; former CIA director and national security adviser Robert Gates replaces him.
May	Allegations surface of prisoner abuse by U.S. troops and intelligence officials in Afghanistan.		
September 18	Afghanistan conducts parliamentary and regional elections after repeated delays. Women win 28 percent of the seats in the parliament.	December 19	Mullah Akhtar Osmani, the fourth senior ranking Taliban leader, is killed in a U.S. air strike.
December 23	Karzai appoints a new cabinet as a result of ongoing tensions with conservative lawmakers in the Afghan parliament.	December 31	By year's end, Afghanistan is the source of 92 percent of the world's heroin. Opium poppy production in Afghanistan peaked that year at 8,500 metric tons. The illicit drug trade in Afghan was worth \$2.7 billion, at a time when legal exports accounted for only \$600 million.
2006			
	The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency becomes the lead organization in efforts to suppress the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan.	2007	
March 16	Former Afghan president Mojaddedi survives an assassination attempt. Mojaddedi is a vocal critic of Pakistan, and many Afghans blame Pakistani intelligence officials for the attack.	April	Coalition forces intercept a large shipment of Iranian weapons destined for the Taliban.
		May 12	Mullah Dadullah, senior military commander for the Taliban, is killed by U.S. and U.K. forces.

May 13	Beginning of a continuing series of minor border skirmishes between the Afghan National Army and Pakistani Armed Forces.		al Qaeda and Taliban facilities.
September 29	Karzai offers to allow the Taliban to be part of the government if it renounces violence. The Taliban reject the initiative and declare they will not negotiate as long as foreign troops are in Afghanistan.	November 4	Democrat Barack Obama is elected president of the United States, defeating Republican senator John McCain in a campaign that focused on the deteriorating domestic economy and the War on Terror. Obama retains Robert Gates as secretary of defense to ensure continuity in the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
2008			
April 27	President Karzai survives an assassination attempt when insurgents attack a military parade in Kabul, Afghanistan.	December 31	By year's end, there are 48,250 U.S. combat troops in Afghanistan. The number of Afghan children enrolled in school has increased from 900,000 in 2001 to 5 million.
June 12	Although participants criticize the government for widespread waste and fraud, the Afghan Support Conference pledges \$15–\$20 billion for economic development.	2009	
July 10	General David Petraeus takes over U.S. Central Command; General Ray Odiemo takes over Multi-national Force in Iraq.	January 22	Obama signs executive orders that forbid the torture of prisoners and orders the closure of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay within one year. The president also suspends the ongoing military tribunals of unlawful enemy combatants.
September	Bush deploys an additional 4,500 troops to Afghanistan in what was described alternatively as a “mini-surge” or “quiet surge.”	February 17	President Obama approves an additional 17,000 troops for Afghanistan.
September 3	The United States acknowledges for the first time that U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted raids into Pakistan against	February 27	Obama announces timeline for withdrawal from Iraq.
		April	Following a series of meetings between U.S. officials and their NATO

	counterparts, the alliance agrees to deploy an additional 5,000 troops to Afghanistan.		which calls on the alliance to use local suppliers and contractors in Afghanistan in an effort to improve the Afghan economy and bolster relations between coalition forces and localities.
May 11	General Stanley McChrystal is given command of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in order to implement a new counterinsurgency strategy.	May 24	The number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan surpasses the number in Iraq for the first time (94,000 in Afghanistan versus 92,000 in Iraq).
August 20	In Afghan presidential elections, Karzai leads the initial balloting, but he fails to gain more than 50 percent of the vote, necessitating a runoff election under Afghan law.	June 2–4	A Loya Jirga appointed by Karzai and consisting of tribal and clan leaders meets in Kabul to develop plans to bring peace to Afghanistan. The summit calls for negotiations with moderate Taliban leaders.
November 7	After a runoff is scheduled, Karzai's opponent, former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, withdraws from the election, claiming that the potential for fraud will make any additional balloting illegitimate.	June 23	President Obama accepts the resignation of the U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, after the general and his staff make disparaging comments about the president and other U.S. political officials.
November 19	President Karzai is declared the winner of the contested August balloting and inaugurated for a second term.	July	The online watchdog group Wikileaks begins publishing a large cache of classified U.S. documents online. The information had been obtained from an Army intelligence specialist Bradley Manning. The initial postings were related to Operation Enduring Freedom.
December 1	The United States announces that it will deploy an additional 33,000 troops to Afghanistan in a troop surge, bringing the U.S. total in the country to 100,000 out of the 140,000 coalition soldiers.		
2010			
April	NATO initiates the "Afghan First" program,		

July <i>(cont.)</i>	Wikileaks releases a second batch of 400,000 documents in October on the Iraq War, and a massive number of diplomatic cables and documents the following month.	September 20	Former president Rabbani is assassinated by the Taliban.
November 19–20	At the alliance’s 2010 Lisbon summit, NATO and Karzai agree to the gradual withdrawal of NATO forces with a target date of 2014 for the removal of all foreign troops.	December 31	There are 88,000 U.S. troops remaining in Afghanistan.
December 31	By year’s end, there are 98,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan and more than 32,000 soldiers from other countries as part of the NATO-led coalition. The year 2010 was the deadliest year for non-Afghan coalition troops, with 711 killed.	2012	
		May	NATO endorses plan to withdraw ISAF combat troops by the end of 2014.
		July	A donor conference in Tokyo pledges \$16 billion in new aid for reconstruction and nation building in Afghanistan.
		September 2	Coalition forces suspend joint operations with Afghan security troops after a rising wave of “green on blue” attacks (incidents in which Afghan forces attacked U.S. or ISAF troops).
2011		December 31	Afghan security forces number 195,000.
January	Karzai makes the first state visit to Russia since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and then participates in the first bilateral summit between the two nations since the 1980s.	2013	
		April	Taliban leader Mullah Omar dies and is succeeded by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.
May 2	Osama bin Laden is killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, by U.S. Special Operations Forces.	June	Afghan forces assume primary responsibility for all security operations.
June 22	The United States announced that it will withdraw 10,000 troops by the end of 2011 and 23,000 troops the next year.	December 31	U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan falls to 38,000.
		2014	Poppy production is estimated to be worth \$3 billion annually. The

	Islamic State begins to recruit former Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan.	May	The Afghan government and the Taliban begin informal negotiations, but the insurgency group refuses to stop its military campaign.
June 14	In runoff balloting, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani wins the presidential election with 55.4 percent of the vote. Abdullah Abdullah receives 43.6 percent in voting that was widely criticized and resulted in a power-sharing agreement whereby Abdullah was appointed chief executive (prime minister).	October 14	U.S. president Obama announces that U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan will remain at 9,800.
		2016	Afghan National Army increases in size to approximately 200,000.
September	Islamic State militants fight a series of battles with Afghan security forces.	January	U.S. forces conduct a series of raids against suspected Islamic State fighters and bases in Afghanistan over a three-week period. The operations are followed the next month by an Afghan-led offensive against the Islamic State.
October	U.S. forces end formal combat operations, although they continue to engage in support missions and covert operations.		
December 31	U.S. forces are reduced to 9,800. NATO formally ends its combat mission in Afghanistan.	April 25	President Ghani announces that the government will end peace negotiations with the Taliban due to continued fighting.
2015	There are an estimated 1,000–2,000 Islamic State fighters in Afghanistan.	July 6	U.S. president Obama announces that approximately 8,400 U.S. forces will remain in Afghanistan through the remainder of his presidency, reversing an earlier pledge to reduce the number of troops to 5,500.
January 1	NATO forces in Afghanistan transition to training missions through Resolute Support Mission and are reduced from 12,000 to about 7,000 by year's end.		

A

Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics

The Afghan Army, which has its roots in the soldiers who fought under Ahmad Shah Durrani in the 1700s, has been historically characterized by a lack of professionalism and deficiencies in modern weaponry and training. The Afghan regular army was often small in comparison with various tribal militias whose loyalty was typically given to regional warlords.

The early Afghan Army consisted of tribal militias, with the monarch commanding a small royal guard. There was no formal training, and Emir Dost Mohammad, who ruled from 1826 to 1838 and 1842 to 1863, initiated a series of reforms to professionalize the military. He formed a standing army of 15,000 that was divided into two divisions and included elite infantry units armed with modern European muskets, along with 45–50 cannon. He hired some European and Indian advisers and even introduced uniforms during his second reign. During the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), the Afghans performed poorly when confronted in set battles, but proved highly adept at guerrilla warfare. They were able to wear down and ultimately destroy a retreating British column of 4,500 soldiers and 12,000 civilians. However, Afghan forces were unable to stop a subsequent series of advances by British forces.

Dost Mohammad's son and successor, Emir Sher Ali Khan, who ruled from 1863 to 1879, expanded his father's military reforms, continuing to acquire ever more modern

weaponry, although not in great numbers. During the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1879–1881), the Afghans did win some victories, most notably at Maiwand (July 22, 1880), but only when they had overwhelming numbers and suffered significant casualties. Otherwise, British forces won a series of overwhelming victories. At the time of the conflict, estimates were that the Afghan Army numbered 50,000, including militias, with more than 300 artillery pieces. The army was organized along the lines of the Indian colonial military in terms of ranks and formations. In addition, there was a conscription system that required one in every eight men between the ages of 20 and 40 to serve in the army on a rotating basis.

Following the war, the new Afghan leader, Abdur Rahman Khan, who generally maintained good relations with the British, spent considerable sums to modernize the army with new weapons. The army was divided into three main branches: infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The basic infantry unit consisted of 8 soldiers, with a company at 100 and a battalion at 600. Most battalions were understrength and usually were organized along clan or tribal lines. Uniforms typically reflected tribal differences and were the responsibility of the individual soldier or unit commander. Cavalry regiments were supposed to number 400 mounted troops (later raised to 600). Cavalry were typically expected to supply their own mounts. Abdur Rahman steadily increased the number of artillery pieces so that there were an estimated 850 by the 1890s, crewed by some 5,500 artillerymen. The artillery was divided into

six-gun field batteries. There were three infantry battalions and four cavalry regiments in the household guard. These troops were better trained, equipped, and uniformed. In 1904, the Royal Military College was established to train officers. Three years later, a group of former Turkish officers were appointed to various positions at the college. The Turks would continue to influence the Afghan military until the 1920s.

When the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) broke out, the Afghan Army consisted of 50,000, including 38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 4,000 artillerymen. There were 260 artillery pieces, including modern German-made 75 mm guns. There were only a small number of machine guns, mostly outdated, and the infantry were armed with older rifles, including the single-shot, breech-loading Martini-Henry, which had been replaced by the British Army in 1888. The army lacked armored vehicles, aircraft, and modern communications. These deficiencies again allowed the British to secure a series of military victories in the war, although the Afghans gained complete independence from the conflict.

After a decade of significant neglect, the Afghan Army underwent substantial modernization in the 1930s, following a series of armed revolts at the beginning of the decade. New specialized infantry, cavalry, and artillery schools were established and staffed by German and Turkish officers. Afghan officers were also enrolled at foreign military academies and sent abroad for additional training. More modern weapons were acquired, including aircraft for the fledgling Afghan Royal Air Force. By 1935, the Afghan state was spending almost half of its annual revenues on the military. The army grew to 80,000. After the outbreak of World War II, German advisers were replaced.

As the Cold War intensified in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Afghan leaders

approached the United States for military assistance. However, the United States was allied with Pakistan, a member of the U.S.-backed Baghdad Pact, and Pakistan and Afghanistan were in the midst of a long-running border dispute. Washington repeatedly denied Kabul's requests. Consequently, in 1955, Afghan prime minister Mohammed Daoud Khan approached the Soviet Union for military support. The result was a \$32.4 million military loan. The Afghans used the funding to purchase modern aircraft and tanks. In addition, Soviet military advisers were dispatched to Afghanistan, while Afghan officers went to the Soviet Union for training. Over the next two decades, Afghanistan became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for military aid and assistance. The number of Soviet military advisers grew from 1,500 to 5,000 in 1978. During this period, the Soviets supported efforts by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to infiltrate the military. The military backed Daoud in a 1973 coup that overthrew the monarchy. Daoud took power as president.

The military backed the PDPA during the 1978 Saur Revolution in which Daoud was overthrown and assassinated. Once in power, the PDPA faced a growing insurgency. As the government dispatched troops to fight, a number of soldiers defected. An estimated 50,000 Afghan troops deserted or joined the resistance in 1978 or 1979. The government responded by trying to integrate militia units into the army, but these forces proved unreliable. The Soviets intervened in December 1979 to prevent the fall of the PDPA government. Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin was killed by Soviet troops and replaced by Babrak Kamal.

The Afghan army performed poorly during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). Desertion remained high with approximately 10,000 troops per year leaving their posts.

The size of Afghan forces fluctuated between 40,000 and 60,000 during the occupation. The main strategy used by the Soviets and Afghan forces was to garrison the larger cities and towns and undertake periodic offensives to clear the countryside of the mujahideen. By the late 1980s, the Soviets increasingly sought to turn security operations over to the Afghan Army in order to facilitate a withdrawal of Soviet forces. When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, Afghan forces were able to maintain control of major cities, including Kabul until 1992. The Afghan Army had a large assortment of Soviet equipment, including more than 1,500 tanks, 800 armored vehicles, and more than 4,800 artillery pieces. The Soviets also provided Scud missile batteries. At the Battle of Jalalabad (March–May 1989), the Afghan Army demonstrated it was capable of defeating the mujahideen in a conventional battle. The government forces were secure in heavily fortified bunkers and defensive works and were able to fire more than 400 Scud missiles at the rebels. The army was not able, however, to regain control of the countryside, and the mujahideen slowly strangled the various garrisons. By 1992, the government controlled less than 10 percent of Afghanistan.

As the government collapsed, army units defected to different mujahideen groups. In 1992, Kabul was captured and the PDPA government fell. During the subsequent Afghan Civil War (1992–2001), the Taliban seized control of Kabul in 1996. Over the next five years, it slowly consolidated power and was able to acquire weapons from the former Afghan Army, including tanks, armored vehicles, and some aircraft.

On the eve of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, the Taliban military consisted of approximately 45,000–50,000 troops, 400 older tanks, and 200–300 armored cars,

along with a small number of combat jets and helicopters. The anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, supported by coalition special forces and airpower, defeated the Taliban. An interim government under President Hamid Karzai was established and then a new Afghan National Army (ANA) created in December 2002. The ANA was slowly increased with training and support by U.S. and coalition forces. Efforts were made to integrate former combatants into the new force. In 2003, the ANA undertook its first major combat operations, and by 2005, it numbered 20,000. The ANA also included a growing number of women soldiers. By 2014, the ANA had grown to approximately 200,000 troops. Their training, equipment, and pay (about \$240 per month) had improved substantially. In 2014, major combat operations were turned over to the ANA from the NATO-led coalition.

Yet the ANA was still unable to suppress the Taliban, which controlled large swaths of the country. Desertion remained a problem, as did Taliban infiltration and sympathizers. “Green-on-blue” violence (attacks by Afghan security forces on their fellow soldiers or police or coalition forces) increased substantially, accounting for 15 percent of all coalition deaths in 2012. This combination of factors led the NATO coalition to agree to maintain 13,000 troops in Afghanistan past 2014 in order to shore up the ANA.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Mujahideen; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of

Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan; United States, Relations with Afghanistan; World War I and Afghanistan, Turko-German Missions (1914–1918); World War II and Afghanistan (1939–1945).

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Afghan Civil War (1989–2001)

The Afghan Civil War destroyed Afghanistan's fragile infrastructure and left the country bitterly divided between the Taliban and anti-Taliban groups, led by the Northern Alliance. Following the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, a civil war erupted that had three distinct phases. The first period was from 1989 to 1992. During this era, the mujahideen groups fought to overthrow the pro-Soviet government of Mohammed Najibullah and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Mujahideen leaders and international observers expected the Najibullah regime to collapse quickly, but the Soviets had left the government considerable weaponry, including Scud

missiles, along with armor, aircraft, and artillery. The regime dug its forces in around key cities and concentrated on retaining its territory. The government won several key victories, including the Battle of Jalalabad (March–May 1989) when regime forces, supported by artillery, aircraft, and missiles, repelled a sustained mujahideen assault on the city.

The mujahideen were divided and some groups fought against each other as political leaders sought to create a united front. The main divisions existed on two levels. There were ethnic divisions between majority Pashtun mujahideen groups and those, such as the Northern Alliance, that were principally Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, and so forth. There were also cleavages between groups that sought a democratic Islamist state, even a constitutional monarchy, and those that supported a more strict Islamist theocracy. The mujahideen continued to receive support from the United States and Pakistan. Islamabad played an active role in trying to undermine the PDPA government, but also caused dissension within the mujahideen by supporting Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar's Pashtun Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*).

By 1991, government forces were increasingly plagued by desertions. Meanwhile, some mujahideen groups had won some significant victories, especially Ahmed Shah Massoud's mainly Tajik militia, as well as Jalaluddin Haqqani's forces, which captured Khost in 1991. Also in 1991, Russian president Boris Yeltsin cut military and economic aid to the Najibullah regime. Finally, Massoud was able to negotiate the defection of militia general Abdul Rashid Dostum, a key regime supporter, and his troops.

In early 1992, Russia made further cuts to aid, including the elimination of oil and gas transfers. Massoud secured a series of

victories, including the capture of Bagram air field, the main government air force base. Meanwhile, Dostum's troops had secured Kabul airport and other key facilities in the capital. On April 17, 1992, Najibullah fled to the UN compound and the PDPA government collapsed. Most of the major rebel groups agreed through the Peshawar Accords, signed on April 24, to establish an interim government with power divided among the main rebel groups. Burhanuddin Rabbani was appointed interim president. Hekmatyar was offered the post of prime minister, but refused to sign the accords and instead endeavored to capture Kabul, launching the second round of the civil war.

From 1992 to 1996, Hekmatyar's forces continued a bombardment and semi-siege of the capital. Fighting also broke out in other urban areas. Hekmatyar continued to enjoy the support of Pakistan, which supplied weapons and funding. In 1994, Dostum switched sides and joined Hekmatyar against the power-sharing government. Meanwhile, the Iranian-backed militias also began to fight the Rabbani government. Repeated efforts to negotiate a settlement, brokered by outside countries including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, failed to end the fighting. Kabul was decimated. Its population was estimated to have fallen from 2 million to 500,000. Throughout the country roads, schools, power plants, and other infrastructure were destroyed. Nonetheless, Massoud's forces began to force the insurgents from Kabul, while other government coalition troops won victories in the countryside.

Frustrated by the inability of Hekmatyar's forces to defeat the interim government, Pakistan began to support a new Islamist grouping, the Taliban, in 1994. Fighting between the Taliban and other forces became increasingly bitter with atrocities committed by both sides. After Pakistan withdrew backing for his faction, Hekmatyar signed a

peace accord with the Rabbani government. However, Pakistan steadily bolstered military support for the Taliban. The hardline Islamist organization was responsible for atrocities against minority groups such as the Hazaras. In 1996, the Taliban were able to seize Kabul and then increase their control over the country.

The final phase of the Afghan Civil War commenced after the Taliban entered Kabul. By 1997, the Taliban controlled about two-thirds of the country and had become allied with the al Qaeda terrorist organization, led by Osama bin Laden. The Taliban were recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Meanwhile, the anti-Taliban forces became united as the Northern Alliance, led by Massoud. In 1998, the United States launched cruise missile attacks on al Qaeda facilities following the organization's terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The following year, the UN enacted sanctions on the Taliban for their failure to turn over bin Laden to the United States for trial.

By 2001, the Taliban had established control over 90 percent of Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance only held the northeast corner of the country. On September 9, 2001, two al Qaeda suicide bombers, posing as journalists, assassinated Massoud. Two days later, al Qaeda launched the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. In response, the United States and its allies deployed Special Forces troops and used airpower to support the Northern Alliance in an offensive against the Taliban. By December, the Northern Alliance had retaken Kabul, ending the long-running civil war. However, the Taliban launched an insurgency from bases in Pakistan.

During the 12-year civil war, more than 400,000 were killed. The conflict also produced more than 4 million internal and



Taliban tanks enter Kabul on September 27, 1996, as the insurgent group captures the Afghan capital. (AP Photo/B. K. Bangash)

external refugees, and caused enormous damage throughout the country.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Al Qaeda; Haqqani, Jalaluddin; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*); Jalalabad, Battle of (1989); Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Najibullah, Mohammed; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Peshawar Accords (1992); Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban.

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Afghan War (2001–)

The Afghan War began in 2001 with the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorist attacks. Those strikes prompted the United States and its allies to back the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance and deploy military troops, aircraft, and other assets to Afghanistan. Despite the international dimension of the conflict, the Afghan War was a continuation of the Afghan Civil War, which began in 1989 (itself an extension of the strife from the Soviet occupation of 1979–1989).

At the beginning of September 2001, the Taliban ruled approximately 80–90 percent of Afghanistan, with the remainder under the control of various opposition groups, the largest being the Northern Alliance. While the Taliban was predominately Pashtun, the Northern Alliance was dominated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks. It had been formed as a coalition of anti-Taliban groups. Its leader, a legendary mujahideen commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud, was assassinated by al Qaeda on September 9, 2001.

Meanwhile, in the 1990s, Osama bin Laden established al Qaeda terrorist bases in Afghanistan with the permission of the Taliban. The al Qaeda leader developed a close working relationship with senior Taliban figures. In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom to overthrow the Taliban, destroy al Qaeda, and kill or capture bin Laden. The United States adopted an unconventional strategy for Operation Enduring Freedom. Instead of launching a large-scale conventional invasion, U.S. military planners decided to rely on the Northern Alliance for the bulk of the ground combat, supported by special operations forces and air and missile strikes. The U.S.-led coalition

also included assets from traditional allies such as the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. It was hoped that the use of the Northern Alliance would prevent the need for a large occupying force once the Taliban had been defeated.

On the eve of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban had approximately 45,000 troops and a hodgepodge of armor and artillery, most of which was left over from the Soviet occupation and Afghan Civil War. Senior U.S. defense officials in the administration of President George W. Bush were confident that coalition airpower could quickly destroy the small Taliban air force and the regime's anti-aircraft capabilities. The coalition air war began on October 7. Once the coalition established air superiority, special operations forces working with the Northern Alliance directed airstrikes against the Taliban and al Qaeda, negating the advantage the regime had in armored vehicles and artillery. In all, just over 3,000 coalition forces were deployed in Afghanistan; the overwhelming majority were U.S. Special Operations Forces (the second largest coalition contributor was the United Kingdom). The Northern Alliance forces under the command of General Abdul Rashid Dostum captured Mazar-e-Sharif on November 10. Kabul fell on November 13, while the last major Taliban and al Qaeda stronghold, Kandahar, was captured on December 7. Under the terms of the Bonn Agreement, finalized on December 5, Hamid Karzai became the interim president of Afghanistan.

Bin Laden was believed to be hiding at a mountain compound near Tora Bora. The U.S. coalition launched an offensive to capture the al Qaeda leader in December 2001, but bin Laden and his senior lieutenants were able to escape across the border into Pakistan, as were the senior Taliban figures. Tora Bora marked the end of the first phase of the Afghan War.



Anti-Taliban militia fighting al Qaeda during the Battle of Tora Bora on December 14, 2001. (AP Photo/David Guttenfelder)

In March 2002, the coalition launched Operation Anaconda in the Shah-i-kot Valley in Paktia Province in eastern Afghanistan. The offensive was in response to Taliban efforts to infiltrate the region and launch attacks on coalition and government targets. The insurgents were forced to withdraw from the region with heavy casualties. The coalition lost 15 killed and 82 wounded, while Taliban and al Qaeda losses were estimated to be 300–400. However, the coalition was unable to isolate and destroy all of the militants, and 400–500 were able to cross back into Pakistan. Anaconda initiated the second phase of the war. U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan (boots on the ground, not including support forces in neighboring countries) grew from 4,100 in January 2002 to 13,500 in January 2004 and then steadily rose to 27,000 by January 2008.

The dynamics of Anaconda were replicated annually over the next decade. Taliban fighters would sneak into Afghanistan to launch offensives in the spring and summer. Coalition forces would attempt to forestall the insurgent attacks with preemptive offensives. The Taliban found support among the Pashtun tribes in the border regions and were able to establish networks to move fighters and material back and forth from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Meanwhile, opposition to the coalition spread beyond the Taliban and al Qaeda. Warlords such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani joined the anti-coalition insurgency, motivated by tribal and clan animosities or opposition to Karzai's pro-Western strategies or coalition efforts to suppress the growing production of opium.

During the Afghan War, the coalition endeavored to accomplish two interrelated

military goals. The first was to provide security and stability for economic and political development. Central to this objective was suppressing the Taliban and other militants. This task was complicated by the Pakistani safe havens of the insurgents and a lack of military resources. In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq. The Iraq War diverted troops, military equipment, and reconstruction aid from Afghanistan. The Bush administration endeavored to compensate for the relatively small number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan by crafting an international coalition and having the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). However, many nations contributing troops placed restrictions on their operations, including combat missions. In 2006, NATO took command of military operations in Afghanistan.

The second major goal of the coalition was to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) to take over security operations, thereby allowing a withdrawal of international forces. However, efforts to recruit and train the ANA had only moderate success. The force was beset by ethnic differences and corruption. Meanwhile, corruption within the Afghan government alienated average Afghans and increased backing for the insurgency, support that was further bolstered by anger toward the coalition over civilian deaths from airstrikes. The militants began to use suicide attacks, which had been virtually unknown in Afghanistan.

During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, Barack Obama pledged to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and refocus on Afghanistan. By his election in November 2008, a resurgent Taliban had gained inroads into previously secure areas of Afghanistan. In 2009, Obama approved a troop surge of 33,000 to defeat the Taliban and other insur-

gents. While the surge suppressed the Taliban in some areas, the insurgency continued to undermine development efforts and attempts to foster political stability. Within the coalition, a rise in attacks by Afghan security forces on coalition personnel was a manifestation of the rising discontent with the overall focus of coalition operations.

On May 2, 2011, U.S. Special Operations Forces killed bin Laden in a raid on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The coalition initiated negotiations with the Taliban on ending the conflict, but little progress was made. Concurrently, Obama ordered the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces by 2014. Other international members of the coalition followed suit. Efforts to negotiate a continued role for international forces, as trainers or advisers, were unsuccessful until the election of Karzai's successor, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, who finalized an agreement with the United States. Operation Enduring Freedom formally ended on December 31, 2014.

Approximately 13,000 NATO troops (including 9,000 U.S. service members) remained in Afghanistan after 2014. The ANA assumed the lead in combat operations; coalition special operations forces continued to undertake missions against the insurgents. In an effort to suppress the Taliban and other radicals in Pakistan, the Pakistani security forces launched a major offensive in North Waziristan during the summer of 2014. The campaign led a large number of militants to flee into Afghanistan at the time that the ANA took on a larger role. The Afghan government forces were ill-prepared to contain the Taliban, which substantially increased the size of areas under its control, effectively ruling about 10 percent of the country by the end of 2015. The ANA and government security forces were also confronted by a small but growing number of Islamic State fighters (although the Taliban and Islamic State

fought each other, as well as the government). By 2016, there were estimated to be 50,000–60,000 insurgents in Afghanistan.

From 2001 to 2015, the international coalition lost 3,512 killed. Afghan government forces, including the Northern Alliance, police, and the ANA, were estimated to have had approximately 14,000–16,000 killed. Civilian casualties were between 32,000 and 50,000, depending on the source. Taliban losses were between 20,000 and 35,000.

Tom Lansford

See also: Bonn Agreement (2001); Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Narcoterrorism; Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Opium Poppy Production; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban; Warlords.

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Afghanistan, Border Disputes

Afghanistan is roughly the size of the U.S. state of Texas. Afghanistan shares its borders with six other countries: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan border on the north. To the east, there is a short 47-mile-long (76-kilometer) border with China. The longest land border is shared with Pakistan to the

east and south. Iran borders Afghanistan on its western side.

The Durand Line is the name given to the border between Britain's Indian colony (now Pakistan) and Afghanistan, which spans 1,510 miles (2,430 kilometers). Throughout the 1800s, Afghanistan feared Russian encroachment. The British occupying India were likewise concerned about Russian attempts to expand into Britain's Indian colony and Afghanistan. There were two wars as a result, the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) and the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). By the late 1800s, the British sought to establish a well-defined border and strengthen relations with Afghanistan and Emir Abdur Rahman Khan, ruler of Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901.

In 1893 Sir Henry Mortimer Durand was serving as the British foreign secretary of Britain's Indian colony. Late in the year, Sir Henry led a delegation to Afghanistan and concluded an agreement with Emir Khan. The agreement established an official boundary between what is now Pakistan and Afghanistan.

At the time the negotiation was considered a great success. However, the border created a geographic division between Pash-tun (or Pathan) peoples living in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The boundary divided the Wazir region (Waziristan) and separated tribes, clans, and families. These divisions explain modern-day tactical challenges in combating extremist forces in the area. The Durand Line is porous in general and even nonexistent in several areas. Modern-day satellite images reveal that the Durand Line splits villages and cuts through buildings. The boundary goes through extremely rugged terrain and is largely inaccessible. However, it is easy for anyone to cross the accessible sections unimpeded.

The Durand Line triggered a political campaign to reunite the Pashtuns on either

side of the border and contributed to the radicalization of Pashtun Islam. In 1897, a group of Pashtuns led a rebellion along the northwest frontier. The British solution to tribal rebellion was to grant semiautonomy in a buffer zone called the Tribal Agencies. The Tribal Agencies spanned from the Durand Line to occupied areas of the British Empire in India (known today as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA]). The FATA provide safe havens to Afghan insurgents and the Pakistan Taliban.

In the decades following the independence of Pakistan in 1947 the governments disagreed about Pashtun unification, and relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were hostile. In the bipolar climate of the Cold War, Afghanistan became increasingly vulnerable to Soviet influence. In dividing Pashtun tribes and clans, the Durand Line has directly contributed to conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

Militants and insurgents continue to live along portions of the border. Today, members of the Taliban and the other extremist insurgent elements that operate on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are almost exclusively Pashtuns. There are only a small number of non-Pashtun groups. Similarly, the FATA are made up mostly of Pashtuns. Pakistan's federal government administers the FATA. The Pashtun challenge to the border continues to the present day.

The border disputes between Afghanistan and its other neighbors are much more limited in scale. The short border between China and Afghanistan is known as the Wakhan Corridor, and the two countries settled border disputes in 1963. Between Iran and Afghanistan, there is a border dispute involving use of the Helmand River (also spelled Hirmand) and the delta. While both states accept the international boundary,

there continues to be disagreement about how to resolve riparian (the interface between land and a river or stream) rights.

Since the independence of former Soviet states, the conflict in Afghanistan has created serious problems for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The border dispute is less about demarcation and more about confronting the side effects of conflict in Afghanistan. These side effects include drug smuggling and trafficking, refugees, and insurgency. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan continue to be concerned about potential future security threats and continued narcotics smuggling.

Much of the border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan runs along the Amu Darya and Panj Rivers. The first bridge crossing the Tajik-Afghan border opened in 2002. As of 2013, there were six bridges linking Tajikistan with Afghanistan. There is only one bridge connecting Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Completed in 1982, the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Friendship Bridge (also called the Freedom Bridge) closed in 1997 when Taliban forces took control of the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, the capital of Balkh Province. While the bridge reopened in late 2001, the Uzbek government has closed it periodically since then.

Of the three countries to the north of Afghanistan, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan has affected Tajikistan the most. During the Soviet era the border was not easy to penetrate. After independence, Tajikistan has had difficulty securing its southern border. Russian forces stationed in the country during the civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997) were reassigned to protect the border with Afghanistan. Cross-border narcotics smuggling has been particularly burdensome for Tajikistan. Russian, and increasingly Tajik, border guards play an important role in policing the border.

Melodee M. Baines

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Afghan-Pakistani Border Raids (2002–); Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission; Durand Line; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Afghanistan, Climate and Geography

The term “climate” refers to decades-long patterns of weather conditions based on average as well as minimum/maximum ranges of temperature, precipitation, atmospheric pressure, and other variables. In contrast, “weather” refers to daily variations in such variables. The interaction of several climate variables contributes to climatic variations in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world.

These include latitude and seasonality, altitude, maritime influence and continentality, semipermanent pressure systems, prevailing winds, ocean currents, storms, and topography. Latitude and altitude apply to regions everywhere, but other variables impact some regions more than others. For example, ocean currents are relatively insignificant for Afghanistan, which is landlocked, whereas topography plays an important role.

Afghanistan’s latitude extends from 29° to 38° north, about the same as from southern New Mexico to northern Utah. Thus, it receives substantial solar radiation, but temperature and precipitation vary significantly between summer and winter. This is a latitude range prone to desert formation because of the Hadley Cell. That is, warm moist air rises at the equator to produce convectational precipitation. The drier air then descends at about 30° north and south to produce a series of deserts in both hemispheres, including the Rigestan Desert in southwestern Afghanistan.

As altitude increases, temperatures over land generally decrease at the rate of 3.3° Fahrenheit per 1,000 feet of elevation. Thus, the Rigestan Desert, with an average elevation of 3,000 feet, is about 10° cooler than deserts at the same latitude (but lower altitude), such as in Iraq and Jordan. Nevertheless, temperatures in the region can surpass 110° Fahrenheit in the summers. Elevations in the Hindu Kush mountain range vary substantially across short horizontal distances. Abrupt changes in altitude produce equally abrupt changes in climate zones. Climatologists include these mountains in the category of “Undifferentiated Highlands” due to their mosaic of climate zones.

Afghanistan’s remoteness from oceans and large water bodies, which could otherwise moderate daily and annual temperature changes, makes continentality more important than the maritime influence. Thus, daily

and annual temperature ranges show greater fluctuation than in coastal countries such as Israel. For instance, some British and Indian troops perished from heat exhaustion during the 1839 invasion of Afghanistan, while extreme cold killed many more during their disastrous 1842 retreat.

Semipermanent pressure systems, prevailing winds, and storms are related variables that play an important role in Afghanistan. Continentality contributes to substantial heating of the Asian landmass during summer. Whereas neighboring Pakistan receives substantial rain during the summer monsoon season, Afghanistan experiences dry conditions, as northerly winds and mountains usually keep this precipitation at bay. In the winter, however, the Siberian high causes westerly winds carrying storms from the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea to veer into Afghanistan, producing substantial rain and snow throughout the Hindu Kush and its highland margins.

Topography is very important for Afghan climate zones. Moisture-laden air may blow across the northern plains without producing precipitation. When that same air rises to cross a mountain, however, rapid cooling and condensation produce orographic (mountain-induced) precipitation on the windward side. As the air mass moves down the leeward slope, however, evaporation replaces condensation in an air mass that has less water vapor. If wind direction remains relatively constant, the leeward side will experience a rain shadow of drier conditions than the windward side.

The Hindu Kush occupies a wide swath from the Tajik and Chinese borders into central Afghanistan. In the winter, deep snow often closes the high mountain passes for extended periods, and prolonged cold frequently brings military operations to a virtual halt. Summer melting, however, provides the

runoff to sustain agriculture throughout numerous valleys while allowing military operations to increase in tempo.

The foothills of the Hindu Kush form two parallel U-shaped transition zones on its margins, extending from the Tajik border toward Herat in the west before looping back toward Pakistan. The inner belt exhibits characteristics of a Mediterranean climate based on average temperatures and a pattern of wet winters and dry summers. The outer belt features semiarid steppes that serve as a transition zone to the Rigestan Desert in the southwest and the edge of the Kara Kum Desert near Turkmenistan. Much of Afghanistan's production of opium poppies occurs in these steppe regions. Most of this outer belt can be classified as semiarid/hot with one exception. In the valleys between the Hindu Kush and the mountains of neighboring Waziristan, the steppes near Kabul are at higher elevations, qualifying them as semiarid/cold, like those of Kazakhstan.

Although Afghanistan is often considered a desert country, its climate is far more complicated and varied, making classification extremely difficult. Indigenous and foreign military forces alike have found that they must prepare for a wide variety of weather patterns when operating there.

Chuck Fahrer

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission; Durand Line; Helmand Valley; Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups

Afghanistan is a multiethnic state whose modern borders are the result of colonialism and whose politics are defined by interethnic rivalry. All of the major groups in Afghanistan have significant cross-border ties with their ethnic counterparts in neighboring states. Afghan geography has contributed to ethnic cleavages, with mountains, rivers, and other natural features isolating groups from the broader society. Meanwhile, past tribal conflicts continue to influence current ethnic relations. The result is that the country remains divided along ethnic, cultural, and linguistic lines.

Since the formation of the Afghan state in 1747, the dominant ethnic group has been the Pashtuns. They are the largest single group and all Afghan monarchs were Pashtuns. However, the colonial era split the Pashtun nation, a division that remained when Pakistan became an independent nation in 1947. Pashtuns currently comprise approximately 40–45 percent of the Afghan population and live in an arc that extends from along the eastern border with Pakistan through the southern region of the country and then along the western border with

Iran. However, a disproportionate share of refugees created by the conflicts since the 1970s have been Pashtuns, and the population has shifted considerably since the Soviet invasion in 1979. Pashtuns had comprised approximately 50 percent of the population.

Most Pashtuns speak Pashtu, but Dari is also common. The majority of Pashtuns are Sunni Muslims, although there are significant Shiite and Sufi minorities. Modern Afghan history has been marked by the Pashtunization of the state as the Pashtuns have endeavored to consolidate their power and impose their language, customs, and religion on the other tribes. For instance, Abdur Rahman Khan (ca. 1840–1901), Afghan king from 1880 to 1901, initiated a resettlement effort to move Pashtuns into the interior and northern regions of the country. Successive Pashtun monarchs expanded their power by encouraging intertribal conflict among some groups. Some minorities, such as the Tajiks, received a significant share of administrative or government posts, thereby tying them to the regime, while other groups, such as the Hazaras, faced widespread repression.

The Pashtuns are not a united group, but are divided into seven major tribes: Durrani, Ghilzai, Jali, Mamund, Mangal, Mohamand, and Safi. The two dominant Pashtun tribes are the Durrani and Ghilzai. While the Ghilzai are the larger group, the Durrani have been the political elite. A Durrani, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1722–1772), founded the Afghan monarchy in 1747, and the nation's royal family comes from the Mohamedzai subclan of the Barakzai clan of the Durrani. Afghan president Hamid Karzai (1957–) is a member of the Popalzai subclan of the Durrani. Relations between the Durrani and neighboring Pakistan have been tense since 1947, as successive Afghan governments



have rejected the inclusion of Pashtun areas as part of that nation.

The Ghilzai emerged as the main rivals to the Durranis. For instance, Nur Mohammad Taraki (1917–1979), a Ghilzai, was one of the leaders of the communist revolution in 1978 that led to the Soviet invasion. During the Soviet occupation, Pakistani intelligence units developed close ties with Ghilzai-led mujahideen groups and worked to undermine the power and influence of Durranis. The Ghilzai also dominated the leadership of the Taliban. Taliban founder and leader Mullah Mohammed Omar (1966–2013) was a member of the Totak subclan of the Ghilzai. Following the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan faced widespread reprisals from other groups, prompting a new wave of internal and external refugees.

Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, making up about 30–35 percent of the population. They are descendants of the Persian peoples of Central Asia and are concentrated in the northeastern areas of the country. Tajiks are often different from other groups in physical appearance. They are taller, with lighter skin, and blond or red hair is not uncommon. The Tajiks were agrarian, unlike the more nomadic Pashtuns, and established towns along the main trade routes through the region. One result was that tribal or clan authority declined. Tajiks speak primarily Persian or Farsi and are known as “Farsiwans.” They were of the Zoroastrian religion, but were converted to Islam. The majority of Tajiks are Sunni, but tend to be more moderate than Pashtuns.

Afghan history was marked by conflict between the Tajiks and majority Pashtuns. Tajiks did control Afghanistan briefly in the 1400s and for a nine-month period in 1929. After the formation of the Afghan state, Tajiks were increasingly co-opted by the

Pashtun monarchy into government service. Nonetheless, tensions between the two groups remained and were exacerbated during the Soviet occupation. Several Tajiks, including Ahmed Shah Massoud (1953–2001) and Burhanuddin Rabbani (1940–2011), emerged as major military or political leaders within the mujahideen (both Massoud and Rabbani were later assassinated). However, ethnic tensions led to minor clashes between resistance groups. After the Soviet withdrawal, Rabbani became president of Afghanistan (1992–1996), but was overthrown by the Taliban. Tajiks formed the core of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, which allied itself with U.S. forces following the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.

The Hazaras comprise about 10 percent of the population and are descended from Mongols and Persians who settled in Afghanistan in the 13th century. They enjoyed a high degree of autonomy throughout most of Afghan history, but were subdued by Abdur Rahman Khan in the 1890s. The Hazaras speak Dari and were traditionally farmers and herders. They were originally concentrated in the southeastern area of Afghanistan, however. Forced relocation through the centuries resulted in most of the Hazaras being concentrated in nine enclaves in the mountainous region known as Hazarajat in Central Afghanistan. Through the 20th century economic deprivation and Pashtunization led an increasing number of Hazaras to migrate to towns and cities, so that the group now comprises about 20 percent of the population of Kabul. Unlike the majority of Afghans, the Hazaras are predominately Shiite Muslims, a trait that has led to discrimination and suppression. Successive regimes in Kabul encouraged repression of the Hazaras by other groups and prompted an unsuccessful rebellion in the 1950s. During the Soviet

occupation, Hazara leaders were able to gain limited autonomy from Kabul in exchange for a pledge not to support the mujahideen. This and growing ties between the Hazaras and Iran led to renewed attacks and repression during the 1990s. Iran backed the Tajik-led Northern Alliance during the Afghan Civil War of the 1990s, prompting a wave of reciprocal atrocities once the Taliban gained power and an organized program to ethnically cleanse the Hazaras.

Other minority groups are concentrated in the northern areas of the country, including descendants of the Turkish peoples, such as the Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Kirghiz. These groups generally speak non-Indo-European Altaic languages and are moderate Sunnis. The Uzbeks are the largest of these populations and comprise about 8 percent of Afghans. Many Uzbeks fled into Afghanistan to escape Soviet repression in the 1920s and 1930s. Consequently, the Uzbeks did not have the lengthy history of ethnic conflict that characterizes relations between other groups. However, Uzbeks have consistently allied themselves with the Tajiks and were critically important to the Northern Alliance. Following a series of terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan in the late 1990s, the Uzbek government began supplying weapons and resources to the Northern Alliance, exacerbating ethnic tensions between Afghan Uzbeks and the Taliban.

The nomadic Turkmen typically speak an archaic form of Turkish and are overwhelmingly Sunni. Turkmen are scattered across northern and central Afghanistan, but all belong to 1 of 12 distinct clans. The Kirghiz were mainly found in the valleys of the Pamir Mountains of northeastern Afghanistan. However, during the Soviet occupation, fighting in the region displaced large numbers of Kirghiz who subsequently settled throughout northern Afghanistan. Both

the Turkmen and the Kirghiz were historically allied with the Tajiks. These groups worked together to fight against the Soviets, and later the Taliban, and formed the core of the pro-U.S. indigenous militias after 2001.

Ethnic and interethnic divisions continue to dominate Afghan politics. In the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban the Karzai regime has struggled to maintain a government that is inclusive of all the major groups, but in doing so has faced resistance from Pashtuns for giving government posts to Tajiks, Uzbeks, or other minorities. For instance, Tajik Mohammad Qasim Fahim was appointed first vice president of Afghanistan in 2002 and elected to the post in 2004. In addition, Karim Khalili, a Hazara, became second vice president in 2002 (he was also elected in 2004). Pashtun leaders have complained that Tajiks dominated the security services under the Karzai regime. Meanwhile, non-Pashtun officials have been targeted by the Taliban, which continues to recruit the majority of its members from Pashtun groups. The Taliban has also continued targeting Hazaras and other minority groups in Afghanistan. The Karzai government remained dependent on support from the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other groups that formed the core of the Northern Alliance.

Tom Lansford

See also: Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Hazara Uprisings (1888–1901); Hazaras; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Karzai, Hamid; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Pashtunwali (Pukhtunwali); Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Taliban; Taliban Insurgency; Taraki, Nur Muhammad.

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Afghanistan, Nationalism

Afghanistan has historically been divided by ethnic, tribal, and religious differences. Consequently, it has not developed a national identity or a concurrent sense of nationalism or patriotism. However, when confronted by an external foe, Afghans have displayed an extraordinary capability to unite against a perceived common enemy, earning the country the title "graveyard of empires."

Afghan nationalism was slow to develop for a number of reasons. The area that became the modern nation of Afghanistan was repeat-

edly invaded from the east and the west. It lay along valuable trade routes through southwest Asia. The result was a territory divided among a variety of ethnic and tribal groups. Pashtuns comprise the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan, but there are significant populations of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Hazaras. Although the Pashtuns have dominated Afghan politics and society, they are also deeply separated by family and clan rivalries. The rural nature of the nation has also retarded a sense of identity or nationalism. The overwhelming majority of the population remain rural and often live in fairly isolated communities. The rugged, mountainous terrain reinforced the tribal divisions and provided fighters with safe havens to retreat to when confronted by superior forces.

Despite these divisions, Afghans have traditionally come together to combat foreign invaders. This is partially a result of the Pashtun code (Pashtunwali), which demands retribution for injury or losses to one's family or clan. Pashtunwali also emphasizes honor and courage. Concurrently in Pashtun culture is the notion of the outsider or foreigner, the *Feringhee*. *Feringhee* means more than just foreigner. It also means unbeliever, adding a religious component to the general antipathy toward outsiders.

During the succession of wars in the 19th and 20th centuries, first the British, then the Russians sought to use the internal divisions in Afghanistan to reduce resistance and to install client regimes. The Anglo-Russian rivalry of the 19th century prompted the first significant nationalist movement in Afghanistan. In the early 20th century, intellectuals such as Mahmud Tarzi were educated or influenced by the growing nationalist movement within the Ottoman Empire. A group of liberal reformers known as the Constitutionalists launched a failed plan in 1909 to replace the monarchy with a constitutional monarchy. A new, more

nationalistic movement, the Young Afghans, emerged. The Young Afghans sought complete independence from Great Britain and reforms to modernize Afghanistan. Tarzi and other liberal leaders played a prominent role in the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) and the country's subsequent independence. However, the movement was suppressed when Amanullah Khan was deposed in 1929.

Thereafter, Afghan nationalism remained an idea principally of the elites in Kabul. During the Soviet occupation, nationalism did not draw the mujahideen together. Rather, it was the more traditional resistance to the Feringhee, a sentiment that was rekindled during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Great Game, The; Khan, Amanullah; Mujahideen; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban; Tarzi, Mahmud; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan

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Afghan-Pakistani Border Raids (2002–)

Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan deteriorated substantially after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 as insurgents used bases in each country to launch attacks into the other. The 1893 Durand Line, which formed the border between Afghanistan

and Pakistan, also divided the Pashtun population, which comprised the largest Afghan ethnic group and was the second largest ethnicity in Pakistan. After Pakistani independence in 1947, there were periodic skirmishes between the two states, but the intensity of the conflicts increased dramatically in the 2000s.

The border has always been fairly porous and Pashtuns have regularly crossed back and forth. After the U.S.-led coalition displaced the Taliban in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, Taliban loyalists and other insurgents escaped into Pakistan and established a series of bases from which to launch attacks into Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Pakistani Taliban emerged as a significant threat to domestic stability in Pakistan, and the group was able to establish de facto control over remote areas in the country. In addition, Taliban areas in Afghanistan served as bases for attacks into Pakistan.

Troops from both nations were accused of crossing the border in pursuit of fleeing insurgents or, more commonly, firing artillery or rockets across the border. The use of aerial drones for attacks on suspected Taliban facilities in Pakistan by the U.S.-led coalition further escalated tensions. In addition, soldiers on both sides of the border often find it difficult to identify the source of rocket or mortar attacks. Both nations have asserted that the other has fired on police or military facilities following attacks by insurgents.

In May 2007, Pakistan charged that Afghan forces had attacked military bases in Pakistan, prompting artillery retaliation in fighting that killed 8 Pakistanis and 32 Afghans. Afghan officials charged that the Pakistanis had attempted to establish military posts on Afghan territory. Negotiations prevented further escalation until 2011. Following a series of minor skirmishes, in July of that year, Pakistani troops fired some 450 rockets at suspected Taliban bases in Afghanistan. The strikes

killed more than 30 Afghan civilians and injured more than 50. Afghan forces responded with an artillery barrage, but sporadic fighting continued. On November 26, NATO air units conducted strikes on Pakistani military positions, killing 24. NATO officials claimed that Pakistani forces fired on them, while Pakistan asserted that NATO soldiers fired first. The incident led Pakistan to close NATO supply lines into Afghanistan until the United States apologized for the attack. In the next year, a raid by Pakistani special forces went at least three miles deep into Afghan territory.

One consequence was increased military ties between Afghanistan and India, including a June 2011 agreement to bolster cooperation between the air forces of the two countries. The tension also reduced cooperation in suppressing the Taliban.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Drone Strikes; Durand Line; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Iraq War (2003–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Taliban; Taliban Insurgency.

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Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars) (1748–1837)

The Afghan-Sikh Wars were a series of conflicts between 1748 and 1837 between the

Afghan kingdom and the Sikh Empire. Ahmad Shah Durrani became ruler of Afghanistan in 1747. Until his death in 1772, the “father of Afghanistan” engaged in a series of campaigns to both unite the fractured Afghans and to expand Afghan territory. While most of his efforts were initially focused on fighting rival Afghan tribes, he invaded the Indian province of Punjab in 1747. Ahmad Shah was a brilliant military leader and was able to defeat the Mughals and the Marathas in successive campaigns. These invasions provided wealth and new territory for his followers. They also created a power vacuum in Punjab that was exploited by the rise of the Sikhs.

In 1748, Ahmad Shah and his forces crossed the Indus River and sacked and absorbed Lahore, in present-day Pakistan. Ahmad Shah left a governor in charge and continued eastward. The Afghans gained substantial territories to the east in India and turned westward to Iran. With Ahmad Shah’s absence from Lahore, the Sikhs moved in and occupied the city. The Afghans retook the city on April 12, 1752.

In April 1757, Ahmad Shah raided northern India for the fourth time. Before Ahmad Shah could return to Delhi, India, a Sikh raiding party freed several of Ahmad Shah’s prisoners held there and absconded with the Afghan ruler’s treasury. The Sikhs and the Afghans later clashed on November 11, 1757, in the Battle of Amritsar (also known as the Battle of Gohalwar). The Sikhs defeated the outnumbered Afghan Army, under the command of Timur Shah Durrani, the son of Ahmad Shah, and forced them to retreat.

Ahmad Shah installed General Jahan Khan as governor of the Punjab along with a force of ten thousand men. By February 1758, the Sikhs were in open revolt and had defeated the governor. Despite ongoing hostilities, the

Sikhs remained neutral during the Third Battle of Panipat on January 7, 1761, between the Afghans and the Marathas. The Afghan victory at Panipat was the high point of Afghan power during Ahmad Shah's reign.

After the Third Battle of Panipat, the Sikhs, whose power had been increasing, frequently clashed with the Afghans for control of the Punjab. Ahmad Shah once again left the Punjab with a weak detachment in place. During his absence in 1762, Sikh leaders met in Amritsar and resolved to destroy Durrani strongholds in the Punjab.

The Afghan stronghold nearest to Amritsar was Jandiala (Jundeala). Somehow the leader learned of the Sikhs' plans and alerted Ahmad Shah, who was en route back to India. The Afghans reached the Indus by November 1762 and made a long and rapid march to surprise the Sikhs as they fought Pashtuns in Jandiala.

The Sikhs learned of Ahmad Shah's approach a few hours before his arrival and scattered. Ahmad Shah's forces pursued and consequently overtook the Sikhs near the city of Malerkotla, where nearly 30,000 Sikh men, women, and children were encamped. Ahmad Shah's forces killed several thousand Sikhs, and the surviving Sikhs fled toward Barnala. As many as 10,000 Sikhs were killed in what is known as Wadda Ghalughara (the second Sikh holocaust).

Ahmad Shah returned to Lahore in March 1763. He ordered his troops to destroy the Sikh shrine Harimandir Sahib (Golden Temple). The shrine, in the Punjab city of Amritsar, was and is the geographical focal point of the Sikh religion. The battle at the Golden Temple marked the climax in hostilities between Sikhs and Afghans.

After Ahmad Shah returned to Kabul in late 1763, a Sikh force marched from Amritsar to Kasoor. They sacked the city, amassed more troops, and marched to Sirhind, where

they battled Afghan troops in December 1763. By January 1764, Ahmad Shah returned for the seventh invasion of India. The Sikhs defeated the Afghans at the Battle of Sirhind and went on to capture Lahore. From 1764, the Sikhs became the ruling power in the Punjab. After Ahmad Shah's death in 1772, his son Timur took over and made no attempt to recover Lahore or the Punjab. Instead, the initiative passed to the Sikhs who launched a series of campaigns against the remaining Afghan territories in India.

Born in 1780, Maharaja Ranjit Singh became ruler of the Sikhs in 1801. He initially concentrated on consolidating his power, but in 1807, he captured Kasur from the Afghans. There followed a series of campaigns against the Afghans. In 1812, a large Afghan force left Kabul to subdue the renegade province of Kashmir. The Afghans had to traverse Sikh territory and proposed a joint invasion of Kashmir with plunder to be divided between the armies. However, both sides soon accused each other of treachery. Ranjit Singh's forces took control of the strategic fortress of Attock. The Afghans besieged Attock. On July 13, 1813, a Sikh army attacked the Afghans in the Battle of Attock. The Afghans were defeated and forced to retreat. Meanwhile, the Persians attacked Herat, forcing the Afghans to divert troops to the west. This allowed the Sikhs to launch an invasion of Kashmir.

Following the Sikh victory in the Battle of Multan (March–June 1818), they were able to capture Peshawar. The next year, the Sikhs were able to complete their conquest of Kashmir. The Afghans were able to recapture Peshawar in 1822, but lost the city permanently after the Battle of Nowshera in 1823. In 1837, Afghan ruler Dost Mohammad Khan gathered an army to push the Sikhs back from the Khyber Pass. They laid siege to the Sikh fort at Jamrud. A Sikh army

advanced to relieve the siege, and the two forces met at the Battle of Jamrud. The Sikhs defeated the Afghans. The battle marked the end of the Afghan-Sikh Wars, although Ranjit Singh would support the British during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842).

Melodee M. Baines

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Durrani, Timur Shah; Jamrud, Battle of (1837); Maratha Empire (1674–1818); Mughal Empire (1526–1857); Panipat, Battle of (1761); Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Ranjit Singh, Maharaja; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Afghan-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (1931)

The 1931 Afghan-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, formally known as the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression between Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was an accord between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to ensure neutrality and mutual nonaggression. It was the successor to a 1926 nonaggression pact and a manifestation of the growing ties between the two countries as the Soviets sought to

expand their influence in the region and the Afghans sought an ally to balance against British power. The 1931 pact was signed in Kabul on June 24, 1931. It was ratified by the Soviets on September 5, 1931, and entered into effect on October 15, 1931, after the exchange of acts of ratifications.

The pact consisted of nine clauses. The first three clauses emulated the 1926 accord by restating that both parties should observe neutrality in the case of aggression acted on, or by third parties; not attack or collude with third parties who could direct attacks upon either party; not hinder economic or financial trade between both parties; not interfere with the internal affairs of the other party; and not permit any organization or activity on its premises that was hostile to the other party. Clauses four and five declared openly that neither signatory parties were bound at the time of signing by any other negotiations, secret or otherwise, which would prevent the full obligation of the first three clauses. Clause six explained that both parties were free to extend other agreements with third parties, as long as the first five clauses were respected. Clause seven concluded that any negotiations or conflicts that arose between the two signatories would be solved by peaceful means.

The final two clauses set forth the timeline for the treaty. The treaty would remain in effect for a period of five years. After the initial duration of the treaty, it would stay in effect for subsequent one-year periods with the first six months of each year acting as a window for denunciation by either party. On March 29, 1936, the treaty was reaffirmed for 10 years, followed by a further 10-year extension to December 18, 1955.

Throughout the 1930s, relations between the two countries continued to grow stronger, although the Afghans did not enter into the formal alliance with the Soviets that Moscow

sought. Trade expanded between the two countries. The share of Soviet imports and exports as a total of Afghanistan's total trade rose from 7 percent in the 1920s to 24 percent by 1939. Soviet military aid expanded, although the Afghans also cultivated ties with Germany and Italy.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Shah, Mohammed Nadir; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (1921)

The Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was an agreement between the countries of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. It was the first international agreement made by Afghanistan after its independence from Great Britain in 1919 and served as the basis of all future relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

The renunciation of imperialism by Vladimir Lenin prompted Afghan emir Amanullah Khan to seek assistance from the Soviet Union during the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919). Although the war ended before the request was acted upon, it led to an increase in formal and informal negotiations between the two countries. Afghanistan sought allies to counterbalance British

hegemony, while the Soviet Union, in the midst of a period of diplomatic isolation, wanted allies.

To formalize ties between the two countries, a treaty of friendship was proposed. The resultant agreement was signed on February 28, 1921, in Moscow. It was ratified by the USSR on April 20, 1921, and by Afghanistan on August 13, 1921. The treaty officially went into effect after the acts of ratifications were exchanged on September 14, 1921, in Kabul. It soured relations with the British who were in the midst of trying to renegotiate the 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi, which ended the Third Anglo-Afghan War, but was seen by both sides as a temporary agreement.

The treaty forbade either party from entering any third-party agreements that would be against the interests of the other. It also pledged mutual cooperation and nonaggression between the two nations. The Soviet Union agreed to supply Afghanistan with an annual stipend, to replace a similar payment that the British had provided prior to the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The Soviets also pledged economic, military, and technological assistance. Afghan vessels were to be allowed in Soviet waters, and Moscow returned the area around the Panjdeh oasis, which had been seized by Russia in 1885, depending on a plebiscite. Afghanistan agreed to close its northern border, which had served as a safe harbor to the *basmachi*, or anti-Soviet Muslim insurgents fighting against the occupation of Bukhara, and to open its markets to Soviet goods and services.

Although the accord seemed to favor the Afghans, it actually proved more beneficial to the Soviets. It gave Moscow an opportunity to expand its influence in the region and removed Afghanistan as a buffer for British India. In addition, the Soviets did not follow through on their side of the treaty. The promised subsidies

were often unreliable; scheduled payments were less than previously arranged, or paid with outdated goods or materials. The military equipment often proved obsolete. When Amanullah was overthrown in 1929, the Soviet subsidies ceased. The promised plebiscite on Panjdeh was manipulated by the Soviets so that region remained part of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the treaty served as the basis for future accords between the two nations, including the reaffirmation of the original agreement in 1926 and the Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression in 1931.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Khan, Amanullah; Panjdeh Crisis (1885); Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Afridi (Khyberree) Tribe

The Afridis are a Pashtun tribe in Pakistan and Afghanistan with a long history of resistance to outside invaders, located primarily in the Khyber region. The tribe historically controlled the strategically important Khyber Pass. Smuggling and tolls on transit across the path through the Spin Ghar mountains were long their primary source of income. The Afridis are descendants of Buddhists from India who were converted to Islam in the 900s. They are predominately Sunni. The tribe is divided into eight clans: Adam Khel, Aka Khel, Kamar Khel, Kuki Khel, Malik Din Khel, Qamber Khel, Sepah, and Zakha

Khel. The clans have a long history of rivalry and feuds, most prominently between the Adam Khel and the Aka Khel, and then between the Kuki Khel and the Zakha Khel. Despite these rivalries, the clans typically united when faced by foreign invaders. The Khyber region and the Afridis were brought under Afghan suzerainty by Ahmad Shah Durrani.

The Afridis fought the British during their advance through the Khyber Pass in 1839 during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). The tribe conducted a guerrilla campaign against the British throughout the war. In order to keep the Khyber Pass open for trade and to reduce raids on colonies to the east, the British began to pay the Adam Khel a subsidy after the conflict. However, in 1850, an Afridi raid on British engineers constructing a road in the region prompted a pacification campaign against the Afridis. Subsequent expeditions were launched in 1853 and 1854.

The Afridis again fought against the British during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). After the defeat of the Afghan Army, the Treaty of Gandamak (1879) granted the British control over the Khyber Pass and the surrounding region. This brought the bulk of the Afridis under British sovereignty. To maintain order in the region, a number of militia units were raised among the Afridis, including the Khyber Rifles, which were later consolidated within the Frontier Corps. In addition, the British introduced the *malik* system in which procolonial leaders were paid subsidies and granted various privileges in exchange for their loyalty.

A major Afridi uprising in 1897 led to the Tirah Expedition (1897–1898), which defeated the tribesmen and pacified the region. During the Third Afghan War (1919), Afridi units of the British Army, including the Khyber Rifles, suffered significant desertions, leading to the disbanding of several

formations. An Afridi battalion was raised during World War II and saw service in Iran.

After World War II, the Afridis supported the independence of Pakistan but subsequently generally ignored the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan with individuals and groups moving freely between the two countries. During the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), the Afridis played a key role in smuggling weapons to the mujahideen. Haji Ayub Afridi, of the Zakha Khel, emerged as a key figure in supplying the anti-Soviet rebels, although he was also a notorious drug lord. In the contemporary struggle between the Taliban and the Afghan and Pakistani governments, the Zakha Khel have generally sided with the governments, while other clans have supported the insurgents.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Durand Line; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Frontier Corps; Gandamak, Treaty of (1879); Khyber Pass; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban (Pakistan); Taliban Insurgency.

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Airborne Units and Tactics

Airborne units played important roles in the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989) and in Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014). Airborne forces were capable of mobility and quick deployments that made them ideal to fight insurgents. Airborne units may be either traditional airborne units (light infantry forces that are capable of being deployed by parachute), or air assault units that are deployed by helicopter.

During Operation Storm 333, the initial invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets employed tactics that emphasized the deployment of airborne forces to capture key strategic areas, including military targets, communications centers, and government facilities. These tactics replicated those used in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Prior to the Soviet invasion in December 1979, the Soviets began quietly prepositioning two regiments of airborne troops in Afghanistan. The forces were tasked with capturing key air facilities, including Bagram airfield, to pave the way for the bulk of the invasion forces. On December 24, Soviet airborne forces seized Bagram and the 105th Guards Air Assault Division was ferried in on 280 aircraft from bases in Turkmenistan (a Soviet airborne division consisted of approximately 8,500 troops). The forces were equipped with armored vehicles and set out for the Afghan capital on December 27 as Soviet infantry and armored divisions invaded from the north. The airborne forces captured Kabul with support from Spetsnaz (Soviet special forces). During the fighting, Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin was killed.

Airborne forces were then dispatched to quickly capture other strategic positions, including the Salang Pass. As regular forces poured into Afghanistan, the airborne troops were withdrawn back to Bagram where they

constituted a strategic reserve that could be quickly deployed. In 1980, the 105th Division was withdrawn and replaced by the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, along with independent air assault regiments. Other airborne regiments were stationed around the country to support counterinsurgency operations. Similar to how the United States used airborne forces during the Vietnam War, Soviet airborne units were moved by helicopter to attack insurgent forces or to reinforce Soviet garrisons under attack. There were also limited parachute assaults from both airplanes and helicopters. The main transport helicopter used was the Mi-8 Hip, which proved vulnerable to antiaircraft missiles, especially after the mujahideen acquired advanced U.S. Stinger missiles beginning in 1986. The Soviets did lack adequate numbers of transport aircraft and helicopters to effectively respond to guerrilla attacks throughout the campaign.

Soviet efforts to create Afghan Army airborne units were generally unsuccessful. For instance, during the Second Battle of Zhawar, the 38th Commando Brigade was wiped out by mujahideen forces after its pathfinders were mistakenly dropped in Pakistan, and its main body of troops was overwhelmed after being deployed (the mujahideen captured 530 troops from the unit).

The Soviets were able to control the main cities and strategic passes, but lacked the troops to pacify the countryside. They instead relied on airpower and the rapid deployment of troops, combined with larger conventional campaigns. They were never able to completely suppress the mujahideen, who used remote mountain hideaways and bases in Pakistan to launch attacks. The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, after losing approximately 14,500 dead and 53,700 wounded (along with some 18,000 Afghan government troops).

Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 8, 2001, with an air campaign to destroy the Taliban's limited command and control structures and degrade their military capabilities. Meanwhile, special operations forces were deployed to assist the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. On October 19, 2001, elements of the U.S. 75th Ranger Regiment and the 101st Airborne Division launched Operation Rhino, a surprise assault on targets near Kandahar. The main mission was to confirm the feasibility of establishing an airfield, Camp Rhino. The troops met little resistance and the facility was eventually garrisoned with 1,100 U.S. Marines in November. Meanwhile, coalition special forces and Northern Alliance troops were able to rout the Taliban. Only after the collapse of the Taliban in November did the United States begin to deploy significant numbers of airborne and conventional forces.

Airborne and air assault units such as the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade were deployed during the subsequent campaigns of Operation Enduring Freedom, including Operation Anaconda in 2002, the first major combat offensive against the Taliban and al Qaeda by U.S. conventional forces. In February 2003, elements of the 82nd made the unit's first combat parachute incursion since the invasion of Panama in 1989. In addition, the 75th Ranger Regiment made four combat parachute drops during the campaign, including Operation Rhino. Like the Soviets, the U.S.-led coalition used airborne troops to rapidly deploy on combat missions where their mobility allowed the troops to surprise targets or serve as reinforcements. Unlike the Soviet forces, coalition troops were deployed more widely in an effort to disrupt the Taliban insurgency, and coalition forces had better air assets. Firebases were established by U.S. airborne divisions in Ghanzi and Kandahar, as well as

other regions. However, with bases in Pakistan, the Taliban were able to maintain their insurgency despite coalition tactics.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Al Qaeda; Operation Anaconda (2002); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Operation Storm 333 (1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Special Operations Forces; Taliban; Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Taliban Insurgency; Tora Bora, Battle of (2001); United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986).

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Aircraft, Types and Tactics

From the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) onward, aircraft have been used in various

conflicts in Afghanistan. Aircraft proved to be critically important for three reasons: reconnaissance, transport, and airstrikes. Afghanistan's rugged terrain made aircraft ideal for scouting. In the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British deployed five squadrons of biplanes, including the two-seater light bomber/reconnaissance BE2C and the larger De Havilland heavy bomber. The aircraft were also used for strafing and bombing ground targets, and carried out bombing missions on cities such as Jalalabad and Kabul. The damage from the aerial attacks was light, but helped end the war by demonstrating to the Afghan emir Amanullah Khan the superiority of modern weaponry.

Aircraft played a much more central role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Operation Storm 333 in December 1979. Aircraft transported an airborne division in the initial wave of the invasion, which allowed the Soviets to capture Kabul almost by surprise. The transports most commonly used during the occupation were the Ilyushin Il-76, which could carry 120–140 troops or 46 tons of equipment (including armored vehicles), and the older Antonov An-12, with a capacity of 90 troops or 22 tons. The An-12 would also be used as a bomber with large munitions or napalm rolled out of the back of the plane (a tactic previously used by the United States in Vietnam).

The Soviets built seven air bases during the occupation; the largest were at Bagram and Shindand. The Afghan government air force operated out of three of the bases. The Afghan Air Force was equipped mainly with older model aircraft until toward the end of the occupation. By 1989, the Afghan Air Force had approximately 400 aircraft, including 150 helicopters.

As the campaign against the mujahideen insurgency progressed, the Soviets used a variety of aircraft for close air support. The Soviets initially used the Mikoyan-Gurevich

MiG-21 Fishbed as their main fighter bomber. Depending on the mode, it was armed with twin cannons and could carry rockets and either two or four bombs. The Fishbed proved ill-suited for the Afghan campaign. It was designed for aerial combat and its speed often made ground attacks inaccurate, especially strafing runs. In addition, the mountainous terrain hindered the accuracy of attacks of all Soviet aircraft, a deficiency that was magnified by the lack of forward air controllers to guide attacks. Later in the conflict, the Fishbed was replaced by the Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot, which was designed for close air support and could carry a bomb payload of up to 10,000 lbs (4,535 kg). The Mig-21s and Su-25s usually operated in pairs.

Helicopters provided the main air support throughout the occupation, with more than 600 of the aircraft deployed in the country. The main attack helicopter was the Mil Mi-24 Hind, which could be armed with machines, cannons, and rockets. The heavily armored helicopter was able to fly through most ground fire, although the craft were vulnerable to SA-7, and later Stinger, antiaircraft missiles. The Hind could also carry up to 12 troops. Helicopters also served as transport for air assault troops, mainly utilizing the Mil Mi-8 Hip, which could carry 24 troops or 6,600 lbs (3,000 kg) of cargo (the Hip also played a major role dropping aerial mines). The large Mil Mi-6 Hook, which had a cargo capacity of 13.2 tons (12,000 kg), provided heavy lift.

By 1986, the use of ever more sophisticated antiaircraft missiles forced the Soviets to change aerial tactics and increasingly rely on high-altitude bombing by fixed-wing aircraft. The Soviets also reduced the use of large formations of attack helicopters, relying instead on smaller numbers, and scout copters to identify targets. By the end of the occupation, the Soviets had lost 333 helicopters and 118 fixed-wing aircraft.

After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Afghan Air Force initially maintained air superiority during the country's civil war (1989–2001), but lack of parts, new aircraft, and pilots eroded its effectiveness. When the pro-Soviet regime fell in 1992, the few remaining aircraft were divided among the various factions of the civil war. After it seized power in 1996, the Taliban maintained a small air force that included 5 MiG 10s, along with about a dozen fighter bombers and about 40 helicopters, including 6 Mi Hips. Anti-Taliban groups, including the Northern Alliance, had some helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, mainly used to transport weapons and equipment.

The Taliban's air force was destroyed during the initial air and cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001. The United States and its allies utilized a range of aircraft in their subsequent operations in Afghanistan. The aerial offensive began on October 7 when coalition aircraft, mainly U.S. B-52 and B-1 bombers, struck 31 Taliban targets. The venerable B-52 Stratofortress, first introduced into service in 1955, had a bomb load of 70,000 lbs (31,500 kg) and could carry air-launched cruise missiles. The long range of the aircraft, 8,800 miles (14,162 km), allowed the aircraft to remain on station for extended periods to provide support for ground forces. The Boeing B-1 Lancer was also used extensively. The B-1 had a payload of 75,000 lbs (34,019 kg) and could fire a variety of precision-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). B-1s dropped 40 percent of the total ordinance of coalition air units during the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, accounting for more than 60 percent of the JDAMs used (Operation Enduring Freedom marked the first combat use of JDAMs by B-1s and B-52s).

The coalition air war was significantly different from that of the Soviets. This was partly

the result of advances in technology and partly because of different tactics. The use of JDAMs provided coalition ground forces with a degree of air support unparalleled in Afghan wars. Forward ground controllers or special operations forces could direct JDAMs from the ground with extraordinary precision. They also allowed much greater coordination between air and ground units. Meanwhile, aircraft, including both fixed-wing and helicopters, would be deployed in holding patterns, ready to support ground troops. The use of refueling aircraft, such as the Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker (capable of carrying up to 150,000 lbs or 68,039 kg of transferrable fuel), extended the mission time of deployed aircraft. The use of drones for reconnaissance and strikes also bolstered the coalition's over-the-horizon capabilities.

Coalition fixed-wing aircraft included carrier-based U.S. Navy Grumman F-14 Tomcat fighters, U.S. Air Force McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bombers, and Royal Air Force Tornado GR4 fighter-bombers. Close ground support was also provided by the slow-flying and heavily armored Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt (commonly known as a "Warthog"), which had a 30 mm Gatling cannon, capable of firing more than 3,900 rounds per minute, in addition to bombs and rockets. The propeller-driven Lockheed AC-130 gunship, depending on the model, was equipped with a 40 mm and 105 mm cannons or a 105 mm cannon and a 25 mm Gatling gun. The lack of modern anti-aircraft missiles among the Taliban and other insurgents meant that fixed-wing aircraft were able to operate on a scale unrivaled by the Soviets. Through 2015, no coalition fixed-wing aircraft had been shot down by insurgents.

Like the Soviets, the coalition relied on helicopters for a variety of missions, ranging from close air support to troop transport. The main gunship used was the Boeing AH-64

Apache, which had a 30 mm machine gun and rocket launchers. The workhorse of the campaign was the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk, which carried a variety of armaments and up to 11 troops or 2,600 lbs (1,200 kg) of cargo. Black Hawks proved vulnerable to ground fire. Through 2015, five had been shot down and 15 damaged by ground fire and RPGs. Heavy lift was provided by the Boeing CH-47 Chinook. The Chinook could carry 33 troops or 16,000 lbs (7,257 kg) of cargo. The Chinook was also vulnerable to ground fire.

While the coalition has enjoyed air superiority, its aircraft have been involved in a number of strikes that have resulted in civilian casualties. In July 2002, an AC-130 fired on a suspected Taliban village, killing 48 and wounding 117 civilians at an engagement party. The incident and others like it created tension between the coalition and the Afghan government.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Airborne Units and Tactics; Al Qaeda; Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Anti-aircraft Missiles; Civilian Casualties; Drone Strikes; Khan, Amanullah; Northern Alliance; Operation Anaconda (2002); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Operation Storm 333 (1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Special Operations Forces; Taliban; Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Taliban Insurgency; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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A coalition UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flying over Afghanistan. Helicopters were instrumental in quickly moving coalition troops and supplies in Afghanistan's rugged terrain. (Department of Defense)

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Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda is an international radical Islamic organization, the hallmark of which is the perpetration of terrorist attacks against local governments or Western interests in the name of Islam. In the late 1980s members of

Tanzim al-Qaida (Arabic for "base" or "foundation") fought with the mujahideen against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda, a Salafi Sunni organization, was established around 1987–1988 by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a mentor to Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden became the leader of al Qaeda from approximately 1988 until his death in 2011. Azzam was a professor at King Abd al-Aziz University in Jidda, Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden attended that university, where he met and was strongly influenced by Azzam.

Al Qaeda developed from the Mujahideen Services Bureau that Azzam established in Peshawar, Afghanistan. Bin Laden funded the organization and was considered the deputy director. This organization recruited, trained, and transported Muslim volunteers

from any Muslim nation into Afghanistan to fight the jihad (holy war) against the Soviet armies in the 1980s.

Other elements in al Qaeda arrived with members of radical groups from other countries, such as a faction of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, some of the members of which had been indicted and had fled Egypt. The credo of al Qaeda came from its beliefs, based on ideas by many radical Islamist thinkers, including the practice of *takfir* (declaring that Muslim leaders who colluded with non-Muslim interests were apostates). Azzam adopted and expanded on these arguments, and bin Laden applied them to the government of Saudi Arabia, which he believed was too closely allied with the West. He proposed armed struggle to combat the far enemy as well as the near enemy in order to create a new Islamic society.

Following the mysterious death of Sheikh Azzam in November 1989, perhaps at bin Laden's behest, bin Laden took over the leadership of al Qaeda. He continued to work toward Azzam's goal of creating an international organization comprising mujahideen who would fight the oppression of Muslims throughout the world. Al Qaeda aims to establish an authentic Islamic form of government, to fight against any government viewed as contrary to the ideals of Islamic law and religion, and to aid Islamic groups trying to establish an Islamic form of government in their countries.

No attacks by al Qaeda are known to have occurred against Israel. The most damaging al Qaeda attack by far has been the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States. The genesis of al Qaeda's great antipathy toward the West—in particular the United States—can be traced back to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, precipitated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Bin Laden, originally a well-to-do Saudi Arabian, allegedly

offered to commit al Qaeda mujahideen to the defense of Saudi Arabia in case of an Iraqi invasion of that nation. The Saudi government declined the offer and permitted the stationing of hundreds of thousands of U.S. and coalition soldiers in Saudi Arabia during the run-up to the war (Operation Desert Shield). This move enraged bin Laden, who perceived the presence of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia as a blatant acknowledgment of the political linkage between his government and the United States. He also portrayed this as a religious failing, for Saudi Arabia is home to both Mecca and Medina, the holiest places in all of Islam, and the members of the Saudi royal family are the guardians of these places. When he condemned the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden was expelled from the kingdom and had his citizenship revoked. He then took up temporary residence in Sudan.

Once in Sudan, bin Laden began training al Qaeda fighters and is believed to have carried out an abortive assassination attempt against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in 1994. Under intense international pressure led by the United States, Sudan expelled bin Laden and al Qaeda leadership in late 1996. From Sudan they traveled directly to Afghanistan, where the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban regime had already ensconced itself. The Taliban not only protected al Qaeda but also probably helped arm it and by doing so gave it an air of legitimacy, at least in Afghanistan. In 1998 bin Laden joined forces with leaders from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, and several other radical organizations, all of whom vowed to wage a holy war against Israel and its allies. In August of that year al Qaeda carried out what is thought to be its first overseas attack against Western interests. That month saw the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,

and Nairobi, Kenya. More than 200 people died in the attacks, and another 4,000 were wounded. In October 2000 al Qaeda also carried out an attack on the U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer *Cole* in the Yemeni port of Aden in which 17 U.S. sailors perished.

The organization of al Qaeda has a *majlis al-shura*, or consultative council. After the death of Osama bin Laden in a 2011 raid by U.S. Special Operations Forces, the *amir al-mu'minin* (commander of the faithful) became Ayman al-Zawahiri, followed by several other generals and then additional leaders of related groups. Some sources say that there are 24 related groups as part of the consultative council. The council consists of four committees: military, religious-legal, finance, and media. Each leader of these committees was originally selected personally by bin Laden and reported directly to him. All levels of al Qaeda are highly compartmentalized, and secrecy is the key to all operations.

Al Qaeda's ideology has appealed to both Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern Muslim groups. There are also a number of radical Islamic terrorist groups, such as *al-Qaeda fi Bilad al-Rafidhayn* ("in the land of the two rivers," meaning Iraq) and *al-Qaeda fi Jazirat al-Arabiyya* ("of the Arabian Peninsula"), which initiated an association with al Qaeda via public declarations.

Al Qaeda's most horrific deed has undoubtedly been the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. The attacks, which killed an estimated 2,976 people, were carried out by the hijacking of four commercial jetliners, two of which were flown into New York City's World Trade Center, destroying both towers. A third jetliner was crashed into the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., while a fourth, supposedly bound for the White House or the U.S. Capitol, crashed in a western Pennsylvania

field, killing all onboard. However, many Muslims and others demanded proof of a direct connection between bin Laden and the perpetrators of 9/11 and were unsatisfied with the results of the investigation into the terrorist attacks, believing instead that the event might have been staged.

It has been alleged that al Qaeda inspired the March 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed nearly 200 and the July 2005 London subway bombings that killed 52. Although al Qaeda took responsibility for the latter, there is no irrefutable evidence linking al Qaeda to either attack; however, it is believed that the perpetrators borrowed al Qaeda tactics to pull them off.

The Global War on Terror, initiated since the September 11 attacks, resulted in an invasion of Afghanistan and the toppling of the Taliban in late 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom). The Western presence in Afghanistan has kept al Qaeda on the run ever since. In addition to bin Laden, some of the leadership have been killed. Since the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, al Qaeda was thought to have supported the growing insurgency in Iraq, which became a virtual full-blown civil war during 2006. Since 2007, U.S. and coalition forces have enjoyed some success in purging Iraq of al Qaeda operatives. While most Arab and Muslim governments have tried to distance themselves from al Qaeda and its operations, there can be little doubt that the group enjoys support among significant elements of the populations of these countries.

Bin Laden was able to put most of the radical Islamic terrorist groups under the umbrella of al Qaeda. Indeed, its leadership has spread throughout the world, and its influence penetrates many religious, social, and economic structures in most Muslim communities. Many of the upper-echelon leadership of al Qaeda continue to elude

American intelligence and Western armies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The membership of al Qaeda remains difficult to determine because of its decentralized organizational structure. By early 2005, U.S. officials claimed to have killed or taken prisoner two-thirds of the al Qaeda leaders behind the September 11 attacks. However, some of these prisoners were shown to have had no direct connection with the attacks.

Al Qaeda continued to periodically release audio recordings and videotapes, some featuring bin Laden himself, to comment on current issues, exhort followers to keep up the fight, and prove to Western governments that it was still a force to be reckoned with through the first decade of the 2000s. In 2009, the number two figure in al Qaeda, Zawahiri, emerged as the operational leader of the group as bin Laden's role continued to be reduced. On May 2, 2011, bin Laden was killed during a U.S. Special Operations Forces raid on his hideout in Pakistan. Zawahiri subsequently became head of the organization. Although some al Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliated groups allied themselves with the Islamic State in 2013 and 2014, the new group emerged as the greatest threat to al Qaeda's dominant role among Islamic extremist groups.

Harry Raymond Hueston

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Bin Laden, Osama; Bush, George W.; Clinton, Bill; Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998); Embassy Bombings (1998); Mujahideen; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; Terrorism; Zawahiri, Ayman al-.

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Ali Masjid, Battle of (1878)

The Battle of Ali Masjid on November 21, 1878, was the first battle of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). It was a tactical victory for the British and opened the road to Kabul for the northern prong of the invading Anglo-Indian army. Ali Masjid was a citadel, built by Dost Mohammad, to control the Khyber Pass. It was strategically located on a high hill (152.4 meters tall or 500 feet), overlooking one of the narrowest parts of the pass. Ali Masjid had a garrison of about 3,700 troops and 24 artillery pieces. The invading Anglo-Indian forces were divided into three columns. The northernmost, known as the Peshawar Field Force, was commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel (“Sam”) Browne and consisted of about 12,000 troops in four infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade, and artillery batteries. Browne was ordered to capture the fortress, open the pass for British troops, and then proceed to Jalalabad. British forces began to scout the fortress in October 1878, and the Afghans, under Ghulam Haider, were aware of the impending attack.

Browne divided his forces into three groups. The Second Brigade, under the command of Brigadier J. A. Tytler, departed the British encampment on the afternoon of November 20. Their objective was to bypass the fortress and attack it from the rear by traversing the Lashora

Valley, which ran parallel to the pass. The First Brigade, led by Brigadier H. T. MacPherson, would follow the Second Brigade, deploy along the high ground overlooking the fortress, and fire down on the Afghans. The remaining troops, led by Browne, would advance through the Khyber Pass in a direct assault on Ali Masjid.

Tytler's column ran into a variety of problems. Traveling under the cover of darkness, the brigade got lost on several occasions and became separated from their supply train. Their delays slowed MacPherson's brigade, which had to follow the same track for part of their advance. By sunrise on November 21, neither column was in position. Meanwhile, Browne's forces advanced steadily toward Ali Masjid. At approximately 10:00 in the morning, the opening shots of the war were fired between Afghan and British scouts. Artillery from Browne's column was deployed to fire on the fortress, but the range was too great for the guns to inflict significant damage. The Afghan batteries replied, but, again, without substantial effect. Near 2:00 in the afternoon, Browne ordered two infantry brigades to advance against Ali Masjid. Both were halted by heavy fire and could make little progress through the afternoon. At 5:00 p.m., Browne ordered his forces to break off contact.

British artillery opened fire on the fortress the next morning, but there was no return fire. Patrols were dispatched to the fortress and found that the Afghans had evacuated Ali Masjid during the night. More than 300 Afghans were captured during their retreat by the First Brigade. British casualties were 16 killed and 34 wounded. Following the battle, Browne advanced to Jalalabad.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Browne, Sir Samuel (Sam); Cavagnari,

Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Mohammad Yakub; Khan, Sher Ali; Khyber Pass; Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleigh (Lord); Stewart, Sir Donald.

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Amin, Hafizullah (1929–1979)

Hafizullah Amin was a leader of the *Khalq* (“Masses”) faction of the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and president of Afghanistan for two weeks in 1979. His seizure of power and brief presidency prompted the Soviet invasion in December 1979. An ethnic Pashtun of the Ghilzai clan, Amin was born on August 1, 1929, outside of Kabul. He attended Kabul University and became a teacher. He earned a graduate degree from Columbia University in 1958 and would return to the United States in 1962 to attempt a doctorate (he did not complete the degree). During his two periods in the United States, the future president was increasingly drawn to Marxism. Upon Amin's return to Afghanistan, he joined the PDPA and was drawn to the *Khalq* Faction, the more radical wing of the party. *Khalq* advocated revolution and the imposition of a Soviet-style government and economy, while the more moderate *Parcham* (“Banner”) Faction supported a gradual transition to socialism. Amin became close to Nur Muhammad Taraki, the leader of the *Khalq* Faction.

Amin became part of the PDPA's central committee in 1967 and was elected to the parliament two years later. By 1973, he was

Taraki's deputy leader of the Khalq wing. During this period, Amin emerged as a staunch opponent of the Parcham Faction. He particularly disliked the leader of the wing, Babrak Karmal. Amin supported the 1973 coup that deposed King Mohammed Zahir Shah. However, his bitterness toward the Parcham wing intensified as the new Afghan leader, Mohammed Daoud Khan, sought support from the moderates in the PDPA and offered various government posts and other preferential treatment.

After the coup, Amin was tasked with recruiting members of the Afghan military and consequently developed close ties with many officers. He believed that the army would support the PDPA in the overthrow of Daoud. Amin circulated a plan to launch a coup in 1976, but it was rejected by the party's central committee. Instead, in 1977, under pressure from the Soviet Union, Khalq and Parcham reconciled and created a unified leadership. New plans for a coup were drafted and preparations made. Then on April 18, 1978, Mir Akbar Khyber, a leading Parcham figure, was assassinated. The PDPA officially blamed the Daoud government, but some members of Parcham speculated that Amin was behind the killing in order to spark a crisis that would allow the party to overthrow Daoud. Large protests broke out in Kabul over the assassination. In response, Daoud ordered the arrest of senior PDPA leaders. Amin launched the coup before he was imprisoned. The resultant Saur Revolution on April 27 deposed Daoud and installed Taraki as president, with Karmal as his deputy.

Amin was appointed foreign minister, but he continued to play a significant role in managing the military for the party. He began to consolidate power. Parcham officials were dismissed or assigned to other posts. For instance, Karmal became the ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, a popular revolt

against the government intensified as the PDPA attempted to implement a fairly radical reform of the country, including the suppression of Islam, redistribution of land, and expansion of women's rights. By the spring of 1979, the majority of the country's provinces were in revolt. Amin responded by pressuring the military to undertake a brutal campaign to repress the rebels. The insurgency worried Soviet leaders who felt that Amin was losing control of the military. With Soviet support, Taraki unsuccessfully attempted to oust Amin in September. When the effort failed, Amin arrested Taraki and had him executed on September 14. Amin then became president.

Amin was unable to stop the insurgency, which was being increasingly fueled by desertions from the Afghan military. Because of Soviet support for his dismissal, Amin endeavored to reduce the country's dependency on Moscow. These two factors led Soviet leaders to begin plans to remove Amin. Karmal was cultivated as Amin's replacement. The Soviets informed Amin that they would be willing to send a small number of troops into Afghanistan to help suppress the mujahideen. However, the real purpose of the intervention was the removal of the Afghan president.

The Soviets launched Operation Storm 333 on December 27, 1979. Amin and his son were killed by Soviet troops during an attack on a heavily fortified military facility in Kabul. Karmal was installed as president and the Soviet occupation began.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Karmal, Babrak; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Khyber, Mir Akbar; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Operation Storm 333 (1979); People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan

(1979–1989); Taliban; Taraki, Nur Muhammad; Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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Andropov, Yuri (1914–1984)

Yuri Andropov was a Soviet political official who ruled the USSR from November 1982 until his death in February 1984. As head of the Soviet secret service, the Committee for State Security (KGB), from 1967 to 1982, Andropov was instrumental in gaining approval for the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Born Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov near Nagutskaya, Russia, on June 15, 1914, the future general secretary joined the Communist Youth League (Komsomol) in 1916. He rose quickly within the Komsomol and became first secretary of the organization's central committee in Yaroslavl in 1938. Andropov was known for his fierce loyalty to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. He was transferred to become first secretary of the Komsomol central committee in Soviet-occupied Finland in 1940. When World War II broke out, Andropov led partisan units in Finland. In 1944, he transitioned from Komsomol to the Communist Party.

After the war, Andropov continued to climb the party hierarchy, joining the staff of the central committee in 1951. As part of the

minor purges that occurred after the death of Stalin in 1953, Andropov was transferred to Hungary as a minor diplomat. However, the following year, he was appointed ambassador to that country. During the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Andropov was shocked at the speed with which the communist regime collapsed. He argued strongly in favor of Soviet intervention and was critical in convincing Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to ruthlessly suppress the insurrection. A year later, Andropov returned to Moscow and continued his rise, becoming a secretary of the Communist Party's central committee in 1962. In 1967, he was appointed to lead the KGB, where he undertook a number of reforms that increased the capability of the organization to monitor and suppress dissent. The KGB also expanded its operations overseas. Andropov believed that the Soviet Union should aggressively support communist insurgencies in the developing world as a way to undermine the influence of the United States and its Western allies. One result was the substantial growth in power of the KGB, which took on a greater role in Soviet foreign policy.

During the Prague Spring in 1968, Andropov again supported military intervention and political repression and even had the KGB develop false reports that overstated the goals of the Czechoslovak reformers. Andropov was elevated to the Politburo in 1973. Although he continued to direct the KGB to suppress dissent within the Soviet Union, Andropov did allow several leading dissidents to emigrate during the 1970s and 1980s as part of an effort to reduce human rights criticisms.

Following the April 1978 Saur Revolution, Andropov and Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko were deeply concerned that the Afghan communist party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA), would not be able to maintain control of the country. Both argued that the PDPA did not enjoy popular support among the Afghan people and opposed a request from the Afghan leader for Soviet troops. Andropov was particularly concerned that the Afghans would resist any Soviet incursion. Meanwhile, internal disputes within the PDPA led to the assassination of Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki on September 14, 1978, and the purge of his supporters by a faction led by Hafizullah Amin. The coup prompted Andropov to change his mind about intervention. The KGB leader subsequently argued strongly in favor of an invasion and the removal of Amin. The Soviets launched an invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and Amin was assassinated by Soviet forces on December 27.

In May 1982, Andropov, who had become the longest serving leader of the KGB, resigned in order to accept a post in the Secretariat of the Politburo. On November 10, 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev died. Two days later, Andropov was chosen to replace Brezhnev. Andropov launched a series of initiatives designed to reduce corruption and economic malaise within the Soviet Union. However, these efforts met with only marginal success and the Soviet economy continued to be stagnant. Some Westerners believed that the ascension of Andropov would signal a change in Soviet-U.S. relations. The KGB leader was believed to be more pragmatic than his predecessor. When Soviet forces were unable to suppress a growing insurgency in Afghanistan, Andropov began to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the conflict, including agreeing to a truce with mujahideen leader Ahmed Shah Massoud in 1983. Nonetheless, Andropov kept the main tenets of Soviet foreign policy in place. Meanwhile, efforts to prevent the stationing of U.S. Pershing missiles in

Western Europe were unsuccessful, and the Soviet Union suffered a major international embarrassment when it mistakenly shot down a South Korean civilian airliner on September 1, 1983, killing 269.

By the summer of 1983, Andropov's health began to fail rapidly. He entered a Moscow hospital for treatment for renal failure. He died on February 9, 1984, after being in office for 15 months. Before his death, Andropov recommended that Mikhail Gorbachev succeed him; however, Konstantin Chernenko became the Soviet leader on February 13.

Tom Lansford

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Brezhnev, Leonid; Cold War (1947–1989); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taraki, Nur Muhammad; Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich.

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Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809)

The first formal accord between Afghanistan and a European power, the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1809 pledged mutual friendship between the two countries and called for a

united front against any potential Persian (Iranian) or Russian aggression in the region. The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 prompted the British East India Company to seek defense agreements with neighboring states in order to create buffers against any potential French military campaign against India. French influence in Persia at the time was especially troublesome since it was perceived as a precursor to a joint Franco-Persian alliance. Meanwhile, officials also worried about potential Russian expansion in the region. Governor General Lord Minto dispatched Mountstuart Elphinstone to Peshawar, the winter capital of the king of Kabul, Shuja Shah. Elphinstone left Delhi in November 1808, along with a mission that included more than 4,000 troops and was designed to impress the Afghans. The British envoy arrived in Peshawar in February 1809. Shuja Shah readily agreed to the British overtures since they offered a means to counter the threat from Persia in the west. In addition, the Afghan king faced growing internal dissent, and he hoped an alliance with the British would strengthen his power.

The treaty was signed on April 14, 1809. Under its terms, Shuja Shah pledged to resist any potential Franco-Persian force or Russian army that sought to cross Afghanistan to attack India. The East India Company agreed to pay for any military operations the Afghans undertook against an invading force. The British also offered to provide officers to train or advise Afghan troops in the event of a conflict. The two countries also promised perpetual friendship and noninterference in each other's affairs. While the main purpose of the treaty was to secure India's border, the accord was also seen by the British as a first step in opening Afghanistan for trade and expanding commercial opportunities throughout the region by allowing the

British access to important trade routes. The treaty was approved by Lord Minto on June 17, 1809.

On May 3, 1809, Shuja Shah was overthrown by his half brother, Mahmud Shah Durrani. Elphinstone was aware of the tenuous hold Shuja Shah had on the throne, but believed that the treaty would be readily accepted by any possible successor. During his time in Peshawar, the British envoy had been gathering intelligence and cultivating relations with leading Afghans. However, the new king allowed the treaty to lapse, prompting the British to approach him in 1814 with a revised version of the 1809 accord.

Meanwhile, Shuja Shah fled into exile in India, but was imprisoned multiple times by Indian rulers, including Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who held the former king from 1813 to 1815. Beginning in 1816, the British granted Shuja Shah an annual subsidy and allowed him to maintain an armed retinue of some 4,000 soldiers. Delhi also supported his return to the throne in 1839.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Durrani, Mahmud Shah; Elphinstone, Mountstuart; Great Game, The; Ranjit Singh, Maharaja.

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Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1905)

The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1905, also known as the Treaty of Kabul, formalized an existing tacit agreement between the Afghan monarch and the Indian colonial government

that gave the British control of Afghan foreign policy. During negotiations, the British endeavored to add additional conditions, but Afghan ruler Habibullah Khan was able to resist that pressure and gain a diplomatic victory.

In 1880, Afghan emir Abdur Rahman Khan exchanged a series of letters with Sir Lepel Griffin, Britain's chief political officer in Afghanistan. The letters defined the relationship between the Afghan monarchy and Britain. Abdur Rahman surrendered control of Afghan foreign policy to the British in return for a pledge of noninterference within Afghanistan. In addition, the British formally recognized Abdur Rahman as emir and pledged to support Afghanistan if the country was attacked. Finally, the emir received a subsidy.

Habibullah succeeded Abdur Rahman after the latter's death on October 3, 1901. The new ruler sought to renew his father's arrangement with the British, but wanted to replace the informal agreement with a formal treaty. However, the British colonial government in India sought to renegotiate the terms of its relationship with the emir. The British wanted additional concessions, including delineation of the border between Afghanistan and British India and a relaxation of trade restrictions. The emir refused to accept any of the modifications.

The British applied various forms of pressure on Habibullah. Lord Curzon, the viceroy of India, ordered an embargo on arms shipments to Afghanistan. In addition, the emir's subsidy was suspended. Habibullah invited the foreign secretary of the Indian colonial government, Louis W. Dane, to Kabul to negotiate an end to the crisis. Dane arrived on December 12, 1904. There followed three months of intense talks. Curzon finally relented and allowed Dane to accept Habibullah's terms. On March 21, 1905, a

new treaty was signed by the emir and Dane. Under its terms, Britain retained control over Afghan foreign policy and pledged support for the emir in the event of external aggression. The subsidy was resumed and arrears paid for the period when it had been suspended. Habibullah was recognized as the king of Afghanistan and Britain pledged to respect the country's territorial integrity. Although it was not a component of the treaty, Curzon permitted the resumption of arms shipments.

The episode initially strengthened the power and influence of Habibullah within Afghanistan and certainly with the British. In 1907, he traveled to India where he was received with great fanfare as a visiting monarch. He was also made a Knight of the Bath in 1907 by Edward VII. Meanwhile, the Liberal government in London lauded the treaty as an example of its fair treatment of less developed states. However, over the next few years, Habibullah's growing relationship with the British began to alienate some Afghan factions. The king remained neutral during World War I, despite popular support for the Ottoman Empire during the conflict. Habibullah was assassinated in 1919, and the 1905 treaty was abrogated.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Great Game, The; Khan, Abdur Rahman.

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Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842)

The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) was the first large conflict in Afghanistan, the frontier area between czarist Russia and British India during the “Great Game,” the quest of each imperial nation to expand and increase its influence. The entire war was characterized by British military miscalculations, complacency, and incompetence.

Dynastic struggles and internal strife typified Afghanistan early in the 19th century. Dost Mohammed seized power in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 1826 and became the virtual king of Afghanistan. At the time, Afghanistan faced two major external threats, the Sikhs in the east and the Persians in the west. The Sikhs captured the city of Peshawar in the Punjab in 1834, and the Persians threatened Herat in 1836.

The British refused to assist Dost Mohammed in recovering Peshawar from the Sikhs and were concerned that the Russians would increase their influence in Afghanistan. The British decided to invade and occupy Afghanistan, depose Dost Mohammed, and replace him with the pliant pro-British Shuja Shah, a former ruler living in exile in India.

The British “Army of the Indus,” commanded by General Sir John Keane and consisting of about 15,000 East India Company soldiers, Shuja Shah’s 6,000-man force, as well as 38,000 camp followers with 30,000 camels, departed India in December 1838. The British force finally reached Kandahar in April 1839.

In June 1839, the British force began its march to Kabul. The formidable fortress of Ghazni, on the route to Kabul, was captured on July 23, 1839, after the British received information that the fortress’s Kabul Gate was weaker than the others. After the gate


was blown, assault troops led by Brigadier General (later Major General Sir) Robert Sale captured the fortress in a confusing action. The British forces lost 17 killed and 165 wounded, while the Afghans reportedly suffered more than 1,200 killed, thousands wounded, and about 1,500 taken prisoner.

The capture of Ghazni cleared the route to Kabul, and Dost Mohammed fled before the British arrived in Kabul on August 7, 1839. The British, who had crowned Shuja Shah emir of Afghanistan on May 3, 1839, propped up his unpopular regime with their continued presence in Kabul. The British had seemingly accomplished their mission. Major General Sir Willoughby Cotton replaced Keane, and the Bombay contingent of the Army of the Indus returned to India.

The British constructed a large cantonment, or fortified military encampment, north of Kabul and about two miles from the Bala Hissar fortress, in which Shuja Shah and his court resided. This site was on a plain dominated by high ground, none of it occupied by the British, and filled with orchards, irrigation ditches, streams, and other terrain obstacles. When completed, the cantonment, with a two-mile perimeter, was virtually indefensible. Moreover, the garrison’s commissariat stores were a quarter mile outside the cantonment, and the security of the lines of communication depended on “friendly” Afghan tribesmen. The situation seemed so stable that many British officers sent for their families to join them.

Cotton retired in 1841 and was replaced by the elderly, ailing Major General William G. K. Elphinstone. Later in the year, the East India Company took measures to reduce its expenses in Afghanistan, which included collecting taxes and withdrawing the subsidy to the tribesmen guarding the lines of communications between Kabul and India. As a result, the first British caravan to travel

FIRST AFGHAN WAR, 1839–1842, AREA OF OPERATIONS



in the area was plundered in October 1841. To demonstrate continued British control, Sale's brigade was ordered to march back to India via the Khyber Pass and scatter the impertinent tribesmen. Sale's brigade entered Jalalabad on November 13, 1841.

In Kabul, the situation had deteriorated. An angry Afghan mob surrounded and sacked the British residency on November 2, 1841, while Elphinstone in the nearby cantonment failed to take any action. The Afghans surrounded the cantonment and captured the commissariat. On November 13, the Afghans placed guns on the Bymaroo Hills and began pouring accurate artillery fire into the cantonment. A 17-company British force, with attached cavalry and engineers and one artillery piece, marched on November 23 to dislodge the Afghan artillery but was soundly defeated.

Surrounded and facing starvation, the British attempted to negotiate a capitulation with the Afghans. During final negotiations

on December 23, 1841, the Afghans treacherously attacked the British and hacked to death Sir William H. Macnaghten, the British envoy. His head and limbs were paraded around the city and his trunk was hung in the bazaar.

The British force, consisting of about 4,500 soldiers (including 700 Europeans) and 12,000 camp followers, was permitted to retreat from Kabul on January 6, 1842. Through deep snow, biting cold, and deep mountain passes, with little food and no shelter, the group was expected to travel 90 miles to Jalalabad. During the following week, tribesmen repeatedly attacked the British, whose route was marked by bloodstained snow and frozen corpses. Finally, on January 13, about 120 soldiers of the 44th Regiment of Foot and 25 artillerymen—all that remained of the British force, except for about 93 taken hostage—struggled through the Jagdalak Pass and were massacred at Gandamak. While there were



The last stand of the British 44th Regiment of Foot on January 13, 1842, at the Battle of Gandamak during the retreat from Kabul. (DeAgostini/Getty Images)

reportedly a few survivors, only one European from the Army of the Indus, Dr. William Brydon, reached Jalalabad.

The retreat from Kabul was one of the most humiliating catastrophes suffered by the British Army in the 19th century. The British, in an attempt to regain some prestige, organized the so-called Army of Retribution and sent it to Afghanistan, where they retained garrisons at Jalalabad, Ghazni, and Kandahar. Commanded by Major General Sir George Pollock, this force assembled at Peshawar, forced the Khyber Pass on April 5, 1842, and reached Jalalabad on April 16, where the siege had been lifted only nine days earlier.

Pollock's army later advanced on Kabul and reached it on September 15, 1842. Two days later, it was joined by Major General Sir William Nott's force, which had held Kandahar. The combined 14,000-man British Army retrieved their hostages, blew up the city bazaar in revenge, and departed Kabul on October 12, 1842. The army reached Ferozepore on December 23, 1842, which ended the First Anglo-Afghan War.

The British, as a result of the actions of the Army of Retribution, disingenuously claimed success in the First Anglo-Afghan War. In addition to the debacle of the retreat from Kabul, the British had lost their aura of invincibility, a key factor in the subsequent Sikh Wars and Indian Mutiny.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Elphinstone, William George Keith; Gandamak, Battle of (1842); Great Game, The; Macnaghten, Sir William Hay; Nott, Sir William; Pollock, Sir George; Sale, Florentia; Sale, Sir Robert Henry ("Fighting Bob").

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Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880)

Afghanistan served as the battleground for a second time in 1878–1880 during the imperial rivalry between Great Britain and Russia known as the Great Game. Advocates of the so-called forward policy of Indian and

imperial defense argued that the British needed to extend their influence in Afghanistan, by occupation if necessary, to forestall Russian encroachment in the region. The British, as they had attempted to do in the First Anglo-Afghan War, wanted to transform Afghanistan from a neutral buffer state into a British client.

The Afghan ruler, Emir Sher Ali Khan, was attempting to consolidate his rule in the late 1870s and wanted to avoid involvement in the Anglo-Russian rivalry. The Russians, victorious in the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War, sent an uninvited mission to Afghanistan. As Sher Ali was struggling with his relative Abdur Rahman Khan for the throne, he began to distance himself from the British and sought Russian assistance. The British, in turn, demanded to send a similar mission to Afghanistan and, rebuffed, issued an ultimatum to Sher Ali. This demand went unanswered, and on November 21, 1878, the British invaded Afghanistan and started the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The second war was not necessarily popular among the British, however, as the opposition in a House of Lords debate from December 1878 showed.

Three British columns advanced into Afghanistan simultaneously. The largest was the 16,000-man, 48-gun Peshawar Valley Field Force, commanded by Lieutenant General (later General) Sir Samuel Browne, V.C. Its mission was to advance on a northerly route through the Khyber Pass to Jalalabad and to clear the way of all opposition. The 6,500-man, 18-gun Kurram Valley Force, commanded by Major General (later Field Marshal Earl) Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., was tasked with occupying the Kurram Valley and then marching to the Shutargardan Pass dominating Kabul. Lieutenant General (later Field Marshal) Sir Donald M. Stewart's 13,000-man, 78-gun Kandahar

Field Force was to march via the Bolan Pass, reinforce the Quetta garrison, then occupy Kandahar.

Browne's force entered the Khyber Pass, but its progress was obstructed by the Afghan-held fort of Ali Masjid, situated 500 feet above the gorge and flanked by other fortifications. Browne attempted to coordinate the actions of his three brigades in an attack in the difficult terrain on November 21, 1878, which ultimately failed. Fearful of being outflanked, the Afghans evacuated Ali Masjid that night and stumbled into the first brigade blocking their escape. Most of the Afghans were taken prisoner. The way was then clear for Browne to advance on Jalalabad, which was occupied on December 20, 1878.

After marching through the Kurram Valley, Roberts's force found its advance blocked by Afghans with artillery at the Peiwar Kotal (Pass). Late on December 1, 1878, Roberts led a large column on a flanking movement that reached the left of the Afghan position. At dawn on the following morning, his troops assaulted and eventually defeated the Afghans, thus clearing the route to Kabul. The victory at the Battle of Peiwar Kotal established Roberts's reputation as a commander.

Stewart's force faced little opposition but suffered from logistical problems. It captured Kandahar in early January 1879. At this stage, with three British columns operating in his country, Sher Ali's grip on Afghanistan became tenuous, and he fled north and died on February 21, 1879. He was succeeded by his son, Yakub Khan. After a British victory at Fatehabad on April 2, 1879, Browne's force occupied Gandamak, and Yakub Khan decided to negotiate with the British. The main British negotiator was Major (later Sir) Pierre L. N. Cavagnari, Browne's political officer. On May 26, 1879,

the Treaty of Gandamak, in which Yakub Khan was recognized as emir in exchange for transferring the Kurram Valley and the Khyber Pass to the British, was signed. In addition, the British received control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs while guaranteeing the protection of Afghanistan and paying an annual subsidy. The Second Anglo-Afghan War seemed to be over.

Cavagnari was appointed British envoy to Kabul. His mission, which arrived in Kabul on July 24, 1879, included political assistants and a Corps of Guides military escort totaling 80 people. In late August 1879, six undefeated and resentful Afghan regiments were transferred from Herat to Kabul. On September 3, 1879, these Herati soldiers received only a fraction of the pay owed them.

Enraged, they briefly attacked the British residency, then retreated. Some 2,000 armed Afghan soldiers later returned, ferociously attacked the residency, and massacred Cavagnari and his mission. This atrocity sparked the renewal of hostilities.

Both the Peshawar Valley Field Force and Kurram Valley Force had been withdrawn earlier, and Stewart's Kandahar Field Force had begun redeploying to India on September 1, 1879. After news of the Cavagnari massacre reached India on September 5, the order to withdraw was immediately canceled. Stewart's force remained in Kandahar and the surrounding area and engaged in pacification operations.

Roberts was ordered to advance on Kabul with the newly formed Kabul Field Force.



Anglo-Indian cavalry charge Afghan forces during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Cavalry was used mainly for scouting but also to counter enemy mounted units. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

He began his advance on September 27, 1879, but the force found its way blocked when it reached a defile near Charasia, about 10 miles from Kabul, on October 5, 1879. The following day, without his full force assembled, Roberts attacked the Afghans with a 4,000-man, 18-gun force. The British, again employing a flanking movement, defeated the Afghans and entered Kabul on October 8. British martial law was ruthlessly applied. Buildings were demolished and drumhead courts-martial were held. Eighty-seven Afghans reportedly involved in the attack on the residency were hanged. Yakub Khan, who had joined Roberts before his force began its march, was not restored to his throne and abdicated on October 12. The united 7,000-man Kabul Field Force then occupied the large, fortified Sherpur Cantonment near Kabul.

As the months wore on, Afghans increasingly resented the British occupation of Kabul. On December 11, 1879, the British sent troops to disperse assembling Afghans, and after December 14, Roberts's force in Sherpur was besieged. Before dawn on December 23, the assembled Afghan tribal levies, inspired by a call for holy war against the infidels, attacked the forewarned British in the Sherpur Cantonment. They charged determinedly with their scaling ladders and suffered heavy casualties from the disciplined British rifle and artillery fire. By early afternoon, the Afghans lost heart and started to melt away, and the British sent cavalry to pursue the fleeing tribesmen.

In early April 1880, Stewart left the defense of Kandahar to Major General J. M. Primrose and his Bombay Army force and marched to Kabul. Stewart's force found its way blocked by a strong tribal force at Ahmad Khel on April 19, 1880. The British fought a desperate battle that day and eventually routed the enemy, who lost

about 1,000 killed and more than 2,000 wounded. The British force, which lost 17 killed and 115 wounded, then continued to Kabul.

Stewart's force arrived at Kabul on May 2, 1880, and he, as the senior officer, assumed command of the combined force. The fall of the Conservative government in England on April 28, 1880, signaled the end of the "forward policy" and direct British involvement in Afghanistan. With withdrawal imminent, the British looked for a capable Afghan to rule the country. They selected Abdur Rahman, a nephew of Sher Ali who appeared sensible, and on July 22, 1880, he was proclaimed emir.

Ayub Khan, a brother of Yakub Khan, believed himself to be the rightful ruler of Afghanistan, and since the beginning of July 1880, he had been marching with a large force toward Kandahar. Primrose sent a 2,500-strong brigade under Brigadier General G. R. S. Burrows to support allied Afghan troops, who deserted in the field. On July 27, Burrows's brigade was caught in the open and overwhelmed as it attempted to attack Ayub Khan's large force at Maiwand, the sole British battalion being veritably annihilated. About half of Burrows's unit was able to retreat to Kandahar, which was immediately besieged.

Roberts was then directed to lead a relief force from Kabul to Kandahar, about 318 miles away. Roberts's 10,000-man combined arms force, containing a logistical element purposely tailored for the mission, began its precarious march on August 9, 1880. Over difficult terrain, through waterless desert, suffering great extremes of temperature, the force reached the outskirts of Kandahar on August 31. The following morning, Roberts attacked Ayub Khan's force, turned the Afghan left flank, and soundly defeated the Afghan force.

The Battle of Kandahar basically ended the Second Anglo-Afghan War and propelled Roberts into the limelight, overshadowing the success of the 1879 Zulu War and other operations in South Africa. Abdur Rahman extended his rule over all of Afghanistan, and British troops returned to India shortly thereafter. While the final battle might have restored some British prestige, overall the Second Anglo-Afghan War was a Pyrrhic victory for the British.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics; Browne, Sir Samuel (Sam); Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Great Game, The; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Sher Ali; Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleight (Lord); Stewart, Sir Donald.

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Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919)

The Third Anglo-Afghan War was a minor conflict that ended in a military victory for the British, but a significant diplomatic win for Afghanistan. The country gained independence from British control over its foreign policy. Afghanistan had long been seen by the British as an important buffer state protecting its Indian colonies from a potential invasion, first by France and later by Russia.

Under the terms of the 1879 Treaty of Gandamak, Afghanistan accepted British sovereignty over its foreign policy. In return, the rulers of Afghanistan received a subsidy (worth more than 2.1 million rupees by 1915) and other economic support from Great Britain. However, when World War I broke out, there was widespread sympathy among the Afghan population for the Ottoman Empire, especially after the sultan called for a holy war against the British and Russians. Germany sought to exploit this sentiment and dispatched a military mission to Afghanistan. The Afghan ruler Habibullah Khan had enjoyed generally good relations with the British and remained neutral during the conflict. He rebuffed Germany's diplomatic outreach.

Habibullah's neutrality angered a group of Afghan elites, including his brother Nasrullah Khan, who emerged as the leader of the pro-German faction. Habibullah was assassinated on February 1, 1919. His brother claimed the throne and ruled briefly,

February 21–February 28, before he was deposed by Habibullah's son Amanullah Khan. Amanullah was an ardent Afghan nationalist and modernist. In his coronation speech, he rejected British control over his country's foreign policy. Amanullah hoped to gain the support of the anti-British elites by taking a strong stance against British influence.

Over the next several months, Amanullah and his military advisers increasingly came to believe that a rapid military strike against British India would be successful. Reports and press accounts indicated growing nationalism against British rule, and the Afghans believed in the wake of World War I that the Anglo-Indian troops on the border would be demoralized and slow to react. The Afghans began to incite the border tribes as part of a strategy that would combine a Pashtun uprising on the Indian side of the border with an invasion. Amanullah sought to regain disputed areas then under the control of the British and to remove British restrictions on his country's foreign policy. He and his closest advisers believed that the British would negotiate rather than participate in a long, drawn-out war.

At the time of the conflict, the Afghan Army numbered about 50,000, but was poorly armed and lacked adequate artillery, machine guns, aircraft, or modern communications and transport. However, there were some 70,000–80,000 tribesmen along the border that could also be used in the campaign. While these forces had even more primitive weapons, they were expert guerrilla fighters and could move rapidly. The Anglo-Indian Army could deploy significantly more troops, especially if forces from elsewhere in India were redeployed. In addition, the British were much better armed, with modern, quick-firing artillery, machine guns, and armored cars, along with modern communications and transport.

Aircraft proved especially important, undertaking bombing and reconnaissance missions, which eroded some of the advantages the Afghans possessed in terms of their knowledge of the terrain. The British were also bolstered by tribal militias of varying capabilities and loyalties.

The Afghan war plan called for a Pashtun uprising in British-controlled Peshawar and a concurrent invasion through the Khyber Pass by the Afghan Army, beginning on May 8. The regular Afghan troops launched the invasion early and advanced through the Khyber Pass, capturing Bagh, in Indian territory, on May 4. The British political agent in Khyber, Lt. Colonel Sir George Roos-Keppel, recognized that the incident was not just a typical border raid and put troops on alert. He then called for reinforcements. Trucks rushed troops to the frontier. Most importantly, Roos-Keppel learned of the planned uprising in Peshawar. He ordered troops to the town, and they cut off Peshawar's water, food, and electricity. Anglo-Indian forces were also able to arrest the ringleaders of the revolt before it spread. Roos-Keppel subsequently played a significant role in maintaining the loyalty of surrounding tribes.

British aircraft began aerial raids on concentrations of Afghan troops and bombed cities, including Kabul. On May 9, Anglo-Indian forces attempted unsuccessfully to retake Bagh. After reinforcements arrived, a second attack on May 11 retook the town. The Afghans lost approximately 100 soldiers, with three times that number wounded. Anglo-Indian casualties amounted to 8 killed and 31 wounded. The Anglo-Indian forces were ordered to advance into Afghanistan. They secured the Khyber Pass, captured several Afghan towns, and began to move toward Jalalabad. However, the Anglo-Indian forces faced a series of mutinies. Unrest amidst the Khyber Rifles led to the unit

being disbanded, while militia auxiliaries from Waziristan deserted. The unrest stalled the advance and left several units isolated. Nonetheless, with Anglo-Afghan troops in Afghanistan, Amanullah decided to ask for a cease-fire at the end of May.

However, Afghan generals believed that the tide was turning, and they launched a new strike, moving to attack Thal near the Kurram River. British brigadier general Reginald Dyer was able to lead a column and lift the siege at Thal on June 2, using artillery and armored cars to inflict heavy casualties on the Afghans. Dyer continued to advance, but an armistice was agreed upon, although final negotiations on a cease-fire were not complete until August 8. In the resultant Treaty of Rawalpindi, the Afghans gained official power over their foreign policy. British subsidies to Afghanistan were stopped, as were arms sales. Finally, Afghanistan accepted the Durand Line as the border with British India. Minor revisions to the treaty were agreed upon on November 22, 1921, including pledges to provide notification prior to military operations along the frontier. British negotiators had hope to secure a separate treaty of friendship between the two countries as a way to forestall Soviet influence in Afghanistan, but Afghan diplomats insisted on an Anglo-Afghan defense treaty as a tool to pressure the Soviets into returning areas that had been captured by imperial Russia in the 1800s, including Bokhara and Khiva. In the end, no treaty of friendship or alliance was signed.

Afghan casualties in the conflict from May through June numbered approximately 1,000–1,200 killed, with an estimated 3,000 wounded. In addition, the Anglo-Indian forces captured a significant amount of the Afghan Army's artillery. Anglo-Indian losses were 236 dead and 1,500 wounded. Meanwhile, sporadic fighting along the border

continued. The British launched a campaign along the frontier in October 1919. The Waziris were suppressed and forced to pay reparations and fines, and to turn over a substantial amount of rifles and ammunition. The Mahsud tribe continued raids against the British until May 1920.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Durand Line; Frontier Corps; Great Game, The; Khan, Amanullah; Khan, Habibullah; Khyber Pass; Panjdeh Crisis (1885); Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919); Roos-Keppel, George Olaf; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan; World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918); World War I and Afghanistan, Turko-German Missions (1914–1918).

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Anglo-Marri Wars (1840, 1880, and 1917–1918)

The Marri, a Baloch tribe in what is now Pakistan, fought a series of major conflicts (1840, 1880, and 1917–1918) and minor skirmishes against the British. Two of the

three wars coincided with the Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839–1842 and 1878–1880) and complicated British efforts to conduct operations in Afghanistan, especially in the area around the Bolan Pass leading into Afghanistan. During the conflicts, the Marris gained a reputation as fierce fighters and implacable enemies.

An Anglo-Indian Army used the Bolan Pass to invade Afghanistan during the First Anglo-Afghan War. During the advance, Marris and other local tribes conducted raids against the British, capturing supplies and disrupting logistics. An expedition against the Marris was launched in 1840. The operation captured the key fort at Kahan in the Bolan Pass in May; however, the facility was soon besieged. A relief expedition in August was repulsed with heavy losses, 184 killed out of a force of 664. The Marris allowed the garrison at Kahan to withdraw in October, bringing to a close the major combat operations of the First Anglo-Marri War. The British subsequently endeavored to blockade the tribes. Three years later, the Marris launched a series of attacks on British posts following the occupation of the Sindh. Additional major attacks occurred in 1859 and in 1862 when the Marris defeated an Anglo-Indian column of more than 6,000 troops. Meanwhile, imperial troops traveling the Bolan Pass often faced attacks or minor sniping. Throughout this period, the British also faced similar raids from the Bugtis, another Baloch tribe. In January 1867, a mixed force of Marris and Balochs, along with other tribesmen, attacked Fort Hurrand. The attack was disastrous. More than 257 of the tribesmen were killed, including their leader Ghulam Hussain Masori Bugti. The British soon after adopted a policy of encouraging intertribal rivalries through subsidies to allies and by placing bounties on recalcitrant chiefs. British forces also engaged in reprisal

raids to destroy crops and capture the livestock of Marri clans suspected of participating in raids.

During the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the Marris again increased their raids on British patrols and convoys. Following the ambush and capture of a convoy outside of Kochali in 1880, the British deployed a force of some 3,000 troops in a punitive expedition in October of that year in what came to be known as the Second Anglo-Marri War. The force was commanded by Brigadier Sir Charles MacGregor. MacGregor defeated the Marris in a series of skirmishes and forced the tribe to surrender £12,500 that had been looted from British convoys and pay a fine of £20,000, as well as turn over a number of clan leaders as hostages to forestall future attacks.

The Third Anglo-Marri War began after Marri leader Sardar Meherullah Khan refused a request from the British to provide recruits for the Imperial Army during World War I. Other Baloch tribes contributed small numbers of soldiers following a conference with British officials. Instead, the Marris began small raids on British posts. On February 19, 1918, a large force of Marris and members of other tribes attacked a British fort at Gunbaz. The British reported more than 200 tribesmen died or were wounded during the failed assault. A subsequent attack against Fort Munro on March 15 was also repulsed with heavy losses among the Marri. A British column, including Gurkhas and British regulars, advanced to Harab and defeated a large force of tribesmen on April 4. Five British troops were wounded, while approximately 100 Marris were killed. After the defeats, the Marris agreed to cease fighting and pay a small subsidy to the British in lieu of providing troops for the imperial war effort. Nonetheless, sporadic raids continued into the 1920s.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Bolan Pass; Khyber Pass.

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Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission

The Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission was established in 1884 in an effort to reduce tensions between Great Britain and Russia by delineating the Afghan border. The commission began work following the Panjdeh Incident on March 30, 1885, in which Russian troops overwhelmed an Afghan garrison in a disputed oasis at the Kushk and Murghab Rivers. The episode almost led to war between the two imperial powers as Great Britain endeavored to stop Russia expansion southward into Central Asia in an effort to protect its colonies and spheres of influence in the region. Diplomacy resolved the crisis, and both governments agreed that clarifying the border between Afghanistan and Russian territory could forestall conflict. British prime minister William Gladstone was especially reluctant to risk war with Russia at the time, as Britain was in the midst of a crisis in Sudan following the Mahdists' capture of Khartoum in January 1885.

At the time, the boundary was very fluid for a number of reasons. It had not been adequately surveyed and the border was generally poorly marked. Many of the local tribes did not recognize the border and would regularly migrate back and forth from

Afghan to Russian territory. In addition, the loyalty of local leaders was tenuous at best. Chieftains that nominally owed allegiance to Kabul could be induced to transfer their loyalty for subsidies from Russia or Great Britain. Russia had proposed the creation of a joint commission in 1882, and two years later, the British created the Afghan Boundary Commission to work on border issues with Afghan emir Abdur Rahman Khan and to meet with their Russian counterparts.

The joint body consisted of existing British and Russian commissions, but no Afghan officials. Russian and British parties began surveying territory during the summer of 1885, and the first meetings of the joint committee were held in November, continuing until September. Further negotiations were held in 1887 and a settlement reached. The British initially argued that an agreement from 1872 set the boundary in the disputed area within Afghan territory. Therefore, the Russia incursion was a violation and that country's troops needed to be withdrawn. However, the main concern of British officials was the defense of India in the event of a Russian invasion. Following the Panjdeh Incident, two railways were completed to Herat, the nearest large Afghan city. British military planners were confident that if the Afghans could delay a Russian incursion, Anglo-Indian troops could be rapidly deployed to counter the Russians. Consequently, the British were willing to concede Panjdeh. Russia sought the oasis because it contained some of the most fertile soil in the area and could serve as a key strategic location.

The final negotiations gave the Panjdeh region to the Russians in exchange for their withdrawal from other areas and a promise to respect the border. Another joint commission was created to deal with new border issues in the 1890s.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Great Game, The; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Panjdeh Crisis (1885); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 temporarily ended more than a century of rivalry between the two imperial powers in Central Asia by establishing mutually recognized spheres of influence in the region. Throughout the 19th century, Britain and Russia had engaged in the Great Game, a euphemism for the imperial struggle for influence in Central Asia. Britain sought to protect India and its lucrative trade routes. Meanwhile, Russia aimed to reduce the power of the Ottoman Empire and expand southward to gain a warm-water port. The colonial competition was principally responsible for the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839–1842 and 1878–1880). Meanwhile, Russian incursions into Manchuria and Korea at the end of the 1800s prompted new fears that Moscow would threaten British interests in China and the Pacific. In response, successive governments in London endeavored to create pro-British buffer states, including Afghanistan, between India and Russian territory. In 1882, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy formed the Triple

Alliance, prompting Russia and France to form an alliance in 1892. Britain then emerged as diplomatically isolated among the major powers of Europe. Initially, this policy of “splendid isolation” was embraced by policymakers and the public, but by the 1890s, Britain faced potential threats to its interests in Africa, Europe, and Asia from the other European imperial powers. In the Far East, Britain ended its policy of avoiding peacetime military alliances through the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. Britain followed its treaty with Japan with the Entente Cordiale, a series of accords with the French that laid the basis for an Anglo-French alliance in Europe and the Mediterranean and resolved a variety of colonial disputes between the two empires. The British also endeavored to negotiate a resolution of their differences with Russia on Persia and Afghanistan, but were rebuffed by Moscow.

The defeat of Russia during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and the subsequent Russian Revolution of 1905 prompted London to reconsider the seriousness of Moscow as a potential rival. Russia’s losses against the Japanese had revealed serious problems with the country’s military, while the 1905 revolution undermined the power of the monarchy. This reevaluation came as British leaders feared the growing naval and economic power of Germany, a concern shared by Russia and France. For Russia, a relaxation of tensions with Britain would allow Moscow time to rebuild its military and consolidate control over its existing territories and spheres of influence. Better ties with Great Britain would also create a better balance against the Triple Alliance.

Meanwhile, a revolution broke out in Persia in 1905. The rebels sought to create a constitutional monarchy. Many of the leaders of the movement were pro-British and sought support from London. They were

able to force the shah to agree to establish a parliament and sign a new constitution. Russian officials were apprehensive that they would lose all influence in Persia and hoped an agreement with the British would allow them to maintain the status quo. The British were willing to grant concessions in Persia in exchange for settling outstanding differences in Afghanistan and Asia. Both nations sought stability in Persia and feared that the revolution would undermine the existing political and economic order in the region.

In 1907, Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British ambassador to Russia, proposed a new round of negotiations with Russian foreign minister Count Alexander Izvolsky in an effort to resolve the main tensions over Afghanistan and Persia. Their talks produced the Anglo-Russian Convention, which was signed on August 31, 1907. The first section of the accord dealt with Persia. The treaty divided the country into three zones. Britain recognized the northern area of Persia as a Russian protectorate. Russia, in turn, accepted a British protectorate in the southeastern third of the country. In the middle region, both Britain and Russia were free to seek economic concessions in what was designed to be a buffer between the two spheres of influence. The two countries divided Persia's customs revenues to address significant debts the country had run up with British and Russian banks. The treaty gave the two imperial powers the right to intervene in Persia if the nation fell in arrears on its debt payments. Persian reformers were outraged at what they perceived to be British duplicity, and the convention created considerable ill will toward the country that liberals in Tehran had previously looked to as a model. Following the convention, the British fully supported a new shah, Muhammad Ali, who came to the throne in January 1907 and soon after abolished the parliament and reversed

most of the reforms accepted by his predecessor (he was overthrown two years later and went into exile in Russia).

In regard to Afghanistan, Britain gained the security it had sought for almost a century. Russia accepted that Afghanistan was firmly in the British sphere of influence and pledged not to intervene in Afghan affairs. Russia also agreed to interact only with the Afghan government through the British. In exchange, Britain promised not to annex any Afghan territory as long as the Afghan monarchy maintained its treaty obligations with London. The accord clearly established Afghanistan as the buffer state that Britain had consistently sought. (See the treaty below in the Related Primary Document section.)

The convention also led to agreement on Tibet. Both imperial powers promised to respect Chinese sovereignty. However, the British were permitted to deal directly with Tibetan officials on economic matters, including new trade agreements. The Russians gained the right for their Buddhist citizens to interact with the Dalai Lama.

In addition to settling the major differences between the two powers in Central Asia, the convention also led to increased diplomatic and military cooperation between the two countries. It led directly to the Triple Entente between Britain, France, and Russia as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance and helped solidify the system of alliances that led to World War I. The convention was supplemented in 1915 after the war broke out, but was repudiated by the Soviet Union in 1918.

Tom Lansford

See also: Great Game, The; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Raj, British (1858–1947); World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918).

Related Primary Document

The Anglo-Russian Convention (Entente), August 31, 1907

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 ended the Great Game for power and influence in central and southwest Asia between Great Britain and Russia. In the accord, Russia and Great Britain agree to spheres of influence in Persia, while Russia agreed that Afghanistan was under British influence.

AGREEMENT CONCERNING PERSIA

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain Provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned Provinces of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms:

I.

Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor of British subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

II.

Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favor of Russian subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, London, 1908, Vol. CXXV, Cmd. 3750; online at http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Anglo-Russian_Entente.

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Antiaircraft Missiles

Antiaircraft missiles were critical to the success of the mujahideen during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). The weapons greatly diminished the air superiority of the Soviets and compensated for the lack of aircraft on the part of the insurgents. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, they enjoyed air superiority during their 10-year occupation. Airpower was one of the keys to Soviet military tactics. Airplanes and helicopters were used to provide fire support for ground troops, to attack and interdict mujahideen forces, and to rapidly deploy troops.

The mujahideen sought antiaircraft missiles to overcome Soviet airpower. The first weapon widely used was the Soviet-built SA-7 (also known as the Strella-2M). The SA-7 was a shoulder-launched missile system that fired a projectile with a 2.5-pound (1.15-kg) warhead and had a range of about two and a quarter miles (3,700 m). It used a basic infrared homing device to track its target. The SA-7 was lightweight (21.5 lbs or 9.8 kg without the missile in place) and durable. However, it was easily evaded with existing infrared countermeasures and

evasive maneuvers by high-speed aircraft. The mujahideen found the weapon deadly against helicopters and slower, low-flying aircraft, but it was not really effective against modern fighters or high-altitude bombers. The SA-7 was responsible for shooting down more than 40 helicopters during the early years of the insurgency, but only 5 airplanes. The mujahideen acquired some SA-7s from Afghan government forces, but the bulk were purchased through intermediaries in Pakistan and paid for with funding from external supporters, ranging from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to backers in the Persian Gulf states.

The mujahideen also used rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), most commonly, the RPG-7, against aircraft. The RPG-7 was a Soviet-manufactured, shoulder-fired 40 mm missile launcher, originally designed to be used against tanks and armored vehicles. It had a range of about 3,000 ft (920 m), although its effective range was closer to 650 ft (200 m). The RPGs proved highly effective against helicopters, especially when landing or taking off. By 1985, the CIA had supplied more than 10,000 RPG-7s to the insurgents for use against Soviet armored vehicles and aircraft. The unguided RPGs were not effective against combat jets.

By 1985, the war in Afghanistan had reached a stalemate. The mujahideen were able to conduct attacks throughout the countryside, but had difficulty holding territory in the face of overwhelming Soviet airpower. Mujahideen military leaders and CIA officials were convinced that the key to turning the tide was the use of more advanced antiaircraft missiles. In 1986, the CIA provided some British Blowpipe surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to the mujahideen. However, the size of the system, its limited range, and the need for the operator to steer the missile made it ill-suited for the Afghan

resistance (the British retired the system from service in 1986).

In May 1986, the United States began to supply the mujahideen with the advanced FIM-92 Stinger missile system. U.S. military officials had initially been reluctant to supply the mujahideen with Stingers for fear that they would fall into the hands of the Soviets and would be easily traced back to the United States. Nevertheless, CIA officials and hardliners within the administration of President Ronald W. Reagan were able to gain approval for the deployment of the missile systems. By the time of the Soviet withdrawal, approximately 250 Stinger launchers and somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500 Stinger missiles had been provided to the mujahideen.

The Stinger changed the course of the war in Afghanistan. The system was a shoulder-fired missile launcher. It was lightweight (33.5 lbs or 15.2 kg), had a range of 5 miles (8 km), and had a larger warhead than other systems (6.6 lbs or 3 kg). It used an infrared guidance system that proved to be highly accurate. Because of its range and accuracy, it could be used effectively against all types of aircraft. From 1986 to 1989, Stingers were responsible for downing about 270 Soviet airplanes and helicopters. The missiles forced the Soviets to reorient their air campaign, utilizing more high-altitude bombing, which proved to be less effective.

When the Soviets began to withdraw, the CIA endeavored to buy back the Stingers from the mujahideen. They recovered about 300 missiles, leaving an estimated 500–600 unaccounted for. While some were transported to other countries, there were still Stinger systems in use during the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001) and Operation Enduring Freedom. There were also a number of SA-7s and even a few Blowpipe systems still in operation. The initial airstrikes of Operation Enduring Freedom seemed to have

destroyed most of the Taliban's antiaircraft capabilities. Also, U.S. and coalition troops were able to recover antiaircraft missile systems after the fall of the Taliban. The Taliban and al Qaeda were effective at using RPGs against helicopters. In addition, the insurgents used an unknown antiaircraft missile to shoot down a U.S. Chinook helicopter in 2007, and coalition forces have reported a number of near misses since 2001.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Al Qaeda; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Special Operations Forces; Taliban; Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Taliban Insurgency; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Arghandab, Battle of (1987)

The Battle of Arghandab (May–June 1987) was a major victory for the mujahideen over a combined Soviet-Afghan government force. During the spring of 1987, various mujahideen militias had launched a series of

raids and attacks near the city of Kandahar. The strikes had been highly successful, causing significant casualties among Soviet and Afghan government troops and the loss of equipment, weapons, and ammunition.

To suppress the mujahideen, the Soviets created a column, about 6,000 strong, centered around a mechanized brigade, with the bulk of the troops and armored vehicles from the Afghan Army. The operation called for a pincer movement to surround and trap the main mujahideen forces at Arghandab, six miles to the north of Kandahar. Arghandab was on a major mujahideen supply route from Pakistan.

Speed and surprise were the keys to the success of the attack, but the terrain was crisscrossed with irrigation ditches and the ground was soggy from recent rains. Meanwhile, the mujahideen had built a series of bunkers and trenches. The advance became bogged down as tanks and armored vehicles were slowed or even became stuck in the muddy fields, presenting prime targets for the mujahideen. In addition, the mujahideen mined likely attack routes. Soviet airpower was minimized after several helicopters were shot down by Stinger antiaircraft missiles. The Soviets tried to use artillery to pummel an area and then send in infantry; however, the defensive fortifications of the mujahideen proved far more sturdy than anticipated. After an artillery barrage, the mujahideen would reoccupy trenches and inflict heavy casualties on the advancing Afghan government troops. Morale among the regular Afghan forces and progovernment militias deteriorated quickly and individual soldiers, and then whole units, began to defect. By June, some government forces were in open mutiny and refused to participate in the offensive.

Toward the end of the offensive, food was in short supply among the mujahideen and

they had limited medical capabilities to treat their wounded. Nonetheless, they continued to stubbornly man their trenches and fortifications. After 34 days, the Soviet and government forces withdrew. They had lost an estimated 500 killed or wounded, with another 1,000–1,200 captured or deserted. The mujahideen lost approximately 150 killed and an unknown number of wounded. The mujahideen were able to keep an important supply route from Pakistan open and maintain their strong hold on the region.

Tom Lansford

See also: Antiaircraft Missiles; Armored Vehicles; Mujahideen; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics.

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Armored Vehicles

Although significant portions of Afghan terrain are unsuitable for armored vehicles, armored cars and tanks have played an important role in combat operations since the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919). As early as 1915, the British deployed some early armored cars in the frontier region between the Indian colonies and Afghanistan. The vehicles were modified Rolls-Royce cars, enclosed with armor plate, that had a single turret with a .303 machine gun, and a crew of three. They were used mainly for scouting, but their firepower also proved highly valuable during infantry attacks, especially during an advance to relieve the siege of Thal in June 1919.

Armored vehicles were critical to the success of the initial Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during Operation Storm 333 (December 1979). The Soviets deployed airborne and special forces units into Afghanistan to attack key government and military installations, including the capital. Armored vehicles were deployed with some of the units to quickly move them to their objectives. For instance, Soviet airborne units took control of Bagram airfield on the eve of the invasion and then moved by armored vehicles to Kabul. Meanwhile, the main thrust of the Soviet invasion was led by motor rifle divisions (mechanized infantry), which had main battle tanks (MBT), infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), and armored personnel carriers (APC). A typical Soviet motor rifle division had 13,000 troops, with about 280 MBTs, 150 IFVs, and 220 APCs. A Soviet armored division, meanwhile, had about 10,500 troops, with 340 MBTs and 240 IFVs. The pro-Soviet Afghan National Army had about 500 older, mostly light tanks and 500 APCs and IFVs.

During the occupation, the Soviets used armored vehicles for reconnaissance, to rapidly transport troops, for fire support, and to lead assaults. The mujahideen had few armored vehicles and relied on antitank missiles and mines to fight Soviet armored vehicles. They did capture some vehicles, while others were acquired through the defections of Afghan Army personnel (including older MBTs). The Soviets tended to use armored vehicles in large formations, which limited their effectiveness against the more mobile mujahideen. In addition, older models of armored vehicles were often deployed in Afghanistan.

The main Soviet MBT used in Afghanistan was the T-62. Although there were various models, the most common weighed 37 tons and had a crew of four; it had a

top speed of 31 miles per hour and a range of 280 miles. The T-62 was equipped with a 115 mm cannon and two machine guns. After the initial invasion, the Soviets maintained approximately 300–700 T-62s in Afghanistan, depending on the year and combat conditions. The T-62 proved vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), especially the RPG-7, and mines (the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency supplied more than 10,000 RPG-7s and 200,000 warheads to the mujahideen by 1985). A new model, the T-62M, with reinforced armor was subsequently introduced to eliminate this weakness. The Soviets lost an estimated 380 tanks during the 10-year occupation.

The mujahideen had few armored vehicles, but they were able to deploy some captured tanks and armored cars. At the First Battle of Zhawar (September 1985), the mujahideen used two T-55s (the predecessor of the T-62) that had been captured from Afghan government forces. The two tanks played a pivotal role in a counterattack that won the confrontation for the insurgents.

The principal Soviet IFV was at first the BMP-1, which had a semiautomatic 73 mm cannon, along with a rocket launcher and machine gun. The IFV had a crew of three and could carry up to eight infantrymen. It had a speed of 40 miles per hour and a range of 370 miles. The BMP-1 was slowly superseded by the BMP-2, introduced in 1980, which had an automatic 30 mm cannon, rocket launcher, and machine gun. The newer model had a crew of three and could carry up to seven infantrymen with a similar range as its predecessor. The BMPs had a number of flaws that made them ill-suited for use in Afghanistan. The BMP-1 did not have air conditioning. The barrel of the main cannon of both models could not be elevated very high, meaning that they could not shoot at mujahideen firing down on them from mountain



Many armored vehicles left over from the Soviet Occupation (1979–1989) were still being used during Operation Enduring Freedom. Here a Soviet BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle advances near Chagatai in Northern Afghanistan in 2001. (AP Photo/Sergei Grits)

positions. Both models were vulnerable to mines and RPGs, leading to the introduction of a new variant in 1984 with better armor. More than 1,050 Soviet IFVs were destroyed in combat during the occupation.

The BTR-70 was the main Soviet APC during the occupation (it replaced the BTR-60, which tended to overheat easily). The BTR-70 had eight wheels and a speed of about 50 miles per hour, with a range of 250–375 miles, depending on the model. The APC had a crew of three and could carry seven passengers. It was armed with a light and heavy machine gun, but was lightly armored. Like the Soviet IFVs, the BTR-70 proved vulnerable to mines and RPGs, and its light armor could also be penetrated by heavy machine-gun fire (calibers larger than 7.62 mm). More than 1,450 Soviet APCs were destroyed in Afghanistan.

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, they destroyed a large number of their

combat vehicles, but some APCs and IFVs had been captured, and others fell into the hands of the mujahideen from the Afghan Army. The result was that a limited number of armored vehicles were used during the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), including T-62s and T-55s. After the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, they acquired the main stockpiles of armor. In addition, the Taliban were able to purchase additional MBTs, IFVs, and APCs in the 1990s (through illicit arms sales). On the eve of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, the Taliban had an estimated 400 T-55 and T-62 MBTs and 200–300 IFVs and APCs.

Operation Enduring Freedom began in October with airstrikes against Taliban military targets, including the group's limited armor assets. U.S. and coalition special forces worked with the Northern Alliance to attack Taliban targets. The coalition special forces were able to call in airstrikes to

neutralize whatever small advantage the Taliban had in terms of armored vehicles. Meanwhile, the Northern Alliance used its small arsenal of tanks and modified armored vehicles against the Taliban. During the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, the coalition did not deploy MBTs. The United States did provide funding for the Northern Alliance to purchase armored vehicles from Russia, including 40 T-55 tanks and 12 helicopters in November 2001.

After the fall of the Taliban, the U.S.-led coalition began deploying a range of armored vehicles. In 2006, Canada, and later Denmark, deployed Leopard 1 and 2 MBTs. The Leopard had a crew of four and was armed with a 120 mm cannon, along with two light machine guns. It was not until 2011 that the United States began deploying its main MBT, the M1A2 Abrams. The Abrams's armament was a 120 mm cannon, one heavy (.50 caliber) and two light machine guns. It had a crew of four. U.S. and coalition tactics were different from those employed by the Soviets, with a higher reliance on light infantry, supported by airpower and artillery, and special forces operations. Therefore there was less of a need for MBTs in Afghanistan.

U.S. and coalition forces did make extensive use of other armored vehicles. The United States utilized the High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (Humvee), Model A2 and its variants (as of 2015, there were 17 variants of the Humvee in use by the U.S. military). Humvees were used as reconnaissance vehicles, troop transports, ambulances, platforms for heavy machine guns, and even missile launchers. Humvees had top speeds of 50–70 miles per hour (depending on the model) and were effective at maneuvering in the Afghan terrain. The vehicles proved vulnerable to mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), prompting the deployment of the M1114, a version of the

Humvee with additional armor. The use of IEDs increased substantially after insurgents in the Iraq War were able to use them to great effect against Humvees. The United States also expanded its use of the M1117 Guardian, a hybrid IFV-APC. The Guardian had a turret with a 40 mm grenade launcher and .50 caliber machine gun. It also had a light machine gun, with a crew of three, and the capacity to carry eight troops. The Afghan National Army (ANA) also used a modified version of the M1117, the Commando. By 2015, the ANA had more than 600 versions of the Commando or the M1117 in service. Other coalition members used a variety of APCs and IFVs, including the Piranha and the Coyote.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Al Qaeda; Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); Iraq War (2003–); Operation Anaconda (2002); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Operation Storm 333 (1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Special Operations Forces; Taliban; Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Taliban Insurgency; Tora Bora, Battle of (2001); United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986).

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Artillery, Cannons, and Mortars

Artillery, cannons, and mortars have played an integral role in the wars of Afghanistan. Long-range artillery proved to be an effective weapon to counter mounted attacks during the 1700s, 1800s, and early 1900s. In the contemporary period, it provided long-range fire support for ground troops. However, the rugged, mountainous terrain of Afghanistan often diminished the impact of artillery and provided significant cover for those targeted in barrages.

By the 1700s, cannons were widely used by the various warring factions in Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah Durrani (the "Father" of Afghanistan), who united the tribes into a single kingdom, effectively used artillery in a series of victories. Ahmad Shah's forces utilized a camel gun, known as a *zamburak*. The *zamburak* was a light artillery piece, or swivel cannon, that was mounted on a camel. The camel would be brought to its knees and the gun fired. It proved a highly useful system of mobile artillery for use against infantry and cavalry (its small size made it ineffective against fortifications). Although there were wide variations, the barrel of the *zamburak* was smoothbore and usually about 3–4 feet (1–1.2 m) in length and with a 2-inch caliber, allowing it to fire a 1-pound (0.5 kg) ball or the equivalent amount of grapeshot. The *zamburak* allowed the Afghans to avoid

the problems associated with transporting heavy artillery across mountains or other rugged terrain. The weapons also only required a single crewman. The weapons helped the Afghans win major victories such as the Battle of Gulnabad (1722) and Panipat (1761). They would later be used in both the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839–1842, and 1878–1880, respectively).

The Afghans, and their later opponents, the British, also used heavier cannons of various calibers. Larger weapons were usually deployed in fortresses. The smoothbore cannons were identified by the size of their ordnance, ranging from 4-pounders (which had a 3.2-inch caliber) to 42-pounders (with a 7-inch diameter). The most common sizes for field artillery were the 6-, 9-, and 12-pounders. During the First Anglo-Afghan War, the Anglo-Indian forces did not deploy large numbers of artillery because of the difficulty of transporting the guns. Both sides used field artillery, which was transported by horses or mules and designed to shift from one area of the battlefield to another. Artillery was organized into batteries, typically of four to six guns.

For the remainder of the 1800s, successive Afghan rulers endeavored to improve their army's artillery by purchasing more modern weapons. By the time of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the Afghan artillery was superior in some cases to that of the invading Anglo-Indian force. For instance, at the Battle of Maiwand, the Afghans deployed 30 guns, including six 12-pound rifled artillery pieces that were better than anything the British had on the field and howitzers, to just 12 guns of the British. The battle was a decisive defeat for the British. After the war, improvements continued so that by 1891, the Afghan Army had 860 artillery pieces serviced by more than 5,500 gunners. The increasingly efficient artillery allowed Emir

Abdur Rahman Khan to defeat a series of rebellions in the late 1800s.

In the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), the Anglo-Indian forces showcased the newer weaponry developed during World War I (1914–1919), including armored vehicles, aircraft, modern machine guns, trench mortars, and quick-firing artillery. Over the next several decades, Afghan military equipment would become outdated, as less attention and funding was devoted to the army. After World War II, Afghanistan turned to the Soviet Union for military aid (after being rejected by the United States). Consequently, the Afghan artillery used primarily Soviet weapons, including the 122 mm D-30 howitzer, the 152 mm D-1 howitzer, and the 82 mm 2B9, a wheeled mortar that fired four-round clips of ammunition.

The Soviets and the troops of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) initially had substantial advantages in artillery following the 1979 invasion. Soviet artillery was used in a defensive posture to protect bases and forces in the field, including convoys. Forward observers were deployed with ground units to direct fire from central bases. For offensive operations, artillery could be used to ambush mujahideen patrols by presighting positions and using forward observers or aircraft to report enemy movements. The Soviets found that self-propelled artillery and mortars were much more effective than traditional howitzers, especially when fighting insurgents in caves or bunkers. In addition, the terrain made it very difficult to quickly move artillery or to deploy it in certain operations. Close air support from helicopters also proved more effective than traditional artillery barrages. To destroy enemy bases, the Soviets introduced the gigantic 240 mm 2S4 self-propelled mortar, which fired a laser-guided shell.

The mujahideen initially relied on captured DRA and Soviet artillery and mortars. However, the guerrilla tactics employed by the insurgents reduced the need for traditional artillery. The mujahideen needed weapons that were portable and easily hidden. They preferred rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) that proved highly effective at close-range targets. During the occupation, the mujahideen received support, including mortars and ammunition for captured artillery and mortars from external supporters such as Pakistan, with funding from the United States and the Persian Gulf states, among others.

Soviet-made artillery and mortars continued to be used during the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001) by both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. For instance, the D30 howitzer was the most common artillery piece. When the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States initially relied on airpower to support the Northern Alliance. Throughout the U.S. intervention, airpower continued to play a major role in providing fire support for ground troops. However, as more U.S. and coalition troops were deployed, the amount and variety of artillery and mortars expanded. One of the most widely used pieces was the 105 mm M119 howitzer used by U.S. and British (designated as the L118) forces. In 2007, the United States began deploying the lightweight 155 mm M777 howitzer in Afghanistan. The M777 had a range of almost 15 miles (24 km), although it could fire an M982 extended-range shell that was GPS-guided with a range of 25 miles (40 km). Like the Soviets, the U.S. coalition found that the terrain made it difficult to transport and deploy heavy guns, causing most artillery to be deployed in stationary bases. Conversely, mortars could be moved

with ground transport or helicopters and fired from much more difficult areas. The United States also utilized self-propelled weapons systems such as the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, capable of firing 12 rockets, which was much more accurate than traditional artillery.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Airborne Units and Tactics; Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Arghandab, Battle of (1987); Armored Vehicles; Mujahideen; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Auchinleck, Sir Claude (1884–1981)

Sir Claude Auchinleck was a noted British general during the 20th century. Born on June 21, 1884, at Aldershot, Auchinleck attended the Royal Military College, Sandhurst and joined the Indian Army in 1903. He was commissioned into the 62nd Punjabis the next year. In 1906 he served in Tibet and in 1907 was posted to Sikkim. During World War I Auchinleck served with his regiment during the repulsing of the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal in 1915, as well as in Aden in 1915 and Mesopotamia in 1916–1918. He received the Distinguished Service Order for his war service. In 1919 Auchinleck attended the Staff College, Quetta and rejoined his regiment, now retitled the 1st battalion, 1st Punjab Regiment, at Peshawar for frontier service. The regiment was deployed in 1926 to settle a boundary dispute between the Waziris and the Mahsuds. After attending the Imperial Defence College in 1927, he was appointed to the command of his regiment in 1928. With the rank of colonel he served as an instructor at Quetta from 1930 to 1932.

In 1933 Auchinleck was appointed to command the Peshawar Brigade. That same year he conducted a short month-long expedition against the Mohmands that involved little actual fighting. In 1935 the Mohmands attacked the road being built from Peshawar, and the British responded with a large-scale expedition consisting of Auchinleck’s brigade and the neighboring Nowshera Brigade under Harold Alexander. As Auchinleck was the senior of the two, he was placed in command of the force that included a tank formation and was supported by Royal Air Force aircraft. The advance of the two brigades began in August 1935 with the campaign conducted in great heat over difficult

terrain against stubborn resistance. During the expedition, tanks were used operationally in India for the first time. By September 1935 the road had been lengthened and the British forces had pushed deep into Mohmand territory. The Mohmands submitted on October 1, 1935.

Auchinleck's service with the Peshawar Brigade enhanced his already excellent reputation, and in 1936 he was appointed deputy chief of the general staff in India. In the early stages of the outset of World War II he commanded Anglo-French land forces at Narvik in the ill-fated Norwegian Campaign and Southern Command in England. In November 1940 he was promoted to general and appointed commander in chief, India. In 1941–1942 Auchinleck served as commander in chief, Middle East during a difficult period of the war and was dismissed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August 1942, being replaced by Harold Alexander. After a period of inactivity, Auchinleck was reappointed commander in chief, India in June 1943 and was responsible for supporting operations against the Japanese in Burma and after the war overseeing the Indian Army during the Partition of India. Auchinleck was promoted to field marshal in 1946. Asked to resign by Louis Mountbatten after the Partition, he left India and retired in 1947. He declined a peerage. Auchinleck died on March 23, 1981, at Marrakesh, Morocco, where he had lived for the last 13 years of his life.

Bradley P. Tolppanen

See also: Mohmand Campaigns.

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Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of (1784–1849)

Sir George Eden, Earl of Auckland, was a British politician who served as governor-general of India and was responsible for initiating the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Auckland was born on August 25, 1784, in Kent, England to a minor aristocratic family (his father was the first Baron Auckland). He enjoyed an upper-class education, attending both Eton and Oxford. After his older brother William died in 1810, Auckland became heir to the barony and took the elder brother's seat in the House of Commons. He then acceded to the House of Lords in 1814 when his father died and he inherited the title. The young baron emerged as a prominent member of the Whig Party.

Auckland served in a variety of government posts, including first lord of the Admiralty. Auckland, New Zealand, was named in his honor in 1840. Meanwhile, in 1835, he was appointed governor-general of India. When he arrived in Calcutta in 1836, the Great Game for influence in Central Asia between Britain and Russia was intensifying. Russian expansion in the region was seen as a potential threat to India. Auckland sought to create a bulwark against Russian influence through treaties of commerce and friendship with regional leaders. He actively sought to undermine Russian influence in Iran (Persia), but Afghanistan was seen as the key buffer to protect India.

In 1836, the governor-general sent noted adventurer Captain Sir Alexander ("Sekundar") Burnes to the court of Afghan emir Dost Mohammad to secure a trade agreement. Burnes was warmly received by the Afghan leader, who sought allies against the Russian-backed Persians and the Sikhs. Under Auckland, the British

broke off relations with Persia over the Siege of Herat (1837–1838). In addition, the governor-general dispatched forces to the Persian Gulf to occupy the Persian island of Kharg.

Through this period, Auckland sought to avoid alienating the Sikh leader, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who was in the midst of a territorial dispute with the Afghans. In January 1838, the colonial Indian government announced to Dost Mohammad that it backed Ranjit Singh's territorial claims. In addition, Auckland's closest advisers, including Sir William Hay Macnaghten, head of Delhi's secret political bureau, contended that Dost Mohammad could not be trusted and instead urged the governor-general to back a rival to the Afghan emir, Shuja Shah. The result was a deterioration in relations between Auckland and Burnes and between the British and the Afghans. Burnes was reprimanded at one point for pledging to provide monetary support for Afghan chiefs in the Kandahar region if they resisted a potential Persian (Iranian) incursion.

After Auckland rejected Dost Mohammad's appeal for support, the emir dispatched a mission to Moscow that resulted in a Russian envoy arriving in Kabul in 1838. Auckland demanded that Dost Mohammad force the Russian to leave, but the emir refused. In response, on October 1, Auckland issued the Simla Manifesto in which he formally announced support for the replacement of Dost Mohammad with Shuja Shah. The manifesto was, in effect, a declaration of war. He concurrently ordered military preparations for an invasion to begin. By the next month, British forces were moving toward the border with Afghanistan.

Hostilities in the First Anglo-Afghan War began in 1839 as an Anglo-Indian column advanced into Afghanistan through the Bolan Pass. Kandahar fell in April, and

Kabul in August. Shuja Shah was installed on the throne and Dost Mohammad subsequently surrendered on November 4. Auckland was created the Earl of Auckland for his actions. The main British forces subsequently withdrew from Afghanistan, but in the later months of 1841, the Afghans rose in rebellion, killing both Burnes and later Macnaghten.

In response to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, Auckland was replaced by the Earl of Ellenborough in February 1842. Meanwhile, the Afghans forced the British to withdraw from Kabul and then massacred the retreating forces. Shuja Shah was assassinated on April 5, 1842. The British regrouped their forces and launched a major campaign to punish the Afghans, but withdrew after recapturing Kabul and conducting a series of reprisals. In Britain, the war came to be known derisively as "Auckland's Folly."

In spite of the disasters of the First Anglo-Afghan War, Auckland retained a significant amount of political patronage. He returned to Britain and was again appointed first lord of the Admiralty in 1846. A lifelong bachelor, Auckland died on January 1, 1849.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Bolan Pass; Burnes, Sir Alexander ("Sekundar"); Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Elphinstone, William George Keith; Ghazni, Battle of (1839); Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Macnaghten, Sir William Hay; Nott, Sir William; Pollock, Sir George; Ranjit Singh, Maharaja; Sale, Sir Robert Henry ("Fighting Bob").

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Avitabile, Paolo (1791–1850)

Paolo Crescenzo Martino (“Abu Tabela”) Avitabile was an Italian mercenary who served in the Persian and Sikh armies and was governor of Peshawar after it was conquered in 1833 from Afghan king Dost Mohammad Khan. Avitabile was born on October 25, 1791, in Agerola, in the Kingdom of Naples. In 1807, he joined the militia of Naples, serving in the artillery. Although he enlisted, Avitabile rose to the rank of lieutenant. He was wounded at the Battle of Gaeta in 1815 and placed on half pay. With the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the future general traveled to Constantinople, and then to Persia (Iran) where in 1820 he obtained a commission in the army of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar, the second Qajar shah of Persia. He eventually rose to the rank of colonel. In 1826, seeking better pay and higher promotion, Avitabile resigned from service with the shah and traveled along with another European officer to join Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s army (at the time, the Sikh leader actively sought European officers to train and enhance his forces). Avitabile was one of four Europeans appointed as senior generals in the Sikh Army.

Avitabile initially oversaw the Maharaja’s command, but in 1827, Ranjit Singh appointed him governor of Wazirabad. He held the position for seven years and developed a reputation as an efficient but stern administrator. In 1834, Avitabile was transferred to

Peshawar to suppress the rebellious tribesmen in the recently conquered region. The following year, Dost Mohammad raised an army and marched to recapture Peshawar, but the invasion failed due to poor logistics and planning. However, the continuous threat of another potential invasion prompted Avitabile to undertake drastic measures against the local populace, including mass hangings. He became known as “Abu Tabela” (a corruption of his last name). The specter of “Abu Tabela” would be used among locals as a boogeyman to threaten miscreant children for more than a century following his tenure.

During the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), the governor provided a variety of assistance for the invading British forces, including porters, pack animals, and supplies. He also shared intelligence with the invading forces, although senior British officers did not always give appropriate credence to his information.

In 1843, Avitabile retired and returned to Naples, along with a fortune that he had acquired while in service to Ranjit Singh. He married Enrichetta Coccia and settled into the life of a wealthy landowner. Avitabile died on March 28, 1850.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars) (1748–1837); Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Bolan Pass; Dost Mohammad; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Ranjit Singh, Maharaja.

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B

Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty Organization)

The Baghdad Pact was an anti-Soviet alliance formed in 1955, and renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959. The pact included Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, but Iraq withdrew from the alliance in 1959. The pact was originally formed to accomplish two U.S. goals. First, the United States sought to create a series of regional alliances to contain the Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949, was the first of these coalitions, which also included the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), created in 1954. The administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower hoped SEATO and CENTO would reduce the need for large-scale deployments of U.S. military forces by strengthening the collective security arrangements of regional allies. Second, the United States specifically wanted to establish what policymakers in Washington called a “Northern Tier” of allies to serve as a bulwark against Soviet expansion into the Middle East.

In 1950, Afghanistan signed an economic cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. The accord prompted the administration of President Harry S. Truman and his successors to launch a variety of initiatives to improve relations with Kabul. The United States increased economic aid and, once in office, the Eisenhower administration expanded these efforts, including inviting Afghanistan to join the Baghdad Pact. However, Afghan prime minister Mohammed Daoud Khan

declined the invitation and instead endeavored to remain neutral in the superpower conflict, all the while attempting to maximize economic assistance from both Moscow and Washington. Daoud was also alarmed by British and U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. Both London and Washington saw Pakistan as the key to preventing Soviet influence in the Middle East. However, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan remained strained over a continuing border dispute and Daoud’s open support for the reunification of the Pakistani Pashtun population with the Afghan Pashtuns.

The Baghdad Pact never developed the robust degree of military cooperation that characterized NATO or, to a lesser degree, SEATO. In addition, while the United States signed bilateral military cooperation agreements with the individual members of the alliance, it did not formally join the grouping. There were a series of joint military exercises among the allies and substantial military assistance from the United States and the United Kingdom. The U.S. military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 and the British intervention in Jordan that same year, combined with the coup in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy, led Baghdad to withdraw from the pact. In response, the organization was relaunched as CENTO with a much more significant role in promoting economic development. When Pakistan requested assistance through CENTO during its 1965 war with India, the United States and the United Kingdom remained neutral. Following the Iranian Revolution, Tehran withdrew from CENTO in 1979, followed

by Turkey and Pakistan, and the organization was dissolved.

Tom Lansford

See also: Cold War (1947–1949); Helmand Valley Project; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Bagram Air Base

Bagram Air Base was a former Afghan and Soviet air force facility that became the major airfield for the U.S.-led coalition forces during and after Operation Enduring Freedom. It was also the largest coalition base of any type in the country. Bagram is located in Parwan Province, approximately 11 km (6.8 miles) from Charikar and 47 km (27 miles) north of Kabul. The local climate is far from ideal for an airfield as frequent sand and dust storms affect operations, and temperatures vary from 120°F (48.9°C) in the summer to 15°F (–9.4°C) in the winter.

The base was first constructed in the 1950s. It had a single runway, but was one of the few airfields in Afghanistan capable of handling large aircraft. In 1976, a new, larger runway was built. The base was one of the first facilities seized during the Soviet invasion in 1979, and it served as a major hub for

Soviet forces during that country's occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). Soviet air units flew from Bagram to conduct bombing missions against the mujahideen, while airborne units also used the facility. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the provincial government took control of the base. The Northern Alliance held the airfield even after the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. The anti-Taliban forces used the base to launch attacks on Kabul. Bagram was subsequently the scene of bitter fighting in 1999–2000, before the Taliban was able to dislodge the Northern Alliance.

British special forces units captured Bagram during the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). The facility was initially used for infantry units as the runway and infrastructure were repaired by the coalition. Eventually, the U.S.-led forces built more than 1,200 structures and added a second major runway, which at 3,500 meters (11,482 ft) was 497 meters (1,630 ft) longer than the original one. At its peak, the base housed 40,000 coalition troops and support personnel and launched 140,000 air missions annually. From Bagram, the mission was launched that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 2011. The base was also the site of a prisoner camp that was the subject of severe criticism by the Red Cross and other humanitarian groups. In response, Parwan, a new detention facility, was built at the base in 2009. In 2012, the management of Parwan was turned over to Afghan authorities.

From the time that coalition forces occupied the base onward, they faced repeated attacks from Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents, including suicide bombings. Bagram was also frequently the target of rocket and mortar attacks, and the insurgents also planted landmines and improvised explosive devices around the airfield. However, the

attacks had only a minimal impact on operations.

With the end of formal combat operations by the United States and its allies in 2014, and the subsequent withdrawal of forces, the base was dramatically reduced in size and scope, although it remained under the operational control of U.S. forces.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Aircraft, Types and Tactics; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Bala Hissar

Bala Hissar (“High Fort”) was a massive citadel at the southern edge of Kabul that served alternatively as the main military fortress of the city and the seat of government. Strategically located on the Sher Darwaza ridge, Bala Hissar overlooked Kabul and was estimated to have been first constructed in the late fifth or early sixth century. The fort had access to fresh water through a series of wells. It was expanded and strengthened multiple times throughout Afghan history, most notably following the capture

of Kabul in 1505 by the Mughal emperor Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur. Babur expanded the fortress, creating an armory and dungeon in the upper section and adding additional walls and turrets to create a lower area, which included his palace. Here he located an elaborate garden, fed by a canal from the Kabul River. The walls of the citadel were up to 6 meters (6.6 yards) high and 4 meters (4.4 yards) thick. The walls were irregular to conform to the shape of the hill upon which the building was located. The fortress measured roughly 600 meters (656 yards) from north to south, and 800 meters (875 yards) from east to west. Approximately 5,000 members of the royal family, courtiers and officials, soldiers and servants lived in Bala Hissar.

Afghan ruler Timur Shah relocated his capital to Kabul in 1775 and rebuilt Bala Hissar, which had fallen into disrepair. Subsequent rulers also lived in the citadel, but again allowed it to deteriorate. When the British invaded Afghanistan in 1839 during the First Anglo-Afghan War, they chose not to occupy the fortress because of its conditions and instead established a camp on the northern side of the Kabul River. During the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the facility was badly damaged when its armory exploded. The citadel was the site of a series of 49 reprisal hangings by the British during their occupation. The British made some repairs to the fortress and briefly utilized it as a barracks before their withdrawal in 1880. Afghan ruler Abdur Rahman Khan decided against reoccupying Bala Hissar and instead built a new palace. The citadel served as a military academy in the 20th century.

In 1979, opponents of the pro-Soviet regime endeavored to use Bala Hissar as a base during an uprising, but they were quickly defeated by security forces. In 1994, the site was the scene of bitter fighting

during Afghanistan's civil war. It suffered significant damage during combat between the forces of Ahmed Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar. In the early 2000s, new military installations were built on the site.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Durrani, Timur Shah; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Kabul; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Mughal Empire (1526–1857).

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Barakzai

The Barakzai (sons of Barak) are one of the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan and have traditionally formed part of the political and social elite of the country. The founder of modern Afghanistan was Ahmad Shah Durrani, who established the Durrani dynasty in 1747. The Durrani Empire was wracked by civil wars in the early 1800s as the sons of Timur Shah Durrani fought each other for the throne. During this period the Barakzai became increasingly powerful. Fateh Khan Barakzai was appointed chief minister for Emir Mahmud Shah Durrani after helping the new emir overthrow his brother, Zaman Shah Durrani. However, Fateh Khan fell out of favor with the emir, who had him arrested and eventually killed. The Barakzai rose in revolt and overthrew the emir, who was

followed by two other Durrani before Dost Mohammad Khan, a younger brother of Fateh Khan, secured the throne and established the Barakzai dynasty in 1823. Dost Mohammad and his successors were members of the Mohammadzai (sons of Mohammad) subtribe of the Barakzai. During the Barakzai dynasty, the tribe's major nemesis were the Ghilzai, the largest of the Pashtun groups in Afghanistan.

Dost Mohammad died in 1839 during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Shuja Shah Durrani, a son of Timur Shah, was installed by the British as emir, but was assassinated in 1842. A Barakzai, Sher Ali Khan, succeeded Shuja Shah in 1842. Through the remainder of the 19th century, Barakzai rulers appointed family members to various political and military posts throughout Afghanistan. The ascendancy of the Barakzai created tensions with other Pashtun tribes and resulted in a series of revolts in the late 1800s. Meanwhile, Sher Ali Khan was overthrown by the British during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), but was ultimately replaced by his nephew, a grandson of Dost Mohammad, Abdur Rahman Khan.

A succession of Barakzais ruled until 1929, when the dynasty was briefly interrupted by Habibullah Kalakani's seizure of power in January of that year. The Barakzai were restored to the throne under King Mohammed Nadir Shah in October 1929. Mohammad Nadir ruled until 1933, when he was assassinated by an ethnic Hazara. Mohammad Nadir's son, Mohammad Zahir Shah, was crowned in November 1933 and reigned until 1973. Zahir Shah was deposed by a cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan, who was proclaimed the first president of Afghanistan. Although the Barakzai dynasty had ended with Zahir Shah, Mohammed Daoud was a prince of the Barakzai by birth.

and had married the former king's sister. Mohammed Daoud was killed, along with most of his family, during the pro-Soviet Saur Revolution in 1978.

After the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies, Zahir Shah helped unite the various tribes and factions behind interim president Hamid Karzai. The former king was granted the title "Father of the Nation" in 2002. He died in Kabul on July 23, 2007.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Khan, Mohammed Daoud; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Shah, Mohammed Nadir.

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Barno, David W. (1954–)

David Barno was a U.S. lieutenant general who commanded coalition forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005. Barno was born in 1954 in Endicott, New York. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1976 and was commissioned a second lieutenant. By 1980, he was a captain and had undergone Ranger training. In 1983, during the invasion of Grenada, he commanded a Ranger company. Barno also served during the invasion of Panama in 1989, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1992. Meanwhile, Barno earned a graduate degree in National Security and Strategic

Studies from Georgetown University, in addition to further studies at the Army War College and the Staff College. Barno commanded a regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division, and then a Ranger battalion, before being promoted to brigadier general and made assistant commander of an infantry division. In 2001, he was promoted to major general, and then lieutenant general two years later.

In October 2003, the newly promoted Barno was tasked with creating a new command that would include U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom, along with responsibility for regional operations in areas of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The general assumed command of coalition troops as the Taliban and al Qaeda had become increasingly aggressive in launching attacks from bases in Pakistan. In response to the Taliban-led insurgency, Barno oversaw a significant increase in coalition forces. In 2003, there were 10,400 international troops in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The number increased to 15,200 in 2004 and to 19,100 the following year. In addition, the area of operations of the U.S.-led coalition grew substantially as the allies sought to establish a presence throughout the country.

Besides combating the growing insurgency, Barno worked to train and ready the new Afghan National Army (ANA), which had been formally created in December 2002. The force initially had a goal of 70,000 troops and was comprised of both new recruits and former militia fighters. The first troops of the ANA were trained by the British, but the United States took over that responsibility. By the time Barno left his post, some 21,000 ANA troops were on active duty. Barno's third major task was to ensure security for the 2004 presidential elections. Despite threats from the Taliban

that they would disrupt the balloting, the polling was held with relatively few incidents of violence.

In May 2005, the general was appointed assistant chief of staff for installation management and transferred back to Washington, D.C. He retired from active duty in 2006. For the next three years, he was the director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He then became a senior fellow at the Center for New American Security and a frequent commentator on security and counterinsurgency issues.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Afghan War (2001–); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Karzai, Hamid; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Taliban; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Bearden, Milton (1940–)

Milton (“Milt”) Bearden was a career officer in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who oversaw the nation’s covert operations in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Bearden was born in April 1940 in Oklahoma. He joined the Air Force in 1958, serving until 1962. He graduated from the University of Texas at Austin and joined the CIA in 1964. Bearden

had a distinguished career and served around the globe, including tenures in Hong Kong, Germany, and later service as the CIA station chief in Nigeria and then in Sudan. In 1986, Bearden was transferred to Pakistan to oversee the covert CIA program of support for the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Bearden was charged by CIA director William Casey with organizing an all-out push to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan as part of the administration of President Ronald Reagan’s broader effort to win the Cold War.

Bearden was successful in increasing the financial support for the mujahideen from external supporters, including the Persian Gulf states. He also brought order to the massive amount of men, materials and weapons, and financial contributions that were flowing into the region to support the mujahideen. In addition, the new station chief improved relations with the Pakistani intelligence service. Bearden used the increasing resources to escalate attacks against Soviet and proregime targets and turn the tide of the conflict. During his tenure, the United States began supplying the mujahideen with advanced Stinger antiaircraft missiles. These weapons undermined Soviet air superiority by forcing planes to fly higher in order to avoid the missiles, and thereby decreasing the accuracy of bombing missions. The Stingers were also highly effective against Soviet helicopter gunships, weapons systems that had become critical for close air support of ground units. Mounting casualties and growing domestic opposition to the war prompted the Soviets to begin negotiations for a withdrawal in 1988. By the middle of February 1989, the last Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Bearden’s relations with his Pakistani counterparts were critically important following the death in an air crash of Pakistan’s

president, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, on August 17, 1988.

Bearden was promoted in 1989 to manage CIA operations in the Soviet Union during the waning days of the Cold War. He then became CIA station chief in Bonn, Germany, in 1992 before retiring in 1994. Bearden subsequently became noted for his commentary on security matters in leading news outlets, and his work as a film consultant. He also authored one work of fiction on the Afghan conflict, and coauthored a book on the end of the bipolar conflict.

Tom Lansford

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Mujahideen; Reagan, Ronald W.; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Wilson, Charles Nesbitt.

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Berntsen, Gary (1958–)

Gary Berntsen was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer who served in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and led efforts to capture or kill al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Berntsen was born on Long Island, New York, in 1958 and joined the Air Force at 18. He served for four years and then participated in the Marine Corps officer training program, but joined the CIA prior to obtaining a commission. In 1984, following two years of training,

Berntsen became a CIA field officer. Over the next 14 years, the former Air Force serviceman was assigned to a variety of counterterrorism posts, including service in Sri Lanka, the Persian Gulf, and as head of the agency’s Hezbollah section.

In 1998, Berntsen was assigned to lead the investigation and subsequent operations in the al Qaeda–led U.S. embassy bombing in Tanzania in which 11 people were killed and 85 injured (in the concurrent attack in Kenya, 213 were killed and 4,000 wounded). At the time, Berntsen and other CIA contemporaries advocated unsuccessfully for strong action against al Qaeda. Instead, the administration of President William J. Clinton launched a series of cruise missile attacks on suspected al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. Meanwhile, 21 suspected terrorists were apprehended in connection with the Tanzanian attacks, mainly as the result of Berntsen’s investigation.

Berntsen would later write in his memoirs that he contemplated leaving the CIA in 1999 as resources were diverted away from counterterrorism operations. However, he was persuaded to remain in the agency by his supervisor, and later head of the CIA’s counterterrorism center, Joseph Cofer Black. Black dispatched Berntsen to Afghanistan on a covert operation in 2000 to attack al Qaeda and support the Northern Alliance. However, the CIA operative was ordered out of the country before he could complete his mission.

Following the 9/11 attacks, Berntsen was appointed to lead CIA operations in eastern Afghanistan. He was specifically tasked with tracking down bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders and killing or capturing them. Berntsen attempted to intercept bin Laden after the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001; however, the lack of coalition military forces on the border between Afghanistan

and Pakistan allowed the al Qaeda leader and many of his forces to escape toward the end of the battle. Berntsen was highly critical of the failure of the CIA and Department of Defense to provide requested resources during his mission in Afghanistan.

Berntsen retired from the CIA in 2005. In 2008, he published a memoir of his experiences in Afghanistan, *Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda*. In 2010, the former CIA operative campaigned for the Republican nomination for a New York Senate seat. He lost in the primary, 55 percent to 45 percent. Berntsen continues to be a media commentator on security issues.

Tom Lansford

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Clinton, Bill; Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998); Embassy Bombings (1998); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Taliban; Tora Bora, Battle of (2001).

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Bhutto, Benazir (1953–2007)

Benazir Bhutto was the leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and prime minister of Pakistan from 1988 to 1990 and 1993 to 1996. Born in Karachi, Pakistan, on June 21, 1953, Bhutto was the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's popular leader and prime minister. Benazir Bhutto graduated from Radcliffe College in 1973 and went on to earn a degree from Oxford University in

philosophy, politics, and economics in 1976. She returned to Pakistan that same year.

On July 5, 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by army chief general Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Arrested by the new government, Bhutto was charged with the murder of a political opponent and executed in 1979. Benazir Bhutto, meanwhile, was held under house arrest. She then left for Britain after her father's death as the leader-in-exile of the opposition PPP. Following Haq's lifting of martial law in 1986, Bhutto returned to Pakistan and became the nation's most prominent prodemocracy leader. After Haq's death, Bhutto won the national elections in December 1988, becoming the prime minister and the first female leader of a Muslim nation.

During the Soviet occupation, Bhutto opposed U.S. support for the Afghan mujahideen, whom she feared would radicalize groups within Pakistan. Instead, she favored a political solution to the Afghan conflict, but found herself at odds with senior Pakistani military and intelligence officers.

There was initial euphoria in both Pakistan and the West that Bhutto's leadership would bring about substantive reforms. But this optimism did not take into account the scale and scope of the problems she faced, and her first stint as prime minister witnessed few meaningful changes. In August 1990 she was ousted by a military coup, which claimed corruption on the part of her government. In October 1990, the United States suspended military and economic assistance to Pakistan because of the coup and its ongoing nuclear weapons program. After Bhutto's return to power in 1993, she visited Washington in April 1995, convincing American policymakers to suspend sanctions previously imposed on Pakistan.

During her second term in office, Bhutto made small strides toward reform, mainly

in health care and education. Her second term also witnessed the rise of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan, which seized power in September 1996 with financial and military backing from Pakistan. Her government was among the few to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In November 1996, Pakistani president Farooq Leghari again dissolved Bhutto's government on charges of corruption and financial irregularities.

In 1999 Bhutto and her husband, Ali Zardari, were convicted of corruption. That same year, Bhutto left Pakistan and went into exile in London and in Dubai. Zardari was freed in November 2004 after eight years in jail. In 2007, Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf granted Bhutto amnesty. Upon her return to politics that year, she was increasingly critical of the Taliban. Bhutto continued as the leader of the PPP until she was assassinated on December 27, 2007, on the eve of elections in which the PPP subsequently won.

Amrita Singh

See also: Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; Mujahideen; Musharraf, Pervez; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban; Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad.

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Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali (1928–1979)

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a Pakistani politician, president (1971–1973), and prime minister

(1973–1977). Born on January 5, 1928, in Larkana, Sind, India, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the son of Sir Shahnawaz Khan Bhutto, an influential landlord and politician in British India. Bhutto studied at the University of California, Berkeley, where he earned a BA degree in 1950, and at Oxford University.

Returning to Pakistan, Bhutto practiced law. He also served in 1957 as a member of the Pakistani delegation to the United Nations (UN). Entering politics, from 1958 he held several cabinet posts in the government led by Muhammad Ayub Khan. As foreign minister in Khan's government from 1963 and as prime minister from 1967 to 1977, Bhutto provided a new direction to Pakistan's foreign policy. He secured Pakistan's relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and when the United States sought rapprochement with China, it was Pakistan that acted as the mediator. Bhutto also bolstered relations with the Soviet Union in a bid to forge a more independent foreign policy and to project his country's prominence in the developing world.

Following differences with President Khan in the aftermath of the India-Pakistan War of 1965, Bhutto began a mass political campaign. His charismatic personality and talk of social justice met with an enthusiastic response, and in December 1967 he launched the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). In the elections of 1970, Bhutto's PPP won a resounding victory in West Pakistan, but the Awami League of East Pakistan won the majority vote. Bhutto continued to speak of the need for constitutional reform, but talks on the subject went nowhere. Meanwhile, the East Pakistani secession movement was rapidly gaining ground, and General Mohammad Yahya Khan, who had taken over from Ayub Khan in 1970, carried out a military crackdown in East Pakistan.

Pakistan was humiliated after its defeat by India in the 1971 India-Pakistan War. The subsequent emergence of Indian-backed Bangladesh added insult to injury. In 1971, Bhutto assumed power with the military's approval. He vowed to rebuild Pakistani morale, and a period of frenetic nation building ensued. Under Bhutto, the government established a special office to support Islamist opposition groups in Afghanistan as a means of undermining the regime of Mohammed Daoud. However, Bhutto and Daoud also worked to improve relations between the two countries.

To counter growing opposition due to his heavy-handed rule, Bhutto called for elections in 1977. Although ostensibly victorious, he was accused of electoral fraud and ousted from power by General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq on July 5, 1977. Bhutto was later arrested on charges of ordering the murder of a political opponent. He was subsequently convicted and executed on April 4, 1979, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Amrita Singh

See also: Bhutto, Benazir; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Mujahideen; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad.

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Bin Laden, Osama (1957–2011)

Islamic extremist and, as head of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, the world's

most notorious terrorist leader, Osama bin Laden was linked most notoriously to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States but also to numerous other acts of terrorism throughout the world. Born on March 10, 1957, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Usamah bin Muhammad bin 'Awa bin Ladin is most usually known as Osama bin Laden. The name Osama means "young lion" in Arabic. According to Arabic convention he should be referred to as bin Ladin, but in the West he is almost universally referred to as bin Laden.

Bin Laden's father, Muhammad bin Awdah bin Laden, was a highly successful and immensely wealthy construction manager from Yemen who prospered thanks to a close relationship with the Saudi royal family. His construction projects included first major highways and then the reconstruction of the Muslim holy cities of Medina and Mecca. The elder bin Laden, who was also strongly opposed to Israel, reportedly had 21 wives and fathered 54 children. Osama was the 17th son but the only son of his father's 10th wife, Hamida al-Attas. The elder bin Laden died in a plane crash in 1967. He left an estate reported to be \$11 billion. Osama bin Laden's personal inheritance has been variously estimated at between \$40 million and \$50 million.

The family moved a number of times but settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There bin Laden attended al-Thagr, the city's top school. He had some exposure to the West through vacations in Sweden and a summer program in English at Oxford University. At age 17 bin Laden married a 14-year-old cousin of his mother. In 1977 he entered King Abdulaziz University (now King Abdul Aziz University) in Jeddah, where he majored in economics and business management. Bin Laden was an indifferent student, but this was at least in part because of time

spent in the family construction business. He left school altogether in 1979, evidently planning to work in the family's Saudi Bin-ladin Group that then employed 37,000 people and was valued at some \$5 billion. This plan was apparently blocked by his older brothers.

As a boy bin Laden had received religious training in Sunni Islam, but around 1973 he began developing a fundamentalist religious bent. This was sufficiently strong to alarm other family members. Bin Laden also developed ties with the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood that same year. While at the university he was mentored in Islamic studies by Muhammad Qutb, brother of the martyred Sayyid Qutb, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, and by Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a proponent of jihad (holy war). Both men had a profound influence on bin Laden.

Two events also exacted a profound influence. The first was the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamists led by Juhaynan ibn-Muhammad-ibn Sayf al-Ta'ibi and the subsequent martyrdom of the group. The second was the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. It is safe to say that the latter event marked a major turning point in bin Laden's life.

In 1979 bin Laden traveled to Pakistan and there met with Afghan leaders Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdurab Rasul Sayaf. Bin Laden then returned to Saudi Arabia to organize resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan. There was considerable sentiment in Saudi Arabia for assisting the Afghans against the Soviets, and reportedly some 10,000 Saudis volunteered. Bin Laden returned to Pakistan with construction equipment, such as bulldozers, to aid the Afghan mujahideen (freedom fighters, holy warriors) fighting the Soviet troops and allied Afghan government forces. This equipment

was used to build roads, tunnels, shelters, and hospitals.

Bin Laden's organizational skills were more important than the equipment, however. He worked actively with Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam to recruit and train jihadists to fight in Afghanistan, much of the funding for which came from bin Laden's personal fortune. He also tapped his contacts in Saudi Arabia for additional funds. Azzam and bin Laden established the Mujahideen Services Bureau. Between 1985 and 1989, approximately 150,000 soldiers entered Afghanistan through training camps established in neighboring Pakistan by the Mujahideen Services Bureau.

In 1986 bin Laden, now having relocated to Peshawar, Pakistan, joined a mujahideen field unit and took part in actual combat. Notably, this included the 1987 Battle of the Lion's Den near Jaji. Such activity sharply increased bin Laden's prestige among the mujahideen.

The mysterious assassination of bin Laden's mentor Azzam on November 14, 1989, opened the way for bin Laden to assume a greater role in extremist Islamic politics. While he agreed with Azzam about the need for jihad against the enemies of Islam, bin Laden carried this philosophy a step further in insisting that it should be extended to a holy war on behalf of Islam around the world.

In the autumn of 1989 Azzam and bin Laden had founded the al Qaeda ("the base" in Arabic) organization. On its announcement, those present were required to sign a loyalty oath (*bayat*). With Azzam's death, bin Laden, at the age of 32, became the undisputed leader of al Qaeda.

With the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. He was now acclaimed as a hero both by the Saudi people and the government. Bin Laden soon



Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 1998. Bin Laden used Afghanistan as a base of operations for his global terrorist network. (AP Photo)

approached Prince Turki al-Faisal, head of the kingdom's intelligence services, offering to lead a guerrilla effort to overthrow the Marxist government of South Yemen, but Turki rejected the suggestion. Bin Laden then settled in Jeddah and worked in the family construction business until Iraqi president Saddam Hussein sent his army into Kuwait in August 1990.

The Iraqi military takeover of Kuwait directly threatened Saudi Arabia, and bin Laden again approached the Saudi government, offering to recruit as many as 12,000 men to defend the kingdom. The Saudi government again rebuffed him. Instead, it allowed U.S. and other Western troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia with the plan to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait by force if necessary. Incensed both at the rejection of his services and the injection of hundreds of thousands of infidels into his homeland, bin

Laden bitterly denounced the Saudi government. Indeed, he demanded that all foreign troops leave at once. His vocal opposition to Saudi government policy brought him a brief period of house arrest.

Bin Laden's opposition to Saudi government policies and the Persian Gulf War led him to leave the kingdom. He moved with his family first to Pakistan and then to Sudan, where he had earlier purchased property around Khartoum. He also moved his financial assets there and became involved in a series of business ventures including a road-building company, all of which added considerably to his personal fortune. From Sudan, bin Laden also mounted verbal attacks on the Saudi royal family and the kingdom's religious leadership, accusing them of being false Muslims. These attacks led the Saudi government to strip him of his citizenship in April 1994 and freeze his financial assets in the kingdom (his share of the family business was then estimated to be about \$7 million). Bin Laden also roundly denounced Israel.

In Sudan, bin Laden also organized the terrorist activities of al Qaeda, which were in place by 1989. Its goals were to incite all Muslims to join in a defensive jihad against the West and to help overthrow tyrannical secular Muslim governments. Bin Laden established an al Qaeda training camp at Soba, north of Khartoum, in 1992. He sent advisers and equipment to Somalia to aid the fight against the Western mission to restore order in that country. He also began terrorist activities directed against Americans in Saudi Arabia. On November 13, 1995, a car bomb in Riyadh killed 5 Americans and 1 Saudi and wounded 60 others. Other similar actions followed.

Mounting pressure by the Saudi and U.S. governments forced the Sudanese government to ask bin Laden to leave that country.

In May 1996 bin Laden relocated to Afghanistan. He left Sudan with little money; the Sudanese government settled with him for only a small fraction of his reported, but no doubt overestimated, \$300 million in assets.

Afghanistan was a natural location for bin Laden. The Islamic fundamentalist Taliban had come to power, and bin Laden had established a close relationship with its head, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Although there was some unease among the Taliban leadership about the possible consequences of hosting the now acknowledged terrorist, their scruples were overcome by bin Laden's promises of financial assistance from his Arab contacts. In return, the Taliban permitted bin Laden to establish a network of training camps and perpetrate worldwide terrorist activities. The alliance was firmly established when bin Laden directed al Qaeda to join the fight against the Northern Alliance forces of General Ahmed Shah Massoud that were seeking to unseat the Taliban.

Now firmly established in Afghanistan, bin Laden began planning a series of attacks against the perceived worldwide enemies of Islam. His principal target was the United States, and on August 23, 1996, he issued a call for jihad against the Americans for their presence in Saudi Arabia. In February 1998 he broadened this to a global jihad against all enemies of Islam. Al Qaeda was in fact largely a holding organization with several dozen terrorist groups affiliated with it. Bin Laden's role was to coordinate, approve, and assist their various activities. Thus, when Khalid Sheikh Mohammed presented a plan to hijack large commercial airliners and crash them into prominent buildings in the United States, bin Laden approved the plan but left its implementation up to Mohammed.

Bin Laden expected that these attacks in the United States, if they were successful, would trigger a vigorous American response

but that this, in turn, would produce an outpouring of support for his cause from within the Arab world. The first assumption proved correct. After the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the United States demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden and take action against al Qaeda. When the leaders of the Taliban refused, U.S. forces, assisted by those of other Western nations, aided the Northern Alliance and attacked Afghanistan, driving the Taliban from power. The second assumption, that a forceful U.S. response would bring a Muslim backlash, proved false.

Bin Laden had also not expected the Taliban to be easily overthrown. When that occurred, he withdrew into his stronghold in Tora Bora, a cave complex in the White Mountains of eastern Afghanistan, where he remained until December 2001. U.S. efforts to capture him and his followers were botched, and he escaped, presumably into northwestern Pakistan. There Islamic fundamentalism and support for the Taliban and al Qaeda is strong. Indeed, Western efforts to capture him made him something of a hero in the Muslim world, where a significant percentage of people professed admiration for him. There are indications that he was wounded in the arm in the U.S. bombing of Tora Bora in late 2001, and there were other speculations about the status of his health. Despite a reward of \$50 million for his capture—dead or alive—Osama bin Laden continued to thwart efforts to bring him to justice until 2011. On May 2 of that year, U.S. Special Forces operations undertook a raid on bin Laden's hideout in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The al Qaeda leader was killed during the operation. He was buried at sea.

*Harry Raymond Hueston and
Spencer C. Tucker*

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Al Qaeda; Bush, George W.; Clinton, Bill; Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998); Embassy Bombings (1998); Mujahideen; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Rabani, Burhanuddin; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; Terrorism; Zawahiri, Ayman al-.

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Blair, Tony (1953–)

Tony Blair was a British Labour Party politician and, as prime minister of the United Kingdom from May 2, 1997, to June 27, 2007, a major supporter of U.S. and coalition efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Anthony (Tony) Charles Lynton Blair was born on May 6, 1953, in Edinburgh, Scotland. He graduated from Oxford with a second-class honors BA in jurisprudence in 1976. Shortly thereafter, Blair joined the Labour Party and became a member of Parliament for Sedgefield in 1983. He became leader of the Labour Party in Great Britain a decade later, on July 21, 1994. When the Labour Party won the 1997 general election,

Blair became the youngest person, at age 43, to become prime minister since Robert Jenkinson, Lord Liverpool, in 1812.

As prime minister, Blair lent strong support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign of Yugoslavia in 1999. He was among those urging NATO to take a strong line against Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia, who was charged with violating human rights in his suppression of ethnic Albanians seeking secession from Yugoslavia, which precipitated the Kosovo War. Through his backing of the strong NATO response, Blair demonstrated that he would support the use of force in order to spread liberty and protect human rights. On April 22, 1999, in a speech in Chicago less than a month after the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia had commenced, he put forth what became known as the Blair Doctrine. In it he argued that it was sometimes necessary to use force to prevent genocide and widespread harm to innocent peoples.

After the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States that led to the deaths of nearly 3,000 people, Blair quickly aligned Britain with the United States. He was convinced that the perpetrators of the act should be dealt with quickly and decisively to prevent setting in motion a series of events that might set Muslims against the Western world. He thus helped form the international coalition that carried out the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) that toppled the extremist Taliban Islamist group that ruled Afghanistan at the time and that was accused of supporting the terrorist group al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, an organization whose objective was to bring down existing governments in the Middle East and impose radical Islamist rule on others around the world, became the top

target in the Global War on Terror. Blair's government sent air, sea, and ground assets into Afghanistan during the initial thrust against the Taliban. The original deployment involved more than 5,700 British troops and then diminished to about 4,500 at the end of Blair's tenure.

In 2003 Blair enthusiastically supported President George W. Bush's call for an invasion of Iraq in order to overthrow the government of President Saddam Hussein. Blair argued that the Iraqi government, which had been ordered by the United Nations (UN) to dispose of its alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), had not cooperated with UN weapons inspectors and was therefore subject to attack. When the United States invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003, Blair's government sent 46,000 British troops to assist with the invasion. Britain was by far the largest non-U.S. contingent in the coalition that supported Operation Iraqi Freedom. British troops remained in Iraq throughout the rest of Blair's premiership, which ended on June 27, 2007. The number of British troops in Iraq decreased significantly since the initial invasion, however, and about 7,000 British troops remained in that country when Blair left office. Blair faced much criticism in Great Britain, even from members of his own party, for his support of the U.S. war effort. Critics accused him of spinning questionable evidence to galvanize support for the invasion of Iraq. In October 2015, Blair apologized for "mistakes" in the prewar intelligence, but defended the removal of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from office.

After resigning as prime minister on June 27, 2007, Blair was named an official Middle East envoy for the UN, the European Union, the United States, and Russia. He was succeeded as prime minister by his chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown.

Domestically, Blair was both credited and criticized for having moved the Labour Party to the center of the political spectrum. His promarket policies seemed to boost the British economy and kept the Conservatives from questioning his motives. Blair successfully pushed for more funds for education and health care, and he oversaw the implementation of a national minimum wage act. Despite his domestic success, however, foreign affairs greatly overshadowed his premiership, none more so than the divisive Iraq War.

Gregory W. Morgan

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Bush, George W.; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Iraq War (2003–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Taliban; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Blood, General Sir Bindon (1842–1940)

General Sir Bindon Blood was a British Army officer best known for his long service in India and skillful command of the Malakand Field Force and the Buner Field Force during the 1897–1898 Pashtun uprising on the North-West Frontier.

Blood was born on November 7, 1842, and was said to take pride in his distant

ancestor, Colonel James Blood, who attempted to seize the crown jewels in 1671. After attending the Indian Military Seminary at Addiscombe, Blood was commissioned a temporary lieutenant in the Royal Engineers. He specialized in signaling and pontoon boat construction. In 1870, he became the first commander of the newly raised Royal Engineer Telegraph Troop. Blood was sent to India in 1871 where he served until 1907, with exceptions of participation in the Zulu War (1879), Arabi Rebellion (1882), and Second Boer War (1901), as well as periods of home leave.

Blood's first experience of active service on the North-West Frontier came in 1877–1878 in the punitive expedition against the Jowacki Afridis. After active service with the Zulu Field Force in 1879, he returned to India and proceeded to Kabul and limited participation in the Second Afghan War. Re-assigned from India to England in 1882, Blood took command of a field company. He was ordered to active service in Egypt, fought with his sappers in the Battle of Tel el-Kebir, and returned to India via England in 1883.

Blood served in staff positions in India and honed the skills that helped him ensure his future success. In 1895, as a brigadier general, he became chief of staff to Major General Sir R. C. Low, commander of the 15,000-man Chitral Relief Force. The six-week operation to relieve the beleaguered fort at Chitral involved tremendous hardships and detailed logistical coordination as the Chitral Relief Force marched over difficult, frequently snowbound terrain and through hostile tribal areas. Blood was knighted for this service.

In 1897, Blood was appointed to command the Malakand Field Force organized to punish revolting tribes in the Swat Valley. Before he was able to complete his mission,

he attached one of his brigades to the Mohmand Field Force. After destroying a number of enemy villages and prevailing in a heated engagement at Gat, the Malakand Field Force met its objectives and was disbanded in October 1897.

At the end of 1897, the only rebellious tribes that had not been properly chastised were the Bunerwals and the tribes living between Buner and the Indus River. The Buner Field Force, under Blood's command, was organized for that purpose in late 1897. Blood's expedition operated aggressively in attacking and entering Buner Province, then traversed the entire area in a show of force, receiving the submission of all tribes encountered, including the Bunerwals. The operation was completed quickly, in large measure due to Blood's leadership, and the Buner Field Force was inactivated on January 20, 1898.

Blood then commanded the Meerut Division for more than two years before being ordered in 1901 to South Africa, where he commanded, as a lieutenant general, operations in the Eastern Transvaal. Returning to India later in 1901, he commanded the important Punjab area, was promoted to full general in 1906, and retired the following year. In retirement, Blood remained active in regimental affairs and recruiting efforts during World War I.

Blood is best remembered as the commander of the Malakand Field Force, the subject of Winston L. S. Churchill's first book, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force* (1898). Churchill dedicated his maiden literary effort to Blood, "under whose command the operations therein recorded were carried out; by whose generalship they were brought to a successful conclusion; and to whose kindness the author is indebted for the most valuable and fascinating experience of his life" (Churchill 1898, p. v). Blood, a very

popular commander, wrote his autobiography, *Four Score Years and Ten*, in 1933. He died in London on May 16, 1940, age 97. Blood's name had appeared in the *Army List* for 80 years.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics; Churchill, Sir Winston; Deobandi School; Malakand Field Force (1897).

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Bolan Pass

The Bolan Pass is a gateway through the Toba Kakar Mountains near the border between Afghanistan and present-day Pakistan. The treacherous 55-mile-long (88.5 km)

pass served as the main route into Afghanistan from the southeast for much of history. The British used the pass to invade Afghanistan in 1839 during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), and it was one of the invasion routes in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880).

The Bolan Pass is located in Baluchistan, about 74.5 miles (120 km) from the present border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The pass is actually a series of narrow valleys and gorges formed by the Bolan River. Its highest elevation is 5,884 feet (1,793 m), and its widest point is 16 miles (25.7 km). In the south, the pass begins at a point that is about 3 miles wide (4.8 km), but narrows to about 150 feet (45.7 m) in width toward the end. The pass begins in the arid Kachhi Plain and is marked by unpredictable weather patterns, including frequent flooding in the spring as the result of melting snows and large storms. The pass led from Baluchistan to Quetta and then to Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. The area was inhabited by warlike Balochi tribes, such as the Marri and the Bugti.

The pass was the route of successive invasions of Afghanistan. In 1485, the Mughals used it to advance into Afghanistan and capture Kandahar. During the First Anglo-Afghan War, the main British invasion force traversed the Bolan Pass in March 1839. The distance from their base at Fort Bukkur to Kandahar was 370 miles (595.5 km), which they hoped to accomplish in 37 segments or marches. While the British met little formal resistance, the rugged, rocky route caused significant casualties among the pack animals and cavalry horses. In addition, the local tribes carried out a series of raids on the column and were highly adept at isolating stragglers and stealing cattle and supplies. The loss of supplies and disease reduced the fighting strength of the British from

approximately 21,000 to 11,000 on the eve of their entry into Afghanistan. Furthermore, the loss of pack animals meant that artillery often had to be moved by hand. In an effort to protect their supply lines, the British captured Kahan and installed a small garrison there. However, the fort was besieged in 1840 in the First Anglo-Marri War. A relief column failed to reach the fort, which surrendered in October 1840 after negotiating safe conduct for the garrison.

During the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the route was used by one of the three invading British columns. The Kandahar Field Force, under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Donald Stewart, traversed the pass and then captured Kandahar, despite continuous raids on his supply lines through the passage.

Control of the Bolan Pass would continue to bedevil the British for the remainder of the colonial period. Additional conflicts with the Marris would be fought in 1880 and 1917–1918. In addition, the British were forced to conduct a series of incursions to suppress tribes throughout the 1800s.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Khyber Pass; Stewart, Sir Donald.

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Bonn Agreement (2001)

The Bonn agreement was reached among Afghan leaders in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001, to create a governing authority for Afghanistan in the aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban regime several weeks earlier. Sponsored by the United Nations (UN), the Bonn Agreement produced the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), a temporary governmental entity. The AIA was inaugurated on December 22, 2001. The Bonn Agreement was designed to stabilize Afghanistan and bring an end to the 20-year-long civil war there. Afghanistan had been plunged into chaos in 1989, when the last Soviet troops were withdrawn from the country. Between 1989 and 2001, Afghanistan was a nation besieged by internal strife and without an effective government that could provide its people basic needs and services. The U.S. government realized that before a permanent Afghan government could come to power, an interim governing body had to be established that could rally the Afghan people and work with the U.S. and allied forces. The Bonn Agreement was undertaken to accomplish these goals.

The AIA, which came into being on December 22, comprised 30 Afghans, headed by a chair. The AIA would have a six-month mandate, followed by a two-year period under a Transitional Authority. At the end of the two years, national elections were to be held and a permanent Afghan government established. Hamid Karzai was chosen to chair the AIA; he became interim president after the convening of the Loya Jirga (grand assembly) on June 22, 2002, and then president of Afghanistan in 2004. The Bonn Agreement also stipulated the creation of the Afghan Constitution Commission, charged with drafting a new Afghan constitution that would be subjected to a future plebiscite. In

the meantime, the AIA was asked to use the 1964 Afghan constitution until the new one could be drawn up. The agreement also established a judiciary commission to help rebuild Afghanistan's judicial system and specifically called for the creation of a national supreme court.

Another important accomplishment of the Bonn Agreement was a mandate to create a development and security mission to be led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Approved by the UN Security Council on December 20, 2001, this mission became the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), charged with pacifying and stabilizing Afghanistan and continuing the hunt for Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents there. Today, the ISAF continues its work in Afghanistan and is the umbrella command organization for all allied military efforts and operations in Afghanistan.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Karzai, Hamid; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014)

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Brezhnev, Leonid (1906–1982)

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was premier of the Soviet Union from 1962 to 1982 and approved the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Brezhnev was born in Kamenskoje, Ukraine,

on December 19, 1906. He was trained as an engineer and joined the Communist Party in 1931. During World War II, he served as a political officer in the military, rising to the rank of major general. After the war, Brezhnev oversaw factory reconstruction in Ukraine and became a member of the party's Central Committee in 1952, and then the Politburo in 1955. He was a close ally of Premier Nikita Khrushchev, but joined the plot that overthrew the Soviet leader in October 1964. Brezhnev became general secretary of the Communist Party, sharing power with Nikolai Podgorny and Alexsei Kosygin. Over the next few years, Brezhnev consolidated power and reversed many of the reforms of his predecessor.

Brezhnev ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to stop that country's liberalization program. To justify the invasion, the Soviet leader promulgated the Brezhnev Doctrine, which declared that the Soviet Union and its satellites would intervene in any socialist country that undertook capitalist reforms (the doctrine was also used to validate the 1956 invasion of Hungary). Brezhnev expanded Soviet influence and power abroad, while suppressing dissent within the Soviet Union and its satellite states.

In April 1978, the Saur Revolution installed the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in power in Afghanistan. However, an insurgency quickly spread through the country. The Soviet Union increased its military advisers in the country from 1,000 to 5,000, but Brezhnev and other leaders were reluctant to take any stronger actions. Brezhnev was committed at the time to détente, and he was in the midst of negotiations with U.S. president Jimmy Carter on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Treaty, which was ultimately signed by Brezhnev and Carter on

June 18, 1979. However, resistance in the U.S. Congress to the agreement and the U.S. deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe in December convinced Brezhnev that the era of détente was over.

The insurrection continued to spread, and Brezhnev approved the recommendation of his top advisers to invade in order to stabilize Afghanistan. The Brezhnev Doctrine was cited to justify the invasion, although Afghanistan was outside of the orbit of the Soviet Union. The invasion dramatically raised tensions with the West. Within Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime was unable to stabilize the country as the mujahideen insurgency continued to spread. Brezhnev died of a heart attack on November 10, 1982.

Tom Lansford

See also: Carter, Jimmy; Carter Doctrine; Cold War (1947–1989); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Operation Storm 333 (1979); Reagan, Ronald W.; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Shultz, George; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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British Cantonment, Kabul

The British Cantonment in Kabul housed the main force of the Army of the Indus after the British captured the Afghan capital in 1839 during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Noted for its poor defensive position

and capabilities, the cantonment became the refuge of the British following the November 1841 uprising. Unable to effectively defend the base, the British abandoned it on January 6, 1842, during the retreat of Kabul.

The Anglo-Indian forces had originally occupied Bala Hissar, the main citadel in Kabul. They turned that facility over to the British-backed claimant to the throne, Emir Shuja Shah Durrani, after he and his entourage arrived from his winter lodging in Kandahar. The new cantonment was constructed under the command of Major General Sir Willoughby Cotton. It was located in marshy ground surrounded by the royal orchard, one mile north of the city.

The site offered few defensive advantages. The low lands in which it was located were surrounded by small hilltop forts controlled by local tribes rather than British forces. The cantonment was fortified with a mud wall with a perimeter of 1,000 yards (914 m) by 600 yards (548.6 m). The wall was vulnerable to cannon fire and only waist height in some places. The fort's stores were housed in a separate facility outside the walls. This was necessary due to space limitations within the perimeter. Between the commissary fort and the main cantonment was a small compound controlled by local Afghans.

In spite of the fort's deficiencies, the senior British military and colonial officers felt secure in their position. The main Afghan forces had been defeated, and the pro-British Shuja Shah was on the throne. Consequently, more attention was paid to the comfort and amusement of the garrison than its security. The cantonment contained a racecourse and cricket pitch. One corner of the compound was devoted to the mission residence, which included quarters for the political officer as well as his bodyguards. The cantonment

became the center of British life in Kabul, taking on the guise of a second city. The higher ranking officers and officials were allowed to send for their families. After a time the residents of the cantonment settled into a peaceful life in Kabul. Concerts and dramatic performances were even staged by the officers and wives.

Throughout this period, resentment toward the British and Shuja Shah grew steadily. The British encampment placed a strain on the local economy. Merchants sought to get the best prices for their products and preferred selling to the British who would pay more. The result was significant inflation and some shortages for native Afghans. The conduct of the Anglo-Indian forces was also a source of discontent, especially their consumption of alcohol. Following the murder of the British resident in Kabul, Sir Alexander Burnes (who was living outside the cantonment), on November 2, 1841, those officers and families living outside the cantonment were ordered to relocate to the compound.

The murder of Burnes unleashed an uprising against the British; and the cantonment came under siege. Afghans in the surrounding forts began a desultory bombardment of the compound, while the food stores located outside the compound were captured, cutting the garrison off from supplies. Several counterattacks were attempted to relieve pressure on the cantonment, but none succeeded. By December 1841, without supplies and reinforcement, the military officers felt that the cantonment could not survive the winter weather. On January 1, 1842, Major Eldred Pottinger, the senior political officer, negotiated a surrender with the de facto leader of the uprising, Mohammad Akbar Khan. Akbar Khan promised safe passage to the British if they turned over the majority of their artillery and ammunition. On January

6, the garrison began an 80-mile retreat to Jalalabad. The sick and wounded were left at the cantonment. The compound was looted and burned while the retreat was in progress, and the majority of those left behind were killed. The Anglo-Indian column made slow progress and faced constant attack, leaving a trail of dead stretching back to Kabul. The remaining forces were eventually massacred at the Battle of Gandamak on January 13.

Jorge Brown

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Durrani, Shuja Shah; Gandamak, Battle of (1842); Great Game, The; Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Pottinger, Eldred.

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British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics

Forces of the British colonial army fought three wars against the Afghans and multiple smaller campaigns from 1838 to the 1930s. The Afghans proved to be among the most difficult foes for the British because of their tactics and the terrain of the country. Nonetheless, when properly led, British superiority in weapons, tactics, and logistics allowed the colonial army to inflict significant defeats on the Afghans.

The British troops that campaigned against the Afghans were really two distinct military forces: colonial units and regular formations. The majority of the troops in colonial units were raised from the native population in the Indian colonies. Known as Sepoys, these native troops were trained and equipped according to European standards. The first British Sepoy regiment was established in 1757 by the East India Company, and there were 20 more within a decade. At first, these units were commanded by British or other European officers, but in the 1800s, Indians were offered commissions (although they could not command European units, only Sepoy formations). The native regiments were typically recruited by caste, ethnicity, or region, providing a high degree of cohesion among the troops. During the Afghan campaigns, the ratio of Sepoys to regular British Army troops was about three to one.

Some colonial units were comprised of European soldiers either recruited in the colonies or who volunteered to serve in the East India Company, and later the British Indian Army. For instance, the Madras European Regiment was originally formed in 1742, and then was reorganized several times before becoming the 102nd Regiment of Foot (Royal Madras Fusiliers) in 1862.

The East India Company created a military academy at Addiscombe, Surrey, in 1809 to train future officers. Cadets enrolled for two years' training between the ages of 14 and 18. After graduation, the cadets were sent to India as ensigns. The academy remained in operation until 1861, after which all cadets went through the Royal Military Academies at Sandhurst and Woolwich. Promotion in the East India Company Army was based solely on seniority, not on talent or ability. The result was often poor leadership as was the case during the Retreat from

Kabul in 1842 in which 4,500 British troops and 12,000 camp followers were massacred by Afghan forces, partially because of the indecisiveness and ineffectiveness of their commanding generals. Defeats during the First Anglo-Afghan War undermined the aura of invincibility surrounding the British and contributed to the Sepoy Rebellion against colonial rule in 1857.

The colonial forces in India were divided into three separate armies, reflecting the three geographic divisions of the presidencies of the East India Company: Bengal, Bombay, and Madras. Each of the three armies had a different command who reported to the respective presidency. After the Sepoy Rebellion, the native units were reorganized and re-formed, but remained as three separate forces until after the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880) when a commission recommended amalgamating the forces into a single command. This was done in 1895. Further reforms were enacted in 1903, which created nine divisions of the existing units.

The second major component of the British colonial army were regular forces, known as “Queen’s Army” troops during Queen Victoria’s long reign (1837–1901). These units were formations of the regular British Army that were stationed in India at the expense of the East India Company and later the colony of India. British officers were able to purchase their commissions from 1683 to 1871. For instance, a captaincy in an infantry regiment in the 1800s cost £1,800. The result was often poor leadership among the officer corps.

Through the 1800s, the British Army was organized into three main combat branches: infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The infantry was the backbone of the Anglo-Indian armies that fought the Afghans. Infantry regiments typically consisted of two battalions (a third, militia or reserve, battalion was added).

Often one battalion would be deployed overseas, while the other one remained in Britain. A battalion had approximately 800 officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel. During the Second Anglo-Afghan War, soldiers began to wear khaki uniforms instead of the traditional red tunic. After the conflict, khaki increasingly became standard in other theaters.

British infantry tactics in the 1800s were based on three basic formations. The column was used to advance, while the line was typically used in defense, although both formations could be used to attack. The column provided a condensed formation, but limited the amount of firepower that could be deployed. The line was easily penetrated, but provided all soldiers an opportunity to deploy their weapons. The square was initially developed to protect against cavalry charges. It provided concentrated fire in all directions, but made the soldiers easy targets for long-range fire. During the Afghan Wars the square was a useful tool to blunt Afghan charges.

The Anglo-Indian cavalry used during the Afghan Wars and along the frontier were mainly light cavalry, utilized principally for scouting and force protection. Compared with their Afghan counterparts, the Anglo-Indian cavalry were well trained, equipped, and disciplined. Cavalry regiments had 400–600 troopers and were organized into brigades of two native and one European regiment. The rugged terrain of Afghanistan often precluded the large cavalry charges of the Napoleonic era, but by the end of the 1800s, Anglo-Indian cavalry was increasingly organized as mounted infantry, able to move rapidly, dismount, open fire, and remount as needed. By the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), armored vehicles and airplanes began to replace cavalry for attacks and scouting.

Artillery in the British colonial army was generally divided between the lighter, more mobile horse artillery and heavy batteries, the field artillery. During the Afghan campaigns, the Anglo-Indian forces did not utilize significant numbers of artillery. The terrain made it difficult to transport and maneuver. The result was that the Afghans sometimes had more artillery during battles, as was the case at the Battle of Maiwand (July 27, 1880). The Anglo-Indian forces had 30 cannons to just 12 for the British.

By the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British had absorbed the lessons of World War I. In addition to ever more modern weapons, including armored vehicles, airplanes, advanced machine guns, and artillery, advances in communications allowed the Anglo-Indian forces to respond more rapidly to attacks by border tribes. After the partition of the former colony of India, the regiments and traditions of the British Indian Army were transferred to the militaries of India and Pakistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces and Tactics; Artillery, Cannons, and Mortars; Cavalry and Cavalry Tactics; Raj, British (1858–1947).

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Browne, Sir Samuel (Sam) (1824–1901)

Sir Samuel (but known as Sam) Browne was a British general who rose to fame during the Sepoy Rebellion, invented the Sam Browne belt, and led a column of imperial forces during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). Browne was born in Barrackpore, India, on October 3, 1824. He joined the East India Company Army in 1840. As a young officer, he served in a variety of campaigns before being promoted to lieutenant in 1849 and given command of a native cavalry unit. Browne became a captain on the eve of the Sepoy Rebellion. During that conflict, he was awarded the Victoria Cross, Britain's highest award for valor. On August 31, 1858, during a skirmish at Seerporah, Browne and one native trooper charged an enemy cannon and prevented the crew from firing on advancing British soldiers. Browne was severely wounded and lost his left arm.

Because of his injury, Browne sought to design a belt that would allow him to carry both a pistol and sabre with ease. The result was the “Sam Browne” belt, which eventually came to be used by military and police forces around the world.

During the Second Anglo-Afghan War, Browne, now a lieutenant general, was given command of one of three Anglo-Indian columns invading Afghanistan in 1878. Browne commanded the northernmost and largest of the formations, dubbed the Peshawar Field Force. It comprised four Anglo-Indian infantry

brigades, one cavalry brigade, and eight batteries of artillery. Browne's column had to force its way through the heavily defended and treacherous Khyber Pass. On November 20, 1878, Browne's forces attacked the fortress of Ali Masjid. Located near the border with India, Ali Masjid was the key to opening the pass. After fighting the British through the day, the Afghans abandoned the fort under a heavy artillery bombardment. The British were able to occupy the fortress on the second day of the battle. Browne then advanced to Jalalabad, and then on to Gandamak. For his actions, Browne was made a knight commander of the Order of Bath.

Browne subsequently commanded the Corps of Guides, one of the more prestigious Indian cavalry units. He attained the rank of full general before retiring in 1898. After he left the army, Browne returned to England and settled on the Isle of Wight. He died on March 14, 1901.

Tom Lansford

See also: Ali Masjid, Battle of (1878); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Mohammad Yakub; Khan, Sher Ali; Khyber Pass; Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleight (Lord); Stewart, Sir Donald.

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Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1928–)

Zbigniew Brzezinski was an international relations scholar, diplomat, and U.S. national security adviser to the James (Jimmy)

Carter administration from 1977 to 1981, including during the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Born the son of a Polish diplomat in Warsaw, Poland, on March 28, 1928, Brzezinski received his PhD from Harvard University in 1953 and became a U.S. citizen in 1958. Following his graduation, he joined the faculty of Harvard and then moved on to Columbia University in 1960, where he stayed until 1977.

Brzezinski served as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. president John F. Kennedy and as a member of the State Department's influential policy planning staff during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. In 1968 Brzezinski resigned his State Department post in protest over U.S. Vietnam War policies. He subsequently returned to academia and directed the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976. After serving as foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter in his successful 1976 presidential campaign, Brzezinski was named Carter's national security adviser in 1977.

As national security adviser, Brzezinski played a critical role in the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as well as in the 1978 Camp David Accords and the resultant 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. He was also instrumental in providing covert aid to the mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan after the Soviet Union invaded that country in 1979. Brzezinski oversaw the initial efforts to supply the insurgents through Pakistan by enlisting the support of Persian Gulf countries. He also advised that the United States enlist China in the effort to supply weapons to the mujahideen.

Most significant perhaps to both Carter and Brzezinski was the 1978 Iranian Revolution and the resultant hostage crisis that began on November 4, 1979, and endured for 444 days, not ending until Ronald

Reagan was sworn in as president on January 20, 1981, at which time the U.S. hostages were released. The crisis dominated the Carter administration in its last year and likely cost Carter his reelection bid. Brzezinski worked closely with the president to end the crisis, including the abortive hostage rescue mission in April 1980, but to no avail.

Following Carter's defeat in the 1980 election, Brzezinski returned to Columbia University. In 1989 he joined the faculty of Johns Hopkins University. He has written and edited numerous books on international relations and has served on the boards of myriad council and advisory committees. Considered something of a hard-liner while in office—especially vis-à-vis communism and the Soviet Union—in more recent years Brzezinski was a critic of the George W. Bush administration's Global War on Terror and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which Brzezinski claims was a monumental error.

Brent M. Geary

See also: Bush, George W.; Carter, Jimmy; Cold War (1947–1989); Mujahideen; Reagan, Ronald W.; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); United States, Relations with Afghanistan

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Buddhas of Bamiyan

The Buddhas of Bamiyan were two enormous statues of Buddha that were constructed in the

sixth century in the Bamiyan Valley, northwest of Kabul. The statues were internationally renowned as a cultural landmark but were destroyed by the Taliban in March 2001 as affronts to Islam. The Bamiyan Valley was used as one of the main trade routes from East to West. Buddhists established a chain of monasteries among more than 100 caves along the route from the second through the sixth centuries. Over the centuries, the monks of these sites created ever more elaborate shrines. The smaller of the two statues, the female, known as “Shahmama,” was built first and rose to 35 meters (114.8 feet). The taller statue, the male, known as “Salsal,” was 53 meters (173.9 feet) tall.

The statues were damaged after the Islamic conquest of the region in the 13th century. On at least three occasions, attempts were made to destroy the Buddhas with cannon fire, including an attack by Afghan emir Abdur Rahman Khan during the suppression of a revolt by the Hazaras (the Hazaras had a long historical connection with the statues). Taliban officials criticized the statues as antithetical to Islam and as idolatry. They announced their intention to destroy the statues in 1998, but took no action until 2001. A range of international actors, including the United Nations and the three nations that officially recognized the Taliban regime, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, all endeavored to prevent the destruction of the statues. However, at the beginning of March, Taliban forces began firing artillery at the statues and then used dynamite to completely destroy the Buddhas over a two-week period. The regime faced international condemnation for the destruction.

Tom Lansford

See also: Hazaras; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Taliban; Wahhabism.

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Sir Alexander “Sekundar” Burnes was a Scottish adventurer who extensively explored Central Asia before being appointed as the British resident in Kabul in 1838 on the eve of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Burnes was born on May 16, 1805, in Montrose, Scotland. At 16 he gained an appointment as an ensign in the East India Company and traveled to India. The future explorer had a proficiency with languages, and he found himself translating both Hindi and Farsi (Persian). Over the next few years, Burnes became well known for his reports and studies on areas of the company’s Bombay presidency. In 1829, he was transferred to the northwest to undertake a survey of the region. Two years later, he secretly mapped areas on a 1,000-mile journey to Lahore with a present of horses for Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Burnes then journeyed to Bukhara (in contemporary Uzbekistan) after traveling through Afghanistan and Persia (Iran). Throughout his explorations, Burnes often donned native garb and disguised himself as a wandering trader, blending in seamlessly through his language abilities. His travels earned him the nickname “Bukhara Burnes.”

Burnes returned to Britain in 1833 and the following year published a three-volume memoir of his adventures, *Travels into Bokhara. Being an Account of a Journey from India to Cabool, Tartary and Persia*. The books were enormously popular and his

fame spread throughout Great Britain. He returned to India in 1835 and was dispatched to Afghanistan the next year to negotiate with King Dost Mohammad Khan. The mission was part of a larger diplomatic initiative to create buffer states between British India and the expanding Russian Empire in what would be dubbed the “Great Game” between the two imperial powers. Burnes correctly perceived that the British should cultivate Dost Mohammad, but the governor-general of India, Lord Auckland, favored a rival to the throne, Shuja Shah. Meanwhile, Burnes was knighted in 1838.

Following the arrival of a Russian envoy in Kabul in 1838, Auckland issued the Simla Manifesto by which the Indian colonial government announced its support for Shuja Shah, thereby initiating the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Burnes became Britain’s political resident in Kabul after the Afghan capital had been captured and Shuja Shah installed as emir. Shuja Shah failed to garner popular support for his rule, and opposition grew steadily after the British occupation. On November 1, 1841, Burnes was warned by his servants that he was in danger, as there were rumors of a general uprising against the British. However, Burnes refused to leave his quarters for the safety of the British military compound. On the morning of November 2, a mob attacked his home. Burnes, his brother Charles, and a party of Indian soldiers and servants were promised safe passage if they left the dwelling, but were attacked and killed as they left. The murder of Burnes and his party marked the beginning of the uprising that ultimately led to the defeat and massacre of the British forces in Kabul.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of;

Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Elphinstone, William George Keith; Great Game, The; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Macnaghten, Sir William Hay; Nott, Sir William; Pollock, Sir George; Ranjit Singh, Maharaja; Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”).

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Bush, George H. W. (1924–)

George Herbert Walker Bush was president of the United States at the end of the Cold War and during the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Bush was born in Milton, Massachusetts, on June 12, 1924. His father was a U.S. senator. During World War II, Bush was a decorated naval aviator who fought in the Pacific. The future president earned a degree from Yale University in 1948 and went on to earn a fortune in the burgeoning Texas oil industry.

Bush was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Texas in 1966 as a Republican. He served until 1971, when he was appointed U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (UN), serving until 1973. He was subsequently appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Bush lost the 1980 campaign to be the presidential nominee of the Republican Party, but successfully campaigned as Ronald W. Wilson’s running mate. He served as vice president

until 1989, and was then elected president of the United States.

Bush was president during a period of immense challenge and change in international relations. In December 1989, Bush launched an invasion of Panama to depose Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. A year later, Iraq invaded Kuwait and Bush developed a broad international coalition, which included the Soviet Union and leading Arab states. The coalition defeated Iraqi forces and restored Kuwait's sovereignty in early 1991.

Bush sought to manage the waning Cold War in such a way as to minimize conflict and maintain stability. Consequently, the United States took a cautious approach to the breakup of states such as Yugoslavia and a moderate stance on German reunification. Bush applauded the 1989 Soviet military withdrawal, but the administration refused to negotiate with the Soviet-backed Afghan president, Mohammed Najibullah. Instead, the administration sought to maintain its ties with Pakistan, which, in turn, continued its support for the mujahideen (including funneling U.S. funds to the insurgents). The discovery of the advanced state of Pakistan's nuclear program in 1990 soured U.S.-Pakistani relations. Meanwhile, in July 1991, Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev declared that the Cold War was over. However, it was not until September of that year that the two superpowers agreed to stop supplying arms and financial support to the opposing forces in Afghanistan. After the flow of arms and cash ended in 1992, Afghanistan ceased to be a major policy concern for the administration.

The United States went into an economic recession during the 1992 presidential campaign, and Bush was accused of spending too much time on international affairs. He lost the election, but emerged as an elder statesman and was involved in a number of

humanitarian causes, including the relief efforts following the 2004 Asian tsunami.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Cold War (1947–1989); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Bush, George W. (1946–)

George W. Bush was president of the United States from 2001 to 2009 and led the country during the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Bush was born on July 6, 1946, in New Haven, Connecticut, into a wealthy and politically powerful family. His grandfather was a senator and his father, George H. W. Bush, was president of the United States from 1989 to 1993. The younger Bush was raised in Midland, Texas, and then graduated from Yale University in 1968. He served as a pilot in the Texas Air National Guard and earned a master's of business administration from Harvard University in 1975.

Bush worked in the oil industry in Texas and became part owner of the Texas Rangers baseball team. His association with the Rangers and his father's popularity in Texas helped the younger Bush win election as governor in 1994. Bush was reelected in 1998 with a record 69 percent of the vote and became recognized as a rising star within

the Republican Party. He won the GOP nomination in the 2000 presidential election and defeated Democrat Al Gore in the general balloting in which Gore won the popular vote by more than 500,000 votes, but lost the Electoral College vote 271 to 266.

The 9/11 attacks dramatically shaped Bush's presidency. The attacks were the worst terrorist strikes in U.S. history and killed almost 3,000. In the aftermath of the attacks, Bush's popularity soared to record levels as he rallied the U.S. population, along with allies including the United Kingdom, Canada, and France, and international organizations ranging from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the United Nations (UN) into a broad coalition against international terrorism. The War on Terror was a multifaceted campaign that included closer law enforcement and intelligence cooperation between allies and military action.

On October 7, 2001, the United States launched military strikes against the Taliban regime after their refusal to hand over al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Code-named Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S.-led offensive relied on special operations forces working with anti-Taliban groups and supported by coalition air and missile strikes. By the end of November, the Northern Alliance had captured Kabul and the Taliban had been overthrown. However, the coalition troops failed to capture bin Laden or senior al Qaeda or Taliban leadership. Instead, the remnants of the groups were able to escape into Pakistan and launch an insurgency against the pro-Western regime of Afghan president Hamid Karzai.

Domestically, Bush sought to enhance the nation's counterterrorism capabilities through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the largest government reorganization since World War II. In addition, the Patriot Act gave the govern-

ment expanded surveillance and detention powers. Civil libertarians criticized the actions for eroding the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. The Bush administration also faced opposition to its plans to try suspected terrorists, including some foreign fighters captured in Afghanistan, with military tribunals and to house the detainees at a special facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

During his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as members of an "axis of evil," and vowed that the United States would undertake preemptive military action to forestall an attack with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by any of these states. The resultant Bush Doctrine was used to justify an invasion of Iraq in March 2003 following charges by the administration that the regime of Saddam Hussein was not cooperating with UN weapons inspections. The Iraq War divided the post-9/11 coalition, as states such as France, Germany, and Russia opposed military intervention. Saddam was overthrown, but a U.S.-led coalition occupying the country faced a bloody and growing insurgency led by former regime officers and al Qaeda in Iraq. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, NATO assumed command of the former UN International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Bush was reelected in 2004 with 50.7 percent of the vote and Republicans enlarged their majorities in the House of Representatives and Senate. However, his domestic popularity began to wane because of the continuing insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and the government's much criticized slow response to Hurricane Katrina, which devastated New Orleans and parts of the Gulf Coast in August 2005. In the 2006 mid-term elections, Democrats regained control of both houses of Congress for the first time since 1994.

In 2007, the Bush administration deployed an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq in what was labeled a “troop surge.” (See the Related Primary Document below.) Combined with efforts to garner the support of Sunni tribal leaders, the surge dramatically reduced violence in Iraq and increased stability. However, violence in Afghanistan continued to rise. In the United States, an economic downturn began in 2007 and quickly worsened, both internally and around the world. Unemployment in the United States rose to 10 percent and major stock indices fell by more than 50 percent in some cases. Bush left office in 2009 with historically low approval ratings.

After leaving office, Bush largely retired from public life, although he agreed to serve, along with former president Bill Clinton, as

the heads of a charitable relief initiative following the devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

Tom Lansford

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Blair, Tony; Bush, George H. W.; Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Karzai, Hamid; Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Obama, Barack; Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Rumsfeld, Donald; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban; Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Tora Bora, Battle of (2001); United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–); United States, Relations with Afghanistan; Warlords.

Related Primary Document

President George W. Bush Discusses Progress in Afghanistan, Global War on Terror, February 15, 2007

In an address to the American Enterprise Institute on February 15, 2007, U.S. president George W. Bush highlighted the accomplishments and successes of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. He also spoke about the continuing challenges faced by the United States and its allies. To meet those challenges, Bush discussed five goals for his administration, the government of Afghanistan, and the nation's allies.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. President. (Laughter.) That's got kind of a nice ring to it. (Laughter.) Chris, thanks for inviting me. I appreciate the chance to come and share some thoughts with the men and women of AEI. . . .

As we implement a new strategy in Iraq, we are also taking new steps to defeat the terrorists and extremists in Afghanistan. My administration has just completed a top-to-bottom review of our strategy in that country, and today I want to talk to you about the progress we have made in Afghanistan, the challenges we face in Afghanistan, and the strategy we're pursuing to defeat the enemies of freedom in Afghanistan.

It wasn't all that long ago that we learned the lessons of how terrorists operate. It may seem like a long time ago—five years is a long time in this day and age of instant news cycles—but it really isn't all that long ago, when you think about the march of history. In Afghanistan, we saw how terrorists and extremists can use those safe havens, safe havens in a failed state, to bring death and destruction to our people here at home.

It was an amazing turning point in the history of our country, really, when you think about it. It was a defining moment for the 21st century. Think about what I just said, that in the remote reaches of the world, because there was a failed state, murderers were able to plot and plan and then execute a deadly attack that killed nearly 3,000 of our citizens. It's a lesson that we've got to remember. And one of the lessons of that September the 11th day is that we cannot allow terrorists to gain sanctuary anywhere, and we must not allow them to reestablish the safe haven they lost in Afghanistan.

Our goal in Afghanistan is to help the people of that country to defeat the terrorists and establish a stable, moderate, and democratic state that respects the rights of its citizens, governs its territory effectively, and is a reliable ally in this war against extremists and terrorists.

Oh, for some that may seem like an impossible task. But it's not impossible if you believe what Jeanne Kirkpatrick said, and that freedom is universal; that we believe all human beings to live in freedom and peace.

Over the past five years, we've made real progress toward this goal I just described. In 2001, Afghanistan was a totalitarian nightmare—a land where girls could not go to school, where religious police roamed the streets, where women were publicly whipped, where there were summary executions in Kabul's soccer stadium, and terrorists operated freely—they ran camps where they planned and trained for horrific attacks that affected us and other nations.

Today, five short years later, the Taliban have been driven from power, al Qaeda has been driven from its camps, and Afghanistan is free. That's why I say we have made remarkable progress. Afghanistan has a democratically elected President, named Hamid Karzai. I respect him. I appreciate his courage. Afghanistan has a National Assembly chosen by the Afghan people in free elections.

Under the Taliban, women were barred from public office. Today, Afghanistan's parliament includes 91 women—and President Karzai has appointed the first woman to serve as a provincial governor.

Under the Taliban, free enterprise was stifled. Today, the Afghan economy has doubled in size since liberation. Afghanistan has attracted \$800 million in foreign investment during that time.

Under the Taliban, there were about 900,000 children in school. Today, more than 5 million children are in school—about 1.8 million of them are girls.

Under the Taliban, an estimated 8 percent of Afghans had access to basic health care. Today, the United States has built or renovated 681 health clinics across the country—now more than 80 percent of Afghans have access to basic health coverage—health care.

Under the Taliban, Afghans fled the country in large numbers, seeking safety abroad. Today, more than 4.6 million Afghan refugees have come home—one of the largest return movements in history.

In today's Afghanistan, people are free to speak their minds, they're free to begin to realize dreams. In today's Afghanistan there's a NATO Alliance is taking the lead to help provide security for the people of Afghanistan. In today's Afghanistan, the terrorists who once oppressed the Afghan people and threatened our country are being captured and killed by NATO forces and soldiers and police of a free Afghanistan. Times have changed. Our work is bringing freedom. A free Afghanistan helps make this country more secure.

We face a thinking enemy. And we face a tough enemy—they watch our actions, they adjust their tactics. And in 2006, this enemy struck back with vengeance. As freedom began to spread, an enemy that cannot stand the thought of a free society tried to do something about it, tried to stop the advance of this young democracy. It's not the only place in the world where the enemy struck back in 2006. They struck back in Iraq. They struck in Lebanon. This should be a lesson for our fellow citizens to understand, where these group of people find freedom they're willing to resort to brutal tactics.

It's an interesting enemy, isn't it? An enemy that can't stand the thought of somebody being able to live a peaceful life, a life of hope, an optimistic life. And it's an enemy we've got to take seriously.

Across Afghanistan last year, the number of roadside bomb attacks almost doubled, direct fire attacks on international forces almost tripled, and suicide bombings grew nearly five-fold. These escalating attacks were part of a Taliban offensive that made 2006 the most violent year in Afghanistan since the liberation of the country.

And so the fundamental question is, how do you react? Do you say, maybe it's too tough? Let's just kind of let this young democracy wither and fade away. Do we forget the lessons of September the 11th? And the answer is absolutely not.

And so the Taliban offensive that was launched was turned back by incredible courage of the Afghan soldiers, and by NATO forces that stood strong. You see, I believe the Taliban felt that they could exploit weakness. I believe that they said to themselves, if we can—we'll test NATO and cause NATO leaders to turn their back on this young democracy.

After the fierce battles throughout the year 2006, the Taliban had failed in their objective of taking and holding new territory.

In recent months, the intensity of the fighting has died down—that's only natural. It does every year when the snow and ice set in there in Afghanistan. But even in these winter months, we stayed on the offensive against the Taliban and al Qaeda. This January, NATO reconnaissance units observed a major Taliban incursion from Pakistan—with about 150 Taliban fighters crossing the border into the Paktika province. So NATO and Afghan forces launched a coordinated air assault and ground assault, and we destroyed the Taliban force. A large number of enemy fighters were killed; they were forced to retreat, where they were engaged by Pakistani troops.

Just two weeks ago, NATO launched an air strike against Taliban fighters who had seized the town of Musa Qala in Helmand province—a key Taliban commander was brought to justice.

The snow is going to melt in the Hindu Kush Mountains, and when it does we can expect fierce fighting to continue. The Taliban and al Qaeda are preparing to launch new attacks. Our strategy is not to be on the defense, but to go on the offense. This spring there is going to be a new offensive in Afghanistan, and it's going to be a NATO offensive. And that's part of our strategy—relentless in our pressure. We will not give in to murderers and extremists.

And we're focused on five key goals that I want to share with you. First, the United States and our allies will help President Karzai increase the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces. After all, for this young democracy to survive in the long term, they'll have their own security forces that are capable and trained. We don't have to teach them courage. These folks understand courage. They're willing to fight for their country. They're willing to defend this young democracy. And so it's in our interest and the interest of NATO countries to provide training so

they have more, more strong fighters—so we're going to increase the size of the national police from 61,000 to 82,000 by the end of 2008. And we'll help them develop new specialties: new civil order brigades, counter-narcotics, and border surveillance.

We're going to increase the Afghanistan army. Today, it's 32,000—that's not enough to do the job in this vast country—to 70,000 by the end of 2008. It's one thing to get them trained and one thing to get them uniforms, but they're also going to have to have ways to move around their country. So we're going to add commando battalions, a helicopter unit, combat support units. In other words, we're going to help this young democracy have a fully integrated security force that will respond to the commands of the elected officials.

Capable troops need intelligence. This is a war that requires good intelligence on all fronts. So the United States and our allies will also work with Afghanistan's leaders to improve human intelligence networks, particularly in areas that are threatened by the Taliban. Together with the Afghan government and NATO, we created a new Joint Intelligence Operations Center in Kabul—so all the forces fighting the terrorists in Afghanistan have a common picture of the enemy. That may sound simple to those of us who have gotten used to sophisticated systems to protect ourselves. This is [an] important innovation in Afghanistan.

America and our allies are going to stand with these folks. That's the message I want to deliver to the Afghanistan people today. Free debates are important. But our commitment is strong: we will train you, we will help you, and we will stand with you as you defend your new democracy. (Applause.)

The second part of our strategy is to work with our allies to strengthen the NATO force in Afghanistan. Today, Afghanistan is NATO's most important military operation. Isn't it interesting that NATO is now in Afghanistan? I suspect 20 years ago if a President stood in front of AEI and said, I'll make a prediction to you that NATO would be a force for freedom and peace outside of Europe—you probably never would have invited the person back. (Laughter.) Today, NATO is in Afghanistan. And I thank the leaders of the NATO countries for recognizing the importance of Afghanistan in our own security and enhancing the security of our own countries.

For NATO to succeed, member nations must provide commanders on the ground with the troops and the equipment they need to do their jobs. Many allies have made commitments of additional forces and support—and I appreciate those commitments, but nearly as much as the people in Afghanistan appreciate them. Norway, Lithuania and the Czech Republic have all agreed to send special operation forces to Afghanistan. Britain, Poland, Turkey and Bulgaria have agreed to send additional troops. Italy has agreed to send aircraft. Romania will contribute to the EU police mission. Denmark, Greece, Norway and Slovakia will provide funding for Afghan security forces. Iceland will provide airlift. The people of Afghanistan need to know that they've got a lot of friends in this world who want them to succeed.

For NATO to succeed, allies must make sure that we fill the security gaps. In other words, when there is a need, when our commanders on the ground say to our respective countries, we need additional help, our NATO countries must provide it in order to be successful in this mission.

As well, allies must lift restrictions on the forces they do provide so NATO commanders have the flexibility they need to defeat the enemy wherever the enemy may make a stand. The alliance was founded on this principle: An attack on one is an attack on all. That principle holds true whether the attack is on the home soil of a NATO nation, or on allied forces deployed on a

NATO mission abroad. By standing together in Afghanistan, NATO forces protect our own people, and they must have the flexibility and rules of engagement to be able to do their job.

Third, the United States and our allies will help President Karzai improve provincial governance and develop Afghanistan's—and to help develop Afghanistan's rural economy. Many Afghans in remote regions fight with the Taliban simply because there are no other jobs available. The best way to dry up Taliban recruits is to help Afghanistan's government create jobs and opportunity. So NATO is operating 25 provincial reconstruction teams across the country. These teams are made up of civilian and military experts. They are helping the Afghan government extend its reach into distant regions, they're improving security, and they're helping to deliver reconstruction assistance. In other words, I just described military operations that are necessary, but in order for these young democracies to survive, there's got to be more than just military. There has to be political development, and tangible evidence that a government can provide opportunity and hope. And these provincial reconstruction teams do just that.

These teams will help build irrigation systems, improve power production, provide access to micro-credit. The idea is to encourage entrepreneurship, job formation, enterprise. These teams will undertake new efforts to train provincial and local leaders. We take democracy for granted. Democracy hasn't exactly been rooted deeply in Afghan history. It takes a while for people to understand how to function as an elected official. It takes help for people to understand the obligations to respond to the people, and these teams will change provincial and local leaders.

Another key element to bringing stability to Afghanistan is building roads. Lieutenant General Eikenberry, who served with distinction in Afghanistan, just finished his tour, he was the senior commander there, said really something very interesting that caught my attention. He said, "Where the roads end in Afghanistan, the Taliban begin." So in order to help the security of this country, the international community has stepped up its road-building campaign across Afghanistan. So far, the United States and other nations have completed construction of more than 4,000 miles of roads—that sounds like a lot, and it is a lot. We're also talking about a big country.

Much of the ring road—we call it the ring road—that links key provincial capitals to Kabul, is pretty well complete. And that's important, because, first of all, road building brings jobs to young men who might be recruited to the Taliban. But roads enable people to get commerce to centers of trade. In other words, roads promote enterprise. Enterprise provides hope. Hope is what defeats this ideology of darkness. And so we're going to build another 1,000 roads [sic] in 2007. It's an important effort, and our allies need to follow through on their commitments to help this young democracy have a road system that will enable it to flourish and survive.

Fourth, the United States and our allies will help President Karzai reverse the increase in poppy cultivation that is aiding the Taliban. After a decline in 2005, Afghanistan saw a marked increase in poppy cultivation last year. This is a direct threat to a free future for Afghanistan. I have made my concerns to President Karzai pretty clear—not pretty clear, very clear—and that in order for him to gain the confidence of his people, and the confidence of the world, he's got to do something about it, with our help.

The Taliban uses drug money to buy weapons—they benefit from this cultivation—and they pay Afghans to take up arms against the government. And so we're helping the President in a variety of ways to deal with the problem. First, he has established what's called a Central

Narcotics Tribunal in Kabul. One way to deal with the drug problem is for there to be a push back to the drug dealers, and a good way to push back on the drug dealers is convict them and send them to prison. He has improved the Afghan Eradication Force, this is mobile units that can deploy across the country to help governors in their eradication efforts.

We're supporting him. We're supporting him through direct aid on these mobile units, and we're supporting him to expand alternative livelihood programs. These poppy growers are trying to make a living. And the idea is to provide these farmers with credit, and seeds, and fertilizer, and assistance to bring their products to market. So the strategy to eliminate poppies is to encourage the government to eradicate, and to provide alternative means for a livelihood, and to help have the roads so that when somebody grows something somebody wants to buy in Kabul, there's a road to be able to take the product along to the markets.

It's important, and we're going to stay focused on the poppy issue. And when the President and his government is able to make progress on it, it will really inspire countries who want to help to do more.

Finally, we're going to help President Karzai fight corruption. And one place where he needs help is in the judicial system. There's nothing more discouraging when justice is not fair. And Afghans too often see their courts run by crooked judges. It's important to have the confidence of the people in a free society. Crooked judges makes [sic] it hard to earn that confidence.

President Karzai, to his credit, has established a Criminal Justice Task Force that is now after public corruption. This task force has 400 prosecutors [sic] and there are ongoing investigations. The United States, Britain and Norway are providing full time prosecutors, judges, police, and defense attorneys to mentor their Afghan counterparts—and I appreciate our own citizens going over there. It is must be neat, really—I guess “neat” isn't a sophisticated word, but it must be heartening to be somebody who's helping this young democracy develop a judicial system that is worthy. And I cannot thank our citizens for taking time out of their lives to go.

The United States has built or renovated 40 judicial facilities; we've distributed more than 11,000 copies of the Afghan constitution; we've trained more than 750 Afghan judges and lawyers and prosecutors. The international community is helping this new government build a justice system so they can replace the rule of the Taliban with the rule of law.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush (2007, Book I). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, pp. 145–155.

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Carter, Jimmy (1924–)

Jimmy Carter was the president of the United States (1977–1981) during the initial Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the recipient of the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize. Carter was born James Earl Carter on October 1, 1924, in Plains, Georgia. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, and was commissioned an ensign in the navy in 1946. Carter served in the military until 1953.

Carter entered politics in 1962 when he successfully ran for the state senate in Georgia as a moderate Democrat. He was reelected two years later. Carter served two terms as governor from 1967 to 1975. He secured the Democratic nomination in the 1976 presidential election and went on to defeat Republican Gerald Ford, with 50.1 percent of the vote to Ford's 48 percent. Carter's presidency was marked by economic malaise, with high inflation and a severe energy crisis in 1979.

Once in office, Carter sought to reorient U.S. foreign policy and emphasize human rights. He tempered support for authoritarian, anticommunist regimes in countries such as Nicaragua and Iran. In an effort to improve the standing of the United States in Latin America, Carter negotiated a series of agreements in 1978 that turned the Panama Canal over to Panama, despite significant opposition in Congress. The president's greatest accomplishment in foreign affairs was his facilitation of the Camp David peace accords in March 1979 between Israel and Egypt, bringing together the two formerly

implacable enemies. Meanwhile, a revolution in Iran overthrew the pro-U.S. shah and installed a fundamentalist Islamist government under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In November 1979, Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking 52 Americans hostage and holding them for 444 days. The incident, and a failed rescue attempt in April 1980, undermined Carter's credibility both at home and abroad.

On December 27, 1979, the Soviets overthrew the Afghan regime of Hafizullah Amin and occupied the country. In response to the invasion, Carter instituted an economic embargo against the Soviet Union. (See his speech below in the Related Primary Document section.) He also requested that the Senate cease consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II nuclear arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union. The U.S. ambassador to Moscow was recalled, and Carter ordered a U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics (the boycott was joined by 65 other nations and prompted the Soviets and their allies to boycott the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games).

During his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, the president promulgated the Carter Doctrine, which declared that any military intervention in the Persian Gulf by an outside power would be met by military force. Carter also asked Congress to provide funds for the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan and Pakistan (\$30 million was initially approved). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was directed to coordinate assistance to, and training of, the mujahideen in cooperation with Pakistan.

Carter lost the 1980 presidential election to Republican Ronald Reagan, 60.8 percent to 41 percent (independent candidate John Anderson secured 6.6 percent of the vote). After Reagan's inauguration in 1981, the hostages in Tehran were released. Carter became renowned as an advocate for democracy and human rights around the world after he left office. He also published a series

of books on politics and humanitarian issues. Carter received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002 for his work.

Tom Lansford

See also: Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Carter Doctrine; Cold War (1947–1989); Mujahideen; Reagan, Ronald W.; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

Related Primary Document

President Jimmy Carter, “Speech on Afghanistan,” January 8, 1980

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. President Jimmy Carter roundly condemned the military action and took a range of actions to pressure the Soviets to withdraw. In a speech on January 8, 1980, Carter spoke about the unjust nature of the intervention and the falseness of Soviet justifications. He noted that he rejected direct military action to force the Soviets out, but had consulted with U.S. allies and agreed to utilize the United Nations to condemn the Soviet invasion and to employ economic sanctions against Moscow. He also discussed his plans to ensure that the economic sanctions would not harm the U.S. economy.

In my own opinion, shared by many of the world's leaders with whom I have discussed this matter, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War. It's a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet Union. Obviously, we all were shocked and deplored publicly and officially the Soviet action in Hungary and then later, in 1968, in Czechoslovakia. Those were two countries which, since the Second World War, were basically subservient to the Soviet Union; they were not independent nations in control of their own affairs. There was an uprising, as you know, and the Soviets brutally stamped the uprising out within those two countries.

This, however, was a sovereign nation, a nonaligned nation, a deeply religious nation, and the Soviets invaded it brutally.

We were informed, other leaders throughout the world were informed, by Soviet Ambassadors and direct messages from Moscow, that the Soviets went into the nation to protect it from some third force that might be threatening Afghanistan. When questioned about where was the third threatening force from, the Soviets have never been able to give a reasonable answer. They claim that they were invited in by the Government to protect Afghanistan. As you know, the leader of Afghanistan, President Amin, who was supposed to have invited them in, was immediately assassinated as soon as the Soviets obtained control over Kabul, the capital city, and several of the members of the President's family were also killed.

We are the other super power on Earth, and it became my responsibility, representing our great Nation, to take action that would prevent the Soviets from this invasion with impunity. The

Soviets had to suffer the consequences. In my judgment our own Nation's security was directly threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviets' move into Afghanistan, if done without adverse consequences, would have resulted in the temptation to move again and again until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world's oil supplies.

I talked to the President of Pakistan immediately after this Afghanistan invasion and also talked to many other of the world's leaders and sent them direct messages. The action that we could take was confined to three opportunities. One is to take military action, which I did not consider appropriate. Our country has no desire, nor could we have effectively implemented military action, to drive the Soviet forces from Afghanistan—which left me with two other options, which I chose to exercise. One is political action, and the other one is economic action.

Politically, we joined with 50 other nations to take to the Security Council two propositions: one, to condemn the Soviet Union for the invasion and therefore the threat to world peace; and secondly, to call upon the Soviets to withdraw their troops. The vote was cast after the debates were concluded. The only nations voting against these two propositions were East Germany—again, a Soviet puppet nation—and the Soviets themselves. The permanent members, as you know, have a veto right. And now a move is underway, which I think will be realized, to take this case to the General Assembly for further condemnation of the Soviet Union.

It's difficult to understand why the Soviets took this action. I think they probably underestimated the adverse reaction from around the world. I've talked to many other leaders, our allies and those representing nations that might be further threatened, and they all believe that we took the right action.

It was not done for political reasons; it was not done to implement some foreign policy. It was done in the interest of our national security.

We did take economic action, which I think was properly balanced. It was carefully considered. We will try to impose this action on the Soviet Union in a way that will have a minimal adverse effect on our own country, where the sacrifices will be shared as equitably as you and I together can possibly devise, and at the same time let the Soviets realize the consequences of their invasion.

We will not permit the Soviets to fish in American waters within 200 miles of our land area. They have a very large fishing fleet, involving hundreds of thousands of tons of fish harvested. They will not have those permits renewed. We will not send high technology equipment to the Soviet Union or any equipment that might have a security benefit to the Soviet Union. This will include drilling equipment, for instance, used for the exploration and production of oil and natural gas. We will restrict severely normal commerce with the Soviet Union, which is highly advantageous to them. And of course, I have interrupted the delivery of grain, which the Soviets had ordered, above and beyond the 8 million tons which our Nation is bound by a 5-year agreement to have delivered to the Soviet Union.

We have taken steps to make sure that the farmers are protected from the adverse consequences of this interruption of grain shipments to a maximum degree possible. It will be a costly proposition. I understood this when I took the action. And my estimate is, based on a fairly thorough, but somewhat rapid analysis, that this year the extra cost to purchase this grain and

to change the price levels of corn and wheat and to pay the extra storage charges will amount to about \$2 billion. That's in fiscal year 1980. In fiscal year 1981 there will be an additional cost of about \$800 million.

It may be that as the season progresses and we have more experience in substituting for the Soviet Union as the purchaser of this grain, that there will be an additional 2 or 3 hundred million dollars spent in 1980. If this should take place, then that would reduce by the same amount, roughly, expenditures in 1981 fiscal year. So, the total cost will be in the neighborhood of \$2.8 billion. This cost will not fall on the farmers except to the extent that they are taxpayers like every other American. This will be shared by all those in this country who pay taxes to the Federal Government.

This grain will not be permitted to go back on the market in such a way as to depress agricultural prices. And in a few minutes I'll let one of the representatives here of the Agriculture Department, Jim Williams, outline to you the details. And I have a sheet prepared, for handing out to all of you—the exact loan prices for wheat and corn and the other prices for the redemption of corn and wheat from storage.

The last point I want to make is this: It's very important that we understand that our allies are working very closely with us. I talked to several of them before we took this action. All of them agreed that it should be taken. We've got the maximum practical assurance from them that they will not substitute their sale of goods, including grain, for our own. There are three major nations that ordinarily have grain to export—Argentina, Canada, and Australia. Argentina does not have adequate grain to make any significant difference.

I talked to President Giscard d'Estaing today, who represents West Europe. They do have substantial quantities of grain ordinarily on hand, particularly barley. They will not substitute their grain for ours that's being withheld from the Soviet Union.

We anticipate that this withholding of grain to the Soviet Union will not force them to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. We understood this from the beginning. We don't think that economic pressure or even condemnation by the United Nations of the Soviet Union will cause them to withdraw their troops. But we hope that we have laid down a marker and let them know that they will indeed suffer, now and in the future, from this unwarranted invasion of a formerly independent, nonaligned country.

I need the support of the American people. I believe that it's a matter of patriotism, and I believe that it's a matter of protecting our Nation's security. I anticipate that we'll get good response from the Congress in the minimal legislation that might be required to carry out these programs. Almost all of it can be done by administrative action under the rights given by the Congress, through legislation, to the Secretary of Agriculture and to me.

There are just a couple of other things that perhaps should be mentioned, but I think I'll wait on them till a little later.

We want to pursue a long-range analysis and a schedule of actions to strengthen American interests and presence and influence in this troubled area of the world, in Southwest Asia. You know about some of these from news reports that have already been issued. And we will take action, with the Congress help, to strengthen Pakistan. Our desire is to do this through a consortium of nations; that's also the desire of Pakistan.

I talked since lunch with President Zia of that country. I've talked to him before about this matter. And other nations in the region who might be threatened by the Soviets, from Afghanistan, will also know that we and many other nations on Earth are committed to their adequate defense capability, so that the Soviets will be discouraged from further expansionism in the area.

Because of the Iranian question, we have greatly built up our naval forces in the northern China Sea or in the Arabian Sea. Those will be maintained at a higher level than they have been in the past. And as you know, there has been a marshaling of worldwide public opinion, not only in the condemnation of the Iranian terrorists who hold our hostages but also against the Soviet Union for their unprecedented invasion of Afghanistan in this recent few weeks.

I don't have a written text, but those are some of the things that I wanted to describe to you. And I think it might be good to have questions from this group now. Perhaps some of the—a few members of the press have been in. Perhaps we could discuss the matter more thoroughly and we could get into some sensitive areas after the press has departed.

Source: Carter, Jimmy. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980–81*. Book 1, 21–24. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981.

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Carter Doctrine

The Carter Doctrine was the doctrine of U.S. foreign policy enunciated by President Jimmy Carter in 1980, which pledged the nation to protect American and allied interests in the Persian Gulf. By 1980, the Carter administration, which had been engaged in an ongoing debate over the direction of U.S.

foreign policy as détente faded, declared its determination to use any means necessary, including military force, to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf. These interests mainly involved Persian Gulf oil and regional shipping lanes.

On January 23, 1980, Carter, in his State of the Union message, declared that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” This emphasis on American military power marked a fundamental reorientation in Carter’s foreign policy. Since 1977, in response to public disillusionment with the Vietnam War and disgust over the Watergate scandal, Carter had attempted to fight the Cold War with different weapons. While not ignoring the Soviet Union, he determined that U.S.-Soviet relations would not be allowed to dominate foreign policy formulation, a stance that he saw as

having led to the costly containment policy and the tragedy of Vietnam. Instead, other nations, especially those in the developing world, would be considered in a regional rather than a global context. Additionally, the United States would assert its international predominance by emphasizing moral rather than military superiority by focusing on human rights and related humanitarian concerns.

But by 1980, the international climate had changed. On November 4, 1979, Iranian students seized the American embassy in Tehran and took 70 Americans hostage. This precipitated a 444-day crisis during which the Carter administration could do little to free the hostages. Also, on December 26, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, sparking a bloody nine-year war there. In his State of the Union message, Carter declared that “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.”

Faced with these twin crises—religious fundamentalist terrorism and communist advancement by military force—during an election year, Carter reoriented his foreign policy. Although he did not abandon his commitment to human rights, the issue was accorded a much lower priority in policy formulation and was no longer used as a major weapon with which to wage the Cold War. Instead, the administration’s official posture reflected a more customary Cold War policy that emphasized military power and communist containment. In addition, a globalist perspective began to supplant the regionalist outlook, with increased emphasis on East-West issues.

The Carter Doctrine provided the policy rationale for the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf and for nonlethal assistance to anti-Soviet insurgents. Carter’s successor, President Ronald W. Reagan, would dramat-

ically expand aid to the mujahideen and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

Donna R. Jackson

See also: Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Carter, Jimmy; Cold War (1947–1989); Mujahideen; Reagan, Ronald W; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N. (1841–1879)

Major Sir Pierre L. N. Cavagnari, an officer with extensive military experience in India, served as the British envoy in the Afghan capital of Kabul in 1879. His murder and the massacre of his mission on September 3, 1879, caused a resumption of the Second Afghan War.

The son of a French general and his Irish wife, Cavagnari was born in France on July 4, 1841, and raised and educated in England. He attended the East India Company’s military “seminary” at Addiscombe and became an ensign in the 1st Bengal Fusiliers in 1858. During the Indian Mutiny he served in Oudh (1858–1859) and in 1861 was appointed assistant commissioner of the Punjab. In 1877, Cavagnari became deputy commissioner for Peshawar. He participated in seven North-West Frontier punitive expeditions.

In 1878, when the Russians sent a mission to Afghanistan, the British also formed a

mission to visit Afghanistan. The British mission was headed by General (later Field Marshal) Sir Neville Chamberlain and included Cavagnari as political officer. The British mission marched out of Peshawar and encamped at Fort Jamrud, at the entrance to the Khyber Pass, on September 21, 1878. The following day Cavagnari, with a small military escort, rode ahead to coordinate passage. Cavagnari was stopped but met an Afghan general he knew, who told Cavagnari that force would be used to oppose the British march, and if they had not been friends, Cavagnari would have been shot.

This rebuff, plus the failure of Afghan ruler Sher Ali Khan to meet with a related British ultimatum, caused the British to invade Afghanistan and start the Second Afghan War on November 21, 1878. Cavagnari served as political officer of Lieutenant General Sir Samuel J. Browne's Peshawar Valley Field Force. He played a key role in negotiating the May 26, 1879, Treaty of Gandamak, which seemingly ended the Second Afghan War, with Mohammad Yakub Khan, Sher Ali Khan's son and successor. Cavagnari received a knighthood for this achievement.

Cavagnari, while considered personally fearless but perhaps "unpleasantly ambitious and ruthless" (Barthorp 1982, p. 71), was appointed British envoy to Kabul. His mission included 80 others, including political assistants and a Corps of Guides military escort. The mission arrived in Kabul on July 24, 1879. In late August 1879, six undefeated Afghan regiments, resentful about their nation's surrender, the presence of foreigners, and the three months' back pay they were owed, were transferred from Herat to Kabul. On September 3, 1879, amid rumors of disaffection, these Herati soldiers received only one month's pay. Enraged, they briefly attacked the British residency and then retreated.

The confrontation was not over, as the Afghan soldiers had only gone to get their weapons. Messages for assistance were sent to Yakub Khan, but they were apparently ignored. Some 2,000 Afghan soldiers returned and ferociously attacked the residency. Cavagnari was hit in the head by a ricocheting bullet; he then led a bayonet charge and died shortly thereafter. By the end of the day, only a few guides remained alive. They rejected Afghan pleas to surrender, fixed bayonets, and charged out of the residency to their deaths. (Three British soldiers who were messengers, and four on detached duty, survived the attack.) The massacre of Cavagnari and his mission sparked the renewal of hostilities.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Gandamak, Treaty of (1879); Khan, Mohammad Yakub; Khan, Sher Ali; Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleight (Lord).

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Cavalry and Cavalry Tactics

The rugged and mountainous terrain of Afghanistan diminished the role that cavalry

traditionally played in warfare. Nevertheless, mounted units were central to military operations such as scouting, and they played a crucial role in a number of battles. Afghan cavalry was traditionally comprised of irregular mounted troops. These forces often fought as small raiding or scouting parties. They typically were armed with muskets or pistols, along with swords or occasionally lances, making them more mounted infantry than true cavalry of the period. Afghan horses were bred for their sturdiness and quickness, and were smaller than European or Arabian breeds.

Afghan cavalry was instrumental in the unification of Afghanistan and the creation of the Durrani Empire in the 1700s. The cavalry troops of Emir Ahmad Shah Durrani proved much more adept at coordinating with infantry than opponents inside or outside of Afghanistan. The Afghan cavalry was generally better armed and led than the mounted forces of the Marathas, which relied upon light cavalry units that were highly independent and notoriously hard to control. At the Third Battle of Panipat (1729), the charge of the Afghan reserve cavalry broke the Maratha ranks and won the day for the Afghans.

Nevertheless, Afghan cavalry lacked the training and discipline of the Anglo-Indian forces they fought in the 1800s and early 1900s. Cavalry was used to overwhelm infantry or counter an opponent's cavalry, but an Afghan cavalry charge tended to be diffuse and spread out, lacking the shock power of a compact formation. The result was that Afghan cavalry seldom played a decisive role in combat, but was highly useful in pursuing a fleeing enemy or for raids or surprise attacks. Instead, the cavalry was often used to conduct a variety of nonmilitary activities such as collecting taxes. In addition, cavalry was utilized as a quick reaction force to ad-

dress rebellions. There was also a permanent cavalry force stationed in Herat and tasked with serving as a border guard.

After the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), Afghan emir Abdur Rahman Khan initiated a series of military reforms to improve the capabilities of his armed forces. Cavalry had been organized in regiments of about 400 mounted troops commanded by colonels. Each regiment was divided into four troops of about 100 cavalymen. In the 1890s, cavalry regiments were increased in size to 600 mounted soldiers, each armed with a short-barreled musket or carbine and a sword. There was little drill or organized training until the 20th century. There was also a wide disparity of quality among units, most of which were organized along ethnic or tribal lines. The best cavalry units were four regiments of royal guards who were better trained and equipped than the average soldiers. Soldiers were expected to provide their own horse or purchase one from government stocks. If a horse was killed in combat, the monarchy would reimburse the owner.

In contrast, the Anglo-Indian armed forces had excellent cavalry, generally well trained and equipped. The majority of the units consisted of native troopers and British officers, along with some European non-commissioned officers (Indians could not hold British commissions until World War I, although some ranks were the equivalent of those in the European units). On various occasions, regular British cavalry units were deployed as well. Anglo-Indian cavalry was organized by function. The heavy cavalry were the shock troops of the battlefield, used to break through enemy formations on large warhorses. Light cavalry units were primarily used for scouting or raiding and were armed with swords or lances, and later carbines. The majority of Anglo-Indian

mounted forces were designated as light cavalry. Irregular cavalry units were often militia forces, also used mainly for reconnaissance or missions in enemy territory. In the mid-1800s, the distinctions between light and heavy cavalry began to diminish, and all units were required to be able to carry out the full range of cavalry functions, including scouting. All cavalrymen carried carbines by the 1880s.

Indian cavalry troops were known as *sowars* and organized into troops of 75–80. Two troops made a squadron, and a regiment had four squadrons of between 400 and 600 men. Regiments were formed into brigades, which for the Anglo-Indian cavalry would usually consist of two native regiments and one European regiment. By the late 1800s, there were 40 Anglo-Indian cavalry regiments. The Anglo-Indian cavalry were expected to provide their own horses or to have the funds to purchase a mount and equipment from the regiment (in the 1880s, a cavalry mount would typically cost £50–60). When the cavalrymen left the service, these costs were returned.

During the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839–1842 and 1878–1880, respectively), the British used relatively small numbers of cavalry in proportion to their total number of forces. The terrain precluded large cavalry charges, and mounted troops magnified problems associated with foraging and supply. Instead, both the Afghan and Anglo-Indian cavalry were primarily used for scouting and raids. If they had a numerical advantage, Afghan cavalry would attack Anglo-Indian cavalry or infantry. Otherwise, they tended to avoid combat. They were capable of carrying out daring raids, forcing the British to conduct scouting operations at troop strength. The venerable British infantry square proved highly effective at withstanding Afghan cavalry charges.

During the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the Anglo-Indian cavalry wore khaki uniforms and increasingly used a combination of mounted and dismounted tactics. Cavalry would ride close to the enemy, dismount, open fire with their carbines and mount again to advance or retreat as necessary. By the 1890s, the Anglo-Indian Army had begun to experiment with mounted infantry, armed with heavier weapons, including machine guns.

By the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), the British had begun to use armored cars and airplanes to take on both the scouting and attack functions of the cavalry. During the conflict, the use of armored vehicles and modern weaponry underscored the growing anachronism of large cavalry formations. In the 1920s, the Afghan Army began to acquire armored vehicles to replace its cavalry units. Nonetheless, horses remained an important resource in later conflicts and were used during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989) by the mujahideen, the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), and even Operation Enduring Freedom (U.S. Special Forces rode along with Northern Alliance fighters in the initial attack on the Taliban after the 9/11 attacks).

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Armored Vehicles; Artillery, Cannons, and Mortars; Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Sher Ali; Maiwand, Battle of (1880); Mujahideen; Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the main foreign intelligence service of the United States. The agency led U.S. efforts to support the mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), and coordinated the early U.S. strategy to overthrow the Taliban after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The CIA had its roots in the Office of Strategic Services, which had been created in World War II. The agency was formally established by the National Security Act of 1947. During the Cold War, the CIA steadily grew in size, scope, and power.

Following the Saur Revolution in April 1978, in which the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)

seized power, the CIA began to provide assistance to the various mujahideen groups fighting the regime. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, President James “Jimmy” Carter ordered the CIA to expand aid, which rose to more than \$20 million in 1980.

One central concern for the agency and the Carter administration was to avoid a direct connection between U.S. support and the mujahideen. In response, the CIA launched Operation Cyclone. The operation involved the CIA funneling funds and weapons through Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. The ISI already had a significant network among the mujahideen and could also provide bases, training, and medical facilities for the fighters in Pakistan. These sites provided critical bases for the mujahideen to plan, organize, and launch attacks (and safe havens to which they could retreat). One result was that the CIA did not have to station a large number of agents in Afghanistan or Pakistan (some sources claim there were as few as 10 CIA operatives based in Pakistan for Operation Cyclone).

Under President Ronald W. Reagan, aid to the mujahideen expanded dramatically. From 1981 to 1987, military and economic aid totaled \$3.2 billion. From 1987 to 1993, it increased to \$4.2 billion. The CIA also worked to convince other states to provide assistance, including weapons. Nations ranging from Saudi Arabia to China provided either financial or military aid to the mujahideen.

By 1985, the conflict had essentially stalemated. The mujahideen controlled the majority of the country, but were unable to capture larger cities and towns. The Soviets and the PDPA were able to defeat the mujahideen in conventional engagements, but were unable to completely suppress the insurgents or hold the countryside. Soviet

airpower was a decisive factor in the major battles. In 1986, Milton Bearden became the CIA station chief in Pakistan. He led an intensified effort to defeat the Soviets. That year, the CIA began to supply the mujahideen with advanced Stinger antiaircraft missiles. The weapons helped turn the course of the war by inflicting heavy losses on Soviet helicopters and aircraft. This forced a change in tactics toward more high-altitude operations, which were less effective.

In 1988, the Soviets began to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. The CIA continued funding the mujahideen in their efforts to overthrow the PDPA government, while the pro-Soviet regime continued to receive military and economic aid from Moscow. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, Moscow ceased aid to the PDPA, as did Washington. The PDPA regime collapsed that year and Afghanistan plunged into a decade-long civil war. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan prompted warnings from CIA agents in the region, who also monitored the activities of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who arrived in Afghanistan in 1996. The CIA provided intelligence for the 1998 cruise missile strikes on al Qaeda facilities following the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Throughout the remainder of the 1990s, CIA agents in Pakistan argued for additional action against bin Laden but were overruled by officials in the administration of President William “Bill” Clinton, who were worried about the possibility of civilian casualties.

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, CIA agent Gary Schroen led a team into Afghanistan to negotiate with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance for a combined campaign against the regime. The CIA used about \$10 million to secure the cooperation of the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban fighters. U.S. and allied special operations

forces coordinated the attacks of the anti-Taliban forces and were able to call in air and missile strikes when needed. The coalition quickly gained a series of military victories over the Taliban, and the regime collapsed in December 2001. Meanwhile, Schroen was replaced by Gary Berntsen, who led an unsuccessful effort to capture bin Laden. CIA operative Johnny “Mike” Spann was the first known U.S. Special Operations member killed in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom. Spann was interrogating prisoners at a prisoner of war facility at Qala-i-Jangi when he was killed during an uprising by Taliban prisoners on November 25, 2001. The uprising was eventually quelled after a week of intense fighting by Northern Alliance fighters and coalition special operations forces.

The CIA subsequently played a leading role in training Afghan militia forces as a new Afghan National Army was established. The role of these paramilitary forces increased in importance as the administration of President Barack Obama began to withdraw U.S. military forces from Afghanistan. The U.S. force shrank to fewer than 10,000 troops in 2016.

Tom Lansford

See also: Bearden, Milton; Berntsen, Gary; Cold War (1947–1989); Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998); Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Northern Alliance; Schroen, Gary.

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Chamberlain, Sir Neville Bowles (1820–1902)

Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain was a British military officer who fought in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) and who led a diplomatic mission whose failure precipitated the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). Chamberlain, whose father was a diplomat, was born in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on January 19, 1820. Along with his siblings, he was part of a well-known military family. His eldest brother became an admiral, while two other brothers were generals, and the final brother a colonel. Chamberlain entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in 1833, but performed poorly and withdrew after less than a year. In 1837, his family arranged a commission for him as an ensign with the East India Company's military service.

Although Chamberlain had not done well academically at Woolwich, he proved to be a good soldier. He was brave and an inspirational and popular officer. During the First Anglo-Afghan War, the young subaltern fought at the Battle of Ghazni (1839) and took part in the advance on Kabul in 1842. During the conflict, he was wounded six times. In 1842, he was promoted to lieutenant. Chamberlain fought in the Gwalior Campaign against the Marathas in India in 1843. He subsequently served in a variety of staff and line positions, rising to the rank of major in 1848 during the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848–1849).

In 1854, Chamberlain became a lieutenant colonel and was given command of a frontier unit that patrolled an area of Punjab that bordered Afghanistan. When the Sepoy Rebellion broke out in 1857, Chamberlain was the adjutant general of the Indian Army. He was again severely wounded during the advance on Delhi and was both knighted and promoted to colonel for his bravery. In 1863, Chamberlain was transferred to Britain, where he was promoted to major general, and then lieutenant general in 1872. The following year, Chamberlain married Charlotte Curler. While in Britain, Chamberlain became active as a member of the Liberal Party (he would later oppose the Boer War in South Africa).

In 1876, Chamberlain was appointed to be the commander of the Madras Army, one of three major commands in India at the time. The next year, he became a full general. Meanwhile, a Russian military delegation traveled to Kabul in July 1878, despite formal opposition from Afghan ruler Sher Ali Khan. The colonial government in India insisted that Sher Ali also accept a British contingent. Chamberlain was chosen to lead the British delegation and set out for Kabul in October. However, when he reached the Khyber Pass, the Afghans would not allow him to proceed. The incident led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

Chamberlain retired in 1881 and returned to Britain, ultimately purchasing a home in Southampton. He was ceremoniously promoted to field marshal in 1900. He died on February 17, 1902.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Ghazni, Battle of (1839); Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Mohammad Yakub; Khan, Sher

Ali; Khyber Pass; Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleight (Lord); Stewart, Sir Donald.

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Chernenko, Konstantin (1911–1985)

Leader of the Soviet Union from February 23, 1984, to March 10, 1985, Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko was the last of the “old guard” premiers prior to the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev. Chernenko was born on September 24, 1911, in a small, isolated village in the Krasnoyarsk region of Siberia. At 18, Chernenko joined the Communist Youth League (Komsomol). He was appointed to head the Komsomol propaganda unit in Novoselovo District and became a full member of the party in 1931. After three years of military service, Chernenko returned to Novoselovo to lead the party’s propaganda efforts. By 1941, he had become the secretary for the party’s regional committee on propaganda. He went through a variety of training courses during World War II, which proved to be the stepping-stones for later promotions. In 1948, he was appointed as the head of propaganda for Moldova. While there, he became close with future Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. As Brezhnev rose in power and prominence, so did his protégée. In 1971, Chernenko became a member of the party’s Central Committee, and a member of the Politburo seven years later.

Yuri Andropov succeeded Brezhnev after the latter’s death in 1982. However, Andropov died after just 15 months in office, and Chernenko became leader of the Soviet Union on February 13, 1984.

Once in office, Chernenko sought to crush the mujahideen and end the insurgency in Afghanistan, which had dragged on for more than four years. In April 1984, the Soviets launched a massive ground and airborne offensive against Afghan fighters led by Ahmed Shah Massoud in the Panjshir Valley in the northeast of the country. The campaign, which ended in a truce with the mujahideen leader, marked a new effort to capture insurgent bases and disrupt supply lines. It was the largest military action undertaken by the Soviets since the initial invasion in 1979. However, the offensive failed to kill or capture Massoud or large numbers of mujahideen. Meanwhile, Chernenko rebuffed a proposal by Pakistani leader Muhammad Zia ul-Haq for negotiations to end the conflict. The insurgency continued to expand during his brief tenure in office.

Domestically, Chernenko maintained the main policies of his predecessors. He did support minor economic and educational reforms. However, Chernenko found himself caught in a growing rift between reformers and hardliners within the party. His support for Andropov’s protégé and leading reformer Mikhail Gorbachev was instrumental in the latter’s rise to power.

Under Chernenko, the Soviet Union boycotted the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics in retaliation for the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow games. However, the Soviet leader publicly called for a summit between him and U.S. president Ronald Reagan to improve relations between the two nations. Chernenko also advocated for the resumption of arms control negotiations between the superpowers. He died before any meaningful

progress was made on East-West relations. A lifelong smoker, and already in ill health when he became premier, Chernenko died of emphysema on March 10, 1985. Gorbachev became the next leader of the Soviet Union.

Tom Lansford

See also: Andropov, Yuri; Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Reagan, Ronald W.; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich.

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Churchill, Sir Winston (1874–1965)

Winston Churchill was a British soldier and renowned politician who led Great Britain during World War II. Born on November 30, 1874, at Blenheim Palace, Churchill was the grandson of the seventh Duke of Marlborough and the son of Lord Randolph Churchill and his American-born wife, the former Jennie Jerome. He attended Harrow and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst and was commissioned to the 4th Hussars in February 1895. The regiment was posted to India in 1896 and stationed at Bangalore in South India. With his self-confidence, great ambition, and energy, Churchill was not content to just fulfill his assigned regimental duties. He was anxious to serve in one of the empire's wars and was prepared to use both his mother's influential friends as well as his own to pull the necessary strings. At the cost of being considered a "medal-hunter" by his critics, Churchill wanted to win glory and a

reputation with which to get into the House of Commons.

In September–October 1897 Churchill served six weeks on the northwest frontier with the Malakand Field Force under the command of Sir Bindon Blood. Churchill had cut short his leave in England to join the expedition as Blood was a friend who had previously promised him an appointment in the event he was given command of another expedition. Without a vacancy on Blood's staff, Churchill initially joined the expedition as a war correspondent, writing for the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Pioneer*, an Allahabad newspaper. While with the field force he wrote 15 dispatches for the newspapers. Much to his disappointment, the articles appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* as being written "by a young officer" rather than under his name. After joining the force, Churchill was appointed an orderly officer to Blood and was later attached to the 31st Punjab Infantry. He was under fire several times in the campaign, including in bitter fighting in the Mohmand Valley in mid-September 1897 and at Aghra at the end of the month.

After returning to Bangalore in mid-October 1897, Churchill quickly wrote his history of the campaign, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force*. The 85,000-word book was published in March 1898 and sold 8,500 copies in the first nine months.

In March 1898 Churchill traveled to Peshawar while on leave from his regiment in a successful attempt to secure employment with the Tirah Field Force commanded by Sir William Lockhart. While Lockhart took Churchill on as his orderly officer, the campaign was by then largely over as the Afridi tribesmen were submitting. Churchill returned to Bangalore in April 1898.

Later in 1898 Churchill fought with a cavalry regiment in the Sudan campaign, and in 1899–1900 he served in the Anglo-Boer War,

where he won international headlines with his daring escape from a Boer prisoner-of-war camp. In 1900 Churchill was elected to parliament. Over the next 55 years he was a prominent and controversial British statesman, holding several cabinet posts and serving twice as prime minister in 1940–1945 and 1951–1955. Churchill was most famous for his leadership of Great Britain during World War II. He died in London on January 24, 1965, and was accorded a state funeral.

Bradley P. Tolppanen

See also: Blood, General Sir Bindon; Lockhart, Sir William; Malakand Field Force (1897); Tirah Campaign (1897–1898).

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Civil Military Operations

Civil military operations are those activities that armed forces undertake to maintain or increase support among civilian populations for their missions. Terminology from the Vietnam War aptly encapsulates civil military relations as the effort to win the “hearts and minds” of civilians. Early civil military operations were relatively crude and usually amounted to efforts to secure the cooperation of elites. From the reign of Ahmad Shah Durrani, who ruled from 1747 to 1772, onward, successive Afghan rulers attempted to garner the support of tribal elders and

chieftains by offering land and other inducements. The British would later offer subsidies to tribes in order to travel through their territory or as a means to buy loyalty or prevent attacks. These subsidies could be paid annually or once for specific concessions.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviets adopted a model of civil military relations in developing states that was a result of repeated interventions during the Cold War. Soviet military advisers worked with local forces to train them to fight pro-Western troops, or in the case of Vietnam, U.S. and allied soldiers. During these interactions, Soviet forces typically did not engage in combat. Thus, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, they did not have a well-developed model for civil military relations in a newly conquered country, nor did the pro-Soviet Afghan government, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Instead, the Soviets and the DRA faced a growing insurgency that was able to gain control of up to 75 percent of the country. The Soviets relied on a military strategy of controlling the major cities and ceding the countryside to the insurgent mujahideen. When Soviet or DRA forces undertook operations, they were designed to destroy mujahideen targets or facilities and deny the rebels assistance from the countryside. Consequently, the Soviets undertook operations to destroy crops, wells, or other supplies that could help the mujahideen. This alienated the rural population and undermined efforts to develop an effective base of support for the DRA or an intelligence network for the anti-mujahideen operations. It also increased support for the mujahideen. In addition, DRA and Soviet reforms designed to modernize and secularize Afghan society instead angered religious leaders.

By the time of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, the United States had developed

an extensive doctrine on civil military relations. When the coalition forces first attacked the Taliban and al Qaeda in October 2001, they began humanitarian operations designed to win the support of the population. Aircraft dropped rations across the countryside (food packets that were prepared in order to meet the dietary restrictions of Muslims). Leaflets were also dropped with information on the coalition and its efforts to overthrow the Taliban, as well as warnings about mines or unexploded military ordinance. As coalition forces were deployed, civil affairs officers began assessing civilian needs, while a central task force was created to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts, including coordination among international nongovernmental organizations. Concurrently, the coalition began to deploy civil affairs teams to the major cities and towns.

The subsequent focus of the coalition's civil military approach was the creation and dispatch of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs were first used in 2002 and were a multifaceted approach to reconstruction and nation building. The teams would vary from province to province, depending on need, but usually consisted of 60–120 personnel, including soldiers, civilian police, and civilian representatives of different agencies, ranging from health officials to economic development advisers. The PRTs were commanded by military personnel who had wide latitude in approving projects, including funding of up to \$25,000 without additional approval. Typical projects would include infrastructure work such as road, hospital, or school construction. PRTs also endeavored to train local officials in a range of areas, such as best practices for good governance or even agriculture. By 2008, there were 26 PRTs, with different countries in the coalition often commanding the teams.

The PRTs were controversial. Afghan president Hamid Karzai asserted that the work being done by the teams could have been better addressed by Afghan government agencies if the coalition had simply transferred the funds used for the PRTs. Some PRTs also became magnets for attacks by the Taliban or other insurgents, undermining efforts to stabilize areas. In other cases, Afghan locals did not believe that they were sufficiently included in the selection or planning of projects, creating resentment over priorities.

The coalition's use of PRTs allowed it to have much better civil military relations than the Soviets, and to undertake and complete a number of short- to medium-term infrastructure projects. The coalition was also more successful in securing the loyalty or goodwill of large numbers of Afghans. However, factors such as civilian casualties and government corruption concurrently undermined support. In the end, civil military relations were not able to permanently counter existing ties to regional warlords or to overcome fear of the Taliban.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–); Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Psychological Operations in Afghanistan; Taliban Insurgency; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Warlords.

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Civilian Casualties

Civilians and noncombatants have historically had high casualty rates during Afghanistan’s many conflicts. That trend has not changed significantly in the country’s modern wars. Civilian casualties result from a variety of intentional and unintentional actions on the part of combatants. Military forces sometimes deliberately target civilians in order to terrorize the population or undermine support for the enemy. Civilians may also be killed in reprisal for actions by opposing forces or to send a message to the enemy. This was especially common when the line between civilian and combatants was not always clear. For instance, in January 1842, during the retreat from Kabul in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), Afghan warriors killed approximately 12,000 camp followers, including women and children, who had traveled with the British forces when they occupied Kabul in 1839.

Noncombatants might also be attacked in order to erode or reduce the enemy’s capability to wage war. Killing farmers or merchants undermines food production and can cause crop shortages. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), Soviet troops and forces from the pro-Soviet Afghan government deliberately targeted agricultural regions in an effort to deny supplies to the mujahideen. Since the insurgents controlled the majority of the countryside, the Soviets generally did not attempt to minimize civilian casualties. Instead, those outside of the

areas under government control were assumed to be cooperating with the mujahideen and were sometimes targeted by the Soviets. Soviet tactics, such as carpet bombing and the indiscriminate use of landmines, created significant collateral casualties. The United States and mujahideen groups accused the Soviets of using chemical weapons against civilian targets. Mujahideen attacks, including rocket strikes on Soviet-held cities, also caused civilian losses. Both sides in the conflict engaged in retributive executions. Ambushes of Soviet or government troops resulted in retaliatory mass executions in nearby villages, while the mujahideen killed villagers suspected of collaborating with the enemy. During the 10-year occupation, an estimated 800,000–1.5 million civilians were killed by both sides.

Civilian deaths may also be collateral damage from military encounters. Towns under siege may be bombarded by opposing forces, resulting in indiscriminate explosions from shells or mortars. The British estimated that about 5,000–7,000 civilians were killed in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), mainly from bombardments. The Siege of Kabul during the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001) left more than 1,000 civilians dead, mostly from rocket attacks.

Decades of conflict along with significant civilian losses disrupted society and traditional clan structures in Afghanistan. When the United States intervened in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban in 2001, it sought to minimize civilian casualties. The use of precision-guided weaponry and restrictions on airstrikes near civilians reduced the number of accidental deaths, as did rules of engagement for ground forces designed to limit civilian losses. In addition, in 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enacted new protocols on air attacks to further reduce

civilian losses after a number of highly publicized incidents in which civilians were killed or injured. For instance, on July 6, 2006, 47 Afghan civilians were killed at a wedding party in an errant U.S. bombing raid. Despite new steps to reduce casualties, bombing missions, missile strikes, and artillery barrages continued to produce noncombatant casualties. Unexploded ordnance also killed.

Between 2001 and 2015, approximately 26,000 Afghan civilians were killed as a result of the ongoing conflict, and more than 100,000 wounded. The United Nations (UN) estimated that the majority of those killed died during combat ground operations, followed by deaths from landmines and roadside bombs, suicide attacks, and airstrikes. The majority were killed by the Taliban and other insurgent groups, with estimates that the antigovernment forces were responsible for up to 80 percent of the dead, depending on the year. In 2015, the number of civilians killed in the conflict rose to a record 3,545, with 7,457 injured according to the UN. Also in October 2015, the humanitarian medical group Doctors without Borders (Médecins sans Frontières) suffered from accidental U.S. air strikes at their hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, where 42 people were killed, including patients and staff members and at least three children. Others were badly injured. It was later determined that human error led to the accidental bombing.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Drone Strikes; Precision-Guided Weapons; Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Taliban, Forces and Tactics.

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Clinton, Bill (1946–)

William Jefferson Clinton, most widely known as Bill Clinton, was president of the United States from 1993 to 2001. Clinton was born in Hope, Arkansas, on August 19, 1946. Clinton had a difficult childhood, but was an intelligent youth who received a scholarship to Georgetown University and then was a Rhodes Scholar before graduating from Yale with a law degree in 1973. While at Yale he met Hillary Rodham, whom he married in 1975. A moderate Democrat, at age 32, Clinton became the youngest governor in Arkansas history when he was elected to that office in 1978. Although defeated in his reelection bid two years later, Clinton retook the office in 1982 and served for the next 10 years. He secured the Democratic presidential nomination in 1992, despite lingering questions over his marriage fidelity and a series of other minor scandals. Clinton went on to defeat incumbent Republican president George H. W. Bush with 43 percent of the vote to Bush's 38 percent, and 19 percent for independent candidate Ross Perot.

Clinton became the first Democrat to win the White House in 12 years, but a failed health care reform effort and scandals among congressional Democrats allowed the Republicans to recapture both houses of Congress in midterm elections in 1994 for the first time since the 1950s. For the remainder

of his time in office, Republicans controlled Congress. Clinton was reelected in 1996 and presided over a booming economy and a series of domestic accomplishments including reforms to the social welfare system and a federal surplus.

His foreign and national security policy record was more mixed. The loss of 19 U.S. servicemen during the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993 led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia, while the reluctance of the Clinton administration to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 would later be cited by the president as one of his greatest regrets. Meanwhile, the United States was struck with a series of terrorist strikes. The first occurred when Clinton had been in office for just over a month. Islamic extremists detonated an explosive-filled van in the parking garage of the World Trade Center, killing six and injuring more than 1,000. On April 19, 1995, right-wing extremists detonated a truck at a federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 in the worst act of terrorism up to that date in the United States. These attacks were followed by a succession of strikes by Islamic terrorist groups on U.S. targets around the world, including a military training facility, the Khobar Towers, in Saudi Arabia in 1995. The emergence of the global terrorist organization al Qaeda became a growing concern for U.S. intelligence agencies. After the Taliban seized control of most of Afghanistan in 1996, al Qaeda was able to establish a series of bases and training facilities in the country.

In February 1998, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden issued a religious decree calling for jihad or “holy war” against the United States. On August 7 of that year, al Qaeda conducted simultaneous attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 and wounding

more than 4,000. In response, the United States launched cruise missile attacks on suspected al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan and Somalia. Clinton faced criticism for not taking stronger action in response to the attacks. In 1999, the administration demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden to face trial for his part in the embassy bombings, but the Afghan government refused. The United States instituted sanctions in response. On October 12, 2000, the U.S. destroyer *Cole* was attacked by al Qaeda in Aden, killing 17 and wounding 39.

Meanwhile, Clinton authorized airstrikes against Iraq in 1998 following the refusal of the Iraqi regime to allow UN-mandated inspections of its weapons of mass destruction program. The United States also led a NATO air campaign against Serbia following atrocities in Kosovo in 1999, while Clinton supported the expansion of NATO to include the former Soviet bloc countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.

A series of scandals plagued Clinton’s second term. In December 1998 he became only the second U.S. president to be impeached. He faced charges of perjury and obstruction of justice related to efforts to cover up an affair with Monica Lewinsky, a White House intern. The Senate acquitted Clinton in February 1999. Clinton was later found in contempt of court for lying during testimony in a separate sexual harassment suit and fined \$25,000, in addition to having his license to practice law suspended.

Clinton left office in 2001, the same year that his wife began a term in the U.S. Senate after being elected from New York. Clinton subsequently became an international spokesperson for his charitable foundation, which raised more than \$2 billion between 2001 and 2014.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Bush, George H. W.; Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998); Taliban; Terrorism.

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Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–)

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the administration of President George W. Bush established an international coalition to undertake military and nation-building missions in Afghanistan. The role of the coalition troops initially differed substantially from that of U.S. forces. The U.S. assets were engaged primarily in combat operations, while the coalition partners emphasized nation building and economic development efforts.

Partially as a result of lessons from the interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s, military officials in the Bush administration, led by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, sought to create a rough division of labor in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. U.S. forces, along with the troops of close allies such as the United Kingdom or Australia, would undertake major combat operations, while a multinational formation, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), would train Afghan security forces and over-

see development missions. The result was a coalition that included the U.S.-led combat forces, ISAF, and Afghan security forces.

Major combat operations focused on suppressing the Taliban and other insurgents. The Taliban would launch offensives each spring, and coalition forces would endeavor to disrupt the militants through regular campaigns. These conventional offensives emphasized the use of combined arms with integrated air and land components (throughout the war, the coalition enjoyed complete air superiority). Coalition ground troops had an extraordinary degree of close air support and artillery and missile coverage. The coalition also employed much more sophisticated communications and electronic surveillance capabilities. Special operations forces were critical for missions targeting insurgent leadership and intelligence gathering. They were also used extensively in operations with Afghan security forces. The war in Afghanistan made wide use of special operations forces, including U.S. Navy Sea Air and Land (SEALs), British Special Air Service (SAS), and Australian SAS.

One of the greatest challenges for the coalition was the porous border with Pakistan, which allowed insurgents to escape to safe havens out of the reach of the coalition. Another obstacle faced by senior coalition officers were restrictions put in place on the operations of national forces. For instance, several contributing nations forbade their forces from being used in offensive military operations. Another major challenge for the coalition was the quality and reliability of Afghan security forces. Despite training and support by coalition forces, Afghan troops often failed to perform at the levels needed to be effective. In addition, beginning in 2008, a wave of Afghan troop attacks against their coalition allies undermined operations. In 2008, approximately 1 percent of coali-

tion casualties were the result of “green-on-blue” violence, but that figure rose to 15 percent in 2012. There were 91 confirmed incidents of green-on-blue violence from 2008 to 2015, resulting in 148 killed and 186 wounded. The majority of these attacks were attributed to Taliban infiltrators.

To facilitate economic development and reduce support, or potential support, for the Taliban, the coalition deployed provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The PRTs included coalition military and civilian personnel and undertook a variety of projects designed to provide security and enhance the human development levels. By 2008, there were 31 PRTs throughout Afghanistan. The PRTs were phased out by 2014.

When it was first deployed, ISAF was limited to operations in and around Kabul. It consisted of about 5,000 personnel from 22 countries, compared with the approximately 7,000 U.S. troops. Command of ISAF rotated among the contributing nations for six-month intervals until 2003. The ISAF commander was always a non-U.S. general until 2007, after which a U.S. four-star general commanded the forces. In 2003, ISAF’s mission was expanded and contributing nations began to undertake reconstruction projects around the country.

Fifty-eight countries contributed troops or other military assets or support to the coalition. Some nations, such as the United States, France, or the United Kingdom, provided personnel to both components of the coalition. Coordination between ISAF and the United States was close, especially after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed command of ISAF in August 2003. Eventually 51 nations provided support for ISAF. In October 2006, ISAF expanded its area of responsibility to include all of Afghanistan.

Coalition forces grew steadily from 2001 to 2014. A troop surge was undertaken

beginning in 2009 in an effort to stabilize the country and allow the subsequent withdrawal of combat forces. The troop surge ended in 2012 after mixed results. In 2002, there were 5,000 non-U.S. foreign coalition forces. That figure grew to 9,000 by 2006, 38,700 by 2010, and peaked at 42,400, the following year, before beginning to decline as countries withdrew their forces. In 2002, U.S. forces numbered 5,200, rising to 20,400 in 2006, and peaking in 2011 at 100,000, falling to 32,800 in 2014. Afghan security forces, including both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and police officers (both local and national police), rose from 6,000 in 2002 to 86,000 in 2006 to 215,000 in 2010 and 340,000 in 2014.

ISAF was terminated in 2014 and replaced by a smaller mission with a focus on training. Resolute Support Mission (RSM) was the NATO-led successor to ISAF. In December 2015, RSM had 12,905 troops from 42 countries. The largest contributor was the United States with 6,800 troops, followed by Georgia with 870, Germany with 850, and Italy with 829. The smallest contributor was Luxembourg with 1 soldier, followed by Iceland with 2 and Estonia with 4. By 2016, the coalition had lost 3,515 killed in Afghanistan, of which 2,381 were U.S. troops. Concurrently, the United Kingdom lost 455 soldiers and Canada 158 between 2001 and 2016.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Petraeus, David; Special Operations Forces; Taliban; United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Cold War (1947–1989)

The Cold War was a bipolar conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1989 in which Afghanistan emerged as a frontline, battleground state. With the end of World War II, the Afghan governments of Prime Minister Hashem Khan and his successor, Mahmud Shah, sought to increase ties with the United States. The Afghans were afraid that the British withdrawal from India would create a power vacuum in the region that would be taken advantage of by the Soviet Union, which had already deployed troops in northern Iran. In 1946, an Afghan delegation traveled to Washington, D.C., seeking military and economic aid. They were rebuffed since Afghanistan was not perceived as strategically important by the United States. Subsequent Afghan efforts to secure U.S. economic and military aid during the late 1940s and 1950s were also met with little interest by the administrations of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. The United States did provide some economic aid in the form of development loans, but not military assistance. Instead, the United States developed a strategic partnership with Pakistan that included the creation of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) through the 1955 Baghdad Treaty.

CENTO included the United States, the United Kingdom, and regional powers, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, and was designed to contain Soviet influence in the region.

The ties between the United States and Pakistan were viewed with suspicion by Mohammed Daoud Khan, who became prime minister in 1953. Daoud gradually improved relations with the Soviet Union as a way to balance against Pakistan. Through the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet economic and military assistance steadily increased. Meanwhile, the creation of the Marxist, pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) provided Moscow with a means of domestic influence in Afghanistan. Daoud overthrew the monarchy in 1973 with the support of the PDPA but became increasingly mistrustful of the organization and of the Soviets. In 1978, the prime minister endeavored to diminish Soviet influence by again reaching out to the United States and the West, but he was deposed during the Saur Revolution in April 1978. A pro-Soviet government took power under Nur Muhammad Taraki of the PDPA.

Domestic opposition to the PDPA regime grew quickly in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government, which both feared and opposed the pro-Soviet regime, began to support antigovernment fighters, the mujahideen. The mujahideen were allowed to establish bases and training facilities in Pakistan, and they were provided military and financial support by the Pakistani intelligence services. Following an internal power struggle, Taraki was overthrown in 1979. In December of that year, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan to prevent the PDPA from being overthrown.

Soviet intervention prompted renewed U.S. attention to Afghanistan. President James “Jimmy” Carter imposed economic sanctions and other punitive measures on the Soviets. The United States also began to provide support to the mujahideen. This assistance was

dramatically expanded under President Ronald W. Reagan whose Reagan Doctrine pledged U.S. backing for any indigenous groups fighting against communist regimes. U.S. support for the mujahideen grew from \$10 million per year in 1980 to \$650 million annually by 1986. U.S. intelligence officers worked with their Pakistani counterparts to train Afghan rebels and to secure weapons and ammunition for the groups. A significant escalation of U.S. involvement occurred in 1986, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to equip the mujahideen with advanced Stinger antiaircraft missiles. These weapons helped erode Soviet air superiority.

By 1986, the Soviet regime of Mikhail Gorbachev was actively trying to arrange a negotiated withdrawal from Afghanistan in exchange for a cessation of external aid to the mujahideen. However, the United States and Pakistan were reluctant to stop their support as long as the PDPA regime continued to be backed by Moscow. The 1988 Geneva Accords provided a framework for the Soviets to withdraw, but failed to halt external support for the warring factions. Although the Cold War was declared over in 1989, Soviet assistance helped the PDPA regime remain in power until 1992 (the same year that Russia cut off all aid to Afghanistan). The end of the Cold War did not stop the fighting in Afghanistan; instead the warring mujahideen battled each other in the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001).

Tom Lansford

See also: Carter, Jimmy; Carter Doctrine; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Helmand Valley Project; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Reagan, Ronald W.; Reagan Doctrine.

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Communications in Military Operations

Throughout the history of conflict, effective communication methods have been central to the success or failure of military operations, whether in traditional combat or counterinsurgency and counterterrorism initiatives. As in countries and campaigns across the globe over the centuries and millennia, it has been critically important to develop and maintain effective communication methods in such operations in 21st-century Afghanistan, whether involving the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Security Assistance Force, or Afghan Security Forces.

The earliest communication techniques were of a person-to-person nature, with warriors passing messages verbally after covering the necessary distance on foot, as a Greek runner did to report the news of an Athenian victory over the Persians at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BCE, at which point he collapsed and died of exhaustion. Those methods evolved over the ensuing 23 centuries to include the use of horses, dogs, carrier pigeons, signal fires, and musical instruments, all in an effort to increase the speed at which vital strategic messages

could be delivered in ways less and less likely to be uncovered by one's adversaries. However, the technological breakthrough that produced modern battlefield communications technology did not occur until the conception, development, and refinement of the electronic telegraph by the American inventor Samuel Morse in the 1830s and 1840s. Subsequent innovations followed more rapidly over the next 150 years, with the most notable examples including telephones over the last quarter of the 19th century and television, satellite, computer, cell phone, and Internet communications during the 20th and 21st centuries. With each new innovation came opportunities for military planners and practitioners to employ methods that allowed for contact over greater distances with higher levels of sophistication useful in traditional combat environments, such as World Wars I and II, but also when confronting nontraditional actors in often connected counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Since the end of the Cold War in particular, the latter types of operations have grown increasingly prevalent, especially with respect to the threats posed to the United States and its allies by terrorist groups driven by extreme interpretations of Islam, especially al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), all three of which are active in Afghanistan.

The use of modern communications technology by the British in combat dates to the employment of the telegraph in the context of the "Great Game" the United Kingdom engaged in with Russia for control over Central and South Asia, including Afghanistan, over the latter half of the 19th century. However, in recent years, the communications methods employed by the United States and its allies on one hand and its adversaries in Afghanistan on the other feature strains of continuity as well as change.

Each side, for instance, has used a variety of old and new methods to communicate on battlefields spread across Afghanistan's rugged geography, but also to spread their ideological messages to targeted populations. Western methods since the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan in the aftermath of al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, include travel on horseback to reach remote villages for face-to-face meetings with tribal leaders, as well as satellites to track Taliban foes and intercept their electronic communications. For their part, both al Qaeda and ISIS, but particularly the latter, have been effective using Internet-based social media networks, most notably Facebook and Twitter, to attract prospective followers via extreme interpretations of Islam. Yet, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden preferred couriers to electronic communications while hiding from U.S. military and civilian forces and agencies tracking him, a strategy that worked until the Central Intelligence Agency uncovered the identity of one such courier and used that information to find that elusive terrorist foe. The resulting U.S. Navy SEAL team raid killed bin Laden at the compound where he had been hiding across the Afghan border in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011.

Robert J. Pauly Jr.

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Special Operations Forces; Taliban.

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Cordovez, Diego (1935–2014)

Diego Cordovez Zegers was a UN diplomat who negotiated the agreements for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Cordovez was born on November 3, 1935, in Quito, Ecuador. He earned a law degree from the University of Chile, and accepted a position with the UN in New York in 1962. Cordovez was dispatched as a negotiator to a succession of conflicts, including the Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, and Iran (during the 1979–1980 Tehran Hostage Crisis).

From 1981 to 1988, he was an undersecretary for political affairs. During his tenure he was tasked with negotiating a resolution to the Afghan conflict. At first, both the Soviets and the mujahideen rejected Cordovez's efforts and refused to talk. Cordovez responded by opening talks with each of the parties involved in the conflict, including the Soviet Union, the United States, and Pakistan, which represented the mujahideen (the Afghan regime of Mohammed Najibullah refused to participate in discussions with the insurgents). By 1986, with casualties mounting and the occupation becoming increasingly unpopular domestically, the Soviets became increasingly willing to negotiate. The United States and Pakistan were insistent that no settlement would be possible until the Soviets withdrew.

In 1988, Cordovez was able to finalize a series of four agreements, the Geneva Accords. In the first, Afghanistan and Pakistan pledged not to interfere in the internal dynamics of the other country. The second accord called for the return of refugees. The

Soviets pledged to withdraw their forces by 1989 in the third accord, while the United States and the Soviet Union promised to end military aid to the warring factions. The Soviets withdrew their troops, but fighting continued and the Najibullah regime was overthrown in 1992, while the Taliban emerged as the most powerful force in the nation, capturing Kabul in 1996.

Cordovez left the UN to serve as foreign minister for Ecuador for four years beginning in 1988. He then taught at Columbia University. The former UN diplomat was appointed as his country's ambassador to the UN in 2005, serving in that post for two years. He died on May 24, 2014, in his hometown in Ecuador.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Geneva Accords (1988); Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998)

The cruise missile strikes of August 20, 1998, were in retaliation for the terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. On August 7, 1998, members of the al Qaeda terrorist organization led by fugitive Saudi Arabian millionaire Osama bin Laden carried out simultaneous attacks on U.S. embassies in the African nations of Kenya and Tanzania. In the joint bombings

of the embassy compounds, 257 people were killed, including 12 Americans. A further 5,000 individuals were injured.

In retaliation, President Bill Clinton ordered the commencement of Operation Infinite Reach. The operation involved cruise missile attacks on six terrorist training camp sites in Afghanistan near the Pakistani border, and a cruise missile strike against the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, which was suspected of producing chemical weapons. (See President Clinton's address to the nation after the strikes on August 20 in the Related Primary Document section below.)

The attacks were launched from American warships in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea. The Afghanistan attack was by far the larger, involving some 75 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The governments of Sudan and Afghanistan both immediately protested the attacks. Sudanese interior minister Abdul Rahim announced that the pharmaceutical factory struck in Khartoum had been producing vital medical supplies, including aspirin, and no components that could be used in the development of chemical weapons. U.S. secretary of defense William Cohen argued that the facility was producing components for the development of deadly VX gas. In Afghanistan, the Taliban, the fundamentalist Islamic government then controlling that country, announced that bin Laden had survived the attack and would never be surrendered to the United States.

Cohen defended the attacks as justified against terrorists or any nation supporting or harboring terrorists. The goal of the attacks, he said, was to disrupt terrorist-training facilities and to kill al Qaeda leaders. The Afghanistan attack killed more than 20 people and wounded dozens more.

The attacks provoked protests throughout the world, particularly in Muslim countries. Many protesters denounced the United States as anti-Islamic, although President Clinton denied any intention by the United States to attack peaceful Muslims. In the aftermath of the attacks, Clinton also came under intense criticism from some in the media who argued that he ordered the strikes to deflect public attention away from the emerging Monica Lewinsky scandal. Just three days before the attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan, Clinton had admitted having had an improper sexual relationship with Lewinsky, a White House intern.

The strikes also did not deter al Qaeda from further attacks upon American citizens. Barely three years later, on September 11, 2001, al Qaeda members seized control of four U.S. commercial aircraft, flying two of them into the World Trade Center towers in New York City and another into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. These attacks, the most deadly terrorist strike upon American citizens to date, provoked a full-scale U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.

Paul J. Springer

See also: Al Qaeda; Clinton, Bill; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Taliban.

Related Primary Document

President Bill Clinton's Address to the Nation on August 20, 1998, after the Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan

On August 20, 1998, the U.S. Navy carried out cruise missile attacks against sites in Afghanistan and Sudan that the U.S. government believed were training camps for terrorists. The Clinton administration indicated

that it had strong evidence that the complexes were part of a terrorist network allegedly involved in the August 7 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The following document is the text of President Bill Clinton's August 20, 1998 address to the nation following the U.S. retaliation.

Good afternoon. Today I ordered our armed forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security.

I want to speak with you about the objective of this action and why it was necessary. Our target was terror. Our mission was clear—to strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Osama Bin Laden, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today.

The groups associated with him come from diverse places, but share a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence, and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents. They have made the United States their adversary precisely because of what we stand for and what we stand against.

A few months ago, and again this week, Bin Laden publicly vowed to wage a terrorist war against America, saying—and I quote—“We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians. They’re all targets.” Their mission is murder and their history is bloody.

In recent years, they killed American, Belgian and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the president of Egypt and the pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747s over the Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan. They gunned down German tourists in Egypt.

The most recent terrorist events are fresh in our memory. Two weeks ago, 12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives, and another 5,000 were wounded when our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were bombed. There is convincing information from our intelligence community that the Bin Laden terrorist network was responsible for these bombings. Based on this information, we have high confidence that these bombings were planned, financed, and carried out by the organization Bin Laden leads.

America has battled terrorism for many years. Where possible, we’ve used law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight. The long arm of American law has reached out around the world and brought to trial those guilty of attacks in New York and Virginia and in the Pacific. We have quietly disrupted terrorist groups and foiled their plots. We have isolated countries that practice terrorism. We’ve worked to build an international coalition against terror.

But there have been, and will be, times when law enforcement and diplomatic tools are simply not enough, when our very national security is challenged, and when we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens. With compelling evidence that the Bin Laden network of terrorist groups was planning to mount further attacks against Americans and other freedom-loving people, I decided America must act.

And so, this morning, based on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, I ordered our armed forces to take action to counter an immediate threat from the Bin Laden network. Earlier today, the United States carried out simultaneous strikes against terrorist

facilities and infrastructure in Afghanistan. Our forces targeted one of the most active terrorist bases in the world. It contained key elements of the Bin Laden network's infrastructure and has served as a training camp for literally thousands of terrorists from around the globe. We have reason to believe that a gathering of key terrorist leaders was to take place there today, thus underscoring the urgency of our actions.

Our forces also attacked a factory in Sudan associated with the Bin Laden network. The factory was involved in the production of materials for chemical weapons.

The United States does not take this action lightly. Afghanistan and Sudan have been warned for years to stop harboring and supporting these terrorist groups. But countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens.

Let me express my gratitude to our intelligence and law enforcement agencies for their hard, good work. And let me express my pride in our armed forces who carried out this mission while making every possible effort to minimize the loss of innocent life.

I want you to understand, I want the world to understand, that our actions today were not aimed against Islam, the faith of hundreds of millions of good, peace-loving people all around the world, including the United States. No religion condones the murder of innocent men, women and children. But our actions were aimed at fanatics and killers who wrap murder in the cloak of righteousness; and in so doing, profane the great religion in whose name they claim to act.

My fellow Americans, our battle against terrorism did not begin with the bombing of our embassies in Africa; nor will it end with today's strike. It will require strength, courage and endurance. We will not yield to this threat. We will meet it, no matter how long it may take. This will be a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism; between the rule of law and terrorism. We must be prepared to do all that we can for as long as we must.

America is and will remain a target of terrorists precisely because we are leaders; because we act to advance peace, democracy and basic human values; because we're the most open society on Earth; and because, as we have shown yet again, we take an uncompromising stand against terrorism.

But of this I am also sure. The risks from inaction to America and the world would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact. In this case, we knew before our attack that these groups already had planned further actions against us and others.

I want to reiterate: The United States wants peace, not conflict. We want to lift lives around the world, not take them. We have worked for peace—in Bosnia, in Northern Ireland, in Haiti, in the Middle East and elsewhere. But in this day, no campaign for peace can succeed without a determination to fight terrorism. Let our actions today send this message loud and clear: There are no expendable American targets. There will be no sanctuary for terrorists. We will defend our people, our interests and our values. We will help people of all faiths, in all parts of the world, who want to live free of fear and violence. We will persist and we will prevail.

Thank you. God bless you, and may God bless our country.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. William Clinton, 1998, Book 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, pp. 1460–1462.

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D

Damghan, Battle of (1729)

The Battle of Damghan was a decisive military victory for Nadir Shah of Persia and a defeat for the Afghan Hotak dynasty, ending its rule over most of Persia. In 1709, Mir Wais Hotak, founder of the Hotak dynasty, rose in revolt against the Persian Safavids and created an Afghan state with its capital at Kandahar. Mir Wais's son Mahmud Hotak invaded Persia and conquered its capital, Isfahan, in 1722 after a six-month siege. Mahmud was subsequently declared shah of Persia. Mahmud died in 1725 and his cousin, Shah Ashraf Hotak, assumed the throne of Persia.

Nadir Shah, a Safavid general, launched an invasion of Afghanistan in 1729. His forces defeated the Afghans in a series of battles and captured Herat. Nadir was able to effectively combine infantry, cavalry, and the early artillery used at the time, while the Hotakis relied primarily on cavalry to break up their opponent's formations.

Nadir's goal was to drive the Hotakis from Isfahan. In an attempt to block the Persian advance, Shah Ashraf set out with an army of approximately 40,000. Nadir had 25,000 troops under his command, but they were better disciplined and armed than their Afghan counterparts. The two armies met near the village of Damghan on September 29. The resultant battle would last until October 5. After a series of skirmishes on the first day of the battle, the Afghans launched a massive cavalry charge at the Persians on October 2. However, the charge was decimated by artillery and musket fire (Nadir had positioned his artillery on high ground

where the guns had a clear field of fire in front of the Persian infantry). The Persians launched a counterattack, which punched through the center of the Afghan lines and cut their forces in half. The Afghans fled, but Shah Ashraf was able to regroup his forces and deploy them for an ambush of the advancing Persians. Nadir stopped his troops short of the ambush, and the Afghans subsequently withdrew. During the fighting, the Persians lost approximately 3,000 dead, to an estimated 12,000 dead Afghans.

Nadir went on to capture Isfahan in December 1729 and restore the Safavids to the throne. Meanwhile, Shah Ashraf was assassinated during the retreat from Isfahan, ending the Hotak claim on the Persian throne. Nadir subsequently overthrew the Safavids and was proclaimed shah of Persia in 1736, establishing the Afsharid dynasty. Two years later he again invaded Afghanistan. He was able to capture Kandahar in 1738, ending the Hotak dynasty. Future Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Durrani, whose father had been killed by Nadir's forces at Herat in 1729, was imprisoned when Kandahar fell. He eventually joined the Afsharid military and used his skills to launch the Durrani Empire.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Hotak, Mir Wais; Hotaki Empire (1709–1738); Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Shah, Nadir.

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Dargai Heights, Battle of (1897)

The Battle of Dargai Heights, October 18–20, 1897, was a British victory and the most significant battle of the Tirah campaign. The campaign had been launched after Afridis and Orakzais rose against the British and attacked a series of forts and outposts in and around the Khyber Pass. In response, the British dispatched the Tirah Field Force, an Anglo-Indian expedition numbering more than 34,500 and including machine guns and modern artillery. It was commanded by Lieutenant General Sir William Lockhart.

The Tirah Field Force marched out of Kohat on October 11, 1897. Within a week, scouts had reached the Dargai Heights whose 5,000 ft (1524 m) cliffs oversaw the surrounding countryside, including the road taken by the invading forces. Lockhart ordered two battalions to scale the Heights and prevent the Orakzais from firing down on the advancing British forces. The Anglo-Indian troops encountered only light resistance and captured the area, suffering 10 dead and 53 wounded. Lockhart decided not to leave a garrison on the Heights since the top of the cliffs lacked water and would be vulnerable to having their supply lines cut off. Consequently, the British withdrew from the Heights.

On October 20, 1897, as the main column passed the Heights, it came under heavy fire. Scouts found that an estimated 12,000 tribesmen had occupied the high ground and were firing on the column. Lockhart ordered artillery to displace the Orakzais; however, the tribesmen remained firm. Under covering fire from the artillery and machine guns, five

battalions moved up the Heights, facing heavy fire. The attack was led by a Gurkha battalion, but it and supporting British units were quickly bogged down. The Gordon Highlanders were next ordered to attack up the slope, supported by the Gurkhas. Piper George Findlater was shot through both feet and caught in the open under enemy fire, but he continued to play the bagpipes. For his actions he was awarded the Victoria Cross, Britain's highest award for valor. Findlater's was one of five Victoria Crosses awarded during the assault. The Gordons reached the Heights and the Orakzais fled. During the attack, the British lost 36 dead and 159 wounded. Orakzai casualties were estimated to be between 200 and 400.

After their withdrawal from the Dargai Heights, both the Orakzais and the Afridis engaged in a series of skirmishes and guerrilla raids, avoiding large, conventional battles. Lockhart continued his advance, conducting a scorched earth policy along the way. In December, the British marched into the Khyber Pass and by April, the revolt was over.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Khyber Pass; Lockhart, Sir William; Malakand Field Force (1897); Tirah Campaign (1897–1898).

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Deobandi School

The Deobandi school was an anti-Western, especially anti-British, fundamentalist Islamist movement based originally in northern India. The movement emerged in the 1860s as a reaction against British colonialism when Sunni clerics established a religious school or madrasah in Deoband, India, Dar-ul Ulum. The madrasah incorporated the teachings of earlier Islamic scholars, including Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), the spiritual founder of Wahhabism.

The Deobandi school stressed a literal and fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran and later Islamic scholarship. Central to Deobandi thought was the rejection of modernism. Clerics asserted that the British and other Western colonial powers had been able to expand their empires because Muslims had turned away from the message of the Prophet and embraced Western ideals and values. Clerics were especially critical of Muslim rulers who endeavored to modernize their country's economic or social structures. Adherents also condemned Shiites as apostates.

The movement spread from the original madrasah along the border region between British India and Afghanistan in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Numerous madrasahs that embraced the Deobandi teachings were established in the region. Various Afghan rulers tried to suppress the Deobandi, including Emir Abdur Rahman Khan, who ruled from 1880 to 1901, and King Amanullah Khan, who ruled from 1919 to 1929. The Deobandi madrasahs were banned in Afghanistan, and clerics who studied at Deobandi schools were banned from the country. Nonetheless, the movement remained popular among the majority Pashtun population in rural areas.

The Deobandi madrasahs played a major role in encouraging opposition to efforts to

modernize Afghanistan in the 20th century, especially during the reign of Amanullah and the tenure of President Mohammed Daoud Khan, in office from 1973 to 1978. During the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), the influence of the Pakistani Deobandi madrasahs increased substantially. They often provided free educations for the Afghan refugee children and young men. Many members of the Taliban were educated at Deobandi madrasahs, and Dar-ul Ulum became the spiritual home of the group. After the Taliban seized power in 1996, they began to implement a strict version of sharia, in line with the Deobandi teachings.

Tom Lansford

See also: Bin Laden, Osama; Buddhas of Bamiyan; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Amanullah; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Madrasahs; Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Taliban; Wahhabism.

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Disraeli, Benjamin (1804–1881)

Benjamin Disraeli was a conservative British politician and ardent imperialist who twice served as prime minister and who sought to counter Russian influence in the Great Game for power and influence in Central and South Asia. Disraeli was born in London on December 21, 1804, to a Jewish-Italian family (the young Disraeli would later join the Anglican Church). He initially studied law, and then tried to become a writer, before turning to politics. Disraeli was defeated three times before he finally

won election to Parliament in 1837 as a Conservative. In the House of Commons, Disraeli developed a reputation as a brilliant orator and a staunch protectionist. The future prime minister opposed the free trade efforts of William Gladstone and the “Peelite” wing of the party (named after Prime Minister Robert Peel). The Peelites ultimately bolted from the Conservatives to form the Liberal Party. Meanwhile, Disraeli served as chancellor of the exchequer in 1852 (he would also hold the post from 1858 to 1859 and 1866 to 1868). He was responsible for a major electoral reform measure in 1867. He subsequently became prime minister in 1868, the first person of Jewish ancestry to hold the position. However, the Conservatives lost the 1868 election to the Liberals, led by Gladstone.

Disraeli led the Conservatives to victory in 1874 and was again appointed prime minister. During his second term, Disraeli faced a series of foreign policy challenges. He purchased shares of the Suez Canal Company in 1875, giving Britain influence over the strategically important waterway. Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, Disraeli skillfully managed to maximize British influence while minimizing that of Russia at the Congress of Berlin. For his accomplishments, Queen Victoria bestowed on Disraeli the title of Earl of Beaconsfield in 1876.

Disraeli remained concerned over the expansion of Russian influence in Central Asia in the Great Game between the two empires. When Russia dispatched an uninvited mission to Afghanistan in 1878, the British demanded an equal opportunity. Afghan leader Emir Sher Ali Khan resisted, in an attempt to remain neutral. The result was the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880) in which the British, through the Treaty of Gandamak (1879), forced the Afghans to surrender control of their foreign policy in exchange for an

annual subsidy. The war was unpopular, especially after combat continued past the supposed end of the war in 1879. Meanwhile, another colonial war against the Zulus in South Africa resulted in significant British casualties. Disraeli and the Conservatives consequently lost the 1880 election to Gladstone and the Liberals. Gladstone and Disraeli again changed places. After leaving office, Disraeli’s health failed rapidly. He died in London on April 19, 1881.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Gandamak, Treaty of (1879); Great Game, The; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Sher Ali; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Dobbins, James (1942–)

James Dobbins is a U.S. diplomat who helped negotiate the 2001 Bonn Agreement and served as special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2013 to 2014. Dobbins was born in New York on May 31, 1942. He earned a degree from Georgetown University. After service in the U.S. Navy, Dobbins became a career diplomat and served in a series of difficult postings. During the 1980s, Dobbins was a deputy assistant secretary of state and participated in talks over

German reunification and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. President George H. W. Bush appointed him as U.S. ambassador to the European Union (1991–1993). He then was tasked with the negotiations over the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia and the U.S. intervention in Haiti. Dobbins served on the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton, and he was appointed a special envoy to the Balkans in the wake of the Kosovo conflict.

In December 2001, Dobbins led negotiations that resulted in the Bonn Agreement. The agreement established an interim government for Afghanistan in the wake of the overthrow of the Taliban regime by U.S.-led coalition forces. Under the terms of the accord, Hamid Karzai became interim president of Afghanistan and the deployment of an international security force was authorized (the force became the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF).

Dobbins became the director of the RAND Corporation's International Security and Defense Policy Center in 2002, a post he held until 2013. In May of that year, President Barack Obama appointed Dobbins as his special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, following the unexpected death of Richard Holbrooke. During his tenure, Dobbins was an advocate of a continuing, albeit reduced, U.S. military presence in Afghanistan to serve as a stabilizing influence. In 2014, Dobbins left government service and returned to RAND as a senior fellow and distinguished chair in diplomacy and security.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Bonn Agreement (2001); Bush, George H. W.; Clinton, Bill; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Karzai, Hamid; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO); Obama, Barack; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014).

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
Dost Mohammad (1793–1863)

The first ruler of what is today the country of Afghanistan, Dost Mohammad forged the several tribes in the region into a unified state. He created the first Afghan Army, which eventually destroyed a British force during the First Anglo-Afghan War. Placed in the difficult position of ruling a buffer state between the powerful Russian and British Empires, Dost Mohammad proved himself to be a skillful player on the stage of world diplomacy.

Born in 1793 in Kandahar, Dost Mohammad was the son of Painda Khan, a powerful tribal leader in southern Afghanistan. Afghanistan was ruled by several large tribes at that time, all of which were battling one another to increase their power in the region; there were also several internal disputes for leadership of each tribe. There was no formal state of Afghanistan, only large groups of ethnic Afghan. Painda Khan ruled the second most powerful tribe in the region and had been fighting against the most powerful tribe, led by Zaman Shah, for several years. In 1801, Zaman Shah captured Painda Khan and executed him. Painda Khan's favorite son, Fateh Khan, made an alliance with Zaman Shah's younger brother, Mahmud Shah, to destroy Zaman Shah. After they successfully brought Zaman Shah down later that same year (and blinded him in the

process, which made him ineligible to rule under Islamic law), Mahmud Shah became the dominant leader in the southern region of Afghanistan with Fateh Khan serving as the power behind the throne.

It was against that backdrop of internecine war that Dost Mohammad grew up, eventually joining his brother Fateh Khan. As a young soldier, Dost Mohammad's wild behavior earned him the appellation "Little Wolf," and he soon emerged as one of the most gifted and ambitious of Painda Khan's many sons. Beginning in 1818, Afghanistan was once again plunged into civil war after the murder of Fateh Khan by Mahmud Shah's son, Kamran Shah. Fateh Khan's 21 brothers swore to avenge him, and during



Dost Mohammad, from an 1848 lithograph. He ruled Afghanistan from 1826 until the British deposed him during the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839. He regained the throne in 1845 and stayed in power until his death in 1863. (New York Public Library)

the unrest that followed, most of them succeeded in knocking Mahmud Shah's family from power, assuming control over various cities and provinces in Afghanistan, and extending their control to other provinces in the region as well.

In 1826, Dost Mohammad inherited control of the city of Kabul after the death of one of his other brothers. Not only did he now command Afghanistan's largest city, but he had also been Fateh Khan's favorite brother. Those two facts convinced Dost Mohammad to launch a campaign to unite all of Afghanistan under his control. Over the next 10 years, he either convinced his brothers to defer to him or drove them from power. He also conquered several territories in the region that had either remained in the hands of Mahmud Shah's family or were held by other tribal leaders. By 1837, much of the territory that comprises present-day Afghanistan was under his control.

In an effort to consolidate his power, Dost Mohammad focused his attention on creating a modern, standing army. The Afghans had had little contact with Europeans at that point, but Dost Mohammad brought several Western adventurers to his kingdom to shape and train his military force. The American, British, and French soldiers who came to Afghanistan had a formidable task before them. Because tribal government existed in much of Afghanistan, Dost Mohammad could only implement reforms on the small number of troops under his personal command, as local tribal leaders generally rejected any attempt to modernize or reform their forces. An additional leftover from the feudal-tribal system was the selection and elevation of officers based on patronage and influence rather than on merit.

Furthermore, Dost Mohammad's treasury fluctuated tremendously, making it difficult to institute a system whereby his soldiers

would get paid regularly. Nevertheless, he made every attempt to bring the soldiers on a regular pay schedule instead of allowing them to earn their incomes through booty and plunder as they had traditionally done. Financial instability also meant that the army had a difficult time maintaining adequate supplies. The army did experience tremendous change during that period, however. Most notable of the many reforms introduced by Dost Mohammad were Western-style uniforms for his troops and the formation of fighting units into infantry, cavalry, and artillery divisions. Afghan forces also became more adept in their employment of weaponry.

Dost Mohammad viewed the establishment of a respectable military force as the key component in unifying Afghanistan politically under his rule. He also introduced some limited reforms that affected the civilian population as well, however, including uniform tax and customs policies, the establishment of the rupee as the country's currency, and a more equitable justice system (although the latter was still highly subject to Dost Mohammad's personal will).

As Dost Mohammad secured his rule within Afghanistan, foreign affairs increasingly claimed his attention. Since the 18th century, Afghanistan had served as a buffer state between the Russian Empire to the north and British-held India to the south, the "jewel" of the British Empire. In the mid-1830s, Dost Mohammad began to see those two great powers as another means to consolidate his hold on his own territory and possibly to reclaim territory that was under the control of other powers in the region. In particular, he was interested in the region of Herat to the west (which was still held by Fateh Khan's killer, Kamran Shah) and Peshawar to the east (which was controlled by India's Maharaja Ranjit Singh).

Dost Mohammad first sought an alliance with the British, offering to help British governor-general Lord Auckland stave off any encroachments by the Russians in return for control over Peshawar (the British had recently brought Ranjit Singh within their sphere of influence). Auckland refused to make any such deal, and in response, Dost Mohammad invited a Russian envoy to his court in 1837. Alarmed by a possible Russian-Afghan alliance, Auckland launched what became known as the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839, deciding that once the British had beaten Dost Mohammad, they would replace him on the throne with a rival leader, Shuja Shah. The Afghan military proved to be no match for the British, who captured Kabul on July 23, 1839. On November 2, 1840, Dost Mohammad surrendered to the British, who brought him to Delhi and placed him under house arrest.

The war continued, however, and Shuja Shah was unable to establish a hold in Afghanistan. The British also found it impossible to hold the territory they conquered in Afghanistan against the unrelenting pressure of tribal leaders, who harassed British troops and repeatedly severed British lines of communication. The British Army eventually attempted to retreat from Kabul in January 1842, but its soldiers were massacred by the Afghans, led by Dost Mohammad's son Mohammad Akbar Khan. With the British government in India now viewing Afghanistan as a wild, ungovernable place, it allowed Dost Mohammad to return to his country in the hopes that he could restore order.

Dost Mohammad arrived back in Afghanistan later in 1842 and quickly reclaimed his throne. The British invasion had sparked feelings of nationalism among the Afghans, who began to see the advantages of banding together as a single nation for the first time.

Those feelings of patriotism and xenophobia, particularly toward the British, greatly assisted Dost Mohammad in regaining control over the Afghan people. He spent the next several years reasserting his authority over the various tribes and regions of the country and was eventually successful in restoring order and unity shortly before his death on June 9, 1863, even capturing Herat just days before he died. Despite his earlier problems with the British, he proved a faithful ally in the years after his restoration, even providing the British with limited support during the Sepoy (Indian) Rebellion of 1857. His death plunged Afghanistan into another period of internecine wars, as his 27 sons battled to succeed him. His third son, Emir Sher Ali Khan, eventually took his place.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Khan, Sher Ali; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Ranjit Singh, Maharaja.

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Dostum, Abdul Rashid (1954–)

Uzbek warlord, chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Afghan Army (2003–2008), and leader of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, Abdul Rashid Dostum was born in Khwaja Dukoh in

Jowzjan Province, Afghanistan, in 1954. He completed his national service as a paratrooper before commencing work in a state-owned gas refinery in 1970. During his employment he engaged in union politics and emerged as a communist union boss, a position he retained until 1978 when he joined the Afghan military in the fight against the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion.

In the early 1980s, however, Dostum began a six-year battle against the Afghan mujahideen as a regional commander of his own militia. By the mid-1980s his aptitude for rallying Uzbek and Turkmen mujahideen soldiers to both government and personal causes proved fruitful. With approximately 20,000 men under his command, he pacified the northern provinces and established control there. While his force was recruited throughout his native Jowzjan Province and had a relatively broad base, the majority of his initial troops and commanders originated from Dostum's home village, Khwaja Dukoh, and represented the core of the force both during the civil war and upon the force's reconstitution in 2001. Despite his military prowess, Dostum's predilection for meting out merciless punishments on the enemy as well as his own men cemented his reputation as a skilled military tactician and a ferocious, uncompromising leader.

Initially allied with the government of President Mohammed Najibullah, in 1992 Dostum switched allegiance as the Soviet-backed government crumbled amid economic woes and internal strife. Despite his communist past, Dostum joined the moderate Tajik leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud, in toppling the Afghan communist government and fought in a coalition against Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmetyar, the Kharuti Pashtun leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan*) in 1992.

Between 1992 and 1997 Dostum ran a secular fiefdom based in Mazar-e-Sharif and the surrounding provinces. Under his watch, women enjoyed the freedom to attend school, ventured outside without burqas, and were permitted to wear high-heeled shoes; Mazar-e-Sharif's university had 1,800 female students. Boasting the last academic institution in Afghanistan, Mazar-e-Sharif was the final bastion untouched by the oppression exercised by the Taliban regime.

As the Taliban forces of Mullah Mohammed Omar approached his stronghold, Dostum assumed a defensive stance and led his Turkmen and Uzbek forces into an ill-fated battle. In May 1997 Dostum's Uzbek commander in Faryab, Abd al-Malik, switched allegiance to the Taliban midway through a skirmish as the Pashtun leader of Balkh and Mazar-e-Sharif, Juma Khan Hamdard, attacked from the east and obliterated Dostum's forces. By 1998, with the gates to Mazar-e-Sharif now open, Hamdard flowed into the secularized city with his Pashtun Taliban brothers, and sharia law was enforced. Dostum went into self-imposed exile in Turkey, where he remained until April 2001. In 2000 he suffered an additional blow to his reputation upon the publication of Ahmed Rashid's book, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, in which the author related the gruesome tale of a soldier being punished by Dostum for stealing.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Dostum moved to redeem his reputation as a leader, and he offered his services to the United States in its quest to defeat the Taliban. With a small company comprising 2,000 horse-mounted rangers, Dostum and U.S. Special Forces secured a pivotal victory over the Taliban in the Hindu Kush Mountains in November

2001, thereby liberating much of northern Afghanistan.

Serving first as deputy defense minister to Afghan president Hamid Karzai, in 2003 Dostum also assumed the position of chief of staff to the commander in chief of the Afghan Army. In 2004 he entered the presidential race but captured only 10 percent of the vote. In response to this loss, Dostum resurrected the Uzbek militia force, much to the chagrin of President Karzai. In a bid to thwart his political endeavors, Karzai urged the commander who had defied Dostum, Abdul Malik, to return to the north and there establish a rival political party, *Hezb-e Azadi-ye Afghanistan* (Afghan Liberation Party). Karzai also placed a governor in Faryab who called for Dostum's indictment for war crimes. The measures were neatly countered, however, when pro-Dostum supporters rioted and drove the appointed governor out of Faryab later that year. Because the north is one of the few areas of Afghanistan in which relative stability has been maintained, government opposition to Dostum has been muted more recently, and his authority prevails for the time being. Holding the northern provinces of Jowzjan, Saripul, Balkh, Faryab, Baghlan, and Kunduz, Dostum also assisted in the establishment of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-e Milli Islami Afghanistan*). In February 2008 Dostum reportedly ordered the kidnapping of a political rival, Akbar Bai. In the process, Bai's son and several associates were beaten and injured. Government forces subsequently surrounded Dostum's home, demanding that he be held accountable for the Bai incident. Dostum claimed that he had not ordered the kidnapping and refused to cooperate with a government investigation. As a result, he was stripped of his army position. Nonetheless, Dostum remained a powerful northern

warlord, and he supported Karzai in the 2009 presidential election.

Luisa Gandolfo

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Karzai, Hamid; Najibullah, Mohammed; National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan*); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Taliban; Warlords.

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Drone Strikes

Drone strikes have emerged as an integral component of U.S. counterterrorism strategy against militants involved in the war in Afghanistan, along with other terrorist operations. Since al Qaeda's attacks against America on September 11, 2001, the United States has employed a range of military tools against its adversaries in the global war on terrorism. Drones have assumed a progressively more prominent role in eliminating members of al Qaeda, its affiliates, and, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with cameras and munitions that operators control remotely to track and target terrorist leaders. They have been used by both the George W. Bush and

Barack Obama presidential administrations, although more extensively by the latter.

As opposed to ground and manned air assaults, and even the comparable U.S. military casualty risk-averse approach of cruise missiles, which must still typically travel thousands of miles from the launch point to the target, drones can approach and strike a target from just thousands of feet overhead. That greater proximity, in turn, increases the likelihood of success in eliminating targets in a fashion that decreases the potential for collateral damage in the form of civilian deaths. Statistically, since 2001, the United States has launched nearly 600 drone strikes against targets across the greater Middle East, including more than 400 in Pakistan. Through the end of 2015, the Obama administration had launched more than 500, approximately 10 times more than the Bush presidency. Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense's Joint Special Operations Command have carried out some of the aforementioned strikes.

For the Bush administration, drone strikes represented a complementary rather than a central component of the struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates. On balance, Bush placed as much emphasis on capturing terrorist enemy combatants, particularly those in important leadership and operational positions, as on killing them. Given the scope and effects of the 9/11 attacks, the president and his advisers viewed the capture and interrogation of enemy combatants for intelligence-gathering purposes indispensable to the fight against terrorism. However, the enhanced interrogation techniques it employed included waterboarding, a simulated drowning approach that produced sufficient backlash from critics who branded it as torture to produce a shift toward increased drone strikes during Bush's final years in office.

Obama condemned the Bush administration’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques as torture repeatedly during the 2008 presidential campaign. Once elected, Obama expanded the American use of drone strikes against high-value terrorist targets, first within the al Qaeda “core” in Afghanistan and Pakistan and its affiliates, most notably al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) but also, more recently, ISIS. Reliance on drone strikes, which have taken out terrorist leaders such as the American-born AQAP head Anwar al-Awlaki, was a manifestation of Obama’s aversion to capturing and interrogating adversaries and reliance on action that would kill known terrorist leaders. However, the issue of civilian casualties as a result of collateral damage still produced criticism from many of the same human rights advocacy groups that rejected the Bush administration’s techniques.

Robert J. Pauly Jr.

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Bush, George W.; Civilian Casualties; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Obama, Barack.

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Dubs, Adolf “Spike” (1920–1979)

Adolf Dubs, known as Spike Dubs, was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 1978

to 1979. He was killed in 1979 during a kidnapping. Dubs was born on August 4, 1920, in Chicago, Illinois. In 1942, he graduated from Beloit College and joined the U.S. Navy, serving in World War II and rising to the rank of lieutenant commander. After the war he entered the U.S. foreign service and attended graduate school at Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis. Dubs became an expert on the Soviet Union and spoke Russian fluently. He was assigned to a variety of posts during his career, including serving as the ranking U.S. diplomat in Moscow from 1973 to 1974 while the ambassadorship was vacant.

Dubs was appointed U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan in June 1978, just after the Saur Revolution overthrew the regime of Mohammed Daoud Khan and replaced it with a pro-Soviet government led by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Relations between Dubs and the PDPA government were businesslike, although there was significant tension because of growing ties with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in rural areas of Afghanistan, the mujahideen had launched an insurgency against the PDPA regime.

On February 14, 1979, Dubs was picked up from his house in a bulletproof car. The ambassador and a driver proceeded toward the embassy when their vehicle was stopped by three men in the uniforms of Afghan police. They were able to convince the driver to roll down his window, at which point they pulled weapons and forced him to open the car. The kidnappers drove Dubs to the Kabul Hotel and then freed the driver with instructions to report the kidnapping to the embassy. Meanwhile, the ambassador was taken to the top floor of the hotel as the kidnappers were joined by a fourth man. The kidnappers contacted the Afghan government and demanded the release of political prisoners.

U.S. officials were informed of the situation and began negotiations with the Afghan Interior Ministry in an attempt to ensure the standoff was solved peaceably and not through force. U.S. officials reported that they thought they had convinced the Afghans not to take action, but at 12:30 p.m., a shot was reported from the room, prompting Afghan security forces to open fire and storm the site. Dubs was killed during the attack, whether by the kidnappers or security forces remains unknown. Two of the kidnappers were killed during the assault and the other two captured, but then shot soon afterward. The PDPA government refused U.S. requests to independently investigate the incident. Regime opponents asserted that Soviet security advisers pressured the Afghans into the assault in order to damage U.S.-Afghan relations and undermine Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin (whom they overthrew in their December 1979 invasion). The United States did cut aid to the country and it did not appoint a new ambassador until after the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Dost Mohammed; Mujahideen; Operation Storm 333 (1979); People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer (1850–1924)

Sir Henry Mortimer Durand was a member of the Indian Civil Service who served as foreign secretary of the government of India from 1884 to 1894. He is best remembered as having negotiated in 1893 the political boundary between India and Afghanistan, known then and since as the Durand Line.

Durand was born in Sehore, Bhopal State, India, on February 14, 1850. His father was in the British Army and later became Major General Sir Henry Marion Durand. The younger Durand was educated in England and entered the Indian civil service in 1870. During the Second Afghan War (1878–1880), Durand served as political secretary to Major General (later Field Marshal Earl) Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., in Kabul.

In 1884, Durand became foreign secretary of the government of India. The 1880s arguably marked the height of the Great Game, the rivalry between British India and Russia over imperialistic expansion into Central Asia. The following year, the Panjdeh Crisis, in which Russian forces attacked the Afghan town of Panjdeh near the disputed northern Afghan boundary, took place. This episode almost caused a war between England and Russia before the crisis was defused through diplomatic efforts.

The boundary between Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier of India remained vague. The Afghan emir Abdur Rahman, despite provisions in the 1879 Treaty of Gandamak that placed (in return for a substantial annual subsidy) the Khyber Pass, the Kurram Valley, and portions of Baluchistan

under British administration, continued to claim the frontier area. The British thought he was encouraging tribal raiding in the frontier area. In the late summer of 1893, Abdur Rahman Khan surprisingly proposed to the Marquess of Landsdowne, viceroy of India, that a conference be held in Kabul to agree to a formal and final delineation of the Afghan-Indian border.

Durand was sent to Kabul to attend this conference and negotiate with Abdur Rahman, considered “a catankerous and suspicious old savage” (Fredericks 1971, p. 239) by Landsdowne. An agreement was reached quickly and easily, perhaps facilitated by Durand offering to increase the emir’s annual subsidy by £300,000. On November 12, 1893, the emir signed and sealed a treaty renouncing all claims to a band of territory extending from the Hindu Kush to the westernmost limits of Baluchistan. This large area contained the formerly contested lands of Bajaur, Dir, Swat, Buner, Tirah, the Kurram Valley, and Waziristan. As a result, the frontier tribesmen acquired a legal status, becoming “British protected persons.” The Durand Line, as the delineated border between Afghanistan and India came to be called, marked the British Empire’s longest land frontier next to the United States–Canada border. Over the following two years, a commission demarcated the boundary on the ground with a series of pillars.

The establishment of the Durand Line was considered a significant achievement and elicited congratulations from Queen Victoria. In many respects, however, it may be considered a factor in the Pathan uprising of 1897. The Durand Line has been criticized as “illogical from the point of view of ethnography, of strategy and of geography,” mainly because it “splits a nation in two, and it even divides tribes” (Miller 1977, p. 241). Nonetheless, the Durand Line remains the

border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, a successor state of British India.

In 1895, Durand was appointed minister to Persia. He advocated agreement with Russia for joint development of the country and continuation of the traditional policy of upholding the integrity and independence of Persia. Durand departed Persia in 1900 without regret and then served as British ambassador to Spain and then to the United States. He was recalled to London in 1906. Durand devoted himself to writing in England before dying on June 8, 1924.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Durand Line; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Durand Line

The Durand Line is a 2,640-km (1,640-mile) borderline dividing modern Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was established in 1893. The exact location of the line is contentious; however, the West and the United States currently recognize the Durand Line as the official border between modern Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Durand Line was established when Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of British India, convinced Abdur Rahman Khan, the emir of Afghanistan, to create a boundary separating the spheres between Durrani Afghanistan and British-controlled India. The British came to dictate the agreement after the British annexed part of Afghanistan, while continuing to control the strategically important Khyber Pass as part of a treaty signed in 1879. After the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), the British established a policy of indirect rule up to the Durand Line, creating a tradition of what would become the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

For many Afghans, the Durand Line represents British imperialism at its worst, and does not reflect the wishes of the people who live on either side of the current border. The Durand Line is an issue among the Pashtuns who live on either side of the border and who supported the mid-20th-century push for an independent state of Pashtunistan. The legality of the Durand Line is bolstered by a 1905 signed confirmation of the border by Emir Habibullah Khan, the successor to Abdur Rahman Kahn, and, more significantly, in Article 5 of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919, the basis of Afghanistan's complete independence. Article 5 formally accepted the Durand Line as the boundary between Afghanistan and British-ruled India (before India was broken into India, East Pakistan, and West Pakistan in 1947).

After the foundation of Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan demanded that the Pashtuns living in the newly created Pakistan be given the right to choose if they wanted to be part of Afghanistan instead of Pakistan, which would have functionally shifted the border into modern Pakistan. The request was refused by the United Kingdom and Pakistan. Afghanistan then began to ignore the Durand Line and claim Pashtun-occupied territory between the Durand Line and the Indus River. This activity became the motivation for the failed push to create Pashtunistan. This desire by Afghanistan to unite the Pashtuns created tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the 1950s the United States and Pakistan entered into an arms deal, weakening the Afghanistan position. Afghanistan also approached the United States, but the United States insisted that Afghanistan improve its relations with Pakistan and join the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), founded to contain the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, instead, turned to the Soviet Union for arms in 1953. The result was an Afghanistan supported by the USSR and Pakistan supported by the United States.

Modern tensions still exist between Pashtuns who either want a Pashtunistan or want to reclaim lands lost to Pakistan by their ancestors who agreed to the Durand Line. More significantly, the current government of Afghanistan does not officially recognize the Durand Line as the international border with Pakistan.

David Harms Holt

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Durrani, Ahmad Shah (ca. 1722–1772)

Ahmad Shah Durrani was the founder of the modern state of Afghanistan. Ruling from 1747 until his death in 1772, Ahmad Shah forged, through conquest, an empire that extended from eastern Persia to northern India and south to the Indian Ocean. His conquests served to check British expansion in the region until well after his death. His reign forged the often warring Afghan tribes into a cohesive regional power that made the Durrani Empire the second largest Islamic power of the time, after the Ottoman Empire. While the empire slowly began to decline prior to his death, it was all but completely dissolved by the reign of Ayub Shah Durrani (1818–1823), the last of the Durrani dynasty to rule Afghanistan.

Born in 1722 in Herat, Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah was born into the Sadozai clan, a ruling Pashtun clan of the time. His father was the governor of the region but was killed in battle with the Hotaki Empire while the future king was still a boy. With the 1729 invasion of the region by Nader Shah, Ahmad Shah and his family fled to Kandahar, only to be caught up in Nadir Shah's 1738 conquest of Kandahar. Ahmad Shah soon joined the ranks of the Afsharid Empire's military, rising quickly to lead a cavalry regiment of

several thousand of his fellow Abdali tribesmen. With the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747, Ahmad Shah found himself head of a large army and in possession of a large part of the treasury of the disintegrating Afsharid Empire. In an October 1747 Loya Jirga outside of Kandahar, he was selected the leader of all Afghans. In one of his first acts, he declared himself the *Durr-i-Durrani* or "Pearl of Pearls," thus earning his dynasty the name "Durrani."

With his vast treasure and a loyal army to follow him, Ahmad Shah quickly consolidated his power around Kandahar with many Pashtun tribesmen and allies rallying to his flag. By the late 1750s, he had captured most of what is present-day Afghanistan, west into Iran, and east into Kashmir and India, keeping the loyalty of Afghani tribesmen with bribes from a treasury fattened through warfare plunder. With the 1761 Battle of Panipat, he solidified control over northern India and halted the northern expansion of the Maratha Empire. By 1769, Ahmad Shah had invaded India more than nine times, plundering the major cities including Delhi, and setting up puppet regimes to pay tribute to his empire.

The Durrani Empire began to decline after the Battle of Panipat. Ahmad Shah found himself dealing with internal strife within his newly earned lands. By the end of 1761, Sikh factions began a series of rebellions around Amritsar in the state of Punjab that were never successfully handled. He was also challenged in the north by the Uzbeks of the Emirate of Bukhara. By the early 1770s, the Marathas had recovered from their defeat at the Battle of Panipat and were able to completely cut off Afghanistan from its former Indian holdings.

Ahmad Shah Durrani died of natural causes in Kandahar on October 16, 1772, leaving his empire to his inept son Timur

Shah Durrani. While the reputation of Ahmad Shah remains strong today, the empire he forged declined soon after his death and left the crumbling nation ripe for the foreign influence of the expanding British Empire.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Durrani, Timur Shah; Hotak, Mir Wais; Maratha Empire (1674–1818); Panipat, Battle of (1761); Shah, Nadir.

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Durrani, Mahmud Shah (1769–1829)

Mahmud Shah Durrani was ruler of the Durrani Empire for two periods, 1801–1803 and 1809–1818. His reigns were marked by instability and a period of decline within Afghanistan. Mahmud Shah Durrani was born in 1769. He was the son of Afghan ruler Timur Shah Durrani and his grandfather was the founder of the Durrani dynasty, Ahmad Shah Durrani.

Timur Shah placed three of his sons (all half brothers) in control of one of the main regions of Afghanistan. The eldest, Mahmud Shah, was governor of Kandahar. The middle brother, Zaman Shah Durrani, ruled Kabul, while the youngest, Shuja Shah Durrani, was the ruler of Herat. When Timur Shah died on May 18, 1793, Zaman Shah’s control of the capital and its resources allowed him to succeed his father. However, after the new emir began to purge leading

members of the Barakzai clan and replace them with relatives and friends, the Barakzai rose in rebellion and threw their support to Mahmud Shah. With the support of Fateh Khan Barakzai, whose father had been executed by Zaman Shah, Mahmud Shah deposed his brother Zaman in July 1801 and became emir.

During his first reign, Mahmud Shah delegated most of his authority to Fateh Khan. This raised the ire of several prominent Durrani chiefs. They offered their support to Mahmud Shah’s half brother, Shuja Shah. The new claimant was able to seize Kabul in 1803 and subsequently overthrew Mahmud Shah.

Shuja Shah was able to gain the support of the Barakzai after he married into the family. In 1809, under threat of invasion from Russia, he attempted to secure an alliance with the British. This angered many Afghan chieftains and led to an erosion of his support. In June of that year, Mahmud Shah was able to displace Shuja Shah and regain the throne (Shuja Shah went into exile in India).

During the emir’s second reign, tensions grew with the Barakzai. In 1818, Mahmud Shah had Fateh Khan arrested, tortured, and killed. Led by Dost Mohammed Khan, the Barakzai rose in rebellion and forced the emir to retreat to Herat where he remained in internal exile until his death on April 18, 1829. He was succeeded by another half brother, Ali Shah, who reigned less than a year and was deposed by yet another son of Timur Shah, Ayub Shah. Dost Mohammad secured the throne in 1826 and established the Barakzai dynasty.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Durrani, Zaman Shah; Durrani Empire (1747–1818).

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Durrani, Shuja Shah (1785–1842)

Shuja Shah Durrani reigned as emir of Afghanistan on two occasions, 1803–1809 and 1839–1842, including during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Shuja Shah was one of the 23 sons of Afghan ruler Timur Shah Durrani, whose death in 1793 led to a series of wars over the throne. In 1803, after his brother Mahmud Shah Durrani was overthrown, Shuja Shah secured the throne and proclaimed himself emir. Shuja Shah then attempted unsuccessfully to end the internal conflicts and secure Afghanistan's borders. The emir married into the Barakzai clan in an effort to unite the two powerful families. The new ruler feared a French-backed Iranian invasion and turned to Great Britain for support and military assistance. The two countries signed the Anglo-Afghan Treaty in 1809. Under the terms of the accord, Shuja Shah promised to resist any French or Russian-backed invasion, while the British offered to provide military training and aid in case of a conflict. However, that same year, Mahmud Shah was able to regain the throne, and Shuja Shah fled to India.

Shuja Shah was initially held prisoner by a native ruler, and then captured by the Sikhs. He was freed after he turned over the 186-carat Koh-i-Nor diamond to Sikh leader Ranjit Singh in 1830. Meanwhile, in 1826, Dost Mohammad Khan had overthrown the Durrani, crowned himself emir,

and founded the Barakzai dynasty. Shuja Shah convinced Ranjit Singh to back his claim to the throne in exchange for a pledge to return Peshawar to Sikh control. In 1834, Shuja Shah led an army into Afghanistan, while Ranjit Singh attacked Peshawar. The Sikhs were able to capture Peshawar, but Shuja Shah was defeated by Dost Mohammad at Kandahar.

Dost Mohammad attempted to recapture Peshawar, against the wishes of the British. The Afghan leader made overtures to the Russians, which prompted the British to seek his ouster. A treaty was signed between Shuja Shah, Ranjit Singh, and the British governor-general of India, Lord Auckland, which recognized Shuja Shah as the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan. British troops invaded Afghanistan along with 38,000 Afghan supporters and camp followers of Shuja Shah. In August 1839, after the British captured Kabul, Shuja Shah was again named emir. The British maintained 16,000 troops in Afghanistan to bolster Shuja Shah, but opposition to the emir and the occupation grew quickly. Attacks against the British, and especially on their supply lines, grew in intensity. By 1841, the British garrison in Kabul was increasingly isolated and threatened. In January 1842, the British commander, Major General William Elphinstone, negotiated an agreement to withdraw the garrison in exchange for safe conduct for his forces and dependents. However, on the retreat, the force was massacred by Afghan tribes led by Dost Mohammad's son.

The withdrawal left Shuja Shah with few allies or supporters. He remained a virtual prisoner in his fortress in Kabul. He tried unsuccessfully to rally tribes against Dost Mohammad. On April 5, 1842, he was assassinated. Dost Mohammad recovered the throne in 1845.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars) (1748–1837); Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809); Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Mahmud Shah; Durrani, Zaman Shah; Durrani Empire (1747–1818); Elphinstone, William George Keith; Great Game, The; Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Ranjit Singh, Maharaja.

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Durrani, Timur Shah (ca. 1748–1793)

Timur Shah Durrani ruled the Durrani Empire from 1772 to 1793. He was believed to have been born in or around 1748, and was the son of the founder of the Durrani dynasty, Ahmad Shah Durrani. Timur seems to have been a favorite of Ahmad Shah, who had 23 sons. Timur Shah was made governor of Punjab when he was nine and his father arranged a marriage with the daughter of the Mughal emperor. However, Timur Shah was driven out of Peshawar in 1758 following his defeat by the Maratha Empire.

When Ahmad Shah died in 1772, Timur Shah was governor of Herat and the oldest of the emir's six surviving sons. He quickly secured the throne after defeating his brother Suliaman Mirza who controlled Kandahar. Timur Shah reorganized the government in an effort to consolidate his power, but faced sporadic revolts throughout his tenure. This

internal strife forced him to ignore the outer areas of the empire, including conquered regions of the Punjab, and he was unable to contain the rising Sikh Empire. Rebellions also forced the emir to move his capital from Kandahar to Kabul, thereby establishing that city as the permanent capital of the country. In another strategy to maintain power, the emir forged increasing ties with the powerful Barakzai tribe. He appointed tribal elders to high positions in the government and military. While this enhanced his ties with the Barakzai, it further alienated other tribes and clans. Timur Shah was forced to raise a levy of Qizil-Bash troops to serve as his royal bodyguard.

Although Timur Shah was not considered a strong leader, he was able to keep the empire together. He was also renowned for his appreciation of the arts and literature. During his reign, the spectacular royal gardens in Kabul were rebuilt. Timur Shah died on May 18, 1793, launching a new round of civil war. The emir did not name a successor, so his sons battled for the throne. Zaman Shah Durrani, Timur Shah's fifth son, reigned from 1793 to 1800, but was then deposed by another son, Mahmud Shah Durrani, who ruled twice, 1801–1803 and then 1809–1818. A third son, Shuja Shah Durrani, also held the throne twice, 1803–1809 and 1839–1842.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Durrani, Mahmud Shah; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Durrani, Zaman Shah; Durrani Empire (1747–1818); Pashtuns (Push-tuns); Qizil-Bash.

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Durrani, Zaman Shah (ca. 1770–1844)

Born in 1770, Zaman Shah Durrani was the third ruler of Afghanistan, the fifth son of Timur Shah Durrani and grandson of Ahmad Shah Durrani. His rule from 1793 to 1800 was one of strife and ended with him blinded and imprisoned in the Bala Hissar prison in Kabul. He eventually escaped to India where he died in 1844.

Zaman Shah was the favored son of Timur Shah, who was ruler of the Durrani Empire from 1772 to 1793. After the death of his father, Zaman Shah ascended to the throne at the age of 23 by imprisoning several of his brothers. With the help of Sardar Payenda Khan of the Muhammadzai, Zaman divided his kingdom between his half brother Mahmud Shah Durrani in Herat and himself in Kabul through an uneasy truce that allowed Mahmud relative independence and Zaman Shah the throne.

Zaman Shah made attempts to expand the empire and restore the rule of the Durrani after the rule of his father, but soon encountered instability at home through the influence of internal Afghan factions supported by his brother and the outside influence of the British, who feared that a strengthened Afghan Empire would damage their own influence within the region. Of primary concern was the reconquest of Punjab, a goal Zaman Shah was never to accomplish.

Meanwhile, his brother Mahmud had attempted several times to take the empire, only to flee to Persia in disarray. Zaman Shah's attempts to consolidate power and to end the system of tribalism, however, even-

tually left him without the support of his most powerful ally, Chief Painda Khan. Zaman Shah damaged the balance of internal power of the dominant Afghan tribes set in place by his great-grandfather. This led to the tribal chiefs plotting to remove Zaman Shah in 1799 and replace him with his brother Shuja Shah Durrani, who eventually gained the throne backed by the British. Upon hearing of the plot, Zaman Shah had the lead tribal chiefs executed. Painda Khan's son, Fateh Khan, was able to escape and joined forces with Mahmud.

In 1800, Zaman Shah was finally able to start his long delayed invasion of the Punjab. His absence, however, allowed the Persian- and British-backed forces of Mahmud Shah and Fateh Khan to take Kandahar and march on Kabul with the help of many of the tribes Zaman Shah had disenfranchised. Upon hearing of the coup, Zaman Shah rushed back with his army but was defeated and captured by Fateh Khan outside of Jalalabad. Zaman Shah was blinded and imprisoned on the orders of his brother, who would only rule for another three years before he was deposed in 1803. Mahmud Shah eventually regained the throne from 1809 to 1818. He made the same mistake as his brother years before and executed the underlying source of his power—Fateh Khan. This led to the rise of Dost Mohammad Khan, brother of Fateh, and an Afghanistan rife with civil war.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Durrani, Mahmud Shah; Durrani, Timur Shah.

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Durrani Empire (1747–1818)

The Durrani Empire was founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who united Afghanistan's fractious tribes into a loose confederation that served as the basis for the modern state. At its height, the Durrani Empire stretched from present-day India through Pakistan and Afghanistan, an area of more than 780,000 square miles (2 million square kilometers). The Pashtun Hotaki Empire had been conquered by Nadir Shah and the Persian Afsharid Empire. However, after Nadir Shah's death in 1747, Ahmad Shah, who had been a general in the Afsharid army, was chosen to lead the Abdali Pashtuns at a Loya Jirga in Kandahar. When Ahmad Shah assumed the throne, he took the title *Durr-i Durrani* (Pearl of Pearls), and the Abdalis have since been known as the Durrani (Ahmad Shah would later also be known as the Father of Afghanistan).

The Abdalis's main rivals in Afghanistan were the Ghilzai, another Pashtun tribe. Ahmad Shah launched a campaign to bring the Ghilzai lands under his control and captured Kabul, along with areas in northern Afghanistan. He then attacked the Mughal Empire in the east, ultimately seizing the capital, Delhi, in 1757, but then allowing the Mughals to retake possession of the city in exchange for an acknowledgment of his sovereignty over regions in present-day Pakistan. Ahmad Shah was able to wrest Herat away from the Persians, and then defeat the growing Maratha Confederacy at the Battle of Panipat (1761). The Durrani Empire reached its zenith in the 1760s. Thereafter, rebellions on

the periphery of the Durrani territory challenged Ahmad Shah's reign, while the Sikhs secured a series of victories in the Punjab. Ahmad Shah died in 1772.

Ahmad Shah's son Timur Shah Durrani succeeded him in 1772. He was generally regarded as a weak leader and faced a number of rebellions. He was forced to move the Afghan capital from Kandahar, which was threatened by the Sikhs and rebellious tribes, to Kabul in 1776. Timur Shah died in 1793, and the empire plunged into a series of civil wars between his heirs. One son, Zaman Shah Durrani, ruled from 1793 to 1800, when he was overthrown by another son, Mahmud Shah Durrani, who held the throne from 1800 to 1803, and then again from 1809 to 1818. Meanwhile, a third son, Shuja Shah Durrani, wrested the throne away from his brothers in the period from 1803 to 1809, only to be overthrown and exiled by Mahmud Shah in 1809. Two other claimants would rule briefly after Mahmud lost the throne in 1818, but the empire essentially split into three kingdoms, Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar, each with a succession of rulers. Throughout this era of instability, the Sikhs, Persians, and other forces steadily encroached on the territory of the former empire.

The Durrani were divided into two main lines. Ahmad Shah's descendants were members of the Sadozai, a clan of the Popalzai tribe. The other main line was the powerful Mohammadzai, a subclan of the Barakzai. In 1826, Dost Mohammad Khan united the three kingdoms and launched the Barakzai dynasty. The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) restored Shuja Shah as emir, but Dost Mohammad regained the throne after the former's assassination on April 15, 1842, and the Mohammadzais of the Barakzai ruled Afghanistan until the monarchy was abolished in 1973.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Barakzai; Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Durrani, Zaman Shah; Ghilzai; *Loya Jirga*; Panipat, Battle of (1761); Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Popalzai.

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E

Elphinstone, Mountstuart (1779–1859)

A Scottish historian who served as lieutenant governor of Bombay from 1819 until 1827, Elphinstone cofounded the Royal Geographical Society. He was particularly adept at information and intelligence gathering. From 1808 to 1811 he served as envoy to the King of Afghanistan, gathering information on politics and culture. During his time abroad, Elphinstone wrote detailed observations in his many diaries, some of which were later published. He became increasingly involved in political and military ventures.

Elphinstone entered civil service in 1795 with the British East India Company. He transferred to diplomatic service in 1801, serving as the assistant to the British Resident in Poona, India. In 1803, Elphinstone served as de facto aide de camp to Colonel Arthur Wellesley during the Second Maratha War. His established and sophisticated system of espionage and intelligence-gathering agents across the Maratha Empire proved beneficial and helped bring about the British defeat of the Marathas.

In 1804, Elphinstone was appointed British resident to the Maratha ruler Ragojee Bhonslia in Nagpur, India, transferring to Gwalior in 1807. As British resident, he preferred indirect rule over annexation, but he fulfilled his duties nonetheless. He believed in the welfare of the Indian people and was instrumental in improving the education system.

In 1808, Elphinstone became one of the earliest British envoys to Afghanistan. He

was sent to Kabul to persuade Shuja Shah to ally with Britain against possible French incursions on the continent. Elphinstone was largely unsuccessful in securing Afghan cooperation but did secure a treaty of friendship, the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1809, that pledged cooperation against French influence in the region in exchange for a yearly British subsidy. The treaty failed to materialize upon the collapse of Shuja Shah's regime. Elphinstone is better known for having written *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubal*, describing the region to European audiences.

In 1811, Elphinstone was transferred back to Poona, India, where he worked to maintain British control of the region by preventing the reunification of the Marathas. During this time, Elphinstone was instrumental in the eventual defeat of the Maratha powers (1817–1818) and was largely responsible for the design of British administrative rule in British-controlled India.

In 1819, Elphinstone was appointed lieutenant governor of Bombay. There he opened a college in Poona that was dedicated to the learning of Sanskrit (an ancient language), ancient Hindu literature, and the study of science. He believed in integrating Western learning with Indian learning and promoted the retention of Indian learning institutions. He was more concerned with the people's welfare than with balance sheets, which set him apart from most of his British counterparts. Most officials of the East India Company were opposed to the idea of India being under its own governance, believing that it would be a long time before India was

ready to assume its own leadership role, but Elphinstone believed in having the Indian people govern themselves, and he worked strategically to provide the foundation for the achievement of sovereignty. He returned to Britain in 1829 and concentrated on writing. Elphinstone died on November 20, 1859.

Brian Carriere

See also: Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809); Durani, Shuja Shah; Great Game.

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Elphinstone, William George Keith (1782–1842)

Born in Scotland in 1782, William George Keith Elphinstone was a distinguished British military officer. He was the eldest son of William Fullerton Elphinstone who served as a director of the British East India Company. William George's uncle, George Keith Elphinstone, was an admiral in the British Navy.

William George entered the British Army as an ensign in 1804 and became a lieutenant four months later. He fought during the Napoleonic Wars and his leadership and success resulted in numerous promotions in rank, including lieutenant colonel in 1813 when he was subsequently appointed to command the 33rd Regiment of Foot. William George led his regiment in the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. His success there earned

him numerous accolades, including becoming a Companion of the Bath and knighthood in the Dutch Order of William and the Russian Order of St. Anne. He commanded the 33rd in the occupation of France (1815–1818) and retained this command in England until 1822. At that time he left the 33rd Regiment and went to half pay. By 1825 he was promoted to colonel and served as an aide to King George IV of England.

In 1837 Elphinstone earned the rank of major general and two years later was chosen to command the Bengal Army in India. In 1841, Elphinstone was placed in command of the British forces in Kabul, Afghanistan, commanding about 4,500 troops, mostly from India, and a garrison of nearly 12,000 civilians.

It became apparent that Elphinstone's health was failing and he was not capable of this command. He left most military matters to his subordinates, failing to deal with a deteriorating military situation after an armed insurrection occurred in Kabul leading to the death of British diplomats Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir William Macnaghten. British forces under Elphinstone began a forced withdrawing from Kabul in January 1842 toward Jalalabad under a negotiated truce; however, the weather and renewed conflict with Afghan tribesmen quickly eclipsed the British convoy. Elphinstone, crippled with gout and clearly incapable of command, and his second in command, Brigadier General Shelton, surrendered to opposing Afghan forces by the end of the first week, leaving the British column to continue. Elphinstone died in captivity on April 23, 1842.

Elphinstone's command in Afghanistan and the subsequent retreat from Kabul in 1842 is seen as one of the worst disasters in British military history. It inflicted significant damage to the morale of British and Bengal troops at the time. Much of the blame

for the disaster was centered on Elphinstone's lack of leadership and indecisiveness in the face of the enemy.

Brian Carriere

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Burnes, Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”); Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Macnaghten, Sir William Hay; Pollock, Sir George; Sale, Florentia; Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”).

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Embassy Bombings (1998)

In its largest terrorist attacks to date, on August 7, 1998, al Qaeda carried out simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 and wounding more than 4,000. In February 1998, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden promulgated a religious decree (fatwa) condemning the United States for stationing troops in Saudi Arabia. The fatwa also called on Muslims to attack Americans and their allies. In late February or early March, al Qaeda began planning the embassy bombings. Fazul Abdullah Mohammad and Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah were responsible for overseeing the attacks. Al Qaeda operatives rented facilities in both Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in the early summer of 1998 and began converting two vehicles into suicide trucks and constructing

large explosive devices, under the supervision of Mohammed Sadeek Odeh. The bomb for each truck weighed approximately 900 kg (1,984 lbs).

The date of the attack, August 7, 1998, was the eighth anniversary of the deployment of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). At approximately 10:30 a.m., a Toyota truck approached the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, but was prevented from entering the compound by a local security officer. Instead, the truck was detonated outside of the embassy, but its force was powerful enough to severely damage the facility and surrounding buildings. Two hundred thirteen people were killed in the blast, including 12 Americans, while more than 4,000 were injured. Concurrently, the second suicide truck, a Nissan delivery vehicle, exploded outside the U.S. embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, killing 11 and wounding 100.

U.S. intelligence officials quickly identified al Qaeda as being responsible for the attacks. On August 20, President Bill Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes against suspected al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. In November, the Clinton administration offered a \$5 million reward for bin Laden, and in January 1999, the United States announced indictments on 21 individuals, including bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda figures. The Clinton administration also initiated negotiations with the Taliban to surrender bin Laden. When the talks failed, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Afghanistan. Meanwhile, UN Security Council Resolution 1267 identified both al Qaeda and the Taliban as terrorist organizations and called on the group's government to turn over bin Laden. The measure also imposed sanctions on the Taliban regime. The inability of the United States to kill or capture bin Laden or seriously damage the al Qaeda network at that time played a significant role

in convincing the terrorist group to escalate its attacks on U.S. interests.

By 2015, only 2 of the 21 indicted remained at large. The rest had been killed or were serving sentences or awaiting trial in the United States. Abdullah was one of those still at large, while Mohammad had been killed in Somalia in 2011, and Odeh was in a U.S. prison serving a life sentence following his conviction in 2001. Meanwhile, the United States doubled the State Department's security budget for U.S. embassies around the world.

Tom Lansford

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Clinton, Bill; Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998); Taliban; Terrorism; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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F

Franks, Tommy (1945–)

Born Tommy Ray Franks on June 17, 1945, in Wynnewood, Oklahoma, General Tommy Franks commanded U.S. forces during the initial invasion of Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom. He would subsequently oversee the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. He enlisted in the army in 1965, but was sent to officer candidate school and commissioned a lieutenant in 1967. The young officer served in Vietnam in the artillery. He was wounded three times and decorated for valor. Franks earned a bachelor's degree in business administration from the University of Texas in 1971, and a master's degree in public administration from Shippensburg University in 1985. Franks served in a variety of positions over the next decade. During the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), he was an assistant division commander. In 1991, he was promoted to brigadier general, rising to lieutenant general in 1995.

In 2000, Franks was made a four-star general and appointed to lead U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the command responsible for the Middle East and South Asia. Franks's low-key, diplomatic style contrasted with that of his predecessors such as the loquacious General Norman Schwarzkopf. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Franks commanded the invasion of Afghanistan. He adopted an unorthodox strategy that emphasized the combined use of special operations forces, indigenous anti-Taliban fighters, including the Northern Alliance, and coalition airpower. The strategy minimized the number of U.S. combat troops deployed,

but still allowed coalition forces to quickly defeat the Taliban, who were deposed in November 2001. Franks was criticized for not deploying additional troops during the Battle of Tora Bora (2001), and thereby potentially allowing Osama bin Laden to escape from Afghanistan to Pakistan.

Franks was also the U.S. commander during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was largely the architect of the operation. The general's plan relied on flexibility and combined air and ground assaults. The result was a series of advances unparalleled since the Blitzkrieg of World War II. U.S.-led coalition forces moved rapidly through the country and overwhelmed Iraqi forces. It was also an offensive that highlighted the utility of joint warfare in which all military branches cooperated to a high degree.

In April 2003, just after the end of the campaign, Franks announced his retirement. After leaving the army, Franks founded a private consulting firm that specialized in natural disaster recovery and response. He also published his memoirs, *American Soldier*, in 2004.

Tom Lansford

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Tora Bora, Battle of (2001); United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Frontier Corps

The Frontier Corps was a militia unit formed by the British in 1907 in the areas along the border between the colony of India and Afghanistan and reconstituted as a paramilitary force after Pakistan became independent in 1947. The British secured control of Punjab following the defeat of the Sikhs at the battle of Gujrat in 1849. They subsequently raised a number of scout and militia units from local tribes to help subjugate the frontier. Initially, most of these units were ad hoc or formed for specific campaigns, but with the advent of the Second Afghan War, administrative regions in Punjab began to create permanent auxiliary formations. In 1878, the Khyber Jezailchis were formed from Afridi tribesmen, and initially led by British captain Gais Ford. Each of the soldiers provided their own rifle or *jezail*. The unit was tasked with protecting the Khyber Pass. In 1881, Nawab Sir Mohammad Aslam Khan became the first Muslim commander of the unit. It was redesignated as the Khyber Rifles in 1887.

The Khyber Rifles were followed by the Zhob Militia, 1883; the Kurram Militia, 1892; the Tochi Scouts, 1894; Chagai Militia, 1896; South Waziristan Scouts, 1900; and the Chitral Scouts, 1903. The units were recruited from different tribes and had different uniforms, equipment, and customs. The auxiliaries participated in a variety of

campaigns, including the Black Mountain Expeditions (1888–1891) and the 1897 Afridi uprising. Meanwhile, indigenous officers were given leadership positions.

In 1907, Lord Curzon consolidated the seven auxiliaries into the Frontier Corps under the command of a British lieutenant colonel who was designated the “inspecting officer.” The first inspecting officer was W. C. Barrett, who was tasked with standardizing training, equipment, and the organization of militia units. Despite the new designation, the units continued to operate independently.

Various units of the Frontier Corps fought in the Third Afghan War (1919). Divided loyalties caused by familial or clan ties led to a large number of desertions and disciplinary issues with the Khyber Rifles during the conflict. Consequently, the Khyber Rifles were disbanded with the majority of soldiers discharged, while some were transferred to other formations, including local police units. After the war, the Frontier Corps was again reorganized and given a primary role in securing transportation and communications networks in the region. Throughout this period, the corps worked to suppress smuggling and defend against cross-border raids from Afghanistan, as well as respond to local uprisings. In 1937, an additional unit, the First Mahsud Scouts, was raised.

During World War II, additional units were raised and the commanding officer became the inspector general, with the rank of brigadier. The corps was deployed throughout the Northwest Frontier Province, along the border with Afghanistan. The Second Mahsud Scouts was formed in 1944, while another unit, the Pishim Scouts, was established in 1946 after the war.

After Pakistan became independent in 1947, the Frontier Corps was expanded with the creation of eight additional units by

1947. In 1949, a new headquarters was established at Bala Hissar Fort in Peshawar.

In addition, the corps was divided with those units stationed in the northern areas of the countries brought directly under the command of the army and designated as the FC Northwest Frontier Province (FC NWFP), while those in the south became the FC Baluchistan. Both commands are led by an army major general. The FC NWFP remained headquartered in Peshawar, while the FC Baluchistan is headquartered in Quetta. Although the corps was led by Pakistani officers, a number of British officers continued to serve as advisers and trainers into the 1950s. In an effort to weaken tribal affiliations and enhance unit allegiance, the corps mixed ethnic groups within its formations. In the 1970s, the FC played a major role in ending an insurgency in Baluchistan. The force was also used to suppress heroin production from the 1980s through the 2000s. The main task of the corps continued to be border security and antismuggling operations.

In the aftermath of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the 60,000-member Frontier Corps became increasingly active in fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda, alongside regular army units. The United States began provid-

ing significant aid to the corps, including \$100 million between 2001 and 2008 for new equipment. In addition, in 2008, U.S. Special Operations Forces were deployed to help train the corps. Meanwhile, the corps continued to spearhead counternarcotics operations in Baluchistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Durand Line; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban; Taliban Insurgency.

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G

Gailani, Pir Sayyid Ahmad (1932–)

Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani was an Afghan mujahideen commander and Sufi leader who founded the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*). Gailani was born on May 1, 1932, in Nangarhar Province. His father was born in Baghdad and traveled to Afghanistan to establish a branch of the Qadiriya Sufi order. Sayyid Ahmad graduated from Kabul University in 1960 with a degree in theology. He became a Sufi *pir* (elder), a religious master or spiritual teacher, based on his education and heredity (his family could trace its lineage to the Prophet Muhammad).

Gailani developed close ties with the monarchy. In 1952 he married a member of the royal family, and he would subsequently gain a number of commercial concessions as a result of his ties. He opposed the 1973 coup that overthrew King Mohammed Zahir Shah and installed his cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan as president. Following the 1978 Saur Revolution, which deposed Daoud and created a pro-Soviet regime under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Gailani fled into exile in Pakistan.

The Sufi leader founded the National Islamic Front as a moderate, royalist grouping that supported the restoration of the monarchy. It drew its recruits from Sufis and former members or supporters of the royal family, including military officers and senior officials. The Front was one of the members of the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan

Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*), also known as the Peshawar Seven, a coalition of mujahideen groups that were supported by Pakistan and other external donors and which were seen as the basis for a post-Soviet Afghan government.

In 1990, Gailani endorsed a failed U.S.-Soviet peace proposal that would have allowed the PDPA to remain in power. After the fall of the PDPA in 1992, Gailani served in the interim mujahideen government, but fled to Cyprus with his supporters when the Taliban took control of Kabul in 1996. Gailani participated in the 2001 Bonn Summit, which established an interim, post-Taliban government. The Sufi leader backed interim president Hamid Karzai in the 2004 presidential balloting. In 2007, he became chair of a large faction in the upper house of the Afghan parliament. Gailani supported Mohammad Ashraf Ghani for president in 2009 and 2014. The Sufi leader repeatedly called for the government to negotiate with moderate members of the Taliban to end the country's current strife.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Bonn Agreement (2001); Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf; Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*); Karzai, Hamid; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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Gandamak, Battle of (1842)

The Battle of Gandamak took place on the morning of January 13, 1842, between about 70–80 British soldiers, 20 officers and 50–60 enlisted troops, primarily from the 44th Regiment of Foot, and local Afghan fighters mainly from the Ghilzai tribe. This battle was the last major engagement during the retreat of Army of the Indus from Kabul. The garrison began the retreat on January 6, 1842, with 4,500 Anglo-Indian troops along with 12,000 camp followers. After seven days of marching through winter conditions, the majority of the Kabul garrison as well as the camp followers had either died or been captured. Individuals and small parties of non-European survivors would slowly make their way back into India over the next several months.

During the night of January 12, following the capture of their commanding officer, Major General William Elphinstone, the remaining British force attempted to push through the Jagdalak Pass. They found the way blocked by a thorn bush barricade, so that the remaining troops and camp followers had to slowly work their way through the barrier while under fire from Ghilzai from the heights. During the attempt to get through the barricade the remaining camp followers closed around the soldiers, making it impossible to organize a counterattack. Those forces that made it through splintered into two groups. The remaining cavalry and others who had acquired horses, about 15, headed toward Jalalabad with the hope of outrunning the Afghan forces. They were not successful and all but 1 were caught and massacred at a nearby village. The sole

survivor was assistant surgeon William Brydon, who was able to reach Jalalabad later in the day.

A small group of British foot soldiers broke off and fought their way to the village of Gandamak. They hoped to find refuge in the village and then eventually make their way to Jalalabad, 30 miles away. However, the British were quickly surrounded by Ghilzai fighters from surrounding villages. The British took position on a hill outside the village in a ragged square.

There was a cease-fire as the Afghans attempted to negotiate with the British soldiers over a possible payment in exchange for safe passage to Jalalabad. However, the Afghans insisted that the soldiers needed to sacrifice their guns in order to be spared. The British refused to give up their weapons. Fighting broke out when the Afghans attempted to seize the weapons. The British square pushed the Afghan force back down the hill. The formation fought off several waves of Ghilzai while also taking sniper fire from a nearby hill. The engagement lasted for two hours. The British had limited guns and ammunition. Once the ammunition ran out, the British continued to fight with bayonets and swords until the last soldier fell.

Captain Thomas Souter was the only surviving officer. In an attempt to save the regimental colors, he wrapped them around his body under his coat. During the fighting at Gandamak, his right shoulder was wounded and his jacket came open. Seeing the bright colors, the Afghan fighters mistook the captain for a senior officer. He was taken captive with several other wounded soldiers. There are conflicting reports on the number of enlisted soldiers that were taken prisoner with him. Some accounts claim that between three and nine wounded soldiers also were taken captive. Souter was rescued along with other British hostages nine months later

when the Army of Retribution captured Kabul. A diary kept by Lady Florentia Sale, an Englishwoman and the wife of Major General Robert “Fighting Bob” Sale, was one of the few accounts of the battle at Gandamak. Florentia Sale and her daughter were also among the hostages rescued. (See her diary excerpt in the Related Primary Document below.)

This battle served as the final note to the disastrous retreat from Kabul. The massacre of the troops at the Battle of Gandamak,

along with the other losses in the campaign, tarnished the British military’s reputation in Central Asia. In an effort to exact vengeance and demonstrate the capabilities of its military, the British colonial government dispatched the Army of Retribution to capture Kabul.

Jorge Brown

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); British Cantonment, Kabul; Ghilzai; Great Game, The; Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Sale, Florentia.

Related Primary Document

The Battle of Gandamak on January 13, 1842, as Described by Lady Florentia Sale

Lady Florentia Sale was the wife of Brigadier Sir Robert “Fighting Bob” Sale of the British Army. She accompanied the retreating Kabul garrison as it sought to make its way to Jalalabad in January 1842. Along with several other European women, including her daughter, she was taken hostage by the Afghans during the withdrawal. Lady Sale kept a journal of her experiences and provided one of the few accounts of the Battle of Gandamak on January 13, 1842, in which the Anglo-Indian forces were massacred by Afghan fighters.

From Soorkhab the remnant of the column moved towards Gundamuk: but as the day dawned the enemy’s numbers increased; and unfortunately daylight soon exposed to them how very few fighting men the column contained. The force now consisted of twenty officers, of whom Major Griffiths was the senior; fifty men of the 44th, six of the horse artillery, and four or five Sipahs. Amongst the whole there were but twenty muskets; 300 camp followers still continued with them.

Being now assailed by an increased force, they were compelled to quit the road, and take up a position on a hill adjoining. Some Affghan horsemen being observed at a short distance were beckoned to. On their approach there was a cessation of firing: terms were proposed by Capt. Hay, to allow the force to proceed without further hostilities to Jellalabad. These persons not being sufficiently influential to negotiate, Major Griffiths proceeded with them to a neighbouring chief for that purpose; taking with him Mr. Blewitt, formerly a writer in Capt. Johnson’s office, who understood Persian, that he might act as interpreter.

Many Affghans ascended the hill where our troops awaited the issue of the expected conference; and exchanges of friendly words passed between both parties. This lasted upwards of an hour; but hostilities were renewed by the Affghans, {278} who snatched at the fire-arms of the men and officers. This they of course resisted; and drove them off the hill: but the majority of the

enemy, who occupied the adjoining hills commanding our position, commenced a galling fire upon us. Several times they attempted to dislodge our men from the hill, and were repulsed: until, our ammunition being expended, and our fighting men reduced to about thirty, the enemy made a rush, which in our weak state we were unable to cope with. They bore our men down knife in hand; and slaughtered all the party except Capt. Souter and seven or eight men of the 44th and artillery. This officer thinks that this unusual act of forbearance towards him originated in the strange dress he wore: his poshteen having opened during the last struggle exposed to view the colour he had wrapped round his body; and they probably thought they had secured a valuable prize in some great bahadur, for whom a large ransom might be obtained.

Eighteen officers and about fifty men were killed at the final struggle at Gundamuk. Capt. Souter and the few remaining men (seven or eight) that were taken alive from the field were, after a detention of a month in the adjoining villages, made over to Mahommed Akbar Khan and sent to the fort of Buddeabad in the Lughman valley, where they arrived on the 15th of February.

Source: Sale, Lady Florentia. *A Journal of the Disasters in Affghanistan, 1841–42*. London: John Murray, 1843.

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Gandamak, Treaty of (1879)

The 1879 Treaty of Gandamak ended the first half of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). The war began after Emir Sher Ali Khan received a Russian envoy on July 22, 1878. The emir subsequently refused to accept a British mission envoy and denied the party entrance into the country. At the time, Great Britain and Russia were at the brink of war, having just completed the

Berlin Conference days before. Tension were high and the British government did not want to appear weak to friend or foe. The viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, gave an ultimatum to either accept a permanent British envoy and apologize or face invasion.

The emir did not respond by the deadline and on November 21, 1878, Anglo-Indian forces invaded Afghanistan from three directions. By winter, the British forces had taken Jalalabad and Kandahar. Sher Ali was unable to repel the invasion. He fled Kabul to seek refuge with Russia, leaving his son, Yakub Khan, in charge. Ali Khan sent requests for support from Russia, but he was refused. The Russian government advised him to make peace with the British. He was denied entry into Russian territory and died on February 21, 1879, in Mazar-e-Sharif.

Yakub Khan had been imprisoned by his father and had little political support among the Afghan elites. Because of hostility in Kabul, the new emir thought it best to discuss peace terms with the British outside the capital city. Consequently, the emir accepted

an invitation from the senior British political officer, Major Sir Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari, to talks at Gandamak where a British garrison was stationed. The emir was received with full military honors. Negotiations began on May 10.

The resultant treaty granted Britain control over all Afghan foreign policy. It established a permanent British residency in Kabul. The Pishin and Sibi Valley, the Kurram Valley, and the Khyber Pass were all ceded to the British. The territorial concessions were part of a larger effort on the part of the British to establish clear and contiguous borders and to reward tribes that had supported the British during the war (British

sovereignty would protect them from reprisals). In addition, a permanent British resident would be established in Kabul. In exchange, the Afghan emir received an annual subsidy from the British of £60,000, and London pledged to protect Afghanistan from any foreign aggressors.

Yakub Khan readily agreed to most of the conditions, but opposed the transfer of territory. This initially caused a delay in the negotiations, but the emir eventually gave in on the point. He offered to house the British resident in the Bala Hissar, the royal palace, in order to ensure the diplomat's safety. The treaty was signed on May 26, 1879. Cavagnari was appointed as the resident to Kabul and moved



Afghan leader Mohammad Yakub Khan signing the Treaty of Gandamak on May 26, 1879. The accord marked the end of the first part of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880) but did not stop the fighting; the war continued for more than a year. (Bibliothèque des Arts Decoratifs, Paris, France/Archives Charmet/Bridgeman Images)

into a compound away from the Bala Hissar to demonstrate his independence.

On September 10, 1879, Cavagnari and the rest of his party were killed by a mob of unpaid soldiers who were convinced the British residency had their pay. This began the second half of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The British were able to defeat the Afghans, but during the occupation Emir Yakub Khan abdicated his throne. Following the withdrawal of British troops in 1880, only

the main provisions of the treaty held, which included the border adjustment and British control of Afghan foreign policy. At the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, the control of foreign policy returned to the Afghan government. See the treaty in the Related Primary Document below.

Jorge Brown

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Great Game, The; Lytton, Edward Robert Bulwer, First Earl of Lytton.

Related Primary Document

Treaty of Gandamak, May 26, 1879

The 1879 Treaty of Gandamak ended the first phase of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). The agreement gave Great Britain control over Afghanistan's foreign affairs and mandated a British resident in Kabul. The treaty also transferred some territory to the British, all in exchange for an annual subsidy to the emir of Afghanistan.

TREATY between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, concluded at Gandamak on the 26th May 1879, by His Highness the Amir Mahommed Yakub Khan on his own part and on the part of the British Government by Major (afterwards Sir Louis) P. L. N. Cavagnari, C. S. I.

From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness's dominion, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness's dominions.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandise carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with and through the dominions of His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country.

With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed by and at the cost of the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the protection of this telegraph line.

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to his Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar and Jelalabad with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say,

the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration, shall be paid to His Highness the Amir.

The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawar and Jelalabad districts, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these passes.

For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfillment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees.

Done at Gandamak, this 26th day of May 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-us-sani, 1296 A. H.

AMIR MAHOMMED YAKUB KHAN

N. CAVAGNARI, Major

Source: Aitchison, C. U. (1892). *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries*. Vol. IX. Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 441–444.

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Gates, Robert Michael (1943–)

Robert Michael Gates was a U.S. Air Force officer, president of Texas A&M University, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and secretary of defense from 2006 to 2011. Gates was born in Wichita, Kansas, on September 25, 1943. He graduated in 1965 from the College of William and Mary with a bachelor's degree in history, then earned a

master's degree in history from Indiana University in 1966, and a PhD in Russian and Soviet history from Georgetown University in 1974.

Gates served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air Command (1967–1969) before joining the CIA in 1969 as an intelligence analyst, a post he held until 1974. He was on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) from 1974 to 1979, before returning to the CIA as director of the Strategic Evaluation Center in 1979. Gates rose through the ranks to become the director of Central Intelligence (DCI)/deputy director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Executive Staff (1981), deputy director for Intelligence (DDI) (1982), and deputy director of Central Intelligence (1986–1989).

He then served as deputy assistant to the president for National Security Affairs (March–August 1989) and as assistant to the president and deputy national security

adviser from August 1989 to November 1991. On November 5, 1991, the Senate confirmed Gates as director of the CIA.

Gates retired from the CIA in 1993 and entered academia. In 1999 he became the interim dean of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, and in 2002 he became president of Texas A&M University, a post he held until 2006.

Gates remained active in public service during his presidency, cochairing in January 2004 a Council on Foreign Relations task force on U.S.-Iran relations, which suggested that the United States engage Iran diplomatically concerning that nation's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Gates was a member of the Iraq Study Group (also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission; March 15, 2006–December 6, 2006), a bipartisan commission charged with studying the Iraq War, when he was nominated to succeed the controversial and discredited Donald Rumsfeld as defense secretary. Gates assumed the post on December 18, 2006. He oversaw the deployment of a 30,000-troop “surge” in Iraq, which helped create a degree of stability that allowed the subsequent withdrawal of all U.S. forces.

Unlike his abrasive predecessor, Gates brought an era of calm and focus to the Pentagon and appeared far more willing to engage in discussion and compromise over matters of defense and military policy. He accepted President Barack Obama's request in 2009 to remain in office in order to provide continuity in the Afghan conflict. However, he also undertook controversial decisions. In May 2009, he replaced General David D. McKiernan with General Stanley McChrystal as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, a rare instance of a commander being removed in the midst of a conflict.

In December 2009, Gates was the first senior U.S. official to visit Afghanistan after President Barack Obama announced his intention to deploy 30,000 additional military personnel to that country in a troop surge. Gates oversaw the May 2011 covert mission that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

Gates resigned in July 2011 and returned to academia as chancellor of the College of William and Mary. In 2014, he also became president of the Boy Scouts of America.

Richard M. Edwards

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Bush, George W.; Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Iraq War (2003–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Obama, Barack; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Rumsfeld, Donald; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Geneva Accords (1988)

The Geneva Accords, signed on April 14, 1988, were a series of agreements between

Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the United States, which paved the way for the end of the Soviet occupation. By 1986, with increasing U.S. and international economic and financial aid, the mujahideen were inflicting a growing number of casualties on Soviet and government forces. Concurrently, Soviet leaders had launched informal negotiations to end the conflict. The primary goal of the Soviet Union during the talks was to ensure that the pro-Moscow regime of Mohammed Najibullah remained in power, while the country withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. The United States and Pakistan primarily sought the withdrawal of Soviet troops, although the Pakistani government also wanted the creation of an interim government and an agreement on the return of refugees. The Najibullah regime's main priorities were to remain in power and to end U.S. and Pakistani support for the mujahideen. At the insistence of the Najibullah government and the Soviet Union, the mujahideen were not allowed to participate in the negotiations. Consequently, Iran refused to participate. The failure of the talks to be more inclusive would prove problematic.

Four separate instruments made up the accords. The first was a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan in which each country pledged not to interfere in the internal politics of the other. This was seen as the mechanism to ensure the end of Pakistani support for the mujahideen. There was a second bilateral settlement between the two countries, which called for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees over an 18-month period. The displaced persons were supposed to be allowed to return without fear of reprisal or retribution. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) agreed to help coordinate the return of the refugees. The third Afghan-Pakistani instru-

ment dealt with the Soviet withdrawal. In a separate agreement, referenced in the Geneva text, the Soviets pledged to conduct a phased withdrawal of all of their troops with half of the forces leaving by August 15 and the remainder gone within nine months. Pakistani officials expressed concern that the agreement did not call for the withdrawal of nonuniformed military advisers or other Soviet personnel. In the fourth and final protocol, the United States and the Soviet Union made commitments to honor the Afghan-Pakistani noninterference accord. This guarantee was seen as the key to reducing the flow of outside arms and financial support to the mujahideen. However, the United States issued a clarifying statement following the accords in which it pledged to resume assistance to the insurgents if the Soviets continued, or restarted, military aid to the Najibullah government. (See an excerpt from the fourth protocol to the accords, below, in the Related Primary Document section.)

The Soviets began their formal withdrawal on May 15, 1988. Meanwhile, the United States ended support for the mujahideen and withdrew its covert operatives from Afghanistan. However, the failure to allow the mujahideen to participate in the negotiations transformed the rebellion into a full-fledged civil war. The Najibullah regime fell in 1992, but the internal conflict continued through the rise of the Taliban and the subsequent U.S.-led invasion in 2001.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

Related Primary Document

Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, April 14, 1988

The Geneva Accords paved the way for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of refugees from Pakistan. The accords were a series of three bilateral agreements between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and a fourth between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the first two, the two countries pledged noninterference in each other's domestic politics and to work together to return the more than 6 million refugees created by the war. The third covered the Soviet withdrawal, while the fourth agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union committed the two countries to guaranteeing the peace.

In a statement to the fourth protocol, below, the United States pledged to cut military and financial aid to the mujahideen, but only if the Soviets reduced their support for the pro-Soviet government in Kabul. The United States also noted that it would not recognize the Kabul regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In the end, both the Soviet Union and the United States continued providing aid to the warring sides in Afghanistan until 1992.

AGREEMENTS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

ANNEX III

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States has agreed to act as a guarantor of the political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. We believe this settlement is a major step forward in restoring peace to Afghanistan, in ending the bloodshed in that unfortunate country, and in enabling millions of Afghan refugees to return to their homes.

In agreeing to act as a guarantor, the United States states the following:

(1) The troops withdrawal obligations set out in paragraph 5 and 6 of the Instrument on Interrelationships are central to the entire settlement. Compliance with those obligations is essential to achievement of the settlement's purposes, namely, the ending of foreign intervention in Afghanistan and the restoration of the rights of the Afghan people through the exercise of self-determination as called for by the United Nations Charter and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan.

(2) The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this regard, the United State has advised the Soviet Union that the United States retains the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the United States similarly will exercise restraint.

(3) By acting as a guarantor of the settlement, the United States does not intend to imply in any respect recognition of the present regime as the lawful Government of Afghanistan.

Source: United Nations. Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention. April 14, 1988. S/19835. Available online at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AF_880414_AgreementsSettlementoftheSituationRelatingAfghanistan%28eng%29.pdf

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Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf (1949–)

Mohammad Ashraf Ghani is an Afghan intellectual who was elected president of the country in 2014, a post he continues to hold. Ghani was born to a prominent family in Logar, Afghanistan, in 1949. His father served in a variety of government posts. He earned an undergraduate degree from the American University in Beirut, before earning graduate degrees in anthropology from Columbia University in New York. After he graduated, Ghani remained in the United States during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989) and taught at the University of California at Berkeley, and The Johns Hopkins University. While in the United States, Ghani gained U.S. citizenship.

In 1991, Ghani was hired as an anthropologist for the World Bank. He worked for the international organization for 10 years, specializing in social policy in developing states such as China and India. In 2001, after the fall of the Taliban, he accepted a post as a special adviser for the UN's envoy to Afghanistan. He played a role in the negotia-

tions and implementation of the 2001 Bonn Agreement, which paved the way for the installation of an interim government led by Hamid Karzai.

In February 2002, Ghani was appointed finance minister by Karzai. He faced a wide range of challenges, including the adoption of a new currency and economic reforms to reduce corruption. Ghani also had to wrestle with warlords and regional leaders over the distribution of foreign aid and economic development projects. In 2004, Ghani left the government and became chancellor of Kabul University.

In 2009, Ghani renounced his U.S. citizenship and ran for the Afghan presidency. He placed fourth. The following year, Ghani was appointed chair of the Transition Coordination Commission, which oversaw the start of the handover of security operations from the NATO-led coalition to Afghan forces. He left this post in 2013 to run for the presidency again, as an independent candidate. During the campaign, Ghani chose former general Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, as his running mate in an effort to broaden his appeal outside of the majority Pashtun population. In the first round of balloting, Ghani placed second with 31.6 percent of the vote among eight candidates. Foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, an ethnic Tajik, placed first with 45 percent. Since no candidate received more than 50 percent of the vote, Ghani and Abdullah advanced to a run-off on June 14. Ghani won that

balloting with 55.4 percent of the vote to 43.6 percent for Abdullah. Accusations of fraud tainted the balloting, but negotiations led by the U.S. secretary of state, John Kerry, resulted in the creation of a power-sharing, unity government with Ghani as president and Abdullah in the newly created position of chief executive. Ghani was inaugurated on September 29, 2014.

Once in office Ghani worked to improve relations with the United States, which had deteriorated in the final years of Karzai's tenure over allegations of financial corruption within the Afghan government and differences between the two countries on security policy. One of Ghani's priorities was a continued U.S. military presence in the country to counter the continuing threat of the Taliban.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Karzai, Hamid; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Taliban; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Ghazni, Battle of (1839)

The Battle of Ghazni on July 23, 1839, was a major British victory during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Ghazni was a large fortress thought to be impregnable, and its capture by Anglo-Indian forces prompted Afghan emir Dost Mohammad to flee Kabul. The First Anglo-Afghan War was launched by the British East India Company

in an effort to replace Dost Mohammad with Shuja Shah Durrani, who was believed to be more receptive to British interests and who would oppose Russian influence in the region.

The British launched their invasion through the Bolan Pass after Punjab Ranjit Singh refused permission for the Anglo-Indian army to use the Khyber Pass. The company army consisted of more than 21,000 troops, including approximately 6,000 Afghan soldiers led by Shuja Shah. The British forces were led by Lieutenant General Sir John Keane, commander of the Bombay Army, one of three army groups in British India. The Anglo-Indian forces met little formal resistance when they advanced through the Bolan Pass, but groups of Afghans waged a guerrilla campaign against the British supply lines, leading to rationing and the loss of a significant number of the column's pack animals. Nonetheless, the column traversed more than 150 miles and arrived at Kandahar on May 4, 1839. The city surrendered without bloodshed and the British advanced to Ghazni.

Ghazni was a massive fortress with walls more than 60 ft (18.3 m) high. It was commanded by Dost Mohammad's son, Hyder Khan. The British reached the citadel on July 21, 1839. Because of the problems with the supply train, the British were unable to bring forward their heavy artillery and had only light field pieces that were not capable of breaching the city's walls. On July 22, Afghan forces loyal to Dost Mohammad attacked Shuja Shah's troops, but were repulsed. Meanwhile, British and native intelligence agents found that one of the gates into Ghazni, the northern or "Kabul Gate," was not fortified. Meanwhile, rumors reached Keane that Dost Mohammad was marching to relieve the fortress with a large army. The information proved to be false,

but it motivated Keane to attack as quickly as possible.

On the night of November 22, Keane ordered a diversionary attack on the southern end of the citadel. Meanwhile, a small volunteer party of sappers, led by Lieutenant Henry Durand, carried explosives up to the Kabul Gate under the cover of darkness. Colonel William Dennie stood by with a storming party to attack once the gate was blown. Durand's party was able to put the charges in place, although they came under fire from the walls. After several unsuccessful attempts to fire the explosives, at around 3:00 a.m. on November 23, the charges went off and destroyed the gate. Dennie's troops immediately rushed through the gate but were met by a fierce Afghan counterattack. Reinforcements were brought forward by Brigadier Sir Robert Sale, and the additional troops forced their way into the city. The remaining Afghan defenders tried to flee, but were cut off by British cavalry. Including casualties among their Afghan allies, the East India Company force lost approximately 200 dead and wounded in the attack, while an estimated 500 Afghans were killed. An additional 1,600 Afghans were captured. Sale was wounded in the attack, but recovered.

After the fall of Ghazni, Keane advanced to Kabul, while Dost Mohammad went into exile. Shuja Shah was subsequently installed as emir of Afghanistan after arriving in the capital on August 6, ending the first phase of the war.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Bolan Pass; Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Elphinstone, William George Keith; Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Nott, Sir William; Pollock, Sir George; Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”).

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Ghilzai

The Ghilzai are the largest and best-known Afghan tribe, a subset of the predominant Pashtun tribe. Also known as Khilji or Ghalji, the Ghilzai peoples are located mainly in the southeastern portion of Afghanistan, roughly between Ghazni and Kandahar. There are also large numbers to be found in western Pakistan and the Suleiman Mountains. In the last several decades, they have staunchly opposed Durrani-led Afghan governments and supported the Taliban regime, before it was toppled by U.S.-led forces in late 2001.

Although the precise origins of the Ghilzai are uncertain, some ethnologists believe that they are descended from Turkish bloodlines and can trace that relationship to at least the 10th century CE. Most Ghilzai speak Pashto and/or Dari, a form of Persian. By the early 18th century, the group had become ascendant in what is now Afghanistan, and Mir Wais Hotak, a Ghilzai, ruled the region from 1709 to 1738. By the late 1800s, however, many Ghilzai had been driven into northern and eastern Afghanistan by the Durrani, which explains their continuing antipathy toward that group. In 1978 the Ghilzai were the major instigators of the revolt against Mohammed Daoud Khan's government, which triggered the Soviet intervention and occupation of Afghanistan that began the following year. Although the succeeding three rulers of Afghanistan, all backed by the Kremlin, were Ghilzai, a large number of the mujahideen fighting the

Soviet occupation were themselves Ghilzai. Historically, the group has been nomadic, in opposition to its chief rival tribe, the Durrani, which tends to be sedentary.

During the 1990s, while Afghanistan was convulsed by civil war after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Ghilzai dominated the rising Taliban movement, which sought to institute an Islamic theocracy over Afghanistan. Indeed, Taliban leader and head of state Mullah Mohammed Omar was a member of the Ghilzai tribe. Today, the Ghilzai population in Afghanistan is thought to number about 9 million, with an additional 1 million located in western Pakistan. They thus make up as much as one quarter of the total Afghan population. Almost all Ghilzai adhere to Sunni Islam (of the Hanafi school), and most are devoutly religious. In modern-day Afghanistan, the Ghilzai opposed the government of President Hamid Karzai, who was Durrani. Prominent Ghilzai warlords, including Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar, have fought both the Taliban and the government. Many Ghilzai are part of the resurgent insurgency movement that attempted to topple the government, rid the nation of Western (chiefly U.S.) influences, and reinstall a Taliban regime.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Durrani Empire (1747–1818); Hazaras; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Hotak, Mir Wais; Karzai, Hamid; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Omar, Mullah Muhammed; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–)

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the last leader of the Soviet Union and led the USSR during the final phase of that country's occupation of, and withdrawal from, Afghanistan. Gorbachev was born in Privolnoye, Russia, on March 2, 1931. He joined the youth wing of the Communist Party in 1946. Gorbachev earned a law degree from Moscow State University in 1955 and then advanced quickly within the party, where he attracted the attention of KGB head and future Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. By 1980, Gorbachev had become a member of the Politburo. Andropov served as Soviet premier from 1982 to 1984. He wanted Gorbachev to succeed him; however, the office went instead to Konstantin Chernenko, who died in office in 1985. Gorbachev was then able to become the general secretary of the Communist Party and leader of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev faced a number of internal and external challenges. The Soviet economy was stagnating and the standard of living was falling in comparison with the West. In response, Gorbachev launched a series of reforms known as perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). Some economic reforms were implemented, including private ownership of businesses. There were also limited political changes, including the elimination of certain restrictions on freedoms of press and speech, and the creation of a new, elected legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies, in 1989.

In foreign policy, Gorbachev endeavored to reduce tensions with the West and agreed to a series of arms control agreements. However, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan bedeviled his efforts at a solution. When Gorbachev entered office, the military situation in Afghanistan was at a stalemate. The Soviets and the pro-Soviet Democratic



Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989. Gorbachev oversaw the final years of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989) and was in power when the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)

Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) government held all of the country's major cities, but the mujahideen controlled the rural areas, about 75 percent of the country. Gorbachev pressured senior Soviet military officers for new offensives to defeat the insurgents, but after 1986, the acquisition of advanced Stinger anti-aircraft missiles eroded Soviet air superiority. It became increasingly clear that there was not a military solution to the conflict. Meanwhile, efforts to improve the credibility and capability of the DRA government failed. Nor were the mujahideen and their supporters, Pakistan and the United States, interested in a negotiated settlement that left Soviet troops in Afghanistan. By 1988, Gorbachev had decided that the war

was not worth continuing. Instead, he was willing to accept the international embarrassment of a withdrawal in exchange for the opportunity to showcase a new Soviet foreign policy that was more cooperative with the West. In February, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops over the next year. He also declared that the Soviets would not interfere with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, including East Germany, as they democratized. On December 3, 1989, Gorbachev and U.S. president George H. W. Bush declared the Cold War over at a summit in Malta.

Meanwhile, opposition to his reforms led to a failed coup in August 1991. Gorbachev was detained, but the coup fell apart because of a lack of popular support and the strong leadership of Russian president Boris Yeltsin who took to the streets and rallied the people. Released from detention, Gorbachev resigned as Communist Party leader on August 24, and then as Soviet leader on December 25. The Soviet Union ceased to exist six days later. After leaving office, Gorbachev remained a controversial figure in Russian politics. Many blamed him for the economic and social problems that followed the fall of the Soviet Union; others believed he was the cause of reduced international prestige for Russia. He unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in 1996, but was sought after in the West as a speaker and pundit.

Tom Lansford

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Andropov, Yuri; Brezhnev, Leonid; Bush, George H. W.; Chernenko, Konstantin; Cold War (1947–1989); Geneva Accords (1988); Gromyko, Andrei; Mujahideen; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taraki, Nur Muhammad; Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich.

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Great Game, The

The “Great Game” was the British term for the competition, initially clandestine, between British India and czarist Russia to gather information about and exert influence and control over the vast, uncharted mountainous regions of Central Asia. The British played the Great Game to protect India, while the Russians wanted to keep the British from interfering with their “eastern destiny.” The term “Great Game” was reportedly coined by an early British adventurer, Lieutenant Arthur Conolly of the 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry, who posed as a Persian merchant and tried to reach Khiva in 1830. The Russian statesman Count Karl Nesselrode called the conflict “the tournament of shadows” (Farwell 1989, p. 106). The Great Game began early in the 19th century and continued until 1907.

In January 1801, Russian czar Paul sent an army of 20,000 Cossacks to invade India. Even though the force met disaster at the Volga River, the czar was not discouraged and tried, without success, to persuade Napoleon Bonaparte to conduct a joint Franco-Russian incursion into India via Afghanistan.

The specter of Russian invasion returned in the 1820s, as the Russians expanded

southward after their victories in the wars against Persia (1825–1828) and Turkey (1828–1829). This began a decade of British exploration in Afghanistan and the surrounding area. British officers who participated in this early stage of the Great Game included Conolly, Lieutenant Sir Alexander Burnes, and Major Eldred Pottinger.

In 1838, anxious to block possible Persian and Russian encroachment, the British East India Company reached an agreement with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, and the pro-British Shuja Shah to restore the latter to the Afghan throne. This precipitated the First Anglo-Afghan War the next year. This conflict witnessed ferocious fighting, including the British invasion of Afghanistan and an uprising in Kabul that resulted in the encirclement of the British force. While evacuating Kabul, this force—consisting of about 4,500 troops (of which 700 were British) and about 12,000 camp followers—was almost annihilated in the frigid mountain passes near Gandamak. A British punitive expedition tried to restore British influence, and the war ended in September 1842. The Russian threat receded.

Imperial rivalry subsided during the following decade. The Second Sikh War ended in 1849, and the British annexed the Punjab as a result. Before and after the Sepoy Rebellion (1857–1859), the British continued absorbing Indian states, and the Russians expanded further in Central Asia, conquering Samarkand in 1868, then Bokhara, Khiva, and, in 1875, Kokand. In England, the “Forward School” argued for military preparations, and the viceroy was directed to take “decided measures for counteracting the danger of the Russian advance in Central Asia and in particular for reestablishing our influence in Afghanistan” (Fredericks 1971, p. 187).

Afghanistan was in the throes of internal dynastic struggles in the late 1870s, and the emir, Sher Ali Khan, tried to avoid involvement in the Anglo-Russian rivalry. The Russians, however, after their 1878 victory over the Turks, flexed their muscles and sent an uninvited mission to Afghanistan. As Sher Ali was struggling with his cousin Abdur Rahman Khan for the throne, he began to distance himself from the British and sought Russian assistance. The British demanded to send a similar mission to Afghanistan and, rebuffed, issued an ultimatum to Sher Ali. This demand went unanswered, and on November 20, 1878, the British invaded Afghanistan and started the Second Anglo-Afghan War. British participation in this 1878–1880 war was very costly, although the British were able to establish the pro-British Abdur Rahman on the Afghan throne. The British also reorganized their political and military intelligence organizations.

The Great Game reached its peak during the 1880s, and the rivalry with Russia was more blatant, depending less on secrecy and disguise. Central Asia was “a vast adventure playground for ambitious young officers and explorers on both sides” (French 1994, p. 36). One of the leading British players during this period was Captain Francis Younghusband.

On March 30, 1885, while discussions were being held to fix the disputed northern boundary of Afghanistan, Russian forces attacked the Afghan town of Panjdeh in the disputed area, killing more than 300 of the Afghan defenders. Afghanistan had been promised aid against aggression by the British, and the Panjeh Crisis almost sparked a war between England and Russia before the crisis was overcome through diplomacy. The Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission continued to meet, delineating the border between Afghanistan and Russia in 1887. Six years later, the boundary between

Afghanistan and British India was fixed by the Durand Line.

Rumors of war persisted through the 1890s and into the 20th century. Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) contributed to the revolution in St. Petersburg in December 1905. Weakened and humiliated, Russia, under French pressure, agreed to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, promising to respect India's frontiers. The Great Game was over.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars) (1748–1837); Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of; Burnes, Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”); Durand Line; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Sher Ali; Panjdeh Crisis (1885); Pottinger, Eldred; Ranjit Singh, Maharaja; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Vitkevich, Ivan Viktorovich.

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Gromov, Boris (1943–)

Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov was a Russian military officer and the last Soviet commander in Afghanistan. Gromov was born in Saratov, Russia, on November 7, 1943. He graduated from the Suvorov Military Academy in Kalinin in 1962, and then the Higher Combined Arms Command School in Leningrad in 1965. Commissioned into the Soviet Army, Gromov rose rapidly through the ranks and was a colonel in 1980 at age 37. That year, he was deployed to Afghanistan for a two-year tour of duty in command of a mechanized infantry regiment. He quickly established a reputation as an aggressive officer who sought to engage the mujahideen. After his tour was finished, Gromov attended the Voroshilov General Staff Academy. In 1984, he was promoted to major general and returned to Afghanistan for a second tour.

In 1987, Gromov began his third tour in Afghanistan, as a lieutenant general and the commander of the 40th Army. That year, he launched Operation Magistral, the largest Soviet military campaign to date in Afghanistan. The goal of the offensive was to reestablish control of the main road between Gardez and Khost and to relieve the Afghan government garrison at Khost, which had been under siege by large formations of the mujahideen. The operation was highly successful. It lifted the siege of Khost and ended a larger push by the mujahideen to create an independent

Islamic state from the Khost district. For his leadership, the general was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union, the nation's most prestigious military decoration.

Gromov was then tasked with overseeing the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan following the 1988 Geneva Accords. The general had to manage the withdrawal of more than 100,000 troops in an operation that would expose the retreating soldiers to a heightened level of mujahideen attacks. Complicating the withdrawal were orders from Moscow that forbade the Soviets from firing on mujahideen positions unless attacked first. An uneasy and unpublicized truce held during the withdrawal, while Gromov did authorize his troops to fire ahead of their movements in order to forestall the formation of mujahideen forces. The withdrawal was completed on February 15, 1989, without the loss of a single soldier to combat, and Gromov was the last Soviet to leave the country.

Gromov refused to participate in the 1991 coup against Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, and he was subsequently appointed first deputy defense minister in the new Russian government. In 1994, he retired from the military with the rank of colonel general. The following year, he was elected to the lower house of the Russian parliament, the Duma. In 2000, the former general was elected governor of Moscow, a post he held until 2012.

Tom Lansford

See also: Andropov, Yuri; Chernenko, Konstantin; Geneva Accords (1988); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Gromyko, Andrei (1909–1989)

Andrei Gromyko was a leading Soviet diplomat who served the Soviet Union for almost 50 years as ambassador, deputy foreign minister, foreign minister, and finally its president. He was generally considered to be uncompromising in the approach that the Soviet Union took to uprisings by insurgent groups in Afghanistan in 1979, which led to a nine-year war with Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko was born in the village of Old Gromyki, near Minsk, on July 18, 1909. He earned a doctorate in economics at Moscow University and rose to prominence as a Soviet diplomat during World War II. In 1943 he replaced Maxim Litvinov as ambassador to the United States.

Gromyko played a prominent role at Soviet premier Josef Stalin's side during the July–August 1945 Potsdam Conference and when Stalin first met Mao Zedong in December 1949. Gromyko was the USSR's permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) from 1946 until he was named ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1952.

The always-proper Gromyko made it clear in his memoirs that he advised against absenting Soviet UN delegate Jakob A. Malik from his post on the eve of the U.S. effort to secure UN condemnation of the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). Gromyko warned Stalin of the possible consequences,

but failed to dissuade him from this decision, which kept faith with the Chinese communists, whose absence from the Security Council was the ostensible reason for the Soviet protest.

On December 4, 1950, Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko, no doubt on Stalin's order, urged Chinese ambassador Wang Jiaxiang to have his government order the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) across the 38th parallel to pursue retreating UN Command (UNC) forces. By April 1951, after the unsuccessful CPVA offensive, Gromyko indicated Soviet interest in a diplomatic solution to the war. He had already informed UN secretary-general Trygve Lie and the governments of Great Britain and India that the Soviet Union desired peace in Korea; he now informed the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, that UN delegate Malik's speech represented official Soviet policy. Gromyko urged that the combatants commence peace talks, limiting themselves to military matters to the exclusion of "political or territorial" considerations. Leaving political matters unresolved would, of course, protect the DPRK. U.S. secretary of state Dean G. Acheson accepted this as the basis for talks, and the long and frustrating negotiations then commenced.

Gromyko subsequently became the longest-serving Soviet foreign minister, holding that post from 1957 to 1985. During the 1958 Berlin crisis, Gromyko warned that, should fighting break out, "modern military technology" (i.e., Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles) would spread the flames of war to the United States; but after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, he was among those calling for renewed friendly relations with the United States. Gromyko subsequently played a role in negotiating a number of arms reductions agreements with the United States.

In March 1979, Gromyko, KGB chief Yuri Andropov, and Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin advocated a strong response after an uprising in Herat, Afghanistan, in which Soviet advisers and their families were killed. All were concerned about the increasing radicalization of insurgents fighting the pro-Soviet government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Gromyko believed that the United States and Pakistan were providing aid to the rebels and that if the Soviet Union did not take action, not only would the PDPA government be overthrown, but the insurgency would spread to Muslim areas of the Soviet Union. At that point, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev decided against direct military intervention in the country. In his memoirs, Gromyko argued that the assassination of Afghan president Nur Muhammad Taraki on September 14 prompted Brezhnev to approve a plan by Andropov to invade the country and replace the current government with one that could provide stability. Through the remainder of his time in office Gromyko was perceived as a hardliner on Afghanistan.

In 1985 Gromyko was “kicked upstairs” to the largely honorific position of chair of the Supreme Soviet (nominal president of the USSR). He retired from public life in September 1988 and died in Moscow on July 2, 1989.

Claude R. Sasso

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Brezhnev, Leonid; Cold War (1947–1989); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Operation Storm 333 (1979); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taraki, Nur Muhammad; Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich.

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Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility

The Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility was the main site where the United States has held those captured in Afghanistan or the broader war on terror. Just weeks after al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that had granted the former group safe haven in Afghanistan since 1996. The United States soon captured a number of its terrorist adversaries and designated them as enemy combatants, leaving the Bush administration with two important questions to answer: where to house the captives and how to use them to whatever advantage possible in the global war on terrorism. The administration's responses—building a detention facility on the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and employing it to extract intelligence from the enemy combatants—have driven the domestic and international perceptions and debates over these issues that have unfolded since.

Bush authorized construction of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility (GBDF) soon after the 9/11 attacks. Beginning early in 2002, the United States began transferring enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere across the greater Middle East to Guantanamo Bay, where they were initially placed in open air compounds with tents providing limited cover from the

elements. Over time, the facility has grown larger and much more sophisticated, in order to accommodate the 779 enemy combatants detained there over the years, with the 104 from a collective 19 countries left at the start of 2016 housed in a state-of-the-art \$16 million prison complex that even features a 19,000-volume library and soccer field.

The most controversial aspects of the GBDF involved the Bush administration's use of enhanced interrogation techniques on the detainees as an intelligence-gathering tool. Those information-extraction techniques included extreme sleep deprivation and the more severe practice of waterboarding, which simulated the effects of drowning. Those techniques drew widespread domestic and international criticism from a range of human rights and legal advocacy groups asserting that they amounted to torture. Further, one particularly notable politician, Senator Barack Obama, pledged during his victorious 2008 presidential campaign to close down the GBDF if elected.

Obama emphasized that promise at the outset of his first term and has worked ever since to shutter the facility by reducing its population ever closer to zero, coupling efforts designed to achieve that objective with a philosophical shift away from taking captives for intelligence-gathering purposes and toward the elimination of terrorist leaders through missile strikes carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly known as drones. However, the U.S. Congress consistently blocked efforts by the administration to close the facility and transfer the inhabitants to sites in the United States.

The most high-profile detainee release to date was the Obama administration's December 2014 trade of five members of the Taliban for U.S. Army serviceman Bowe Bergdahl. Bergdahl was captured by the Taliban after walking away from his base in

southeastern Afghanistan in June 2009 and subsequently held by that group and the Haqqani terrorist network. Bergdahl was charged with desertion and endangering American forces and is awaiting a court martial trial scheduled for February 2017.

Robert J. Pauly Jr.

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Bush, George, W.; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Obama, Barack; Terrorism; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Gul, Hamid (1936–2015)

Hamid Gul was a Pakistani general who oversaw intelligence and covert operations in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989) and the subsequent Afghan Civil War (1989–2001). Gul was born in British Punjab on November 20, 1936. He graduated from the Pakistan Military Academy and was commissioned in the army. He fought in an armored unit in the wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Gul became a protégé of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who seized power in 1977, and received a coveted appointment in

military intelligence. In this post, Gul oversaw training and supply programs for the mujahideen, funneling money and weapons from the United States, the Persian Gulf states, and China to the insurgent groups. In this capacity, Gul developed an extensive network of contacts among the mujahideen.

In 1987, Gul was appointed to lead the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's main military intelligence organization. Gul increased the military capabilities of the mujahideen as the Soviets and the forces of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) faced mounting losses. On August 17, 1988, Zia died in a plane crash and was replaced by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, while Benazir Bhutto was elected prime minister following Pakistan's first free elections since 1977. Meanwhile, in 1988, the Soviets began to withdraw from Afghanistan, and the last troops left in February 1989. With the Soviets gone, Gul sought to implement a new strategy whereby the mujahideen transitioned to conventional warfare in an effort to conquer those areas under the control of the DRA.

Gul and other leading Pakistani military officials believed that the DRA would quickly collapse. However, the regime was able to maintain its grip on key cities and towns through the use of armor and airpower. The failure of the mujahideen to defeat the DRA in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal led to Gul's dismissal in 1989. Gul continued to support the mujahideen and endorsed the Taliban during the Afghan Civil War.

Gul opposed the regime of Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf and was arrested in 2007. Critics of the former spymaster accused him of supporting terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Taliban. Gul died on August 15, 2015.

Tom Lansford

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Haqqani, Jalaluddin; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*); Jalalabad, Battle of (1989); Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; 9/11, War on Terror; and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Peshawar Accords (1992); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban.

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Gulabzoy, Sayyed Mohammad (1951–)

Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoy was an Afghan politician who served as minister of communications, minister of internal affairs, and ambassador to Russia during the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime. Gulabzoy was born in eastern Afghanistan in 1951. An ethnic Pashtun, he joined the Air Force and was commissioned an officer. He backed Mohammed Daoud Khan's 1973 coup and advanced rapidly through the ranks. In the 1970s, he joined the PDPA, aligning himself with the *Khalq* (Masses) faction, the more radical of the two main groupings in the party (the more moderate wing was *Parcham* or Banner).

Gulabzoy became close with Hafizullah Amin, one of the leaders of the *Khalq* faction. In 1978, Amin orchestrated the Saur Revolution, which overthrew Daoud and

installed a pro-Soviet PDPA government, led by Khalq head Nur Muhammad Taraki. Gulabzoy became minister of communication in the new government. The relationship between Taraki and Amin deteriorated over the next year. Gulabzoy transferred his allegiance to Taraki. When it appeared that Amin was going to try to depose Taraki, Gulabzoy joined three other senior PDPA figures in what came to be known as the gang of four. Taraki traveled to an international conference in September 1979. While he was gone, the gang of four attempted to assassinate Amin, but the plot failed and the four went into hiding at the Soviet Embassy in Kabul (some accounts assert the four were smuggled to the Soviet Union). Meanwhile, when the Afghan president returned, Amin had him arrested. Taraki was killed on September 14 and Amin declared himself president.

The murder of Taraki prompted the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Gulabzoy and his colleagues provided the Soviets with key intelligence prior to the invasion. They also helped lead Soviet special operations forces into Kabul and the presidential palace. Amin was killed and replaced by Parcham leader Babrak Karmal. Because of his aid during the invasion, the Soviets pressured Karmal into appointing Gulabzoy as interior minister on December 28. In this position, Gulabzoy commanded the Sarandoy (“Defenders of the Revolution”), a paramilitary force within the interior ministry. The Sarandoy eventually numbered more than 100,000 and were used for both police activities and combat operations against the mujahideen. Gulabzoy used his position to fill the ranks of the Sarandoy with Khalq supporters.

During the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, Gulabzoy was appointed ambassador to Moscow by President Mohammed Najibullah,

who had replaced Karmal in 1987. Gulabzoy reportedly plotted to depose Najibullah and was dismissed from the PDPA in 1990. He managed to stage a political comeback in 2005, when he was elected to the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of the Afghan parliament.

Tom Lansford

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Karmal, Babrak; Najibullah, Mohammed; Operation Storm 333 (1979); People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Sarandoy; Taraki, Nur Muhammad.

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Gulnabad, Battle of (1722)

The Battle of Gulnabad was a decisive battle between the Afghan forces and the Safavid army. By 1700, the Safavids had lost much of their sway in Afghanistan, and in 1704, the Safavid Shah Sultan Husayn dispatched a Georgian-Iranian army led by Georgian king Giorgi XI (Gorgin Khan) to subdue the rebellious Afghan tribes. Gorgin Khan defeated the attackers and forced them to accept the Safavid rule. However, his governorship in Afghanistan proved to be heavy-handed and oppressive, prompting an Afghan revolt led by the Ghilzai tribal chief Mir Wais in the spring of 1709. The Afghans defeated the Georgian contingents and expelled the Iranians from Afghanistan. The loss of capable generals and elite troops left Iran exposed to future attacks, which

eventually culminated in the Afghan Invasion of 1722. After the death of Mir Wais, his son Mahmud assumed the leadership of a loose coalition of Afghan tribes. In 1722, he invaded Iran and faced the Safavid army near Gulnabad on March 8. The armies were unequal in size but their precise numbers remain unknown; it is unlikely that Mahmud had more than 18,000 men, whereas the Iranian forces had about 40,000 men and two dozen artillery pieces, commanded by Frenchman Philippe Colombe. The Iranians, however, failed to exploit their superiority and suffered from a lack of unified command as the army was divided into several parts to avoid arousing jealousy among its proud commanders.

The battle began with the charge of the Iranian right wing, commanded by the experienced Georgian general Rustam Khan, head of the Safavid royal troops (*qullars*). He gained considerable success against the Ghilzai left wing and reduced Mahmud to a state of panic. But the Iranians failed to coordinate their attacks. First, 12,000 Arab cavalry that followed Rustam's charge chose to rampage the enemy's camp instead of pressing on the attack. Had the Iranian center under Vizier Muhammad Quli Khan attacked at that moment, the Afghans would inevitably have lost the day. But the vizier held back, which allowed Mahmud to drive back Rustam Khan. When the Iranian left wing led by Ali Mardan Khan finally

attacked, the Afghans feigned flight and lured it onto their masked camel guns (*zanburaks*), which opened fire at point-blank range and devastated the Iranian ranks. The Afghan cavalry charge then broke through and wheeled on the rear of the Iranian artillery, whose crews were slaughtered. The rest of the Iranian army, deployed in the center under the vizier's command, fled from the battlefield without even making contact with the enemy.

The decisive defeat at Gulnabad effectively marked the end of the Safavid Empire. The Afghans captured Isfahan after a six-month siege but were unable to hold on to their Iranian conquests. Their withdrawal created a political vacuum in Iran, prompting a long-term conflict among various pretenders for the throne.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Durani Empire (1747–1818); Hotak, Mir Wais; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan.

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H

Haig, Alexander (1924–2010)

U.S. Army general, U.S. secretary of state during 1981–1982, army vice chief of staff during 1972–1973, and supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during 1974–1979, Alexander Haig was born on December 2, 1924, in Bala Cynwyd, a suburb of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He attended Notre Dame University and subsequently graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1947. He served on General Douglas MacArthur's personal staff in Japan after World War II and saw combat duty during the Korean War. Haig received a master's degree in international relations from Georgetown University in 1961.

Haig then served a tour at the Pentagon. During 1965–1967, he served in the Vietnam War with the 1st Infantry Division, rising to lieutenant colonel. He returned from Vietnam to become deputy commandant at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, in 1968.

In 1969 Colonel Haig became military assistant to National Security adviser Henry Kissinger. Advanced to brigadier general in October 1969, Haig became deputy assistant for national security affairs in 1970. Haig played an important role in Vietnam War planning by participating in the decisions to carry out the secret bombing of Cambodia. He was promoted to major general in March 1972.

In September 1972 President Richard M. Nixon advanced Haig to full general and appointed him army vice chief of staff, bypassing 240 higher-ranking general officers and

prompting considerable criticism by many who regarded Haig as a yes-man for the president. Haig retired from the military in 1973 to become White House chief of staff to President Nixon. As such, Haig maintained stability and helped organize a smooth transition after Nixon's August 1974 resignation.

Haig resumed his military career in 1974 when President Gerald Ford appointed him supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe. In 1979 Haig retired from the military again after disagreeing with President Jimmy Carter's policies toward the Soviet Union.

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Haig served as a foreign policy adviser to Ronald Reagan. Appointed secretary of state, Haig served during 1981–1982. He advocated a firm stance against perceived threats posed by the Soviet Union and was an early supporter of aid to guerrillas fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. He believed that support for the mujahideen was more important than détente. Haig worked to gain additional backing for the insurgents among the European allies of the United States, including Great Britain. Meanwhile, in a television interview in February 1982, Haig revealed that the United States had evidence of the Soviet use of chemical weapons against the mujahideen.

After the 1981 assassination attempt on President Reagan, Haig infamously and erroneously claimed that he was "in command at the White House" in the absence of the vice president.

In 1982 Haig engaged in shuttle diplomacy to mediate the growing conflict between

Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. It became clear, however, that Haig was more sympathetic to the British cause, which engendered bad feelings on the part of the Argentines. Haig's abrasive manner and mismanagement of the Falklands crisis forced his resignation on June 25, 1982. He established his own consulting firm after leaving government service.

Haig died on February 20, 2010, at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, of complications from an infection.

John David Rausch Jr.

See also: Cold War (1947–1989); Mujahideen; Reagan, Ronald W.; Shultz, George; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Haq, Abdul (1958–2001)

Abdul Haq was a mujahideen leader who was killed by the Taliban in 2001 during Operation Enduring Freedom. Haq was born on April 23, 1958, in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, into an affluent Pashtun family. As a youth, he was active in opposition efforts against the regime of Mohammed Daoud Khan, and then against the pro-Soviet government led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghani-

stan (PDPA). When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Haq joined the mujahideen and took up arms against the Soviets and government forces.

Haq developed a reputation as a brave and resourceful commander. He cultivated a relationship with the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) service of Pakistan and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, and used his contacts to procure weapons and financial backing. Haq would later break with the ISI over what he believed was the agency's efforts to keep the mujahideen divided. During the occupation, Haq was wounded a dozen times, including the loss of part of his right foot.

After the Soviets withdrew in 1989, Haq continued to fight against the PDPA government until it fell in 1992. He was appointed police commissioner in Kabul after the mujahideen captured the city and made interior minister in the subsequent coalition government. However, after a civil war broke out among the mujahideen, Haq left Afghanistan and moved to Dubai where he established a lucrative import/export business. Meanwhile, the Taliban took control of most of Afghanistan in 1996.

In 1998, Haq agreed to serve as a peace negotiator for the United Nations in the world body's unsuccessful effort to end the Afghan Civil War. He returned to Afghanistan. The following year, his wife and son were assassinated by the Taliban. The killing prompted Haq to unite with Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud in an effort to bring together anti-Taliban Pashtuns with the mainly Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara Northern Alliance. The Taliban assassinated Massoud prior to the 9/11 attacks, prompting Haq to seek refuge in Pakistan.

After the 9/11 terrorist strikes, Haq sought to reinvigorate the anti-Taliban resistance. After secretly meeting with disaffected

Taliban figures, Haq became convinced that if the senior leadership of the Taliban could be removed or killed, the rest of the grouping would collapse. Against the advice of his colleagues in Pakistan, in October 2001, Haq covertly entered Afghanistan to rally opposition groups along with a small party, 20 altogether. He was intercepted by the Taliban, captured, and executed on October 26.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Mujahideen; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Taliban.

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
Haqqani, Jalaluddin (1939–2014?)

Jalaluddin Haqqani was the founder and former leader of the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network, a mujahideen organization that conducted guerrilla operations against Soviet forces during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s and later fought the U.S.-led coalition after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Haqqani was born in Karezgay, located in the Zadran District of Paktia Province, Afghanistan, in 1939. In 1964, he began his education at Dar-al-’Ulam Haqqaniya Deobandi in Akora Khattak, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan, and earned the religious honorific title of *Mawlawi* (lord or master) after receiving a doctorate in 1970.

After the overthrow of Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah in 1973 and the

subsequent rise of Mohammed Daoud Khan, Haqqani emerged as a vocal critic of the new regime. He fled to Pakistan to escape suspicions of treason. Once within Pakistan, Haqqani joined other opposition figures in efforts to undermine the Daoud government. After the Saur Revolution deposed Daoud in 1978 and installed the pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Haqqani joined the ranks of the mujahideen group *Hezb-e Islami* (“Islamic Party” or “Party of Islam”). He later defected to the less radical group known as the *Hezb-e Islami Khalis*, led by Mohammad Yunus Khalis.

The Hezb-e Islami Khalis factions were highly autonomous, and this decentralized structure allowed Haqqani to take command of a force of mujahideen guerrilla fighters



Former mujahideen and insurgent leader Jalaluddin Haqqani in 1998. Haqqani emerged as a major non-Taliban rebel leader, fighting against the coalition after the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. (AP Photo/Mohammed Riaz)

who soon dubbed themselves the Haqqani Network. Throughout the 1980s, the Haqqani Network fostered relationships with many anti-Soviet resistance groups and organizations. Haqqani also forged ties with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, as well as multiple private Arab donors in the Persian Gulf.

During the occupation, Haqqani led mujahideen forces besieging Khost and defeated Afghan government forces during the Battle of Zhawar in 1985 (although he was wounded in the Second Battle of Zhawar in 1986 in which the Soviets briefly occupied the town). Infighting among the various mujahideen leaders reduced the efficiency of the fighters. Haqqani's greatest victory was his capture of Khost in April 1991 from PDPA forces.

After Kabul was captured by mujahideen forces in 1992, Haqqani was named minister of justice in the newly formed coalition government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Although he tried to remain neutral amidst the infighting of the various factions, Haqqani was increasingly disenchanted with the government. In 1995, he joined the Taliban. When the Taliban overthrew the Rabbani government in 1996, Haqqani was appointed minister of borders and tribal affairs, but not given any real power or influence in the new regime.

When the U.S.-led coalition overthrew the Taliban in 2001, Haqqani fled to Pakistan and relaunched the Haqqani Network with reported support from the ISI. He allied his group with the Taliban and launched attacks on coalition and government targets from bases in Waziristan, Pakistan. Haqqani was responsible for the increasing use of suicide bombings by the Taliban. His son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, had a growing role in the network and was reported to have succeeded

his father as the group's main military commander while Jalaluddin remained the spiritual leader. On July 31, 2015, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that Jalaluddin Haqqani had died the previous year from complications arising from a prolonged illness and was buried in Afghanistan. The reports were denied by the Taliban and by those close to the Haqqani family.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Haqqani Network; Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan; Khalis, Mohammad Yunus; Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986).

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Haqqani Network

The Haqqani Network is an Islamic extremist organization operating in the Afghan provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost and the North Waziristan (NWA) region of Pakistan. The group is aligned with the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and is known for conducting spectacular terrorist attacks against the Afghan national government and coalition forces. Jalaluddin Haqqani formed the group in the 1980s and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, has led the organization since 2005.

Jalaluddin Haqqani was among the first Afghan Islamic extremists to take up arms

against the Afghan government after Mohammed Daoud's 1973 coup. Haqqani left Afghanistan after the coup to receive training and assistance from the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government in Pakistan. Haqqani fought the Afghan government and later the invading Soviet forces until the latter's withdrawal in 1989.

During the 1980s, the Haqqani Network received extensive arms and training from the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and the American Central Intelligence Agency. Haqqani and the ISI have maintained a close working relationship ever since. During the anti-Soviet insurgency, Haqqani established a series of training and support bases in North Waziristan, Pakistan, with the help of the ISI.

After initially opposing the Afghan Taliban regime, Haqqani aligned with the group in 1995 under pressure from the ISI and became one of the Taliban's most effective commanders. In recognition of his power and influence, the Taliban appointed him minister of tribal and frontier affairs in 1998, but largely sidelined him from real decision-making power. After the American invasion in October 2001, Haqqani escaped into Pakistan and reconstituted the Haqqani Network, vowing to wage jihad with the Taliban against the United States. The Haqqani Network continues to align with the Taliban while also conducting independent operations.

The Haqqani Network draws its support from several sources, the most important of which is the Pakistani government. The Haqqanis provide a link to the TTP and brokered a truce between the Pakistani government and the TTP in December 2007. The Haqqanis also help Pakistan to destabilize Indian encroachments into Afghanistan. In return for these services, the Pakistani Army and ISI provide the Haqqani Network a safe haven in NWA to launch attacks in

Afghanistan and recruit fighters from local tribes.

Another source of support comes from Jalaluddin Haqqani's connections with foreign jihad groups. The Haqqani Network was the first mujahideen group to incorporate Arab volunteers in 1987. This resulted in a close relationship with Arab sponsors, including al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. In 2001 the Haqqani Network served as key conduit for the escape of al Qaeda operatives into Pakistan after the U.S.-led invasion. These groups assist the Haqqani Network in the financing and training of recruits and launching attacks in Afghanistan.

The final source of support is Jalaluddin Haqqani's reputation as an original and authentic mujahideen fighter, his military prowess, and religious devotion. This has allowed the Haqqani Network to co-opt or replace tribal leaders in their areas of operation and gain access to the highest decision-making councils of the Taliban. It is uncertain if Jalaluddin's alleged death in 2014 will diminish the group's influence, as his son Sirajuddin is not as respected as his father.

In January 2003, the Haqqani Network commenced offensive operations in the group's main area of operations, in the areas of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost Provinces dominated by the Zadran tribe. This area, known as the "Zadran Arch," provides an access corridor from the group's bases in Pakistan into southeastern Afghanistan. The group specializes in improvised explosive device attacks and was one of the first insurgent groups to adopt the use of suicide bombers in Afghanistan. The group has expanded its operations north toward Kabul and has conducted a series of spectacular attacks against government and coalition targets in the capital, starting with the 2008 Serena Hotel attack. The Haqqani Network has also reportedly been involved in several

high-profile kidnappings, including that of *New York Times* reporter David Rohde and U.S. Army sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.

Alexander D. Stephenson

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Haqqani, Jalaluddin; Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban.

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Harkay ul-Mujahideen (HuM)

The *Harkay ul-Mujahideen* (HuM) was a radical mujahideen group formed to fight the Soviets and the pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The organization was originally established in Pakistan in 1985 after disaffected fighters split from another anti-Soviet group, the *Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami* (Islamic Jihad Movement or HuJI), which had been created a year earlier. The breakaway group was led by Fazlur Rehman Khalil, a founder of the

HuJI, who split with that group’s coleader, Qari Saifullah Akhtar.

The HuM received significant support and training from Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, and Khalil forged close relationships with senior Pakistani intelligence officers. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the ISI worked with the HuM to shift the focus and resources of the group to fight against the Indians in the Kashmir conflict, and later to establish cells in Bangladesh. In 1993, the HuM and the HuJI were merged to create the *Harkat ul-Ansar* (HuA) as part of a broader effort by the ISI to coordinate anti-Indian groups in Jammu and Kashmir. Differences between the groups plagued the new organization over the next several years. In 1997, the United States designated the HuA as a terrorist group and the organization was again branded as the HuM in an effort to escape punitive action. Dissidents from the HuM formed a new grouping, the *Jaish-e Mohammed* (Army of Muhammad) that same year.

Meanwhile, Khalil became increasingly close with Osama bin Laden and was one of five signatories of the al Qaeda leader’s 1998 fatwa (religious decree) against the United States and Israel (the signatories dubbed themselves the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”). Khalil resigned as group leader in 2000. After the 2001 al Qaeda attacks on the United States, the HuM was identified as a terrorist organization. Reports assert that the HuM has cooperated with the Taliban and al Qaeda in attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir since 2001. Nonetheless, in 2012, the Pakistani government refused to designate the HuM as a terrorist group. Estimates were that the HuM had approximately 400 fighters in Kashmir in 2016.

Tom Lansford

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan; Muhajideen; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Terrorism.

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Harlan, Josiah (1799–1871)

Josiah Harlan was the first known U.S. citizen to travel to Afghanistan. He became active in Afghan and Punjab politics, eventually securing the title Prince of Ghor. Harlan's career was marked by extraordinary adventures, and he was reportedly the model for the protagonist in Rudyard Kipling's *The Man Who Would Be King* (1888).

Harlan was born on June 12, 1799, in Newlin, Pennsylvania, to Quaker parents. A voracious reader, Harlan was particularly fascinated by the life and adventures of Alexander the Great. In 1820, he traveled to India and China. After a failed engagement, the young adventurer decided to seek his fortunes in Asia rather than return to the United States. Although he had no formal medical training, Harlan served as a surgeon for the East India Company in Burma from 1824 to 1826. He then returned to India where he met the deposed Afghan king, Shuja Shah. The American agreed to work to restore the exiled king, but after traveling to Afghanistan with a small force, he decided that there was little support for overthrowing the current monarch, Dost Mohammad Khan. In 1829, Harlan journeyed back to Punjab where Maharajah Ranjit Singh was

recruiting Europeans for military and political posts. Harlan was able to secure a post as governor of Nurpur and Jasrota. Three years later, he became governor of Gujrat.

In 1838, Harlan's restlessness overcame him and he volunteered to lead a military expedition for Dost Mohammad against slave traders among the Hazaras in Afghanistan. The American led an army through the high mountain passes of the Hindu Kush, at one point raising a U.S. flag. He then defeated and expelled the slavers and arranged for the Hazaras to pay an annual tribute to the Afghan king. While in Balkh, the adventurer convinced a local ruler to appoint him prince of Ghor, a Hazara fortress in the Hindu Kush. He returned to Kabul in 1839 on the eve of the British invasion during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). He was a vocal critic of the occupation, and the British expelled Harlan for his pro-Afghan sympathies.

Harlan returned to the United States and published a popular memoir. He married Elizabeth Baker in 1849, and the couple had one child, a daughter, Sarah. In the 1850s, the adventurer became involved in the unsuccessful effort to replace mules with camels as pack animals for the U.S. Army in the Southwest. During the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), Harlan raised a regiment of light cavalry for the Union Army in August 1861. He served briefly as colonel of the unit (which was known as "Harlan's Horse"), but was court-martialed and allowed to leave the service for medical reasons. He eventually moved to California where he again practiced medicine. Harlan died in obscurity on October 21, 1871, in San Francisco.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Hazaras; Ranjit Singh, Maharaja.

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Hazara Uprisings (1888–1901)

The Hazara Uprisings were a series of revolts by ethnic Hazaras against Afghan emir Abdur Rahman Khan. Abdur Rahman, known as the “Iron Emir,” sought to increase control over the Hazaras and other wayward tribes. He sent forces to subjugate the Hazaras in the 1880s, ending the long-standing autonomy of the group. In response, the Hazaras had three separate uprisings from 1888 to 1901 that were met by increasing brutality and repression. Following the last uprising, a forced migration removed 60 percent of the Hazara population from their lands in the Hazarajat.

The first uprising took place in 1888 when the emir’s cousin, Mohammad Eshaq, revolted. Believing that there was a chance to regain their independence, the tribal leaders of the Sheikh Ali Hazaras fought under his banner. In an effort to divide the rebels, Abdur Rahman declared the Shi’a Hazaras to be infidels. This created tensions between the mainly Sunni Pashtun rebels and the Hazaras. It also created incentives for other Pashtun tribes to fight against the rebels. Tribes loyal to the emir were able to confiscate the land of rebel Hazaras and enslave Shi’a members of the tribe. By 1890, the revolt had been crushed. The Hazaras were disarmed and heavily taxed, while the emir appointed an administrator for the region.

The second uprising began in 1892 as a result of lingering resentment toward the emir’s actions in the first rebellion and the increasingly reckless actions of the occupying forces. The spark for the revolt involved an assault against the wife of a local chieftain by Afghan soldiers. Hazaras stormed the local garrison, killed the soldiers, and acquired the weapons and ammunition of the outpost. Other local chiefs quickly joined the rebellion, which spread throughout Hazarajat. The emir used techniques similar to those he employed during the first uprising. He declared a jihad against Shi’as. Both sides committed atrocities against each other. The rebel forces were defeated at the town of Oruzgan. Thousands of the rebels were captured and sold into slavery. Some were killed as a warning to others.

The third uprising began just a year later. Once again Hazaras attacked government outposts in a largely spontaneous revolt that caught the government forces by surprise. The Hazaras were able to retake most of the Hazarajat. However, they were unable to maintain their resistance as the government blockaded food and other supplies from reaching the region. The rebellion quickly died out, but sporadic fighting continued over the next eight years. Meanwhile, large numbers of Hazaras fled to Persia or Baluchistan. Others were enslaved or displaced by Pashtun nomads that Abdur Rahman sent in to resettle Hazarajat in a broad program of ethnic cleansing.

Jorge Brown

See also: Hazaras; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Pashtuns (Pushtuns).

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Hazaras

The Hazaras are an ethnic group that comprise approximately 10 percent of the population of Afghanistan or about 2.8 million people. With cultural and religious ties to Iran, the Hazaras have long been subject to discrimination and persecution. Originally descendants of Persians who settled in Afghanistan in the 1200s, the Hazaras speak Dari, a dialect of Farsi. Like most Iranians, the Hazaras are primarily Shi'a, unlike the majority of Afghans who are Sunni. Approximately 90 percent of Hazaras are either Twelver Shi'a or the more radical Islami (Sevener) branch of Shi'a. The remaining 10 percent are Sunni, mostly those whose ancestors were forced to convert.

The Hazaras originally settled in the southwest corner of Afghanistan, but centuries of repression and forced relocation moved most Hazaras into nine separate areas of a dry, mountainous region of central Afghanistan that came to be known as Hazarajat. The Hazaras were traditionally pastoral herders, but in the 20th century, many began to migrate to cities and towns in search of employment. Once in the urban areas, Hazaras often took low-skill, low-wage jobs, initiating a cycle of poverty that continues into the 21st century.

The Hazaras were highly autonomous for most of their history. They angered Afghan rulers by supporting Iranian incursions into areas claimed by Afghan rulers. In the 19th century, successive Afghan rulers endeavored

to bring the Hazaras under the control of Kabul. In 1839, the Hazaras agreed to pay a tribute to Afghan king Dost Mohammad Khan. Because the British sought a strong Afghanistan to act as a buffer against Russian expansion, London supported Afghan efforts to extend sovereignty over the Hazaras. During the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan (1880–1901), the Hazaras were finally brought under the control of the monarchy following a lengthy series of uprisings and revolts. By 1893, their territories had been conquered, and Abdur Khan implemented programs of forced resettlement and brutal suppression. A significant portion of the Hazara population died during this era.

In the 1940s, the central government in Kabul launched a new Pashtunization program designed to extend Pashtun control of the country and forcibly integrate ethnic minorities through cultural and linguistic eradication initiatives. The Dari language was suppressed as were other manifestations of Hazara culture. In addition, special taxes were imposed on ethnic minorities. The Hazaras rose in revolt against the taxes in the 1950s and were able to force their repeal. During this era, the Hazaras formed strong political organizations that often functioned as parallel local governments.

During the Soviet invasion, the Hazaras initially joined other Afghans in opposing the occupation. However, unlike the Pashtuns, the Hazaras did not migrate as refugees to Pakistan or other states in large numbers. One result was that their percentage of the overall population increased during the Soviet era, rising from about 8 percent to 14 percent, before falling back to around 10 percent in the 1990s. During the occupation, the Hazaras were able to secure a high degree of autonomy in exchange for a cease-fire with the Soviet-backed regime. This further alienated the group from the rest of Afghanistan and

added to existing ethnic tensions. Nonetheless, after the Soviet withdrawal, the Hazaras retained their autonomy.

During the Afghan Civil War of the 1990s, the Hazaras supported the regime of Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, who in turn backed Hazara autonomy. Hazara militia groups fought alongside the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Iran also backed Rabbani and provided the Hazaras with arms and financial support. When the Taliban came to power in 1996, they revived efforts to suppress the group. A range of government officials called for the Hazaras to convert and become Sunnis or leave Afghanistan. The Taliban specifically charged that the Hazaras were infidels because of their religious beliefs and that the group had participated in atrocities against Taliban supporters. Hazara leaders and human rights groups documented a series of massacres and executions by Taliban forces through the late 1990s. For instance, when the Taliban captured Mazar-I Sharif in 1998, they executed more than 2,000 Hazara men and boys. These tactics solidified Hazara support for the Northern Alliance.

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, additional Hazara militias were recruited to fight the Taliban. The groups supported the post-Taliban government and were rewarded with a variety of government posts, although de facto discrimination against Hazaras continued. During the post-2001 insurgency, the Taliban intensified guerrilla operations against the Hazaras.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Afghanistan: Ethnic Groups; Dost Mohammad; Hazara Uprisings (1888–1901); Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin (1947–)

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a former mujahideen leader and Afghan warlord who served twice as prime minister of Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was born in Baghlan in 1947 in northern Afghanistan. He entered Kabul University in 1970, where he became a member of the country’s largest communist group, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Hekmatyar was arrested and expelled in 1972 for the political murder of a fellow student, a prominent Maoist. However, he was released the following year as part of a general amnesty.

The future warlord joined Burhanuddin Rabbani’s *Jamiat-e Islami* (Islamic Society), but later split with the organization because of its moderate approach. He went on to form the *Hezb-e Islami* (Islamic Party) in 1975. Hekmatyar led an unsuccessful revolt that failed to attract any significant popular support. He fled into exile in Pakistan where he began to receive substantial support from the Pakistani intelligence service because of his opposition to the Afghan government and his strident Islamism. Hezb-e Islami was allowed to establish a series of camps and settlements on the Pakistani side of the border. The network he developed allowed Hekmatyar to emerge as one of the principal

leaders of the mujahideen after the Soviet invasion in 1979. However, he also fought other mujahideen groups for control of territory and resources and engaged in a long-running feud with Ahmed Shah Massoud, the military commander of Jamiat-e Islami.

After the Soviet withdrawal, and subsequent civil war, Hekmatyar's forces captured Kabul in April 1992. His troops were displaced by Massoud, and Hekmatyar subsequently signed a peace accord through which he became prime minister of the interim government from 1993 to 1994. After leaving office, Hekmatyar and Hezb-e Islami again began fighting Jamiat-e Islami. In the midst of this civil war, a new grouping, the Taliban, seized power in 1996. In an effort to unite the anti-Taliban factions, Hekmatyar was briefly appointed prime minister again in 1996, but was forced to flee the Taliban. Over the next five years, Hekmatyar lived in exile, mostly in Iran. When the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, the former prime minister declared his opposition to the allied invasion and announced his support for the Taliban. He was expelled from Iran, and the Iranian and Pakistani governments closed the facilities and camps of Hezb-e Islami in their respective countries.

By 2002, Hekmatyar was back in Afghanistan leading militants against the U.S.-led coalition troops. He survived a U.S. air strike on May 6, 2002. The following year, he was designated a terrorist by the United States. Through the early 2000s, Hekmatyar created a powerful insurgent network within Afghanistan, funding his operations through the opium trade. By 2008, he had become the most powerful non-Taliban warlord fighting the central government and the international coalition.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Bonn Agreement (2001); Hazaras; Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*); Islamic Society (JIA) (*Jamiat-e Islami*); Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Najibullah, Mohammed; Narcoterrorism; Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Opium Poppy Production; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; Warlords.

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Helmand Valley

Bisected by the Helmand River, the surrounding valley that bears the name of the waterway is the most fertile and rich agricultural region of Afghanistan. The river is fed by the melting snows of the Hindu Kush Mountains and flows in a southwestern course for a total distance of 1,150 km (710 miles) toward the Iranian border, ending in a series of marshes and lakes. It is the largest river in Afghanistan and its watershed includes almost half of the country. There are a number of tributaries, including the Arghandab River. The Helmand River also provides water for the agrarian regions of eastern Iran.

Unlike most of the rest of the dry, mountainous country, the Helmand Valley is a rich and fertile region, often referred to as the “breadbasket” of Afghanistan. The region has been settled for an extended period. The valley was the site of the winter capital of the Ghaznavid Empire and the home of the

Sakastans. Early inhabitants were Zoroastrians, but the area was also settled by Buddhists and Hindus, before being conquered by the Ghaznavids in the 10th century and converted to Islam. The region was once part of the semi-independent province of Kandahar, and was made part of greater Afghanistan by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747. Helmand Province now comprises about 10 percent of the entire country and is one of the largest provinces in Afghanistan. It is inhabited primarily by Pashtuns and has a population of 1.5 million spread among more than 1,000 villages and towns.

For centuries, successive projects were undertaken to divert portions of the river to improve agriculture. Canals and irrigation ditches were common. Beginning in the 1700s, a succession of larger canals were built in an effort to expand the land under cultivation. In the 1930s, a Japanese company began work on a massive canal, but work ended with the advent of World War II (1939–1945). After the war, the Afghan government contracted with a U.S. firm for a series of dams designed to increase irrigated land and to provide electricity. Work on the Helmand Valley Project, partially funded with U.S. aid, continued until the Soviet invasion in 1979. Two major dams were finished. They increased the area of land under irrigation by more than 1 million acres.

In the 2000s, the Helmand Valley continued to be the major agrarian region of Afghanistan. A variety of crops are grown in the region, including corn, cotton, wheat, peanuts, and tobacco. The valley has also become the largest producer of opium in the world, responsible for approximately three-quarters of annual production. Partly in an effort to suppress drug production and partly to protect the various dams and electric power plants from the Taliban-led insurgency, U.S. and coalition forces established several bases

in the area in 2006 during Operation Enduring Freedom. Through heavy fighting in the spring and summer of 2006, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces defeated a Taliban offensive and launched a counter-campaign, Operation Achilles, in 2007.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Climate and Geography; Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Helmand Valley Project; Narcoterrorism; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Opium Poppy Production; Taliban.

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Helmand Valley Project

The Helmand Valley Project is an ambitious, multiyear project to expand irrigation and electrification in the southern areas of Afghanistan through the construction of a series of dams on the Helmand River. Since the 1700s, successive Afghan governments had endeavored to regulate the flow of the Helmand River and divert water for irrigation. The river is the largest in Afghanistan and its basin incorporates about 40 percent of the country. In 1946, the government of Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan signed a \$17 million agreement with an American engineering firm, the Morrison-Knudson Company, to build a series of roads in Helmand Province, repair existing dams on the Helmand River, and construct new hydroelectric dams. Under the terms of the arrangement, a limited partnership was formed, Morrison-Knudson Afghanistan (MKA).

The partnership ensured that most of the local work was contracted out to Afghan companies and workers in the region. In addition to providing jobs for locals, MKA also trained a generation of Afghan engineers and technicians who went on to work on other infrastructure projects. The Helmand Valley Authority (HVA) was created to oversee the project.

In order to save costs, MKA declined to undertake several key geographic surveys. The result was that several of the projects were built in less than ideal locations, leading to cost overruns and operational problems later. The project's expanding budget forced the Afghan government to negotiate a \$21 million loan from the U.S. Import Export Bank. An additional \$18.5 million loan was provided by the Import Export Bank in 1953. These loans would later be supplemented by direct U.S. aid, as the project expanded in scope and cost. Between 1960 and 1970, the United States committed an additional \$80 million in assistance to the project.

In 1952, the Arghandab Dam was completed at a cost of \$6.7 million. Located north of Kandahar, the facility regulated the flow of the river to adjust for the seasonal low and high waters. It also provided irrigation for more than 150,000 acres of previously marginal land. Within a few years of completion, agricultural production had doubled. In addition, a small hydroelectric plant at the dam produced 6,400 kilowatts of power. The following year, a larger dam was completed at Kajaki at a cost of \$13 million. The Kajaki Dam expanded the area under irrigation by 500,000 acres and further expanded electrical power. In addition, 160 kilometers of irrigation canals were completed. More than 4,000 nomads settled in the region after the construction of the two dams as part of a government program to increase agriculture.

The project was plagued by a variety of problems. Many of the irrigation canals were badly constructed or built in areas with poor soil. The result was the loss of significant amounts of water to ground absorption. The resettlement program was met with resistance and resulted in a minor insurgency. There was widespread corruption within the HVA, which contributed to consistent cost overruns. While the project did significantly increase agricultural production, it also resulted in a rise in the drug trade, and Afghanistan eventually became the world's leading supplier of heroin.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Climate and Geography; Helmand Valley; Khan, Shah Mahmud; Narcoterrorism; Opium Poppy Production; Taliban; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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Herat, Siege of (1837–1838)

The Siege of Herat was an Afghan military victory against a Persian (Iranian) army besieging the city of Herat. By the 1830s, the three Afghan subkingdoms of Kandahar, Kabul, and Herat were each ruled by a different emir. Herat's nominal emir was Kamran Shah, but he had ceded most of his power to the kingdom's vizier, Yar Mohammed Khan. Yar Mohammed had prevented the Persian conquest of Herat in 1833 by agreeing to pay tribute to the shah of Iran, Fat'h-Ali Shah Qajar (he soon stopped the payments). Concurrently, the Afghan regent undertook

an ambitious program to strengthen the central government of the region and improve the military, as well as enhance the defenses of Herat. Herat increasingly came to be seen as a potential threat to Persia. The city was located in a rich agricultural region and sat astride a major trade and communications route. In 1830, it had a population of more than 100,000 and was the second largest city in the region. However, Herat subsequently went into a period of economic decline and the roads, canals, and walls of the city were in disrepair.

In 1836, Persia launched a campaign to reassert sovereignty over Herat, but cholera ended the effort before significant progress was made. Meanwhile, a new Russian envoy, Count Ivan Simonich, pledged financial and military assistance to the shah of Iran, prompting a new offensive the following year. The British envoy to Persia, Sir John McNeill, endeavored unsuccessfully to negotiate a settlement between the Persians and Afghans. In October 1837, a 30,000-man Persian army crossed the border with Herat (the besieging force eventually rose to 40,000). By the next month, the Persians had reached the city. Both the Persian and Afghan forces faced disease and malnutrition as the fighting continued into the winter and spring of 1838. Among the Persian forces were a number of European mercenaries, while a British adventurer, Eldred Pottinger, helped Yar Mohammed lead the defenses of the city.

The British were concerned that the fall of Herat would increase Russian influence in the region and potentially threaten India. McNeill made another failed effort at diplomacy and then broke off relations with Persia on June 6, 1838. Consequently, the governor-general of India, Lord Auckland, ordered military preparations to commence. On June 17, British forces landed and captured the

Persian island of Kharg in the Persian Gulf. Unwilling to risk a conflict with Britain, the czar ordered Simonich's recall. Word reached Herat of the recall on June 22, but the shah decided on an all-out final assault before Simonich left. On June 24, Persian forces attacked the city and were able to breach the city's walls and briefly gain a foothold before Pottinger and Yar Mohammed rallied the Afghan forces and repulsed the attackers.

On August 11, 1838, the British issued an ultimatum to the shah demanding the withdrawal of his forces from Herat. The shah withdrew after besieging the city for 280 days. Subsequently, in an effort to create a buffer zone to protect its colonies in India from the possibility of future Russian interference, the British launched the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842).

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of; Great Game The; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Pottinger, Eldred.

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Herat, Uprising (1979)

In 1979, opponents of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) rose in revolt in Herat, marking the beginning of the widespread insurgency by the mujahideen. The 1978 Saur Revolution installed a pro-Soviet government led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

The new regime began to implement reforms that angered religious conservatives, including increased educational and economic opportunities for girls and women. Other segments of the population were opposed to a controversial land redistribution plan that undermined the power of the tribal elders and chiefs.

On March 15, 1979, a spontaneous uprising began in Herat, spread quickly through the city, and drew people in from the surrounding countryside. Estimates were that some 20,000 people took to the streets, and then took over government buildings and posts. They attacked symbols of the regime, destroying PDPA posters and defacing government facilities. A group of Soviet military advisers was attacked and killed, along with their families. The insurgents were lightly armed with AK-47s or older rifles, but many of the military and security forces simply deserted and either joined the rebels or left Herat. Fighting intensified over the next few days, with small bands of PDPA officials and security forces barricading themselves in a few stout buildings.

The DRA government dispatched the Afghan Army's 17th Division to suppress the revolt. However, when the division reached the city, it promptly mutinied with most soldiers joining the rebels. The airport became the last major bastion of government control. The Afghan government initially appealed to the Soviet Union for military support, but Moscow declined to intervene. After their initial success, the rebels began to disperse. Those who had come from surrounding areas began to return home. The lack of a central leader or leadership structure meant that there was little discipline or planning.

Afghan armored units were rushed to Herat from Kabul, while the air force undertook a brutal aerial bombing campaign. Herat was subjected to a massive bombard-

ment that dispersed the rebels, but destroyed the town. During the attack to retake the city and in subsequent reprisals, an estimated 15,000–24,000 Afghans were killed. The revolt and other uprisings galvanized resistance to the DRA and increased support for the growing mujahideen movement. The Herat Uprising also helped convince the leadership of the Soviet Union that the PDPA government could not maintain control over the country. The Soviets increased military aid to the government and ultimately intervened to depose the DRA government in December 1979.

Tom Lansford

See also: Brezhnev, Leonid; Mujahideen; Operation Storm 333 (1979); People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Hostages and Kidnapping

Widespread hostage-taking and kidnapping are relatively new phenomena in Afghanistan and are some of the increasingly radical tactics that have emerged among extremist groups such as the Taliban and the Islamic State since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. Hostages traditionally have been taken by warring sides in Afghanistan as a negotiating tool or a guarantee of safety. For example, during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), after the massacre of the British

column retreating from Kabul, some hostages, including Lady Florentia Sale, her daughter, and her newly born granddaughter, were kept as hostages until she was able to arrange her release through bribes. However, the traditional code of Pashtunwali required Pashtuns to provide refuge or sanctuary for those fleeing enemies. This tended to reduce the frequency of hostage taking among the warring Afghan tribes.

During the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), the brutality of the conflict resulted in relatively few prisoners or hostages being taken, especially after an uprising at the Babader Fortress in April 1985 when Soviet and Afghan government prisoners of war rose and captured the mujahideen training center (all of the prisoners died in the ensuing fight). Many mujahideen commanders were also reluctant to take prisoners because of the difficulty of moving or sheltering them. However, estimates were that some 300–400 former Soviet prisoners or deserters voluntarily remained in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989.

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, insurgents began using kidnappings as a tactic for four reasons. First, hostage taking provided a means of intimidation among the local population. Family members or loved ones could be kidnapped to pressure local officials or tribal leaders to bend to the will of insurgent groups. Hostages could also be used to deter Afghans from cooperating with, or supporting, the government in Kabul or the U.S.-led coalition. Second, hostages provided a ready source of cash to finance insurgent operations. By 2015, ransoms for international hostages averaged between \$200,000 and \$500,000, depending on the nationality of the hostage. One result of the lucrative nature of kidnappings was the rise of criminal gangs involved in hostage taking for purely financial gain. Third, kidnappings were a means of

striking fear and terror into the population and promoting ethnic cleansing. For example, the Islamic State has routinely kidnapped ethnic Hazaras. In 2015, the Islamic State beheaded seven Hazara hostages during a campaign that targeted buses and motorists on one of the nation's main highways. As many as 31 Hazaras were kidnapped in a single day. Reports indicated that the attacks were meant to drive the Hazaras from central Afghanistan. Fourth, and finally, hostages have been used to negotiate the release of imprisoned militants. For instance, in March 2007, Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo was kidnapped by Taliban fighters, but freed in exchange for the release of five Taliban officials (two Afghans traveling with Mastrogiacomo were beheaded). In May 2014, U.S. Army sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who had been captured by the Haqqani Network in June 2009, was exchanged for five Taliban militants held by the United States at the time.

The majority of kidnappings in the country involve Afghans, mainly because coalition forces and Afghan security officials are much more aggressive in trying to locate and free foreign hostages (also, security tends to be better for foreigners). In addition, as the conflict has dragged on, more and more senior insurgent leaders and tribal elders have been killed. The result is a younger generation of militants with fewer ties to local communities or to tribal hierarchies.

Tom Lansford

See also: Haqqani Network; Hazaras; Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, DAESH); Taliban; Terrorism.

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Hotak, Mir Wais (1673–1715)

Mir Wais Hotak united most of Afghanistan under his control and founded the Hotak dynasty in the early 1700s. Mir Wais was born into an influential Ghilzai family in 1673 in or near Kandahar. At the time, Kandahar was under the control of the Persian Safavid dynasty. In 1704, a series of revolts and raids prompted the Persians to dispatch a new governor to Kandahar. The new governor, Gurgin, endeavored to suppress the Ghilzai and undermine Mir Wais, their popular leader. The governor was unable to do either, and his harsh methods only reinforced support for Mir Wais. Meanwhile, Persian efforts to compel the Sunni Afghans to convert to Shia further alienated the population.

Over several years, Mir Wais and his closest supporters began plotting to overthrow not just the governor, but Persian rule. In 1709, Gurgin and his aides were killed during a meal with Mir Wais. The Ghilzai then quickly attacked and overwhelmed the Persian garrison in Kandahar, gaining control over the city. He declared himself prince of Kandahar. Over the next six years, Mir Wais focused his energies on two fronts. First, he endeavored to unite the Afghan tribes, including the longtime enemies of the Ghilzai, the Abdali (Durrani). Second, the prince had to defeat the Persians. He needed to force them from Afghan territory and defeat a series of offensives they launched to recapture their lost land. Mir Wais succeeded in both efforts, defeating the Persians and unifying Afghanistan under the Hotaki dynasty. However, he died relatively young of natural causes in 1715 at age 42. He was succeeded by his brother, Abdul Aziz Hotak,

who ruled until 1717 when he was assassinated in a coup that placed Mir Wais's oldest son, Mahmud Hotak, on the throne.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Hotaki Empire (1709–1738); Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Shah, Nadir.

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Hotaki Empire (1709–1738)

The Hotaki Empire briefly ruled Afghanistan and Persia. It was formed in 1709, but lasted until just 1738 when it was overthrown by Nadir Shah, fighting for the Persian Safavid dynasty. The Hotakis were Ghilzai Pashtuns under the sovereignty of the Safavid Empire, but they chafed under Persian attempts to force them to convert from Sunni to Shi'a Islam. In 1709, a Ghilzai tribal leader, Mir Wais Hotak, started a rebellion and was able to take Kandahar. He used it as a base to launch an offensive against the Persians and unite most of present-day Afghanistan. He died of natural causes in 1715 and was succeeded by his brother, Abdul Aziz Hotak. Abdul Aziz was overthrown two years later by Mahmud Hotaki, the oldest son of Mir Wais, who was, nevertheless, only 18 when he gained the throne.

By 1720, Mahmud had consolidated his power and launched an invasion of Persia. Although outnumbered, his army defeated the Safavids in a series of battles and besieged Isfahan, the Persian capital, in 1722. The Persian shah abdicated in October,

ending the siege, and he acknowledged Mahmud as the new shah. Mahmud expanded his control over most of present-day Iran, marking the height of the Hotaki Empire. However, frightened by a rebellion in 1723, Mahmud enacted increasingly harsh measures against the Persians, including the execution of a number of nobles. His behavior became erratic and alienated his leading generals, who feared the shah's actions would lead to a larger revolt by the Persians. Mahmud was overthrown in a palace coup in Isfahan and died on April 22, 1725. He was succeeded by his cousin Shah Ashraf Hotaki, who became shah of the Persians. Mahmud's brother Hussain Hotak became ruler of Afghanistan.

Shah Ashraf faced military threats on multiple fronts when he assumed the throne. The Russians and the Ottomans threatened his territories in the north, while Safavid general Nadir Shah launched an offensive to regain the Persian throne in 1729. Nadir Shah was able to capture Herat and then advance on Isfahan. Shah Ashraf led an army against the Persians at the Battle of Damghan (1729). Although they outnumbered the Persians, the Afghans were defeated. Shah Ashraf lost a subsequent battle against the Persians, thereby ending Afghan sovereignty over Persia and briefly restoring the Safavid dynasty. As Shah Ashraf was leading his retreating army back to Afghanistan in 1730, he was assassinated.

Hussain Hotak was the last Hotaki ruler. Nadir Shah invaded Afghanistan in 1738. He captured Kandahar, then the capital of the Hotaks. Hussain was killed, ending the Hotaki Empire. Ahmad Shah Durrani liberated Afghanistan from Persian control and established a new empire in 1747.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Damghan, Battle of (1729); Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Hotak, Mir Wais; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Shah, Nadir.

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Humanitarian Aid Operations

Years of war and conflict devastated the infrastructure of Afghanistan and destroyed the majority of social networks in the country. The result was a dramatic humanitarian crisis that lasted from the 1980s to the contemporary era and which prompted repeated humanitarian assistance efforts by international actors, ranging from the United Nations (UN) to the United States. During the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), fighting led some 3.3 million Afghan refugees to flee to Pakistan, while another 3 million crossed into Iran. In addition, there were more than 5 million internally displaced persons. During the occupation, the overwhelming majority of international assistance was directed to displaced persons in Pakistan. When the Soviets began to withdraw in 1988, the UN launched “Operation Salam” to facilitate the return of the refugees and began economic redevelopment. Operation Salam was initially funded at \$650 million and provided funding for a wide range of humanitarian operations, including refugee resettlement, new housing, immunizations, and even demining programs. The UN also initiated widespread food distribution (agricultural production in Afghanistan had fallen by an estimated 40 percent during the Soviet occupation). By 1991, the UN was providing approximately 60,000 metric tons of food aid annually, along with more than 6,000 tons of seeds. These efforts reduced the ongoing humanitarian crisis, but renewed

fighting between the pro-Soviet government and the mujahideen undermined attempts to rebuild. Still, by 1991, more than 2 million Afghans had returned.

After the fall of the pro-Soviet government in 1992, the UN established the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) to expand humanitarian programs. Once again, fighting limited the effectiveness of the world body's efforts. By 1994, the new strife had created an additional 1 million internal refugees, even as efforts were under way to bring refugees back from Pakistan and Iran. The UN also faced difficulty in securing contributions for its Afghan programs. In 1995, the world body only received about half the funding it requested from member states for humanitarian operations in Afghanistan. The rise of the Taliban wors-

ened conditions as fighting intensified. In 1999, the UN imposed sanctions on the Taliban, but continued aid, providing more than 90,000 metric tons of food in 2000. In addition, there were more than 150 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer groups operating in Afghanistan or in Pakistan and providing aid to Afghans. These groups endeavored to coordinate their efforts through a regional council, the Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). These groups often faced threats and harassment from the Taliban, especially for efforts to provide health care or education to Afghan women.

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the U.S. military included plans to provide humanitarian aid as part of the offensive against the Taliban. Efforts were made to coordinate



A UN aircraft is unloaded in Kandahar in February 2002. International aid was very important to Afghanistan as the country began to rebuild after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. (AP Photo/Gregory Bull)

assistance with the various UN agencies and NGOs in the region. When the U.S.-led aerial campaign against the Taliban began on October 7, 2001, the coalition also initiated airdrops of food, code-named humanitarian daily rations (HDRs). Each HDR was a single meal. Ultimately about 4.3 million of these were dispersed.

Meanwhile, after the 9/11 attacks, the UN withdrew its foreign staff from the country, bringing most of its operations to a stop. After the fall of the Taliban, an interim government led by President Hamid Karzai was put in place. In March 2002, the UN established the UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) to coordinate humanitarian efforts. UNAMA steadily grew in size and scope, and its mandate was repeatedly extended by the UN Security Council.

The central focus of the military coalition in its humanitarian operations came to be the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The PRTs were first deployed in 2002 and combined a military force with civilian and civilian police to undertake reconstruction and humanitarian operations. The teams numbered between 60 and 120. By 2008, there

were 26 PRTs in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of coalition forces meant a corresponding decrease in the number of PRTs. Concurrently, the number of NGOs and private aid groups increased substantially after 2001, but these organizations often faced danger from insurgents and warlords, along with friction with coalition military units over their operations.

Tom Lansford

See also: Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–); Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan.

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Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been employed in warfare almost since the introduction of gunpowder. They remain the weapon of choice for insurgent and resistance groups that lack the numerical strength and firepower to conduct conventional operations against an opponent. IEDs are the contemporary form of booby traps employed in World War II and the Vietnam War. Traditionally they are used primarily against enemy armor and thin-skinned vehicles.

A water cart filled with explosives was employed in a futile effort to assassinate Napoleon Bonaparte in Paris as he traveled to the opera on Christmas Eve, 1800. The emperor escaped injury, but the blast killed the little girl the conspirators paid to hold the horse's bridle and killed or maimed a dozen other people. In more recent times, IEDs have been employed against civilian targets by Basque separatists and the Irish Republican Army. Molotov cocktails, or gasoline bombs, are one form of IED. The largest, most deadly IEDs in history were the U.S. jetliners hijacked by members of the terrorist organization al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, and used to attack the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.

IEDs became one of the chief weapons employed by insurgents during the Iraq War (2003) and its aftermath to attack U.S. forces and Iraqi police and to carry out sectarian violence. The simplest type of IED was a hand grenade, rigged artillery shell, or bomb

triggered by a trip wire or simple movement. It might be as simple as a grenade with its pin pulled and handle held down by the weight of a corpse; once the corpse is raised, the grenade explodes. Bombs and artillery shells are also used as IEDs. Such weapons may be exploded remotely by wireless detonators in the form of garage door openers and two-way radios or infrared motion sensors. More powerful explosives and even shaped charges can be used to attack armored vehicles. Casualty totals are one way to judge the effectiveness of a military operation, and growing casualties from IEDs in the 1980s and 1990s induced the Israeli Army to withdraw from southern Lebanon.

The use of IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq prompted the U.S. military to change tactics. In 2006 and 2007, the United States began deploying more heavily armored vehicles, including Humvees with additional armor. The United States also deployed more than 14,000 electronic jammers to Afghanistan and Iraq and new diagnostic devices to better detect the chemicals used in IEDs. Between 2006 and 2013 alone, the United States spent about \$21 billion to suppress IEDs, which were responsible for an estimated 60 percent of all U.S. casualties in Afghanistan (and 85 percent of Afghan security forces casualties). By 2014, the use of IEDs in Afghanistan had begun to decline significantly as coalition forces withdrew or undertook fewer combat operations.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Armored Vehicles; Coalition, Forces

and Tactics (2001–); Iraq War (2003–); Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Terrorism; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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India, Relations with Afghanistan

The history of the relationship between the peoples inhabiting Afghanistan and India at present dates back more than two millennia. One particularly significant parallel between their respective histories is the extent to which external actors have sought to control both countries and the broader Central and South Asian regions in which they are situated. Early examples of such external intervention included imperial incursions by the ancient Persian king Darius I of Babylonia and the Greek king Alexander the Great of Macedon in the 500s and 300s BCE, respectively. Next came encounters with Middle Ages empires, the most powerful of which were those headed by Muslim ruler Mahmud of Ghazni in the 11th century and the Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan in the 13th century.

Afghanistan first emerged as a united country in the mid-1700s under Ahmad Shah Durrani. At that juncture, as the Mughal Empire that controlled parts of both Afghanistan and India from the early 16th to early 18th centuries slipped into decline, Great Britain set its sights on expansion into both Central and South Asia. It began with the economic

initiatives of the East India Company, which established Fort St. William along the Ganges River in 1696, leading to the development of the western Indian city of Calcutta, now known as Kolkata.

Britain rapidly built an economically productive, albeit often politically restive, colonial empire in India and battled Russia for the opportunity to do the same in Afghanistan. A successful offensive against the flagging Mughal regime left the East India Company in position to appoint William Hastings as its lord governor of India in 1774, a position that transitioned to British governmental control in 1858. While still consolidating its control over India, Britain elected to pursue the creation of a Central Asian buffer zone, the heart of which was Afghanistan. The British then clashed with Russia in a geopolitical “Great Game” for control over both Afghanistan and the broader region. Ultimately, neither was able to maintain a long-term grasp on any part of Afghanistan for long, as illustrated by insurgencies that produced the Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1839–1842 and 1878–1880. Afghanistan and India remained directly linked geographically, sandwiched between the British and Russian/Soviet spheres of influence through the end of the United Kingdom’s Indian Empire, which was punctuated by the division of the territory into the newly independent states India and Pakistan in 1947. The division of British India into India and Pakistan was drawn primarily along religious lines, with Hinduism the predominant religion in the former and Islam the near exclusive faith practiced in the latter.

Over the course of much of the Cold War, Afghanistan was a relatively stable country, albeit one overshadowed by the principal powers of Central and South Asia, most notably China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. That regional calm was broken

by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the ensuing decade of mujahideen resistance supported by the United States, Pakistan, and Arab fighters from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states, punctuated by Moscow's withdrawal in 1989. Regrettably, Afghanistan descended into anarchy as rival mujahideen and other tribal factions switched from confronting the Soviets to fighting one another, while the international community stood by rather than intervene. By the mid-1990s, a group of Muslim students educated in Pakistani religious schools (madrasahs) had emerged as a source of order in Afghanistan, only to impose an extreme variant of Sunni Islam, known by some as Wahhabism and others as Salafism, on the population and then provide safe harbor to the terrorist organization al Qaeda. That group's terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, drew American intervention in Afghanistan that forced the Taliban regime from power and set the stage for both counterterrorism and nation- and state-building efforts that continue in that country at present.

The 21st-century Afghan-Indian relationship now in place has both bilateral and multilateral components. Bilateral interactions are restricted primarily, if not exclusively, to ways Afghanistan and India can facilitate limited direct cooperation on economic, political, and security matters. Such cooperation is typically conditioned by the ways a given issue is also connected to Delhi's and/or Kabul's relationships with regional and global powers that have a variety of interests in Afghanistan, especially Pakistan, China, Iran, Russia, and the United States. Invariably, there are important distinctions between these states' policy objectives and resulting actions vis-à-vis a particular issue, relative to those of their allies and adversaries. Multilateral interactions, in turn, afford Afghanistan

and India opportunities to come together under the auspices of international organizations and regional agreements and projects that include one or more of the aforementioned regional and global powers.

As a general rule, most Afghan-Indian interactions of both the bilateral and multilateral brand since the post-9/11 intervention and conduct of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and nation- and state-building operations by the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan have been of an economic or political rather than military nature. Economically, Kabul's need for investment in domestic infrastructure projects, increased bilateral trade with India and other regional partners, especially China, as well as multilateral energy projects, drive its behavior. Under President Ashraf Ghani's leadership, Afghanistan is eager to build on the \$2.2 billion in aid it received from Delhi during President Hamid Karzai's 13 years in office. India is presently Afghanistan's fifth-largest bilateral donor and second-largest trade partner, with further increases probable moving forward. In addition, India hopes to benefit from the Trans-Afghanistan pipeline, a \$10 billion project expected to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to India and Pakistan by 2020.

Robert J. Pauly Jr.

See also: Maratha Empire (1674–1818); Mughal Empire (1526–1857); Raj, British (1858–1947).

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Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan

The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate is Pakistan's military intelligence agency. The ISI has a long history of involvement in Afghanistan and has been used by successive Pakistani governments to exert influence, especially among the Pashtun tribes. The ISI was founded in 1948, soon after the partition with India. The organization steadily grew in power and influence within both the Pakistani military and the government. By the 1970s, the ISI became increasingly autonomous and beyond the control of even senior military figures.

Islamabad refused to accept the Durand Line, which divided the Pashtun people, as the basis for the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Through the years, Pakistani governments sought to gain influence with the Afghan Pashtun community to draw them to Pakistan and undermine their loyalty to Kabul. The effort intensified, especially after the 1978 Saur Revolution overthrew the regime of Mohammed Daoud Khan and installed the Marxist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The ISI actively supported anti-DRA mujahideen fighters and provided bases and material support for the insurgents. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accelerated this trend.

The ISI was led by General A. R. Akhtar from 1979 to 1987. He was succeeded by

General Hamid Gul, who commanded the agency from 1987 to 1989. During the 10-year Soviet occupation (1979–1989), the ISI numbered approximately 10,000. During this period the budget for the organization rose steadily, especially after nations such as the United States and Saudi Arabia began funding the mujahideen. Partly in an effort to obscure their aid to the rebels, external supporters used the ISI to distribute resources and funding. The ISI also oversaw the bases and training of the mujahideen and helped the militants plan operations.

The ISI favored Pashtun mujahideen over other insurgent groups and prioritized aid and assistance accordingly. Non-Pashtun groups regularly accused the ISI of withholding funding and weapons during the occupation. Among the Pashtun groups, Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar's Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*) was the principal recipient of assistance. The ISI cultivated Hekmatyar as a potential leader for a post-DRA Afghanistan. One result was considerable infighting among the various mujahideen groups as Hekmatyar endeavored to minimize the role of other fighters.

After the Soviet withdrawal, the ISI sought a quick victory over the DRA and the collapse of the regime. It planned and supported a series of unsuccessful conventional attacks on DRA strongholds, including Khost and Jalalabad. The failure of these offensives led to the dismissal of Gul in 1989. The ISI remained involved in Afghanistan during that country's civil war (1989–2001). After it became clear that other tribes and groups would not accept Hekmatyar as Afghan leader, the ISI shifted its support to a new formation, the Taliban, in 1994. After the Taliban seized power in 1996, the ISI worked closely with the fundamentalist group to help it consolidate control over Afghanistan.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the ISI reduced ties to the Taliban, although it continued to be accused of having connections with the militant group in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Gul, Hamid; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*); Jalalabad, Battle of (1989); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

In the aftermath of the removal from power of the Taliban regime through the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in late 2001, a need arose for an outside military force to focus on providing as secure an environment as possible for the management of the Western-led nation- and state-building project that followed. That presence came in the form of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with the vast majority of its members drawn from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which took over formal leadership of ISAF in August 2003.

The rationale for the establishment of ISAF was a straightforward, sensible one designed to help ensure a prudent division of labor in military responsibilities, one that

permitted the United States the flexibility to focus on counterterrorism generally and the hunt for al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his core circle of followers specifically, while ISAF handled the security component of nation- and state-building efforts. As the United States pursued bin Laden, unsuccessfully over both the short and longer terms during President George W. Bush's two terms in office, ISAF deployed 10,000 forces, all but exclusively in the capital of Kabul, before NATO assumed a leadership role, expanding the number of deployed troops to 30,000 and the geographic range across Afghanistan's ethnically and tribally diverse regions. ISAF was built through force contributions from 42 countries, including 28 NATO member states.

As with his immediate predecessor, President Barack H. Obama's strategy in Afghanistan had significant effects on ISAF force levels, as well as strategic objectives set and pursued therein. The Obama administration placed a renewed emphasis on the struggle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, with the corresponding rise in U.S. force levels from 30,000 to 100,000 punctuated by the death of bin Laden through a Navy Sea Air and Land (SEAL) team raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011, just as the American presence topped 100,000. With bin Laden gone, the United States reduced deployment levels in Afghanistan drastically, drawing down from 100,000 to 9,800 over the ensuing three and a half years, leaving the remaining U.S. troops in place to train Afghan security forces. Concurrently with the U.S. draw-down, ISAF acted in a comparable fashion, reducing its presence from 30,000 to the 7,000 in place at the start of 2016 to complement American training efforts. Both U.S. and ISAF follow-on forces are operating under tight rules of engagement that limit the help they can provide to counter ongoing

Taliban insurgent efforts, as well as increasing violence from affiliates of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in Afghanistan.

Robert J. Pauly Jr.

See also: Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014).

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Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan

After centuries of conflict, relations between Afghanistan and Iran improved significantly in the 20th century. The two countries historically overlapped, while their respective rulers sought to conquer territory from each other. In 1709, Afghan Mir Wais Hotak launched a revolution against the Persian Safavid Empire, which controlled most of Afghanistan at the time. Mir Wais captured Kandahar from the Persians, and one of his successors, Mahmud Hotak, invaded Persia and forced the shah to abdicate, claiming the throne for himself. After the Afghans were defeated

at the Battle of Damghan, the Persians reconquered their territory. In 1738, Nadir Shah invaded Afghanistan, recapturing Kandahar. However, Ahmad Shah Durrani freed Afghanistan from Persian control in 1747, becoming the first emir of the country.

Over the next century, Afghan-Persian relations were dominated by constant struggles over Herat, which both nations claimed. Herat became, along with Kandahar and Kabul, one of the three principalities of Afghanistan. The Afghans defeated a Persian campaign to capture Herat in 1833, and a larger, more concentrated offensive. The latter attack included support from Russian advisers, prompting British concerns over the spread of Russian influence in the region. The siege was one of the underlying causes of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), as Britain sought to maintain Afghanistan as a friendly buffer state to protect its Indian colonies from Russian interference. Iran would not give up its claim to Herat until 1857, following the Anglo-Persian War in which the British secured sovereignty over southern Iran (and reinforced their goal of maintaining Afghanistan as a buffer state).

The Hazaras of Afghanistan are descendants of Persians who settled in the country. They comprise about 10 percent of the current population (approximately 2.8 million). The Hazaras have cultural, social, and religious ties with Iran. The Hazaras speak a dialect of Farsi known as Dari and are the only predominantly Shi’a group in Afghanistan. During a series of revolts against the Afghan monarchy in the 1800s, the Hazaras looked to Iran for support and as a safe haven to flee to in the midst of government repression. In the 20th century, Iran undertook a variety of efforts to improve the economic and social status of the Hazaras who had traditionally been the subject of discrimination in Afghanistan. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, which

deposed the shah, coincided with the Soviet invasion and occupation (1979–1989) of Afghanistan. During this period, Iran provided arms, funding, and bases for the anti-Soviet Shi'a mujahideen. Tehran also supported efforts to secure greater autonomy for the Hazaras during the occupation, even backing a ceasefire with the Soviets.

Iran backed the coalition government of Burhanuddin Rabbani after the fall of the pro-Soviet regime in 1992. Iran opposed the Taliban because of the group's efforts to suppress the Hazaras, whom they considered to be heretics. The Hazaras faced widespread repression and atrocities from the Taliban after they came to power in 1996. Relations between the two countries deteriorated significantly during this period. During the era of Taliban rule, Iran supported the opposition Northern Alliance. In 1998, the Taliban killed nine Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif. The incident almost led to war between the two countries.

After the U.S.-led coalition toppled the Taliban in 2001, relations between the two countries improved. Iranian diplomats helped secure an agreement at the Bonn Conference that led to the creation of a unity government under Hamid Karzai. Tehran continued efforts to support the Hazaras through humanitarian and economic assistance. However, evidence emerged that Tehran was also providing weapons and some funding for the Taliban in the post-9/11 era. The goal of Iran seemed to be to undermine the U.S.-led coalition, even at the expense of strengthening the most significant anti-Shi'a force in the country. Concurrently, Iran supported Afghanistan in various disputes with predominantly Sunni Pakistan. The rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan after 2014 renewed Iranian support for ethnic Hazara militias to combat the new extremist group.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Hazara Uprisings (1888–1901); Hazaras; Taliban.

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Iraq War (2003–)

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 diverted resources and attention from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and created tensions with some of the closest allies of the United States, including France and Germany. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the administration of President George W. Bush formulated a doctrine of preventive war by which the United States would preemptively use military force against security threats. Commonly called the “Bush Doctrine,” the policy was promulgated by the president during his January 2002 State of the Union address in which he characterized Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as members of an “Axis of Evil.” Bush called on those nations to renounce efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and end support for terrorism. He warned that the United States would take unilateral military actions to prevent attacks on U.S. soil or interests. The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy specifically stated that the United States would use preemption to preclude WMD attacks.

During the summer and fall of 2002, the Bush administration endeavored to gather domestic and international support for stronger action against Iraq, beyond existing United Nations (UN) sanctions. The administration argued that military action was needed because of Iraq's continuing efforts to acquire WMDs and its support for terrorism. On October 16, 2002, the U.S. Congress approved a resolution authorizing the president to use force against Iraq on a vote of 297–133 in the House of Representatives and 77–23 in the Senate. On November 8, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, which declared that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was in breach of previous UN resolutions to destroy its WMD and missile programs and that it had one “final” opportunity to comply. Following the resolution, the regime did allow the UN to resume weapons inspections, but failed to fully cooperate with the world body. The United States and its supporters, including the United Kingdom and Spain, pressed for a UN resolution to authorize the use of force against the regime, but were blocked by an antiwar coalition that included Russia, France, and Germany and which argued for additional time for the UN inspections before stronger action was undertaken.

During the buildup to the Iraq War, the focus of the United States shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq. Military resources, especially special operations forces, were redeployed from Afghanistan to prepare for the invasion. The diplomatic attention of the Bush administration was also redirected at a time when the interim Afghan government of Hamid Karzai sought new economic development support. After their initial defeat, the Taliban and other insurgent groups began to regroup in Pakistan and launched new attacks in the summer and fall of 2002, as well as the spring of the following year.

On March 20, 2002, Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq. U.S., Australian, British, Danish, and Polish conventional and special operations forces attacked Iraq, while the U.S. coalition launched massive air and missile strikes on the country. Total coalition forces numbered about 300,000, mainly U.S. soldiers and marines, with approximately 45,000 British and 2,000 Australian troops, and small contingents of special operations forces from other countries. The Iraqi Army numbered 450,000, along with thousands of paramilitary forces.

The initial invasion planned for a two-pronged invasion from the south, from Kuwait, and from the north, through Turkey. However, Ankara refused to allow the United States to utilize Turkey for the offensive, forcing U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld and senior commanders to recalculate their strategy. A smaller, leaner invading force was used in a two-pronged pincer assault from the south. Led by armor and mechanized infantry, coalition forces advanced rapidly from the south and captured Baghdad on April 10 in one of the fastest military advances since World War II. Saddam, his sons, and senior regime leaders went into hiding (Saddam's sons Uday and Qusay were killed on July 22, while the Iraqi leader was captured on December 13).

Although the coalition easily defeated Iraqi conventional forces, a fierce insurgency soon began. Led by former regime officers and officials, the strife soon began to draw in significant numbers of foreign fighters opposed to the U.S.-led occupation. The conflict began to take on the parameters of a civil war as the country's Sunni and Shi'a populations battled each other. Militants began utilizing a variety of new tactics in the insurgency including suicide bombings and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The radicalization of the insurgency soon spread

to Afghanistan as insurgents there copied these tactics (there had never been a history of suicide bombings in Afghanistan). In order to suppress the sectarian violence, the Bush administration employed a troop surge, deploying an additional 30,000 troops to quell the violence and launching renewed efforts to gain the support of Sunni tribes to fight the militants. By 2008, the violence had declined and the United States began to re-deploy troops from the surge.

While campaigning in the 2008 presidential election, Barack Obama pledged to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and concentrate on winning the ongoing war in Afghanistan. By 2010, the last U.S. forces were withdrawn from Iraq. From 2003 to 2011, 4,483 U.S. troops were killed in Iraq, along with 318 soldiers from other coalition nations (the United Kingdom suffered the second

greatest loss of life with 179 killed). Estimates of total Iraqi casualties range from about 114,000, including military deaths, to 461,000.

Obama would use the surge strategy in Afghanistan beginning in 2009 as the United States deployed an additional 33,000 troops and secured further reinforcements from coalition allies. The surge in Afghanistan was less successful than in Iraq at creating an interim period of stability.

The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq in 2011 prompted the United States to launch airstrikes against the extremist group. In addition, U.S. troops were redeployed to Iraq to train the nation's security forces and to conduct special operations missions against the Islamic State. By 2016, the number of U.S. forces in Iraq had grown to about 4,500. Meanwhile, by 2014 the Islamic State had



A U.S. Marine on patrol in Afghanistan's Helmand Province in 2009. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan allowed more combatants to be deployed there. (U.S. Marine Corps)

established a presence in Afghanistan, with an estimated force of about 1,000–2,000 fighters by 2015.

Tom Lansford

See also: Bush, George W.; Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, DAESH); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Petraeus, David; Rumsfeld, Donald.

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Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*)

The Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*) was a mainly Shi'a mujahideen group established by Ayatollah Muhammad Asef Muhsini in 1978 to resist the pro-Soviet regime that took power after the Saur Revolution. The organization was initially supported by Iran and drew recruits from the predominately Shi'a Hazara population, as well as other Shi'a groups. It was one of a group of three major

and five minor Shi'a parties that formed the "Tehran Eight." These mujahideen groups formed a loose confederation that received weapons and financial support from Iran.

However, following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, the movement broke with Tehran and allied itself with other moderate, non-Pashtun Islamist groups in the Northern Alliance. The movement continued as part of the Northern Alliance during the Afghan Civil War. Islamic Movement fighters participated in the capture of Kabul and the overthrow of the pro-Soviet regime in 1992. The group endorsed the presidency of Burhanuddin Rabbani. As part of the Northern Alliance, the movement fought against the Taliban through the remainder of the 1990s. Sayed Hussein Anwari, an ethnic Tajik, was the organization's military commander during this period.

Following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Islamic Movement supported Afghan president Hamid Karzai. It also began the transition into a formal political party. Anwari was appointed minister of agriculture, a post he held from 2002 to 2004 (he served as governor of Herat from 2005 to 2009). In 2005, Muhsini resigned as party leader. That year, the movement joined a broad opposition coalition, and Sayyed Mohammad Ali Jawed became leader of the party.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Bonn Agreement (2001); Hazaras; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Karzai, Hamid; Muhsini, Ayatollah Asef; Mujahideen; Northern Alliance; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Islamic Party (Hezb-e Islami)

The *Hezb-e Islami* (“Islamic Party” or “Party of Islam”) is an Islamic, Pashtun political organization based in Afghanistan. It was originally founded in 1977 by Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar, but splintered in 1979 into two factions, the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and the Hezb-e Islami Khalis (HIK). The HIG further split in 2004, as members defected to support the Afghan government. One group of HIG defectors registered themselves as a new political grouping with the Ministry of Justice as Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan (HIA), which transitioned in 2005 to Hezb-e Islami Khalid Faruqi (HIKF), led by Mohammad Khalid Faruqi.

In 1973, Hekmatyar joined the *Sazman-i Jawanan-i Musulman* (“Muslim Youth”). The group’s core mission was to oppose the growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan. As the Muslim Youth evolved, Hekmatyar clashed with group leader Burhanuddin Rabbani. By 1977, the Muslim Youth had split into two factions: the moderate, predominately Tajik *Jamiat-i Islami* (“Islamic Society” in Dari), led by Rabbani, and the more radical Hezb-e Islami, under Hekmatyar.

After the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Hezb-e Islami fractured into two wings. Mohammad Yunus Khalis broke with Hekmatyar to establish the HIK, which was less fervent and Islamist than the main wing, the HIG, under Hekmatyar. Soon after its formation, the HIK was able to take control of the Nangarhar Province. Both the HIG and HIK fought the Soviets and pro-Soviet government forces during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). Hekmatyar formed relationships with

officers from Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, and the HIG received significant financial and material support during the conflict. The HIG also established a series of bases in Pakistan.

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, the HIG and the HIK continued to fight the pro-Soviet government. After it fell in 1992, the HIG fought with the newly installed coalition government of various mujahideen groups, led by Rabbani until 1996 when Hekmatyar briefly served as prime minister in a unity government. The rise of the Taliban eroded support for the HIG, and many of Hekmatyar’s fighters defected to the new Islamist group. When the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, the unity government fell and Hekmatyar fled to Iran. The HIG fought against both the Taliban and the Rabbani government over the next several years.

When the U.S.-led coalition overthrew the Taliban in 2001, Hekmatyar aligned his group with the former regime to fight against the Northern Alliance and international troops after Iran closed the offices of the HIG and forced him out of the country. The HIG launched attacks from Pakistan on the coalition and the government of President Hamid Karzai. The HIG emerged as one of the most potent insurgent groups besides the Taliban. However, in 2004, during the Afghan presidential elections, many in the HIG abandoned Hekmatyar and backed Karzai. In 2005, HIG defectors renounced any association with the HIG and created a new political party, HIKF, after their leader Khalid Faruqi. The HIKF was an effort by former HIG members to be part of the political process. The new party was able to secure a number of seats within the newly elected Afghan parliament (Khalid Faruqi was one of the HIKF candidates that gained a seat). The HIG continued to fight against the government and

coalition forces. By 2015 it was estimated to have a strength of between 1,500 and 2,000 fighters.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan; Karzai, Hamid; Khalis, Mohammad Yunus; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Taliban.

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Islamic Revolutionary Movement (*Harakati Inqilabi Islami*)

The Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakati Inqilabi Islami*) or IRMA was a Pashtun mujahideen organization during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). In 1978, the Saur Revolution overthrew the regime of Mohammed Daoud Khan and installed a pro-Soviet government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Once in power, the PDPA began to arrest opposition figures, including leading Islamic clerics. Prominent Islamic scholar Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi fled to Pakistan to avoid detention along with other opposition leaders (his brother was arrested and murdered by the regime). The exodus resulted in the creation of a number of anti-PDPA groupings in Pakistan.

In an effort to unify the various mujahideen groups, IRMA was created in September 1978 as a coalition of opposition groups.

Mohammadi was named leader of the alliance, which quickly fractured as the result of differences between moderates and conservatives. By the time of the Soviet invasion in December 1979, IRMA had emerged as one of several mujahideen groups. Under Mohammadi, the organization was a moderate, mainly Pashtun, Islamist grouping that launched military operations against the Soviets and the PDPA regime in and around Kandahar. IRMA attracted recruits from madrasahs that were considered moderate to liberal. It was one of seven mujahideen groups, known as the Peshawar Seven, formally titled the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*), that were officially recognized and supported by the Pakistani government.

IRMA continued fighting the PDPA after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. When the regime collapsed in 1992, Mohammadi was named vice president of Afghanistan in a coalition government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Over the next several years, he endeavored unsuccessfully to craft a truce between the Rabbani government and rebel mujahideen groups during the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001). In 1994, Mohammadi chaired a Loya Jirga, which began preparations for national elections. The rise of the Taliban disrupted plans for the balloting. Meanwhile, IRMA declined as members left the grouping to join more radical mujahideen formations, including the Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*), led by Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar, and the Taliban, after 1994. Mohammadi resigned as vice president in 1995. Many members of IRMA fled to Pakistan after the Taliban took power in 1996.

Mohammadi died in Pakistan in 2001, and his son Ahmad Nabi Mohammadi became leader of IRMA. The organization changed its name to the Islamic and National Revolution Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakat-e*

Inqilab-e Islami wa Melli-ye Afghanistan) in an effort to attract new support and transitioned to a political party in Afghanistan, opposed to the presidency of Hamid Karzai. In 2005, the new movement became part of a coalition of 12 opposition groups, the National Understanding Front of Afghanistan (*Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli-ye Afghanistan*). The front opposed the government of President Hamid Karzai and sought to create a unified opposition. However, internal disputes undermined the cohesion of the alliance, which became defunct. In 2015, Qalam u Din Muhammad became leader of the movement.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*); Islamic Society (JIA) (*Jamiat-e Islami*); Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*); Mujahideen; Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Islamic Society (JIA) (*Jamiat-e Islami*)

The Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*) is a political party in Afghanistan and a former mujahideen group. The Jamiat is a moderate Islamist party, traditionally dominated by Tajiks, who comprise about 30 percent of the

Afghan population. It is concentrated in the northwest and central areas of the country. The group emerged in the 1970s from the Muslim Youth (*Sazman-i Jawanan-i Musulman*) opposition party after a split between a moderate faction and a more hardline wing. The moderate group was led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and became the Jamiat. The more extreme faction became the Pashtun-dominated Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*) under Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar.

After the Saur Revolution of 1978 installed a pro-Soviet regime under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Jamiat sought to create a unified opposition, but was unable to attract the support of ethnic Pashtuns who instead backed *Hezb-e Islami*. With the Soviet invasion in 1979, the Jamiat began active combat against the regime. During the occupation, Jamiat member Ahmad Shah Massoud emerged as one of the most capable and efficient of the mujahideen commanders (he was an early supporter of Rabbani from the latter's time as a professor at Kabul University where Massoud was a student). Under Massoud's leadership, the Jamiat was able to inflict a series of defeats on the Soviets and PDPA forces. Despite military success, the group was opposed by Pakistani intelligence officials who preferred to support ethnic Pashtun organizations. One result was regular battles between the Jamiat and other mujahideen groups, especially after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.

The Jamiat forces were instrumental in the fall of the PDPA government in 1992. Rabbani attempted to create a coalition government, but was opposed by Hekmatyar and some other Pashtun groups. Fighting between the various factions prolonged the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001) and led to the rise of the Taliban in 1994 and the capture of Kabul by the group in 1996. In

response, Rabbani and Massoud formed a coalition of anti-Taliban groups, the United Front or Northern Alliance, with the Jamiat leader as president of the group.

The Jamiat supported the U.S.-led effort to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Rabbani briefly served as interim president of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, but was replaced by Hamid Karzai under the terms of the 2001 Bonn Conference. The Jamiat emerged as the largest and most influential Tajik party in Afghan politics. Rabbani was killed by a suicide bomber on September 20, 2011. Rabbani's son Salahuddin replaced him as leader of the Jamiat. In 2015, Salahuddin was appointed foreign minister.

Tom Lansford

See also: Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*); Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, DAESH)

The Islamic State is a Sunni extremist group that originated from al Qaeda in Iraq and went on to conquer territory in both Iraq and Syria. It became active in Afghanistan in 2014. The group is alternatively known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Daesh. The Islamic State has engaged in

wide range of atrocities, including televised executions that showcase grisly murders, from beheadings to immolation. It has ruthlessly persecuted religious minorities in areas it controls. It has also supported and encouraged terrorist strikes throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and the United States. The group draws most of its fighters from abroad through sophisticated recruiting on social media.

The Islamic State declared a caliphate in 2014, claiming to be the legitimate political and religious successor to the last caliphate, the Ottoman Empire. Since then it has endeavored to expand its operations into other countries. During the spring and summer of 2014, disaffected members of the Taliban and other insurgency groups in Afghanistan began to pledge their allegiance to the Islamic State. The first significant battles between Afghan security forces and Islamic State militants were in September 2014 in Ghazni. By 2015, Hafiz Saeed Khan was recognized by the Islamic State as its “governor” in Afghanistan, while Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, who had been captured by the United States while fighting for the Taliban, but released from Guantanamo Bay in 2007, was named as his deputy. Khadim was allegedly killed in a U.S. air strike in February 2015, while Khan was also reported to have been killed by a U.S. attack in July of that year (the Islamic State denied he had been killed and in December 2015 released an audio recording that they claimed to be Khan).

By 2015, there were estimated to be 1,000–2,000 Islamic State fighters in Afghanistan, mainly in the southeast of the country, along the border with Pakistan. The epicenter of Islamic State activity had shifted to Nangarhar Province where the Islamic State has announced a plan to make the provincial capital, Jalalabad, its regional

headquarters. Reports that year indicated that a growing number of foreign fighters with allegiance to the Islamic State were traveling to Afghanistan. The largest number of foreign militants were from Pakistan and believed to be former members of the Pakistani Taliban. The Islamic State launched a growing number of attacks on religious minorities in Afghanistan, including the Hazaras, a predominately Shi'a group.

Clashes between the Islamic State and the Taliban became more frequent in 2015, as both groups endeavored to expand their influence when troops of the U.S.-led coalition began to turn responsibility for security operations over to the Afghan National Army (ANA). In response to the growth of the Islamic State, the United States and other coalition partners increased airstrikes on suspected militant targets beginning in February 2016.

Tom Lansford

See also: Al Qaeda; Hazaras; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Taliban; Terrorism.

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Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*)

The Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*)

was a coalition of seven mujahideen groups during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). The origins of the group lay in the efforts of the Pakistani government to coordinate the Afghan resistance groups in the aftermath of the Saur Revolution (1978) and the subsequent Soviet invasion a year later. A large number of resistance groups emerged in the aftermath of the intervention, and the proliferation of these organizations undermined efforts to concentrate efforts or cooperation on strategy.

In 1980, the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan was created among five existing mujahideen groups. However, the coalition quickly fell apart. In order to stop the continuing fragmentation of mujahideen groups, in 1981, the Pakistani government announced it would only recognize six groups and only provide aid and weapons to those entities (a seventh was later added). In 1985, the groups were brought together as the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (commonly known as the Peshawar Seven). The seven were the Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakati Inqilabi Islami*), under Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; the Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*), led by Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar; the Islamic Party Khalis (*Hezb-e Islami Khalis*), commanded by Mohammad Yunus Khalis, who broke with Hekmatyar in 1979; the Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani; the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (*Ittehad-e Islami bara-ye Azadi-ye Afghanistan*), commanded by Abdurab Rasul Sayaf; the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*), under Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani; and the National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*), founded by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi.

Six of the seven groups were dominated by Pashtuns; Rabbani's mainly Tajik Jamiat

was the only exception. Six of the seven were also mainly Sunni; Mojaddedi's group was Sufi. Three of the constituent formations were considered moderate, those led by Gailani, Mohammadi, and Mojaddedi. Hekmatyar's was considered the most extreme. His group was also the largest and best organized with an extensive network of schools and hospitals in Pakistan. Hezb had approximately 20,000–30,000 fighters. However, Hekmatyar's Hezb also fought regularly with other mujahideen groups. Jamiat was the second most powerful of the seven, with an estimated strength of 12,000–14,000 and significant support among the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and some moderate Pashtuns.

The coalition endeavored to gain legitimacy as the government-in-exile of Afghanistan. It did secure significant support from the United States and Persian Gulf states. After the fall of the pro-Soviet regime in 1992, the seven groups endeavored to form a coalition government. Mojaddedi was appointed interim leader of the government, followed by Rabbani. Hekmatyar withdrew from the coalition and endeavored to capture Kabul, launching a new phase of the civil war that began when the Soviets withdrew in 1989. The infighting between the mujahideen contributed to the rise of the Taliban, which seized power in 1996.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Mujahideen; Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Taliban.

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Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan*)

The *Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami* (Islamic Unity Party) was established in June 1987 by a number of Muslim Shiite factions based in Tehran, Iran. It was one of the mujahideen groups that fought for control of the Afghan government after the ouster of the communist regime of President Mohammed Najibullah in April 1992. After the Taliban seized control of the capital in September 1996, the Hezb-e Wahdat joined the opposition Northern Alliance.

The umbrella grouping was formed from the predominately Hazara “Tehran Eight.” The Hezb-e Wahdat included the Afghan Nasr Organization, the Da’wa Party of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan, the Guardians of the Islamic Jihad of Afghanistan, the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, the Islamic Force of Afghanistan, the Islamic Struggle for Afghanistan, Hezbollah, and the United Islamic Front of Afghanistan.

When it was founded, the Hezb-e Wahdat claimed to represent some 2 million Shiite Afghan refugees in Iran. In late 1992 and early 1993, it fought in Afghanistan alongside Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *Hezb-i-Islami* (Islamic Party) in fierce battles against Burhanuddin Rabbani's *Jamiat-i-Islami* (Islamic Society). In September 1990, the Hezb-e Wahdat moved its governing Consultative Council to Peshawar, Pakistan.

After the Taliban religious militia seized the capital in September 1996, Hezb-e Wahdat joined the opposition Northern Alliance and began fighting to regain control of the country. In doing so, it allied with many of its former foes. Following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States and the U.S.-led assault against the Taliban, the Northern Alliance gained control over most

of Afghanistan. Over the next decade, the organization fragmented so that by 2009, it was split into four main factions, with the largest allied with the Afghan government of Hamid Karzai and led by Abdul Karim Khalili. The second main faction, under Mohammed Mohaqeq, would later support President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani after his election in 2014.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Hazaras; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghani-

stan; Karzai, Hamid; Mohaqeq, Mohammed; Mujahideen; Taliban.

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Jagdalak Pass

Also spelled Jugdalak and Jugdulluck, Jagdalak is a strategic site located in the Surobi district in Kabul Province, 60 miles southeast of the capital, Kabul. Situated between the city of Kabul and Jalalabad, it is renowned for its ruby mines. The village is west of the pass of the same name, and the Tora Bora mountains are to the east. Prior to the construction of the highway, it was an important stop on the trade route between Kabul and Jalalabad.

During the Anglo-Afghan Wars the village was the site of several military encounters. During the retreat from Kabul in 1842 during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), the Anglo-Indian forces camped in the village for two days as they negotiated with Afghan rebel leader Akbar Khan for safe passage. The British commander, Major General Elphinstone, and his accompanying officers were taken hostage during the talks. The remaining force attempted to retreat through the pass but were blocked. The majority were cut down by enemy fire; those who escaped made their way to Gandamak.

During the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), the British built a fort near the village and installed a garrison. Its primary purpose was to maintain the pass and secure the telegraph wire between Gandamak and Kabul. Asmatulla Khan, a Ghilzai leader, organized an attack on the British forces stationed there. On December 29, 1878, he attacked the fort, but the Ghilzai were rebuffed by British reinforcements who arrived in the midst of the battle. The tribal fighters subsequently dispersed.

During the reign of the Taliban, the ruby mines generated \$16 million in annual revenue for the Taliban government. Currently, the Afghan government has closed the mines in an attempt to prevent plundering of precious gems from the area by local tribes.

Jorge Brown

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Pollock, Sir George; Taliban.

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Jalalabad, Battle of (1989)

The Battle of Jalalabad in 1989 was a defeat for the mujahideen by the forces of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in February 1989, there were widespread expectations that the DRA regime would swiftly collapse. The mujahideen controlled

75–80 percent of the country, while the DRA really only exercised sovereignty over the major cities. Momentum also seemed to be on the side of the mujahideen, who continued to receive support and backing from Pakistan, the United States, and various other countries. DRA forces were deserting in high numbers, and many mujahideen leaders and Pakistani and U.S. intelligence officials predicted they would disintegrate in the face of significant force.

Mujahideen leaders identified Jalalabad as a prime target with the Soviets gone. The city was less than 40 miles (64.4 km) from the border with Pakistan. Mujahideen forces attacking Jalalabad could easily be resupplied and reinforced. Once taken, the city could serve as the temporary capital for a new government while the remaining DRA strongholds were taken. Working with Pakistani intelligence officers, mujahideen commanders, including Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar and Abdurab Rasul Sayaf, among others, led about 10,000 fighters against the 4,500 DRA troops defending the city.

The mujahideen were well supplied and most of the militants were battle-hardened veterans of years of combat. However, the DRA troops were well prepared for the attack. Large, layered minefields were established around the city and an elaborate system of bunkers and entrenched positions had been built. The troops had significant artillery and missile support. The DRA air force could also provide close air support and undertake bombing raids.

The mujahideen attack began on March 5, 1989. The mujahideen captured Samarkhel, a strategic garrison on the outskirts of Jalalabad, and secured the city's airport. However, the tide quickly turned against the insurgents. Hekmatyar did not coordinate his attacks with Sayaf and the other mujahideen commanders. The mujahideen also failed to cut the main

road from Jalalabad to Kabul, allowing reinforcements and supplies to be sent to the besieged city. The DRA air force proved more capable than anticipated and conducted raid after raid against the attacking forces. The DRA also began firing SCUD missiles at the mujahideen. Although the Scud were inaccurate, they had a major psychological impact on the besiegers. Counterattacks in April allowed the DRA to retake the airport. By May, the siege had been lifted. In July, DRA troops finally retook Samarkhel. The DRA claimed that 3,000 mujahideen were killed in the fighting, although that estimate was believed to be inflated. Approximately 12,000 civilians died in the battle. DRA losses were unknown.

The battle demonstrated that the DRA troops could fight well when in heavily fortified defensive positions and supported by airpower. It also revealed deficiencies in the weaponry and command and control structures of the mujahideen. Jalalabad fell to the mujahideen in April 1992, after the DRA government was overthrown in Kabul.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Mujahideen; Sayaf, Abdurab Rasul.

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Jalalabad, Siege of (1842)

The Siege of Jalalabad was a British victory during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). The British captured Jalalabad during

their advance on Kabul in 1839. In 1841, a brigade under the command of Major General Sir Robert “Fighting Bob” Sale was ordered to return to India from Kabul. However, his troops were repeatedly attacked, and he decided to stop at Jalalabad on November 13 and convert the town into a garrison in order to provide support for the main Anglo-Indian army in Kabul.

The Anglo-Indian forces occupied the citadel in the corner of the city and began work to repair and strengthen the fortress’s defenses. On November 15, some 5,000 Afghan tribesmen attacked the city. Although they were initially repulsed, Sale’s forces numbered only 1,600, with six cannon. The general realized he could not adequately defend all of Jalalabad and pulled his forces into the citadel, ceding control of the town back to the Afghans. Sale agreed to begin negotiations over a withdrawal. However, the talks broke down over the general’s mistrust of pledges of safe conduct.

On January 13, 1842, William Brydon brought news to the garrison that the main force from Kabul, with 4,500 troops and 12,000 camp followers, had been massacred as they retreated from the Afghan capital (Sale’s wife and daughter were traveling with the force, but were taken hostage). To make matters worse, in February, an earthquake damaged the walls of the citadel. The battlements were repaired, but over the next few weeks, the Afghans initiated a tight siege of the fortress. Whereas the British had been able to dispatch forage parties into the surrounding countryside for livestock, they were now cut off from food and supplies. The Afghans hoped to starve the British into surrender. Forced to repeatedly reduce the rations of his troops and camp followers and facing the long-term prospect of starvation, Sale had to launch a series of armed forays into the town and surrounding countryside to capture food.

Realizing that he could not hold out much longer, the general decided on a desperate gamble. On the morning of April 7, 1842, the entire garrison left the citadel in three columns and attacked the Afghan besiegers, estimated to number about 6,000. Using disciplined volley fire, the Anglo-Indian troops were able to inflict heavy casualties on the surprised Afghans, who retreated, breaking the siege. The Anglo-Indian forces captured the main Afghan camp, including supplies and artillery. Anglo-Indian losses were 20 dead during the siege and 42 killed in the final engagement. Afghan losses were estimated to be 200–300. A week later, a British force under General Sir George Pollock arrived to relieve the garrison, which then joined the larger column in its advance on Kabul beginning in August.

Jack Covarrabias

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Sale, Flor-entia; Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”).

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Jamrud, Battle of (1837)

The Battle of Jamrud (April 30, 1837) was last major battle between the Sikh Empire and the Afghan kingdom during the Afghan-Sikh Wars. During the battle, the Afghans were commanded by Mohammad Akbar Khan and Mohammad Afzal Khan, sons of Emir Dost Mohammad, while the Sikhs were led by General Hari Singh Nalwa. Jamrud was a strategic point at the southern end of the Khyber Pass. The Afghans built a fort

there to control access to the pass, but the Sikhs captured the outpost in the winter of 1836 as they steadily expanded into what had previously been Afghan territory, including the city of Peshawar.

In April 1837, scouts informed Dost Mohammad that a large portion of the Sikh troops at Jamrud had been recalled to the Sikh capital of Lahore. Local Khyber chiefs, loyal to Dost Mohammad, requested troops from Kabul to recapture the fort and drive the Sikhs from their lost territories. The emir became convinced that if his forces recaptured Jamrud, the Afghans could then advance on Peshawar. To attract more fighters, Dost Mohammad declared a jihad or holy war on the Sikhs.

Dost Mohammed sent Mohammad Akbar to lay siege to the fort and to cut it off from communications or supplies. He then dispatched reinforcements led by his eldest son, Mohammed Afzal. After the two forces were combined, they launched several reconnaissance attacks against the fort. The Afghans were further reinforced by Nawabs Jabber Khan from Jalalabad, Usman Khan, and Sham-Shuddin Khan. The total Pashtun force numbered approximately 20,000.

The Afghans directed cannon fire at the fort and were able to breach its walls. However, on April 30, 1837, Nalwa returned from Lahore with a force of 10,000, supported by artillery. He launched a frontal attack, which forced the majority of the Afghans to retreat. Mohammad Afzal's troops, about 2,000 strong, stood their ground and forced Nalwa

to shift the momentum of his advance. The Sikhs were able to dislodge the remaining Afghans, but a cavalry charge checked their progress. Emboldened by the success of the cavalry, the Afghan commanders were able to rally their retreating forces and commence a counterattack on the stalled Sikhs. They recaptured the areas overrun by the Sikhs and retook 11 of 14 captured artillery pieces and 3 Sikh cannons. However, the Afghans were unable to force their way into the fort. During the fighting, Nalwa was wounded and soon died of his injuries.

Two days later additional Sikh reinforcements arrived. The Afghans withdrew through the pass. Both sides claimed victory. The Sikh army was able to repel the siege of the fort and maintain control of the south side of the pass. However, the battle ended expansion of the Sikh Empire into Afghanistan.

Jorge Brown

See also: Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars) (1748–1837); Dost Mohammad; Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Khyber Pass.

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K

Kabul, Retreat from (1842)

On January 6, 1842, British major general William Elphinstone led 16,500 Anglo-Indian soldiers and camp followers in an organized retreat from Kabul following a surrender negotiated between Mohammad Akbar Khan, son of Emir Dost Mohammad, and Major Eldred Pottinger, the senior British political officer. The terms of surrender required the garrison to give up all its artillery but two six-pounder cannons, along with the majority of its ammunition and most of the remaining camp treasury. In exchange, the British would be allowed safe passage and an escort to Jalalabad. Akbar Khan also pledged that the British would receive food and other supplies along the journey. Hostages would be left with Akbar Khan to ensure the return of his father, Dost Mohammad, and the complete removal of all British forces from Afghanistan.

The retreating force was organized into four sections: an advance guard, followed by the main body of troops and dependents, the camp followers, and a rear guard. On the morning the retreat began, the promised escort did not show up. Along the route, the promised food and supplies also did not appear, leaving the column with little or no food (a problem that was particularly acute among the camp followers). From the moment the group left the British cantonment in Kabul it took fire from the Ghilzai tribesmen. The Ghilzai were in positions on hillsides using Jezail flintlock rifles that had a range of 500 feet (152.4 m). The British Brown Bess muskets had a range of 300 feet

(91.4 m). Hence, the Ghilzai were able to snipe at the retreating force with little threat from return fire.

The weather added to the problems of the column. The retreating force was subjected to harsh winds, heavy snow, and temperatures below freezing. A majority of the sepoys and camp followers lacked winter clothing. The conditions and lack of food reduced the pace of the column to a mere five miles on the first day. During that first night the severe weather left an estimated 5,000 with frostbite. Some of those died in their sleep. Others were unable to continue because of frozen limbs or appendages. They were left with a collection of baggage and other equipment that was abandoned. Almost all would die of exposure or be killed by the marauding tribesmen.

On January 7, the force faced increasing attacks by local tribes. The frequent raids created chaos. It was decided to abandon and spike the six-pounder cannons in order to deny their use to the Afghans (the guns had become a major target of the Ghilzai raids). Akbar Khan arrived and sought a conference with General Elphinstone, who halted the column on the second day after six miles' progress. Akbar Khan explained the lack of escort as a misunderstanding, but demanded that the British surrender the remaining treasury and more hostages in return for safe conduct. Although Elphinstone agreed to these demands, no escort appeared and the tribal raids continued.

Historians are divided on Akbar Khan's actions. Some evidence suggests that he was simply stalling the British to allow more



Dr. William Brydon was one of the few survivors of the 4,500 Anglo-Indian troops and 12,000 camp followers who left the Afghan capital on January 6, 1842, in the retreat from Kabul. Brydon arrives here at Jellalabad on January 13. (Ann Ronan Pictures/Print Collector/Getty Images)

tribesmen time to get in position prior to the British arrival at the Khurd Kabul pass. Other accounts suggest that his authority among the Ghilzai tribes was not strong enough to restrain them from attacking the wounded column. The Anglo-Indian force was ambushed when it entered the pass on January 8. The Ghilzai allowed the advance guard to enter the pass and attacked only when the main body had entered the gorge. Military discipline broke down as camp followers crowded around soldiers for protection, making it difficult to maneuver for defense or fire weapons.

Another meeting with Akbar Khan on January 9 resulted in the officers with families and the remaining European women and

children being handed over to Akbar for their protection. The British fought through the Huft Kotul. Once they reached Tezeen, it was decided to attempt a night march to get past the Ghilzai. However, the camp followers learned of the march and traveled closely with the columns, causing widespread disorder. This drew the attention of the local forces and the British had to fight their way through the night. They made for Jagdalak and camped there for two days. General Elphinstone was called to a conference by Akbar Khan. At the conference, General Elphinstone and his accompanying officers were taken hostage.

On January 12, 1842, the remaining forces attempted another night march to get

through the Jagdalak Pass, which cut through the Hindu Kush Mountains. They found the way blocked by a thorn bush barricade. It was slow working through the barricade while under fire from the Ghilzai from the heights. During the attempt to get through the barricade the remaining camp followers closed around the soldiers, making it impossible to organize a counterattack. Those forces on foot fought their way to the village of Gandamak on January 13. They made their stand there with only a handful of survivors taken captive.

Those few with horses attempted to outrun the Afghans, but only one European, Dr. William Bryon, made it to the British-controlled fort at Jalalabad. Several Indian soldiers and camp followers arrived later. Around 80 European captives were taken. This massacre called into question the superiority of the British military. Government officials in India, along with the public, demanded that Britain's military reputation be restored, and the Army of Retribution subsequently recaptured Kabul and destroyed the Afghan capital.

Jorge Brown

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); British Cantonment, Kabul; Dost Mohammad; Elphinstone, William George Keith; Gandamak, Battle of (1842); Great Game, The; Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Pottinger, Eldred.

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Kabul, Siege of (1996)

The Siege of Kabul was a battle in 1996 between the Taliban, the Afghan government forces coalition led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani, and former mujahideen leaders Ahmad Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, during the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001). Factional fighting within the city and along its outskirts had destroyed large areas of Kabul and killed thousands of civilians since the fall of the pro-Soviet government in 1992. By 1995, the growing power of the Taliban had brought many of the disparate factions together to unite against a common enemy.

In November 1995, Taliban forces cut off the city to the south. However, by December, Massoud had pushed the Taliban ground forces back from Kabul. The Taliban were still in artillery range and continuously bombarded the city in what became a 10-month siege. During the winter months, Taliban leaders discussed the merits of negotiation, but hardliners won the day and the siege continued. In January 1996, the Taliban issued a decree ordering Rabbani to step down or they would intensify attacks on the city. Rabbani refused and the siege settled into a stalemate.

Taliban leaders believed the shaky coalition opposing them would ultimately collapse. Kabul had been in a consistent state of war since 1992. That year, Hekmatyar's forces launched rocket attacks against the city after he was unable to take control of the government. Instead an agreement had been

reached sharing power between Rabbani, Massoud, and Hekmatyar, with Rabbani as president and Hekmatyar as prime minister, a post the former mujahideen leader refused, and Massoud as defense minister. Hekmatyar was backed by Pakistan and believed that he could defeat the other coalition members. He was wrong. His inability to conquer Kabul or defeat the Rabbani government led Pakistan to shift its support to a new group, the Taliban. In addition, Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum's forces to the north of the city also launched occasional attacks on the capital.

In February 1996, all opposition groups except for the Taliban agreed to a coalition government with Rabbani as its leader. This reduced significantly the pressure on Kabul, which had been almost surrounded. Taliban forces had control of the south, Dostum's forces controlled the north, with Hekmatyar's forces in the west. In May 1996, Rabbani and Hekmatyar reached a further deal in which Hekmatyar accepted the role of prime minister. He took office in July in a swearing-in ceremony during which the Taliban launched a rocket to disrupt the occasion. The deal bolstered the number of troops defending Kabul, but it also stretched the resources of Massoud's forces, the best among the coalition, since they now had to help defend Hekmatyar's bases and territories. The Taliban continued its rocket attacks and built up its forces south of the city.

During the siege, the coalition government received some international support. The United Nations and Red Crescent attempted to drop humanitarian aid to the civilians still inside Kabul. Meanwhile, Russia was providing support through technical help to upgrade the city's airport, and Iran built a bridge to get military supplies to the Rabbani government. Finally, India assisted in the refurbishing of the Afghan national

airline, including upgrades to existing aircraft and new airplanes. The air link provided an important source of supplies. At the same time, the Taliban received assistance from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the form of arms and funding.

On September 11, 1996, the Taliban took Jalalabad, further tightening the noose around the city. On September 22, Taliban forces secured Kunar, which cut off any potential cooperation between Massoud and other coalition forces. Taliban forces now controlled three sides of the city with only the north open for resupply. Four days later, fearing that the Taliban would soon surround the city, Massoud gave the order for his forces to evacuate the city. On September 27, the Taliban entered Kabul with no resistance. One of their first actions after securing the city was to execute Mohammed Najibullah, former head of the Afghanistan communist government, and his brother.

Jorge Brown

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Revolutionary Movement (*Harakati Inqilabi Islami*); Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Taliban; Taliban, Forces and Tactics.

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Kabulov, Zamir (1954–)

Zamir Nabiyeovich Kabulov was a Soviet, and later Russian, diplomat who represented his country in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989) and after the fall of the Taliban. Kabulov was born on June 22, 1954, in Uzbekistan. In 1977, he earned a degree from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and went to work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also became an agent for the Soviet intelligence agency, the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB). After being assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, Iran, from 1979 to 1983, Kabulov was reassigned to Kabul where he became the KGB's lead agent in the country. Kabulov faced a daunting task trying to infiltrate the mujahideen and work with intelligence officers from the nominally pro-Soviet government who often had mixed loyalties. He was unable to create a highly efficient intelligence network, but proved more effective than his predecessors.

From 1987 to 1991, Kabulov was assigned to the headquarters of the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, before he was again posted to Afghanistan in 1991. The following year, he left Kabul after the fall of the pro-Soviet government. Kabulov was transferred to the Russian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, where he began to interact with the Taliban. From 1996 to 1998, he was part of a failed United Nations initiative to mediate the Afghan Civil War.

Kabulov represented Russia at the 2001 Bonn Conference and helped negotiate the resultant agreement, which established an interim Afghan government after the fall of the Taliban. In 2004, President Vladimir Putin appointed Kabulov ambassador to Afghanistan, a post he held until 2009. During his tenure as ambassador, Kabulov repeatedly criticized the U.S.-led military coalition's

strategy and tactics, arguing that the allies were repeating the mistakes made during the Soviet occupation. The ambassador was subsequently appointed a special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan by Putin. In this post, he endeavored to improve relations between Russia and Pakistan and expand military collaboration, especially in arms sales.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Mujahideen; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Kalakani, Habibullah (*Bacha-i Saqao*) (ca. 1891–1929)

Habibullah Kalakani (*Bacha-i Saqao*) was an ethnic Tajik who ruled as emir of Afghanistan for 10 months in 1929 before being overthrown and executed. Kalakani was born in 1891 just north of Kabul. He was a rebellious youth who defied authority. At one point, he burned down the home of a local mullah after a dispute. Kalakani left home and drifted through a series of menial jobs before joining the army in 1919. His military service was short, and Kalakani either deserted or was dismissed soon after he enlisted. The future king returned to his village and joined a band of bandits who preyed on travelers through the region. During this period, Kalakani became an efficient and

effective guerrilla commander, highly adept at hit-and-run tactics and able to raid even highly defended caravans. He also gained a reputation for robbing mainly from the wealthy and sharing his spoils with the less fortunate. As a result, his fame and stature steadily grew during the 1920s.

In 1928, Afghan king Amanullah Khan endeavored to implement a range of Western reforms. The king's initiatives produced a backlash from religious conservatives and prompted an armed uprising, which began in the eastern region of the country, but spread rapidly. Kalakani joined the revolt and drew additional fighters to his standard from among the Tajiks of northern Afghanistan. He advanced on Kabul as large numbers of the Royal Afghan Army deserted. By January 1929, Habibullah's forces were on the outskirts of Kabul, and then were able to move into the city. Amanullah abdicated in favor of his brother Inayatullah Khan on January 14, and then fled into exile. Surrounded, with few troops left, Inayatullah surrendered the throne to Habibullah on January 17 and then escaped via airplane out of the country.

Habibullah immediately rescinded Amanullah's reforms. However, the new monarch was unable to unify the country. Pashtuns objected to the presence of a Tajik on the throne, while regional and tribal leaders refused to surrender newly won power to the king. Habibullah came to be known by the derogatory sobriquet *Bacha-i Saqao* ("son of a water carrier"). Meanwhile, Nadir Shah, a general in the former regime, was able to gather troops and invade from the south in September 1929. Nadir Shah's forces had modern weapons and logistical support from the British. They inflicted a series of defeats on Habibullah's forces and, by October, were at the gates of Kabul. On October 13, Nadir Shah's troops seized control of Kabul. Habibullah fled, but was captured and executed

on November 1. Nadir Shah subsequently became king of Afghanistan. Habibullah was more popular after his death and became a symbol for the poor and oppressed in Afghanistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Khan, Amanullah; Shah, Nadir; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Kandahar, Battle of (1880)

The Battle of Kandahar was a British victory in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880) and the last major confrontation of the war. After the initial phase of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British placed Abdur Rahman Khan on the Afghan throne in May 1880, and began preparations to withdraw their troops. However, Ayub Khan, the governor of Herat and a claimant to the Afghan throne, launched a new rebellion during the summer of 1880 with approximately 10,000 followers. A British column sent to suppress the uprising was defeated with heavy losses at the Battle of Maiwand on July 27, 1880. The defeated British troops retreated to Kandahar where they were besieged by Ayub Khan's forces. By August, Ayub Khan had the town surrounded and had begun an artillery barrage.

To relieve the siege, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Roberts, later ennobled as Lord Roberts, was dispatched with a column

of troops from the main British forces in Kabul. The Anglo-Indian force consisted of about 10,000 troops, mainly Indian soldiers and Gurkhas. Roberts marched on August 8 and covered the 320 miles (515 km) by August 31, an extraordinary military feat. Meanwhile, alerted of the approach of the British, Ayub Khan retreated to a defensive position near the village of Mazra. The Afghans were at the top of a spur, meaning the British would have to attack uphill. Although sick with a fever, Roberts decided to attack the next day.

On September 1, 1880, British artillery began bombarding the Afghan positions. Roberts ordered two attacks on the villages of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad and Gundigan, to clear his right and left flanks in preparation for the main assault. Gundi Mulla Sahibdad was captured by the 92nd Highlanders and the 2nd Gurkhas after intense fighting. A mixed force of the 72nd Highlanders along with Sikh infantry and Gurkhas took Gundigan after heavy hand-to-hand combat. The Anglo-Indian forces then advanced against the main body of Afghans, who fled before a bayonet charge. The battle was over by 1 p.m. when Anglo-Indian troops captured the main Afghan camp. Anglo-Indian casualties were 238 dead, while the Afghans lost more than 2,500.

Ayub Khan's forces dissipated and the rebellion ended. Abdur Rahman's throne was secure, although he would face a series of rebellions during his reign. The battle was the last major combat during the war, and the British subsequently withdrew from Afghanistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); British Cantonment, Kabul; Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Gandamak, Treaty of (1879); Khan, Mohammad Yakub; Maiwand, Battle of (1880); Peiwar Kotal, Battle of

(1878); Roberts, Sir Abraham; Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleigh (Lord); Sherpur, Battle of (1879); Stewart, Sir Donald.

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Karmal, Babrak (1929–1996)

As a founding member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and a lifelong advocate of Soviet-style Marxism, Babrak Karmal was hand-selected to serve as president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan after the December 1979 Soviet invasion. His tenure in office is notable for its lack of independence from Soviet control, leading to comparisons with Shuja Shah, who is regarded as a puppet of the British Empire from 1839 to 1842. Karmal was unable to bridge the disparate political elements in Afghanistan or stop guerrilla operations against the Soviet occupation. This ultimately led to his political fall from favor with the Soviet Union and his forced resignation in May 1986.

Karmal, born on January 6, 1929, as Sultan Hussein, was raised in a prominent wealthy family in the Kamari district of Afghanistan outside of the capital, Kabul. His father was Major General Mohammed Hussein, a close friend of a former prime minister, General Mohammed Daoud. Karmal became active in Afghani politics early, serving time in prison from 1953 to 1955 while attending the College of Law and Political Science at Kabul University. It was during his time in prison that Karmal was introduced to pro-Soviet Marxist ideology through fellow inmates Mier Akbar Khybar

and Mier Mihammad Siddiq Farhang, both prominent figures in the Afghani Marxist movement of the 1960s. Karmal changed his name while in prison to distance himself from his prominent upbringing. He graduated with a degree in law in 1960 and worked for the Afghan government until 1963.

Upon the passage of the 1964 Afghan Provisional Constitution, which legalized political parties, Karmal was prominent (along with Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin) in establishing (1965) the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the Communist Party). He became the leader of the pro-Soviet wing of the party, "Parcham." By 1967, however, the party split along ideological lines with Karmal leading the pro-Soviet Parcham and Taraki leading the more communist-leaning "Khalq." Karmal stood for election to the National Assembly, serving from 1965 to 1973. Karmal, through Parcham, supported the 1973 coup against the monarchy that led to the rise of Mohammed Daoud Khan.

By the mid-1970s, Daoud had systematically removed most elements of Parcham from his government and severely restricted Karmal and the PDPA. This setback resulted in the restructuring of the PDPA in 1977 with Taraki serving as general secretary and Karmal as second secretary. The catalyst for action came on April 17, 1978, with the assassination of longtime Karmal friend and Parcham supporter Mier Akbar Khyber. The resulting Saur Revolution led to the communist takeover of Afghanistan and a Taraki-led government. Initial efforts were made to include both Parcham and Khalq in the government with Karmal being appointed deputy chair of the Revolutionary Council; however, within months Karmal found himself in exile in the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia.

Karmal remained exiled in Prague during the period of political turmoil between the assassination of Taraki and the assumption of power by Amin. However, with the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent death of Amin, Karmal was placed in power with the backing of the Soviet Union. His tenure in office largely focused on trying to win domestic support for the PDPA through a series of reforms and amnesties; however, with a general Afghan distrust of Soviet intentions supported by the backing of the United States, Karmal found himself losing ground between trying to appease non-PDPA political elements and his increasingly frustrated Soviet backers.

By as early as 1983, the Soviet Union began looking for a way to ease Karmal out of power as a solution for changing the worsening domestic situation in Afghanistan. With Soviet attention focused on Karmal as the problem, Karmal's Soviet-backed power quickly realigned toward long-term PDPA member Mohammad Najibullah. By November 1986, Karmal was formally removed from all of his roles and exiled to Moscow.

Najibullah later invited Karmal to return to Afghanistan, possibly as a way to try to secure his own increasingly weak political position, allowing Karmal to witness the retreat of Soviet forces and the eventual collapse of Najibullah's government by 1992. Najibullah spent the rest of his days in relative obscurity with little impact on Afghan politics. Karmal died of liver cancer in Moscow in December 1996.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Khyber, Mir Akbar; Najibullah, Mohammed; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1978–1989); Taraki, Nur Muhammad.

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Karzai, Hamid (1957–)


Hamid Karzai is an Afghan politician, supporter of the mujahideen, and was president of Afghanistan after the demise of the Taliban regime in December 2001. Hamid Karzai was born into a politically prominent family on December 24, 1957, in Karz, not far from Kandahar, Afghanistan. A Sunni Muslim, Karzai is an ethnic Pashtun from the Popalzai tribe. His grandfather was a high-ranking Afghan official, and his father, Abdul Ahad Karzai, was a tribal elder and served as deputy speaker of the Afghan parliament in the 1960s. In 1976 Hamid Karzai went to India as an exchange student. He later studied international relations and political science at Simla University, from which he earned an MA degree in 1983. During his stay in India, his nation was invaded and occupied by Soviet troops in December 1979, prompting a hard-fought struggle against the Soviets that lasted until 1989.

Beginning in 1984, Karzai dedicated himself fully to the ouster of Soviet forces from his homeland by helping to raise money to support the mujahideen fighters, who had begun to wage an increasingly effective guerrilla war against Soviet occupation troops. He also served as director of information for the National Liberation Front,

located in neighboring Pakistan, and later served as deputy director of its political operations. Karzai reportedly became a key contact for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was helping to funnel money and weapons to the mujahideen.

Before long, Karzai had cultivated close ties with CIA director William Casey and Vice President George H. W. Bush. For a time Karzai was in the United States, but he returned to Afghanistan in 1989, at which time the Soviets had withdrawn their troops from the country. At the same time, the mujahideen were attempting to form a new government.

In late 1989 Karzai began serving the provisional Afghan government as director of foreign relations for the interim president. In 1992 a permanent government was inaugurated, and Karzai began serving as



After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Hamid Karzai was appointed interim president. He went on to be elected leader of Afghanistan in 2004 and 2009. (NATO)

Afghanistan's deputy foreign minister. By 1994 civil war had broken out among numerous mujahideen groups and the ascendant Taliban, an extreme right-wing fundamentalist movement. Initially Karzai supported the Taliban, but he quickly withdrew his support when he saw for himself its real agenda. Resigning his government post in 1994, he began working to form a national Grand Council (Loya Jirga) that would eventually, he hoped, oust the Taliban from power. He exiled himself to Quetta, Pakistan, and there worked with his father to bring down the Taliban. In 1999 his father was assassinated, presumably by agents of the Taliban, an event that served to strengthen Karzai's resolve.

When Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001, Karzai returned to Afghanistan and organized local support in Kandahar to aid coalition forces and the Northern Alliance in their drive to topple the Taliban. This was accomplished in December 2001. On December 5 he became chair of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan. Less than three weeks later he was sworn in as interim chair.

Karzai's job was a difficult one, attempting to rule over a nation exhausted and ravaged by years of war and unrest. Indeed, he found it nearly impossible to travel outside the confines of Kabul, the capital city. In June 2002 Karzai became president of the interim government. In the meantime, he and other Afghan leaders had convened the Loya Jirga. (See his 2003 State of the Nation address to the people of Afghanistan in the Related Primary Document section below.)

In October 2004 Karzai was formally elected president in nationwide elections. He began serving his five-year term in December 2004 in an inauguration that received much worldwide attention. But he found it

almost impossible to implement needed reforms on a countrywide basis. He also witnessed a rise in activity by Taliban fighters and members of al Qaeda. The nation remained desperately poor, and he rejected U.S. demands that he put an end to opium poppy production, fearing that doing so would further impoverish Afghans. Nevertheless, Karzai has tried to be a unifying force in a fractious country and has enjoyed some success in forging alliances with tribal and regional leaders. He remains committed to championing human rights in his country, and he has attempted to empower Afghan women. Toward this end, he has appointed several women to high-ranking government posts. This has met with much resistance among conservatives.

In recent years Karzai made some headway in the economic sphere and even reached out to moderate Taliban members, claiming that the Taliban is welcome in Afghanistan so long as it does not include militants or terrorists. Karzai has frequently criticized the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for airstrikes aimed at eradicating militants in rural Afghanistan. Numerous attacks have injured or killed innocent civilians. Karzai also pointed out in 2006 that the billions of dollars going to the Iraq War could have easily reconstructed Afghanistan, putting that nation on a much firmer footing. Despite his criticisms, he remains deeply appreciative of American efforts in his nation since 2001 and remains an important ally in the global War on Terror. In 2006 he pledged to end poppy cultivation in Afghanistan as soon as practical, acknowledging that the crop was helping to feed the continued insurgency there. Between 2002 and 2008 Karzai was the target of four assassination attempts, at least two of which were blamed on radical Taliban insurgents.

In the waning years of the George W. Bush administration relations between Washington and Kabul deteriorated, especially after Karzai publicly criticized the U.S. war in Iraq, claiming that it was siphoning badly needed funds from the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. He also rankled U.S. policymakers by proclaiming his close ties to Iran. During 2008 and into 2009, U.S. attacks on Taliban strongholds that inadvertently killed civilians angered the Afghan president. In turn, the Barack Obama administration criticized Karzai for being ineffective and unsteady and argued that his regime has done too little to stop the poppy and narcotics trade. Nevertheless, Karzai announced his intention to run for reelection in August 2009 despite U.S. signals that it preferred an alternative candidate and despite rampant Afghan corruption.

Karzai won the 2009 election amid cries of corruption, intimidation, and vote rigging, when his opponent in the second runoff election bowed out. Throughout 2009, many

Western leaders, including Obama, tried to distance themselves from the Karzai regime. In particular, the United States rebuked Karzai for the continued vast corruption and drug trade in Afghanistan and his failure to address the security concerns of his people. In January 2010, Karzai reached out to the Taliban, asking them to join a Loya Jirga in an attempt to reach a peace settlement. Karzai was reportedly not much enthused with the Obama administration's decision to send 33,000 more troops to Afghanistan beginning in early 2010. He also became more critical of civilian casualties, especially from airstrikes. Karzai left office in September 2014 at the end of his second term. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani became president at that time.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf; Mujahideen; Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Taliban; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

Related Primary Document

Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai. “State-of-the-Nation Speech.” Radio Afghanistan (Dari and Pashto). Kabul, Afghanistan, April 8, 2003

In his State of the Nation address Afghan leader Hamid Karzai criticized his government for its shortcomings, its failure to provide security by setting up a national army and police force sufficiently quickly, to implement the disarmament process, and to root out corruption and nepotism in the civil service. He gave a painstaking and detailed account of what had been achieved in the country in defense, the economy, transport and communications, education, and human rights and made further pledges in this respect. Parts of the speech are excerpted below.

Announcer (recording in Dari): Dear listeners we would like to draw your attention to a speech delivered by esteemed Hamed [sic] Karzai, the head of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, on the progress of one year and the plans of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan for the year 1382 (2003).

Speech:

Hamed Karzai (recording in Pashto): In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate recites some verses from the Holy Koran Very dear compatriots, sisters and brothers, may peace and the blessings of God be upon you. . . .

Security and defence

Peace, stability and security:

The conflicts ended generally across the country in the solar year 1381 2002–2003, and it was because the establishment of new regime put an end to the reasons for the conflicts. Fighting was eliminated across the country. However, there can be no doubt that occasionally clashes have taken place among some groups and commanders, or the remnants of Taleban [*sic*] and Al-Qa'idah [*sic*] have had clashes with the counter-terrorism coalition in some areas of the country. But generally, the rule and influence of the terrorists of Al-Qa'idah and other monsters are diminishing day by day. It is because the public at large in Afghanistan and the vast sections of the people hate war. They want to live in peace, in security, within their country. They want their fields and gardens to flourish and to shape their lives that have been shattered for 23 years. They are seeking to settle in their houses, villages and cities honourably and respectably.

It is noteworthy that the memories of the sacrifices rendered by our people and countrymen of Afghanistan in their struggle to safeguard security in the country and in securing the country's frontiers and fighting against Al-Qa'idah and other anti-Afghan militant evils. Our people have rendered similar services in history, which could be compared with their struggle against the terrorists and Al-Qa'idah at the present time. All we Afghans are determined that from now on, no one should play with our lives and fate. We would not let them disrupt the peace in our country and force us to leave our country and take refuge in other countries.

We witnessed the convention of the Emergency Loya Jerga [*sic*] last year in the month of Saratan June–July, comprising Afghans of every class and tribe, including representatives of the refugee Afghans. The discussion lasted for seven days. They carried out the duties assigned to them in an independent, peaceful and brotherly environment. The council concluded with unity and accord.

The convening of the Loya Jerga in the country, after the years of unrest, war and destitution, is a manifestation of the existence of political stability. The government ministries and the institutions that are responsible for safeguarding peace and security have also made progress in the formation of the National Army, the police force, and in security affairs last year, which I would like to mention as follows:

Under the supervision of the National Army Formation Commission, the work on the formation of the National Army began properly last year. The proposals for the manning and standard of the National Army have been finalized. The process of absorbing youngsters into the National Army is in progress. In the final days of last year, two regiments of the National Army were completely absorbed into the framework of the Defence Ministry after military training

and commenced their operations. The new military units of the National Army are skilfully and faithfully performing their assigned duties in Bamian and Paktika provinces.

To have good arrangements for the defence of the country and forming the National Army, last year we set up commissions for the defence of the motherland, disarmament, demilitarization, examining the education and training of officers and the recruitment of servicemen. Some of the commissions are operational now and they have started on their duties.

The Demilitarization Commission, headed by the deputy head of state, Prof Abdol Karim Khalili, is the most important commission. Its aims are to enforce countrywide and stable peace in the country. It aims to improve the economic sector in the country and to provide employment for those who have joined in economic and public-service activities and have given up military duties.

However, some work on disarmament has been done in some parts of the country. We formed an independent commission to organize it better. Thanks to the initiative of the Japanese government, an international conference was held in Tokyo, Japan, last year in Hout February–March to seek financial resources for the practical commencement of the Disarmament and Demilitarization Commission and for the commission's operations. Pledges of financial assistance for the demilitarization of Afghanistan and disarmament programmes were made at the conference. These financial pledges will play an effective role in enhancing the commissions.

In the formation of the national police force and the rehabilitation of the internal system of the Interior Ministry some achievements have been attained thanks to the support of experts from Germany last year. The most important of them is the rehabilitation of the Police Academy. At the moment, around 1,500 students are undergoing training at that academy. Relations between all of the provinces and the capital city were established last year. And similar relations were established between the provinces and their districts. Despite some shortcomings, we can boldly say that Afghanistan, after several years, is now in possession of a relatively advanced, countrywide and single administration.

Source: Karzai, Hamed. "State-of-the-Nation Speech." Radio Afghanistan (Dari and Pashto). Kabul, Afghanistan. April 8, 2003.

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Kazemi, Syed Mustafa (1959–2007)

Syed Mustafa Kazemi was an Afghan political figure and former commerce minister

who was killed by a suicide bomber in 2007. An ethnic Hazara and a Shiite, Kazemi was born in 1959 in Parwan Province in eastern Afghanistan. Kazemi became part of the mujahideen when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. He joined a Shiite insurgency group that was based in Iran and later became a member of the mainly Hazara Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan*). The young mujahid subsequently became a member of Wahdat's central committee.

During the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), Kazemi supported the coalition government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. He backed the Northern Alliance in its efforts to defeat the Taliban and became an ally of the coalition's military commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Kazemi participated in the December Bonn Conference that chose Hamid Karzai as interim president of a unity government. In 2002, he was named commerce minister, a post he held until the 2004 elections (he did not back Karzai in the balloting).

The former minister was elected to the lower house of the Afghan parliament in 2005. He helped form a new political party, the National Islamic Empowerment Party (*Hizb-i Iqtedar-i-Milli-Islami*), in 2006, along with Ahmad Shah Ahmadzay, a religious conservative who opposed the U.S. military intervention and ran as an independent in the 2004 presidential balloting. Kazemi brought the new party into the opposition United National Front (*Shuray Mottahed-e Melli-e*) or UNF, led by Rabbani. The UNF was comprised primarily of ethnic minority groups who had previously backed the Northern Alliance. The new alliance endorsed a broad amnesty bill as a first step toward bringing the Taliban into a negotiated settlement.

On November 6, 2007, Kazemi was part of a parliamentary delegation visiting a sugar factory in Baghlan, in northeastern Afghanistan. A suicide bomber approached the group and detonated his device, killing Kazemi, 5 other parliamentarians, and 40–59 others. More than 120 were wounded in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, which the government blamed on the Taliban.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Hazaras; Karzai, Hamid; Northern Alliance; Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Taliban.

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Khalis, Mohammad Yunus (1919–2006)

Mohammad Yunus Khalis was a mujahideen commander during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). He led the forces of the Khalis faction of *Hezb-e Islami* (“Islamic Party” or “Party of Islam”) or HIK. Originally born in 1919 in Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan, Khalis was educated in the theology and law of Islam at the Dar al-’Ulum Haqqaniya seminary in Pakistan, earning the religious title of *Mawlawi* (“lord” or “master”). Throughout the 1960s, Khalis supported Islamic student movements, including the *Sazman-i Jawanan-i Muselman* (“Muslim Youth”), while at Kabul University. He established a reputation as a moderate conservative who rejected more extreme revolutionary ideologies.

Following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 by Mohammed Daoud Khan, Khalis absconded to Pakistan and became more active among opposition groups. The Muslim Youth split into two groups in 1975, Burhanuddin Rabbani's moderate, mainly Tajik, *Jamiat-e Islami* (Dari for “Islamic Society”), and Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar's more radical, predominately Pashtun *Hezb-e Islami*. Khalis joined Hekmatyar's new group. Relations between Khalis and Hekmatyar deteriorated over the next several years. The Islamic scholar increasingly opposed the extremism of Hekmatyar. In 1979, Khalis openly broke with Hekmatyar and established his own wing of *Hezb-e Islami*. The two factions were

differentiated by the names of their leaders: Hezb-e Islami Khalis (HIK) and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG).

During the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), Khalis led the HIK as one of the mujahideen groups fighting the Soviets and the pro-Soviet government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The HIK operated from bases in Pakistan and with support from international backers, including Pakistan and the United States. Under Khalis, the HIK was a loosely knit organization of smaller mujahideen groups, each highly autonomous. Khalis cooperated with other mujahideen formations, and the HIK undertook joint operations on occasion.

After the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, Khalis continued to fight against the DRA government. In 1992, when the DRA fell, the HIK took control of Khalis's home province of Nangarhar. Khalis was disenchanted with the political infighting among the mujahideen groups in the post-DRA era. He backed the Taliban after its formation in 1994 and during the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001).

After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, reports indicated that the HIK joined the Taliban in fighting the coalition. However, it is not clear if the entire HIK fought the U.S.-led forces or just individual segments of the group. Khalis went into hiding after the fall of the Taliban and died on July 19, 2006, at the age of 87.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*); Islamic Society (JIA) (*Jamiat-e Islami*); Taliban.

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Khan, Abdur Rahman (ca. 1844–1901)

Abdur Rahman Khan, known as the “Iron Emir,” ruled Afghanistan from 1880 until his death in 1901. During his reign, he helped strengthen the country's central government, and he introduced a series of reforms to the military and civil service. Abdur Rahman faced repeated uprisings and other internal challenges to his rule, but he was able to defeat his domestic enemies, while maintaining good relations with the British.

Abdur Rahman was born in Kabul sometime around 1844 into the Barakzai dynasty. His grandfather, Dost Mohammad Khan, ruled Afghanistan from 1826 to 1839 and from 1845 to 1863. Abdur Rahman's father, Mohammad Afzal Khan, was governor of Balkh and appointed his son a subgovernor at just age 13. Mohammad Afzal then ruled Afghanistan from 1865 to 1867, after deposing his brother Sher Ali Khan. Abdur Rahman's first taste of war occurred during this period when he led a force that freed his father from captivity in Ghazni, allowing Mohammad Afzal to secure the throne. However, Mohammad Afzal died on October 7, 1867, fighting against Sher Ali's forces. He was succeeded by his brother and Abdur Rahman's uncle, Mohammad Azam Khan. Mohammad Azam ruled for less than a year before Sher Ali reclaimed the throne. Abdur Rahman was forced into exile in Russian Turkistan where he remained until 1879.

While Abdur Rahman was in exile, the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880) broke out. Sher Ali died on February 21, 1879, and was succeeded by his son, Mohammad

Yakub Khan. A rebellion against the new ruler led to his abdication and replacement by the leader of the insurgency, Ayub Khan (one of Sher Ali's sons). Meanwhile, with Russian backing, Abdur Rahman returned to Afghanistan in an effort to press his claim to the throne. Despite his Russian endorsement, the British reached out to Abdur Rahman and offered their support against Ayub Khan in exchange for his acceptance of the Treaty of Gandamak, originally signed by Mohammad Yakub in 1879, which gave Britain control over Afghanistan's foreign policy in exchange for an annual subsidy. Abdur Rahman gave his assurances to the British, who recognized him as ruler of Afghanistan and withdrew their troops the following year.

Abdur Rahman formally took power in July 1880 and immediately faced a series of challenges to his reign. Ayub Khan continued to press his claim to the throne. In 1881, he attacked Kandahar, prompting Abdur Rahman to march to relieve the city. The new emir defeated the old one and forced Ayub Khan into exile in Persia (Iran). Meanwhile, tribes along the border between Afghanistan and British India continued to resist the new emir.

Beginning in the 1880s, the Ghilzai launched a series of rebellions against Abdur Rahman. In an effort to suppress the rebellious tribe, the Afghan monarch began to forcibly relocate Ghilzai to northern Afghanistan. This further inflamed the tribesmen, but government forces were able to suppress the rebellion. The Hazaras also rose in revolt in 1891, and were likewise defeated. During this period, the emir's cousin, Ishaq Khan, also launched a revolt. Ishaq Khan was a regional governor who backed local warlords who opposed Abdur Rahman's efforts to impose new taxes. The revolt was subdued after the defeat of rebel forces at the battle of Ghaznigak (1888).

During the 1890s, Abdur Rahman launched new military campaigns to consolidate his power, including an invasion of Kafiristan to subdue rebellious tribes.

Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, Abdur Rahman continued attempts to modernize Afghanistan. He established the first modern hospital and introduced new agricultural techniques. The emir reorganized the provincial administration, increased taxes, and improved tax collection. This gave greater revenue to the state and financed his concurrent reforms of the military. The emir reorganized the Afghan military and embarked on an ambitious program to purchase modern weapons. The military improvements helped Abdur Rahman deal with the succession of major rebellions. In 1895, he abolished slavery in the kingdom.

The emir also had to deal with external challenges. Questions over the border between Afghanistan and Russia rose to a crisis in 1884 as both nations deployed troops to the disputed area around Panjdeh. In February 1885, Russian forces attacked Afghan troops and captured the territory, prompting British diplomatic intervention. Negotiations between the two imperial states resulted in an agreement delineating the border in 1887. In 1893, Abdur Rahman proposed a conference in Kabul with the British to delineate the border between Afghanistan and British India. The British delegation was led by Sir Henry Durand, who gave his name to the resultant boundary, the Durand Line. The creation of the Durand Line reduced tensions, but did not eliminate cross-border raids, and the division of the Pashtun people would remain problematic through the 1900s and into the 2000s.

Abdur Rahman died on October 1, 1901. He was succeeded by his son and heir, Habibullah Khan, in a peaceful transition.

Brian Carriere

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission; Dost Mohammad; Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer; Durand Line; Gandamak, Treaty of (1879); Ghilzai; Great Game, The; Khan, Habibullah; Khan, Sher Ali; Panjdeh Crisis (1885); Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Khan, Amanullah (1892–1960)

Amanullah Khan was monarch of Afghanistan from 1919 to 1926. During his reign, he secured full independence from Great Britain, but his efforts to modernize the country alienated conservatives and religious leaders. He was forced from the throne in 1926. Amanullah was born on June 1, 1892, the third son of Afghan emir Habibullah Khan. In 1913, Amanullah married Soraya Tarzi,

the daughter of Mahmud Tarzi, a leading Afghan reformer and intellectual.

During World War I, Amanullah supported Afghan entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers (Austria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire). The pro-German faction of the Afghan government was led by the emir's brother, Nasrullah Khan. However, Habibullah steadfastly remained neutral during the conflict. Meanwhile, Amanullah was appointed governor of Kabul.

On February 20, 1919, Habibullah was assassinated. An Afghan military officer was accused of the crime and later executed, but many asserted that the killing was orchestrated by senior officials who opposed Habibullah's pro-British policies. The murdered emir's eldest son, Inayatullah Khan, threw his support to Nasrullah, who was proclaimed emir on February 21. Amanullah used his position as governor of Kabul to take control of the treasury and secured the loyalty of the royal guard and military. After a week in power, Nasrullah surrendered the throne to his nephew Amanullah, who was crowned emir on February 28. Nasrullah was subsequently imprisoned for participation in the assassination of Habibullah and died a year later in captivity.

Upon assuming the throne, Amanullah announced his intention to end British control over Afghanistan's foreign policy. He then launched a preemptive war on Great Britain by invading India in May 1919. The emir and his closest advisers were convinced that the British would not be willing to engage in a long, drawn-out conflict. The war ended in a military defeat for the Afghans as the British were able to repel the Afghan invasion and actually launch an offensive into Afghanistan. However, during negotiations over an armistice, the British agreed to cede control of Afghan foreign policy to Amanullah, in exchange for the elimination of an

annual subsidy through the Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919), which also set the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and British India.

During the war, Amanullah approached the Soviet Union and launched negotiations over a possible friendship treaty. The emir sought an opening with the Soviets as a way to counter British influence, which he perceived as more threatening since the Russian Revolution had overthrown the czar and Moscow appeared less interested in gaining territory from Afghanistan. Since they were diplomatically isolated, the Soviets were eager to establish relations with neighboring states. Freed from British control of his foreign policy, Amanullah approved a draft friendship treaty with the Soviets on September 12, 1920, with final ratification on



King Amanullah Khan ruled Afghanistan from 1919 to 1929 and tried, unsuccessfully, to modernize the country. (AP Photo)

February 28, 1921. The treaty itself called for Soviet economic aid to Afghanistan and precluded either country from signing other treaties that would undermine Afghan-Soviet relations.

The Soviets paid Amanullah an annual subsidy of \$500,000 from 1921 to 1924 and provided various forms of military assistance, including 13 aircraft, along with pilots and crew, to establish the Afghan air force. An additional nonaggression pact was signed between the two states in 1926. Amanullah also looked to Turkey and Germany for assistance, inviting military advisers from both countries and seeking commercial agreements.

Like his father, Amanullah sought to modernize Afghanistan through economic and social reforms. He sought to expand trade and bring new industries to the country. The emir promoted Western dress and had his wife appear in public without a veil (Soraya encouraged other women to do so as well). The emir was the first Afghan ruler to have a monogamous marriage and endeavored to suppress polygamy. Amanullah appointed Soraya minister of education and in that position, she established the first girls' school in Afghanistan. In 1926, Amanullah had himself crowned king to replace the title of emir.

Amanullah's reforms were popular in Kabul and among some of the country's elites, but they provoked a backlash from religious conservatives. In 1927, the king and queen traveled to Europe and the Middle East for a series of state visits. Amanullah hoped the journey would result in greater economic assistance and commercial opportunities for the country. Instead, in 1928, while they were out of the country, a rebellion broke out. Amanullah tried to suppress the revolt, but the army deserted him after Jalalabad fell to the rebels in 1929. On January 14, 1929, Amanullah abdicated in favor of his

brother, Inayatullah Khan, and fled to British India. Inayatullah ruled for a brief three days before he too was forced to abdicate and fly out of Kabul. Habibullah Kalakani seized power, but was deposed in October 1929 by Mohammed Nadir Shah. Amanullah briefly endeavored to reclaim his throne without success, and instead, traveled to Europe where he remained in exile with his wife and family until his death in Zurich, Switzerland, on April 25, 1960.

Brian Carriere

See also: Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (1921); Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Durand Line; Great Game, The; Kalakani, Habibullah (Bacha-i Saqao); Khan, Habibullah; Khan, Nasrullah; Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Shah, Mohammed Nadir; Tarzi, Mahmud; Tarzi, Soraya; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Khan, Habibullah (1872–1919)

Habibullah Khan ruled Afghanistan from 1901 to 1919. He endeavored to reform and modernize the country and maintained

Afghan neutrality during World War I. Habibullah was born in Russian Turkistan on June 3, 1872, the eldest son of Afghan emir Abdur Rahman Khan. He succeeded his father as emir upon the latter's death on October 1, 1901.

Abdur Rahman had faced a series of revolts and challenges to his reign as he endeavored to consolidate his power. The emir gained a harsh reputation for his repression of foes. When he became emir, Habibullah adopted a more conciliatory approach. He brought tribal leaders and warlords together in a newly created state council that was tasked with advising the monarch. The emir also granted tribal leaders more power within the provincial governments and reduced the military service requirements among the tribes. Finally, he offered amnesty to those that had been exiled or imprisoned for political reasons. Among those who returned to Afghanistan was Mahmud Tarzi, who emerged as one of the leaders of the liberal movement in Afghanistan. He would serve as foreign minister to the emir, whose son, Amanullah Khan, married Tarzi's daughter, Soraya Tarzi, in 1913.

Like his father, Habibullah wanted to modernize Afghanistan. He reorganized the administrative units of the country, creating six provinces, each divided into districts and led by a governor. The emir abolished some of the harsher components of traditional Afghan law and instituted a requirement that any death sentences had to be approved by the monarchy. Habibullah launched an ambitious road construction program and began importing automobiles into the country while he also sought to increase Afghanistan's small railroad network. Kabul became the first Afghan city with electricity, and the first telephone line was laid from the capital to Jalalabad in 1908. Education was important to the emir, and in 1904 he established

the Habibia School, the nation's first secondary school. The emir also endeavored to improve primary education throughout the country and reduce the very high illiteracy rate (in excess of 95 percent of the population). He also founded Afghanistan's first military college (and increased the pay of the military).

In 1904, Habibullah compelled the British to renegotiate their relationship with Afghanistan. The British sought to impose additional restrictions on the new emir, but Habibullah resisted. After three months of talks, the resultant Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1905 allowed Britain to retain control over Afghan foreign policy, but pledged British assistance if the country was attacked. It also increased the subsidy paid to the emir. In 1907, Habibullah paid a state visit to India and received a knighthood from King Edward VII.

When World War I commenced, Habibullah came under enormous pressure to join the Central Powers. The sultan of the Ottoman Empire called on all Muslims to fight a holy war against the British, French, and Russians. In addition, Germany and the Ottoman Empire dispatched military missions to Afghanistan. However, Habibullah remained steadfastly neutral. The emir's £400,000 annual subsidy from the British was used to support his reforms. In addition, he feared that Afghan entry into the war would reopen internal divisions and slow his efforts at modernization.

Habibullah's failure to enter the war angered members of the Afghan elite who formed what became known as the "German Faction," led by his brother and prime minister, Nasrullah Khan, and supported by his son Amanullah. At the same time, religious conservatives in Afghanistan were displeased with the emir's modernization efforts. After the war ended, Habibullah was assassinated

on February 20, 1919. Nasrullah became emir, but was ousted by Amanullah on February 28.

Brian Carriere

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1905); Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Great Game, The; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Amanullah; Khan, Nasrullah; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan; World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918); World War I and Afghanistan, Turko-German Missions (1914–1918).

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Khan, Jan Mohammed (d. 2011)

Jan Mohammed Khan was a mujahideen warlord during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), governor of Oruzgan from 2002 to 2006, and an adviser to President Hamid Karzai. Little is known

of Khan's early life, although he came from a prominent family within the powerful Pashtun subtribe, the Popolzai. Some accounts assert that Khan was a school janitor prior to the Soviet invasion, others contend he was a wrestler. During the Soviet occupation, Khan fought as a mujahid and his militia was loosely affiliated with Burhanuddin Rabbani's multiethnic Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*) and later with Sibghatullah Mojaddedi's Sufi group, the National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*). He was wounded fighting the Soviets, he lost the use of his left eye, and he developed a reputation as a fearless and inspiring leader. After the Soviets withdrew, Khan emerged to lead his militia against the pro-Soviet regime, and supported Rabbani's coalition government after the fall of the regime.

Khan had a close relationship with Abdul Ahad Karzai, the father of future Afghan president Hamid Karzai. In 1998, Khan was arrested by the Taliban and held in a prison in Kandahar. He was freed when the U.S.-led coalition deposed the Taliban in November 2001. The following year, President Karzai appointed Khan governor of Oruzgan. Khan and other regional warlords supported Karzai's presidential candidacy in 2004 and 2009.

The former warlord's administration was tainted by graft and corruption. Nepotism was also common. More significantly, Khan was involved in the growing, but illicit, opium trade. Khan was effective in suppressing the Taliban, but he alienated non-Pashtuns and non-Popolzai Pashtuns. Under international pressure, Karzai removed Khan from office in 2006. The warlord was instead appointed to a position within the ministry of tribal affairs in an apparent bid to retain his loyalty.

On July 17, 2011, Khan and an Afghan member of Parliament, Hasham Watanwal,

were killed when Taliban militants attacked the warlord's Kabul compound. Several of the attackers were killed and one captured.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Islamic Society (JIA) (*Jamiat-e Islami*); Karzai, Hamid; Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah; National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*); Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Taliban.

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Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar (1890–1988)

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was a Pashtun leader who advocated nonviolent resistance to British colonial rule in the regions along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Ghaffar Khan was born on February 6, 1890, in Utmanzai in the North-West Frontier Province in British India. He was educated at a British missionary school, but became fervently opposed to British rule. Ghaffar Khan established a religious school in his village in 1910, but it was ordered closed by the British five years later. He traveled throughout the region working to promote education and build schools, but also to oppose British colonialism. He founded a succession of opposition movements, each of which was banned by the colonial government.

In 1919, at the end of World War I, Ghaffar Khan met Mahatma Gandhi and soon became an advocate for nonviolence. In 1929, he founded the organization "Servants of God" (*Khuda-I Khidmatgaran*), also known

as the Red Shirts for wearing red tunics. The group embraced nonviolence and advocated Pashtun nationalism and anticolonialism. The Servants of God movement spread on both sides of the border. The Servants of God used strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts to protest British rule. While encouraged in Afghanistan, the British continuously endeavored to suppress the movement. Ghaffar Khan and other leaders of the groups were repeatedly arrested. For his efforts, Afghanistan Amalluah Khan granted him the title of “Pride of the Afghans” (*Fakhr-i Afghan*).

Ghaffar Khan supported a unified India and opposed efforts to create a separate Muslim state. He unsuccessfully tried to reduce sectarian violence before independence. Once it became clear that India would be partitioned, Ghaffar Khan argued for the creation of an independent state from the North-West Frontier Province instead of inclusion in Pakistan (the new state was to be called Pashtunistan). After partition in 1947, Ghaffar Khan was arrested and imprisoned for six years. After his release, he continued to advocate for Pashtun autonomy and was repeatedly arrested for short periods. In 1964, he fled to Afghanistan and remained in exile there until 1972. A year after his return to Pakistan, he was again arrested and would periodically be under house arrest for the remainder of his life. Ghaffar Khan opposed the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, but urged nonviolent resistance. He died in Peshawar on January 20, 1988, but was carried back to Jalalabad to be buried during a cease-fire.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Khan, Amanullah; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Raj, British (1858–1947); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Khan, Mir Masjidi (d. 1841)

Mir Masjidi Khan was an Afghan tribal leader who fought the British during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Masjidi Khan was born into a prominent family in the Kohistan region of northeastern Afghanistan. By the late 1830s, he was a tribal chief in Kohistan. In 1839, the British invaded Afghanistan in the First Anglo-Afghan War. They sought to depose Emir Dost Mohammad and replace him with the pro-British Shuja Shah Durrani who had been ruler of Afghanistan from 1803 to 1809. Dost Mohammad fled advancing Anglo-Indian forces in August 1839 as the invaders approached Kabul. The emir endeavored to rally the tribes to fight the British but initially had little success in Hazarajat and surrounding regions.

In Kohistan, Mir Masjidi and his fellow chiefs had not taken up arms against the Anglo-Indian forces, but neither had they been cooperative with the new regime. When Shuja Shah called on tribal leaders in July 1840 to raise troops for a new army to fight alongside the British against Dost Mohammad, Mir Masjidi and his fellow chiefs refused. They also rebuffed orders to provide tribute and taxes to Shuja Shah. A joint Anglo-Afghan force was dispatched to Kohistan to force compliance. The troops conducted a series of raids and burned or otherwise destroyed the numerous forts and

compounds in the region. Mir Masjidi's citadel, Khwajah Khizri, was attacked by an Anglo-Afghan contingent. Although outnumbered, the chief was able to hold off the British, even after they destroyed one of the walls of his fortress. Mir Masjidi was wounded in the assault. After the British withdrew, the chieftain and his forces retreated to Nijrab where other resistance leaders were gathering. They invited Dost Mohammad to join them and take command of their militias.

Dost Mohammad hurried to the region and joined his remaining loyal troops with the militias of Mir Masjidi and another local warlord, Sultan Mohammad Khan of Nijrab. The Afghan forces defeated an Anglo-Afghan column of about 800 troops in the battle of Parwan on November 2. After the battle, Dost Mohammad decided that further fighting against the Anglo-Indian forces was futile, in spite of the victory. The superiority of British weapons convinced the emir that the invading forces could not be beaten in the long run. Dost Mohammad rejected Mir Masjidi's pleas to continue fighting and instead traveled to Kabul where he surrendered to the British on November 4.

Mir Masjidi and other tribal leaders continued to fight the British. However, they were forced to retreat into the mountains. Unable to capture the rebel leader, the British offered rewards and other incentives for his capture or death. Sometime in the early months of 1841, Mir Masjidi died of either poisoning or illness. His resistance to the British made him a national hero and a beloved martyr.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Great Game, The; Macnaghten, Sir William Hay; Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”).

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Khan, Mohammad Akbar (1816–1845)

Mohammad Akbar Khan was an Afghan prince during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). He massacred an Anglo-Afghan Army during the retreat from Kabul (1842). Akbar Khan was born in 1816, the son of Afghan emir Dost Mohammad Khan. He earned the sobriquet “Hero of Jamrud” after forces led by him and his brother, Mohammad Afzal Khan, defeated the Sikhs at the Battle of Jamrud in 1837. While the encounter was a strategic draw that left the fort at Jamrud in the hands of the Sikhs, the encounter halted the encroachment of the Sikhs into areas traditionally controlled by the Afghans.

After the British invaded Afghanistan during the First Anglo-Afghan War, Dost Mohammad was deposed and exiled from Kabul to the remote town of Mussoorie in the eastern highlands of what was then British India. The pro-British Shuja Shah Durrani was placed on the throne. Akbar Khan emerged as the leader of Afghan resistance to the British occupation. The Anglo-Indian troops were concentrated in a few key garrisons, including Kabul. The future emir rallied tribes from the countryside and began a quasi siege of the main Anglo-Indian garrison in Kabul. On November 2, 1841, he called on the Afghans to rise in rebellion against the British and attacked and captured strategic posts in the city. On December 23,

the British commissioner in Kabul, William Hay Macnaghten, was assassinated while trying to negotiate with Akbar Khan. On January 1, 1842, the British commander, General William Elphinstone, accepted a pledge of safe conduct from Akbar Khan for his troops and camp followers. In return, the Anglo-Indian forces turned over most of their artillery, ammunition, and supplies. The occupying forces began their retreat on January 6.

The retreating forces came under almost immediate attack, while most of the sick and wounded left behind were killed, despite assurances of their safety. Over the next several days, Akbar Khan took several groups of hostages, including Elphinstone, while casualties mounted within the column from constant raids and sniping by Afghans. On January 13, the remaining Anglo-Indian troops were killed at the Battle of Gandamak. Of the 4,500 troops and 12,000 camp followers, less than a hundred survived as hostages or those that were able to escape the encircling Afghans before the final battle. Shuja Shah was assassinated on April 25.

In retaliation, the Anglo-Indian Army of Retribution recaptured Kabul in September 1842 after defeating Akbar Khan in a series of battles. The Afghan prince tried to rally his people and declared jihad or holy war against the invading troops, but to no avail. Most of the hostages taken by Akbar Khan were released during the army's advance. The Anglo-Indian forces destroyed areas of Kabul and retreated, ending the war. Meanwhile, the British released his father, who reclaimed the throne. Akbar Khan was assassinated by poisoning in 1845.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Dost Mohammad; Gandamak, Battle of (1842); Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Macnaghten, Sir William Hay.

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Khan, Mohammad Hashim (1885–1953)

Mohammad Hashim Khan was an Afghan prince who served as prime minister of the country from 1929 to 1946. Hashim Khan was born in 1885 and was the younger brother of Mohammed Nadir Shah, who ruled Afghanistan from 1929 to 1933. After Nadir Shah seized the throne from Habibullah Kalakani, he appointed his younger brother as prime minister. Hashim Khan retained that position after his older brother was assassinated in 1933 and his nephew, Mohammed Zahir Shah, became king.

As prime minister, Hashim Khan worked to restore the country's public education system, which had been essentially shut down during the 1929 civil war. He also endeavored to suppress dissent and endorsed harsh measures against opponents of the regime. The prime minister did grant limited power to regional assemblies. Throughout the 1930s, Hashim Khan endeavored to modernize the country's economy and military. He also sought to decrease the influence of both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Consequently, Hashim Khan sought new allies and economic partners. The prime minister approached Germany and negotiated a series of agreements that resulted in increased trade between the two countries and the deployment of a German

military mission to train the Afghan Army. Germany also underwrote a number of infrastructure programs in Afghanistan, including road construction and expansion of the country's limited power system through the construction of hydroelectric facilities.

Hashim reached out to regional states in an effort to build a series of alliances to further offset British or Soviet power. The most significant result of his efforts was the 1937 Treaty of Saadabad, a nonaggression agreement between Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. The prime minister hoped to use the treaty as the basis for more formal military ties between the states, but little came of his efforts.

During World War II (1939–1945), Hashim Khan was a staunch advocate for Afghan neutrality, despite the country's ties with Germany and its ally, Italy. Afghanistan formally declared its neutrality in 1940 after the prime minister received the endorsement of a Loya Jirga to stay out of the conflict. The following year, under pressure from both Britain and the Soviet Union, Hashim Khan expelled the German and Italian military economic advisers in the country.

The dominant role played by the United States during the war prompted Hashim Khan to seek to open relations with the superpower as a means to counterbalance Soviet influence in the region, especially after the withdrawal of the British from India. Hashim Khan was replaced in 1946 by his brother Shah Mahmud Khan. Shah Mahmud was considered the most liberal and pro-Western of Zahir Shah's uncles, and he was chosen to accelerate the pace of reforms in the country. Hashim Khan died on October 26, 1953.

Tom Lansford

See also: Khan, Shah Mahmud; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; United

Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan; United States, Relations with Afghanistan; World War II and Afghanistan (1939–1945); Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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Khan, Mohammad Ismail (1946–)

Mohammad Ismail Khan was an Afghan mujahideen commander and warlord who served as governor of Herat, and minister of energy and water in the post-Taliban government of President Hamid Karzai. Khan was born in 1946 in Herat. An ethnic Tajik, Khan joined the Afghan military, attended the Kabul Military Academy, and was commissioned a lieutenant. By 1979, he was a captain. The previous year, a pro-Soviet government came to power under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The PDPA began to arrest opponents of the regime and supporters of the previous government. The new government also began to implement unpopular reforms, including a controversial land redistribution program. After government troops fired on protestors in Herat in early March 1979, an uprising against the PDPA regime and its Soviet advisers spread through the city and countryside. Khan and other Afghan soldiers joined the rebels, turning over weapons and ammunition. When PDPA troops recaptured Herat, Khan escaped into the countryside and joined the mujahideen group, the Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani.

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), Khan distinguished himself as a guerrilla commander, earning the nickname “Lion of Herat.” He commanded Jamiat-e Islami’s western forces. When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, Khan continued fighting the PDPA government. His muhajideen captured Herat in 1992 and he became governor of the surrounding province. Over the next several years, Khan fought against the rising power of the Taliban. When the Taliban seized power in Herat in 1995, Khan and up to 8,000 of his followers fled to Iran, but conducted periodic attacks on the Taliban from bases across the border as part of the Northern Alliance. He was briefly captured by pro-Taliban militias in 1997, but was able to escape.

When the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban, Khan captured Herat and was confirmed as governor by the post-Taliban government. During his tenure, he ruled the province in a highly autonomous manner, often at odds with the government in Kabul. He formed a provincial militia of about 25,000–30,000 and was generally perceived more as a warlord than a governor loyal to Kabul. Despite tensions, Khan supported Karzai in the 2004 presidential election. In 2005, he was named minister for energy and water.

In 2007, Khan joined the United National Front, led by Rabbani. The groups sought to unite opposition groups and rally behind a single candidate in the 2009 balloting, but fell apart before the election. Khan retained his ministry during Karzai’s second term. After he won the presidential election in 2014, Mohammed Ashraf Ghani endeavored to reduce the power and influence of the regional warlords. Khan was not given a position in the new cabinet and resisted efforts to curb his political power in Herat.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Herat, Uprising (1979); Mujahideen; People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Khan, Mohammad Yakub (ca. 1849–1923)

Mohammad Yakub Khan was an Afghan prince who briefly ruled his country during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880) and signed the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879. Born around 1849, Yakub Khan was a son of Afghan emir Sher Ali Khan. Sher Ali became emir in 1863, but was deposed in 1865 by his brother. He was able to regain the throne in 1868, and made Yakub Khan governor of Herat. When Sher Ali named a younger son, Abdulla Khan, as his heir apparent, Yakub Khan rose in rebellion, along with another brother, Mohammad Ayub Khan, in 1870. Both believed they had a stronger claim to the crown than Abdulla Khan. The forces of the two brothers attacked Kandahar, but were defeated. Yakub fled to the border with Persia and was able to gain support for another campaign against his father from the Persians. He recaptured Herat in May 1871, but found himself isolated and unable to run the province because of a lack of funds. Yakub Khan reconciled with his father, who again appointed him governor of the province.

The prince continued his intrigues against Sher Ali, including negotiations to switch the allegiance of Herat from Afghanistan to

Persia. The emir invited his son to Kabul to settle their differences and promised him safe conduct. Yakub hoped to secure financial assistance from his father, but remained unwilling to recognize Abdulla Khan as heir (he stipulated as one of the conditions for his visit that he not have to meet or attend the heir to the throne). When Yakub Khan arrived in Kabul in November 1874, he was arrested and imprisoned. Ayub Khan, who had remained in Herat, arrested several supporters of the emir and endeavored to rally the tribes to rebel against Sher Ali. However, few heeded his call, and he went into exile in Persia after Sher Ali dispatched an army to pacify the province.

Yakub Khan was still under custody when the British invaded Afghanistan at the start of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The war was the result of British fears of Russian influence in Afghanistan, which was regarded as a strategic buffer for Britain's Indian colonies. Sher Ali fled Kabul as the British advanced and died on February 21, 1879. Yakub Khan was freed from prison and crowned ruler of Afghanistan upon the death of his father. The new emir agreed to negotiate with the British to end the war following a series of defeats inflicted upon Afghan forces. Yakub Khan met a British delegation under Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari at Gandamak in May 1879. The resultant Treaty of Gandamak gave the British control of Afghan foreign policy in exchange for an annual subsidy of 600,000 rupees and enhanced commercial ties between Afghanistan and British India. The treaty also required Yakub Khan to accept the presence of a British mission in Kabul.

The British mission was led by Cavagnari and created considerable resentment among Afghans. Regional warlords, including the emir's brother Ayub Khan, were highly critical of the treaty. On September 3, 1879,

Afghans attacked the British mission, led by soldiers who had been unpaid, killing Cavagnari, his staff, and a small unit of Anglo-Indian troops. The uprising sparked a larger rebellion led by Ayub Khan. Faced with dwindling support among his people and increased pressure from the British, Yakub abdicated on October 21.

Afraid that he would be killed for his role in negotiating the Treaty of Gandamak, Yakub fled to the British lines. In December 1879, he voluntarily went into exile to British India. Meanwhile, Ayub Khan pressed his claim to the throne, while the British, on July 22, 1880, proclaimed Abdur Rahman Khan, a grandson of former emir Dost Mohammad Khan and nephew of Sher Ali, as emir. Ayub Khan won the Battle of Maiwand against the Anglo-Indian forces on July 27, but was defeated by British general Sir Frederick Roberts on September 1, 1880. The defeat of Ayub Khan ended major resistance to Abdur Rahman, who ruled Afghanistan until 1901. Yakub Khan remained in India until his death on November 15, 1923.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Dost Mohammad; Gandamak, Treaty of (1879); Great Game, The; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Sher Ali.

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Khan, Mohammed Daoud 1909–1978

Mohammed Daoud Khan was an Afghan prince and political figure who deposed the monarchy in 1973 and served as president of the country until his overthrow and death in 1978. Daoud's fall from power led to the Soviet invasion in 1979. Daoud was born in Kabul on July 18, 1909, to the royal family. The young prince studied in France and was trained as a military officer. His cousin, Mohammed Zahir Shah, became king in 1933. The following year, Daoud was appointed governor and military commander of the Eastern Province, and then given the same post in Kandahar.

During World War II, Daoud supported Afghan neutrality. He became a lieutenant general in 1939 and was named defense minister in 1946 in the cabinet of his reformist uncle, Shah Mahmud Khan. He launched a series of military reforms to modernize the army. Three years later, he became interior minister. In 1953, the king dismissed Mahmud Khan and named Daoud to replace him. Political and social reforms under Mahmud Khan had increased resistance to Kabul by the conservative tribes, while tensions with Pakistan over the unification of the Pashtun people into a single state, Pashtunistan, had deteriorated sharply.

Once in office, Daoud endeavored to improve the Afghan economy through a series of five-year plans that emphasized centralized planning and industrialization. Both plans, 1956–1961 and 1962–1967, fell far short of their objectives. However, he was able to increase economic aid from the United States in the form of development loans and substantially expand economic assistance from the Soviet Union. Daoud continued efforts to modernize the army, including increasing military aid from the

Soviet Union. A series of brief campaigns suppressed tribal opposition to the central government in the late 1940s. The prime minister continued some social reforms, including expanding women's rights, such as allowing women to go into public without wearing a veil.

Daoud's autocratic style alienated other elites while he ruthlessly jailed opponents and suppressed dissent. Instead of resolving the Pashtunistan crisis, he exacerbated tensions with Pakistan by arming border tribes and covertly encouraging raids by the tribes and Afghan military forces into disputed areas. In response, Pakistan closed the border with Afghanistan, which prompted an economic crisis. In 1963, Zahir Shah forced Daoud to resign. The king endorsed new political reforms after Daoud's dismissal, including the creation of a new constitution in



Mohammed Daoud Khan became the first president of Afghanistan after he led a coup against the monarchy in 1973. He was overthrown and killed by Afghan communists in 1978. (AP Photo/R. Satakopan)

1964 and new elections the following year. However, opposition to the monarchy grew steadily during the 1960s, especially in the wake of a serious famine and economic downturn.

In 1973, with the support of leftist opposition groups, including the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Daoud seized power and forced his cousin into exile. He proclaimed himself president of a new republic. The new president deepened ties with the Soviet Union and permitted a growing number of Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan. Daoud's aggressive approach toward Pakistan led that country to support antiregime fighters with military and economic assistance, as well as training bases for the growing mujahideen. The mujahideen grew as Daoud endeavored to suppress Islamist conservatives.

In 1977, the PDPA began planning and preparing to overthrow Daoud and install a pro-Soviet client government. Daoud began efforts to suppress the PDPA while simultaneously endeavoring to reduce Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union. Prominent PDPA members and other leftists were purged from government positions. The president also launched diplomatic initiatives to improve relations with the United States and increase economic ties with Iran and moderate Persian Gulf states.

Mir Akbar Khyber, a prominent PDPA intellectual, was killed by an unknown assailant on April 17, 1978. The assassination prompted widespread demonstrations in Kabul and other Afghan cities. Daoud believed that the PDPA was using the killing to incite unrest and ordered the arrest of senior party officials. The PDPA took this action as the cue to launch its planned coup against Daoud. On April 27, army units loyal to the PDPA began to move into position in and around Kabul. The next day, the presidential

palace was stormed and Daoud and his family were killed in what became known as the Saur Revolution. A pro-Soviet government was installed, but infighting among the new regime prompted the Soviets to intervene in December 1979.

Tom Lansford

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Khan, Shah Mahmud; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979).

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Khan, Nasrullah (1874–1920)

Nasrullah Khan ruled Afghanistan for one week in 1919 following the assassination of his brother, Habibullah Khan. Nasrullah was born in exile in Russian Turkestan in 1874. He was the second son of Abdur Rahman Khan, who had been forced to flee Afghanistan in 1869. Abdur Rahman returned to Afghanistan and became emir of the kingdom in 1880 during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). One result of the war was that the British acquired control over Afghan foreign policy in exchange for an annual subsidy to the emir. Nasrullah became a fervent Afghan nationalist and bitterly resented British interference in his country's affairs. He also became a very devout Muslim.

In 1901, Abdur Rahman died and was succeeded by his eldest son, Habibullah.

Nasrullah enjoyed considerable political influence during his brother's reign. Nasrullah was appointed commander of the Afghan Army and made prime minister. He was even officially named the heir to Habibullah, instead of the emir's own sons. Habibullah's other brother, Mohammad Omar, was kept under unofficial house arrest for most of the emir's reign.

During his reign, Habibullah sought to maintain good relations with the British while he undertook economic and social reforms in Afghanistan. Nasrullah opposed his brother's conciliatory approach. He offered financial support to Pashtun tribes on the British side of the border in a succession of conflicts with the British. Nasrullah also emerged as the leader of a pro-German faction during World War I. When the conflict broke out, the Ottoman sultan Mehmed V proclaimed the war a jihad or holy struggle against the Allied powers of Russia and Britain. Nasrullah and the emir's son, Amanullah Khan, were staunch advocates of joining the war on the side of the Central Powers of Austria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. A Turko-German mission in 1915 led to the drafting of the Afghan-German Friendship Treaty of 1916. Habibullah signed the measure but then detained the messenger carrying the document so that it was never delivered to Berlin for Kaiser Wilhelm II to sign. The following year, Nasrullah unsuccessfully urged an attack on Russia following the Russian Revolution.

Throughout the war, there were reports that Nasrullah was plotting to overthrow his brother. On February 20, 1919, Habibullah was assassinated during a hunting trip with Nasrullah and the emir's oldest son, Inayatullah. Nasrullah traveled to Jalalabad where he was declared emir with Inayatullah's backing the next day. However, when word reached the capital of Habibullah's assassination,

Amanullah was able to secure the support of the army and the government bureaucracy. Most of the country's leading chieftains and tribal leaders backed Amanullah. Faced with Amanullah's growing strength and a concurrent lack of support for his monarchical bid, on February 28, Nasrullah arrived in Kabul where he renounced the throne in favor of Amanullah.

On March 3, 1919, Nasrullah was arrested. A trial was held where Habibullah's assassination was blamed on an army officer who was subsequently executed. Nasrullah was sentenced to life in prison, but died the following year. He was most likely murdered on the orders of his nephew to remove any potential threat to the new emir.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Great Game, The; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Amanullah; Khan, Habibullah; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan; World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918).

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Khan, Shah Mahmud (1888–1959)

Shah Mahmud Khan was an Afghan prince who served as prime minister from 1946 to 1953 during the early days of the Cold War. Shah Mahmud was born in 1890. He was the brother of Mohammed Nadir Shah, who

became king of Afghanistan after defeating Habibullah Kalakani (Kalakani held power for less than a year in 1929). Nadir Shah made his brother minister of war. After the king was assassinated in 1933, his son Mohammed Zahir Shah became king with the support of Shah Mahmud.

Zahir Shah retained his uncle as minister of war until 1946. During his tenure, he brought in German military advisers to help modernize the Afghan Army, which underwent a dramatic period of modernization. He supported Afghan neutrality during World War II and was a strong proponent of better ties with the United States as a way to balance increased Soviet influence in southwest Asia after the war.

Zahir Shah appointed Shah Mahmud prime minister on May 19, 1946. He was considered more liberal than his brother Mohammad Hashim Khan, who had preceded him, serving as prime minister from 1929 to 1946. Shah Mahmud was tasked with reforming the country's economy and political system. He faced several significant challenges. The partition of the British colony of India into India and Pakistan had reinvigorated the Pashtunistan issue—the drive to unite the Pashtun people in a single country. Tensions over the Pashtunistan matter strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Shah Mahmud sought to enhance ties with the United States. He requested military and economic aid from the administration of Harry S. Truman, but the growing security relationship between the United States and Pakistan led Washington to rebuff the requests. However, Shah Mahmud's government contracted with a private U.S. firm to undertake the Helmand Valley project to create hydroelectric dams and irrigation canals. The project was funded through development loans from the U.S. Import-Export

Bank and was one of the largest infrastructure projects in Afghan history. In 1951, the prime minister made an official visit to Washington, D.C., to press his case directly with Truman, but the administration continued to deny military assistance to Afghanistan.

The prime minister put pro-Western moderates into senior positions and initiated a range of reforms. He expanded the university system and increased the number of teachers as part of an attempt to expand education. Shah Mahmud also dramatically expanded the number of Afghans who went abroad for technical training or additional education. He increased spending on infrastructure programs and expanded the nation's telephone system, as well as the highway and rail system. Political reforms led to relatively free and open elections for the national assembly in 1949, resulting in what became known as the "Liberal Parliament." However, opposition groups gained a majority in the legislature while antigovernment organizations became more bold and open in criticizing the government. During the late 1940s, groups such as the Awakened Youth emerged, the forerunner of the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In response, opposition leaders were arrested and the 1952 elections were highly controlled, resulting in a conservative, pro-monarchy assembly.

On September 7, 1953, Shah Mahmud was replaced by Mohammed Daoud Khan, who gradually began to turn toward the Soviet Union. Shah Mahmud died on December 27, 1959.

Tom Lansford

See also: Cold War (1947–1989); Helmand Valley Project; Khan, Mohammad Hashim; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); United States, Relations with Afghanistan; Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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Khan, Sher Ali (ca. 1825–1879)

Sher Ali Khan was twice emir of Afghanistan, from 1863 to 1868 and from 1868 to 1879. He ruled Afghanistan at the start of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880) and died in the midst of the conflict. Sher Ali was born sometime around 1825, most likely in Kabul. He was the third son of Dost Mohammad Khan, who deposed the Durrani and established the Barakzai dynasty. Dost Mohammad had 27 sons and when he died on June 9, 1863, there were multiple claimants to the throne. A broad civil war broke out. Sher Ali was able to gain the throne, only to be deposed by his half brother Mohammad Afzal Khan two years later. Mohammad Afzal had been imprisoned in Ghazni, but was freed by his son, Abdur Rahman Khan. Mohammad Afzal's tenure was equally short; he died on October 7, 1867, in Kabul and was replaced by another half brother, Mohammad Azam Khan.

Sher Ali regained the throne in 1868 after he captured Kabul and Abdur Rahman was exiled to Russian Turkistan. Sher Ali spent the next decade trying to consolidate power. The emir also nurtured a grudge against the British, who had not recognized him as emir when he first came to power in 1863. Sher Ali believed that the lack of formal acknowledgment by the British had undermined his claim to the throne. With the widespread fighting, the British had been waiting to see if a clear winner emerged.

As Sher Ali concentrated on securing his kingdom, his main priority in foreign policy was to avoid being drawn into the Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry in the region. During the early years of his second reign, the emir was able to maintain cordial relations with British India. The colonial administration was pleased to see an end to the civil wars in Afghanistan since it wanted a strong buffer state between its territory and the rapidly expanding Russian Empire. Sher Ali's strategy was based on neutrality, manifested by a refusal to accept a permanent diplomatic mission in Kabul from either the British or the Russians.

Within Afghanistan, Sher Ali faced growing internal dissension. He had named his son Abdullah Jan as his heir, which infuriated another son, Mohammad Yakub Khan. Yakub had won several battles in the effort to secure his father's throne and believed himself better suited to rule. Sher Ali had him imprisoned. However, in 1878, Abdullah Jan died and Yakub was released.

Meanwhile, also in 1878, the Russians dispatched a diplomatic mission to Kabul. Although uninvited, the mission prompted deep concerns on the part of the British who demanded that they be allowed to forward a similar party. Sher Ali refused, fearing that it would compel the Russians to send another mission. The British escalated their demands with an ultimatum to which the emir chose not to respond. The British invaded Afghanistan on November 21, 1878, starting the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

The British won a series of battles and advanced on Kabul. They were able to capture Kandahar and inflict heavy losses on the Afghans. Sher Ali placed Yakub Khan in command of Kabul and fled. He had hoped to secure military support from Russia, but his pleas were unanswered. While traveling to Turkistan, he died on February 21, 1879.

Yakub Khan became emir and accepted terms from the British through the Treaty of Gandamak (1879), only to face an insurrection led by his brother Ayub Khan, which forced him to abdicate on October 12. On July 22, 1880, Abdur Rahman Khan, the son of Mohammad Afzal, was proclaimed emir and recognized by the British as the monarch of the Afghans. Ayub Khan was defeated and forced into exile.

Brian Carriere

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Dost Mohammad; Durrani Empire (1747–1818); Gandamak, Treaty of (1879); Great Game, The; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Ayub; Khan, Mohammad Yakub; Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleigh (Lord); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Stewart, Sir Donald; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Khistmand, Sultan Ali (1935–)

Sultan Ali Khistmand was prime minister of Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). Khistmand was born on May 22, 1935, near Kabul to a poor Shi'a, ethnic Hazara farming family. He attended Kabul University where he studied economics. While at the university, he was drawn to Marxism because of the inequalities in Afghan society. Khistmand was involved in several underground opposition groups even though he worked for the Ministry of Mines and Industries for 12 years.

Khistmand participated in the creation of the communist, pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965. When the party split into two factions two years later, Khistmand joined the *Parcham* ("Banner") wing, instead of the more hard-line *Khalq* ("Masses") wing (each faction was named after its respective newspaper). Khistmand became a well-known party member, often writing essays for the Banner publication. After the PDPA overthrew the government in the Saur Revolution in April 1978, the economist was appointed minister of planning. However, when the Khalq faction purged Parcham members of the new regime in August, Khistmand was arrested. He was imprisoned, tortured, and sentenced to death (the sentence was later reduced to 20 years' imprisonment).

Khistmand and other Parcham members were released after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Upon his release, the economist became deputy prime minister and minister of planning. In June 1981, Khistmand was appointed prime minister (he also remained minister of planning). He became the first Hazara and the first Shi'a prime minister of Afghanistan. His appointment was part of a broader effort by the PDPA to appeal to Afghanistan's ethnic and religious minorities.

Generally perceived as a moderate, the prime minister endeavored to reduce poverty and improve housing. He also attempted with moderate success to maintain public services, including education and utilities, sewage and sanitation, in the areas under the control of the PDPA and their Soviet allies. However, the antigovernment mujahideen targeted government workers and services and undermined the regime's efforts. Despite Soviet support, the economy of Afghanistan declined significantly during the occupation.

Khistmand resigned in May 1988, but was reappointed in February 1989. In 1990 the PDPA assembly elected the prime minister as vice president of the regime. However, Khistmand resigned in 1991 after clashing with President Mohammed Najibullah over economic policy. As the PDPA regime collapsed, Khistmand and his family fled to the Soviet Union in February 1992. He and his family then settled in the United Kingdom, where they remain in exile. In 2002, the former prime minister published his memoirs in three volumes.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Najibullah, Mohammed; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979).

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Khost, Sieges of (1980–1989)

The city of Khost remained under more or less continuous siege throughout the Soviet

occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). Located near the border with Pakistan, Khost was strategically important for several reasons, including the large Khost airfield, which had a runway that could support combat jets and would serve as a hub for Soviet helicopter operations during the occupation. The city had a population of about 100,000, mainly Pashtuns, and a garrison of about 9,000 troops from the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), along with about 25–30 Soviet advisers. Mujahideen strength fluctuated significantly, ranging from 5,000 to about 10,000.

Prior to the Soviet invasion, the mujahideen launched attacks against troops of the pro-Soviet government. In May 1979, an offensive by a government mechanized brigade ended in the surrender of the entire force of 2,000, along with their weapons, artillery, and armored vehicles. Soon after the Soviet invasion in December, mujahideen forces moved into the surrounding countryside. Khost's proximity to Pakistan meant that it was relatively easy for the insurgents to resupply from bases across the border. During the siege, the Soviets tried a variety of strategies to interdict supplies, including dropping aerial mines on the supply routes, conducting aerial bombing raids on the paths, and even trying to bribe border tribes into attacking the supply convoys. None of the efforts was very successful.

The mujahideen were able to occupy the hills surrounding Khost and fire down on the city and garrison during the sieges with artillery and rockets. By 1980, Khost was cut off by the mujahideen and could only be resupplied by air. Over the next few years, the insurgents endeavored to capture the remaining outposts outside of the city in order to pave the way for a direct assault on Khost itself. In June 1983, the DRA's 38th Commando Brigade launched an attack to break through

to the city, but the offensive was repulsed with heavy casualties. As the siege wore on, defections became more problematic for the DRA forces. In 1983, two tank crews defected with their T-55s. However, in 1984, DRA troops were able to open a road to Khost, briefly lifting the siege, with the aid of some tribal militias.

The DRA's recruitment of tribal militias highlighted one of several continuing problems faced by the mujahideen—disunity. Ethnic and regional divisions prevented insurgent forces from cooperating fully. There were often disputes over command, or the distribution of supplies or captured weaponry. The mujahideen also lacked equipment. They did not have enough artillery and were woefully deficient in armor. They also lacked modern mine-clearing equipment, ceding a major advantage to the dug-in troops of the DRA.

To relieve the pressure on Khost in August 1985, the DRA and Soviet forces launched an offensive against the main rebel base in the region at Zhawar. The offensive was unsuccessful, but a new campaign against Zhawar was able to capture the base in April 1986. However, the DRA and Soviet forces quickly withdrew, allowing the mujahideen to reoccupy the base. In August 1987, the Soviets launched a major offensive to lift the siege, utilizing 18,000 troops, along with heavy armor, led by Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, the commander of the Soviet 40th Army. The operation was successful, lifting the siege and clearing a road to the city that would remain open until the Soviet withdrawal.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Armored Vehicles; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Gromov, Boris; Haqqani, Jalaluddin; Mujahideen; Operation Storm 333 (1979);

Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Varennikov, Valentin; Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986).

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Khost Rebellion (1924–1925)

The Khost Rebellion was an insurrection that was led by Mangal tribes against Afghan emir Amanullah Khan's efforts to modernize the country. The tribes were most opposed to reforms that increased taxation, established conscription, and banned polygamy. The conservative clerics of the tribe asserted that the changes violated sharia law. The Mangal tribes began the conflict, but it soon spread to other Pashtun tribes in eastern Afghanistan. The revolt was led by Abdullah, Mullah-i-Lang, and Mullah Abdul Rashid.

In an effort to counter opposition to his reform program, Amanullah convened a Loya Jirga of representatives drawn from the upper strata of society, including large landowners, loyalist clerics, and tribal leaders. Although he met with considerable resistance, Amanullah was able to convince the Afghan elites to support most of his reforms. The one area where Amanullah was unable to gain any concessions was in regard to women's rights. The clerics bitterly opposed the emir's bid to outlaw polygamy.

Amanullah was forced to modify the section of the reform addressing women. He

also accepted a proposal that new laws would not supersede some traditional legal systems already in place. The emir's concessions satisfied most of the objections of the elites. Consequently, the clerics agreed to declare a fatwa against the rural clerics that opposed the emir's reforms. The rebel leaders were branded as heretics and declared traitors to Islam and Afghanistan. Those who supported the rebels were also branded as blasphemers.

The Loya Jirga helped garner additional support for Amanullah. Tribes that had not committed to the government or the rebels backed the emir. Government troops also had a substantial advantage in terms of weapons, including machine guns and artillery. The Afghan military also used two biplanes against the rebels to conduct both aerial attacks and reconnaissance missions. Many of the attacks were on villages and other civilian targets. The airplanes were flown by German mercenaries who were veterans of World War I.

Abdul Karim, the son of former emir Yaqub Khan who ruled briefly during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), emerged as the leader of the rebellion. Abdul provided a degree of legitimacy to the insurrection and served as an inspiration to those opposed to Amanullah's modernization programs. While Abdul Karim's leadership seemed to draw new supporters to the rebellion, Amanullah used his opponent's role to discredit the revolt. The emir argued that Abdul was an agent of the British. This line of propaganda convinced some wavering tribal leaders to back the throne.

Rebel forces drove to within eight miles of Kabul, pillaging as they went. However, the rebellion was suppressed in 1925, mainly as the result of the superior weapons and training of the government forces. Rebel leader Mullah-i-Lang was captured and

executed along with 40 other rebel leaders. Those rebels who escaped fled to India. Though the revolt only lasted nine months, it taxed the resources of the government. It accounted for two years' worth of state revenue. This prevented Amanullah from going forward with several of his modernization projects. The extent of the rebellion's effects can be seen in Amanullah's position as he scaled back his reforms in order to gain support from the clerics. He went on a world tour afterward, gathering more ideas for modernization. The emir subsequently increased his reform efforts. The resistance to modern reform led to another tribal revolt, which resulted in Amanullah's abdication in 1929.

Jorge Brown

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Khan, Amanullah.

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Khyber, Mir Akbar (1925–1978)

Mir Akbar Khyber was a prominent leader of the Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) whose assassination sparked the Saur Revolution and the overthrow of Mohammed Daoud Khan's government. Khyber was born on

January 11, 1925, in Kabul. In 1947, he graduated from the Harbi Pohantoon Military University, but refused to participate in a graduation ceremony and as a result was not commissioned into the army. Khyber became increasingly active among opposition groups. He was arrested and imprisoned for subversion in 1950 for his embrace of communism and his opposition to Islam. While in prison in 1953, he shared a cell with Babrak Karmal and is generally credited with solidifying the Marxist ideology of the future PDPA leader and prime minister.

Despite his imprisonment, Khyber secured a teaching position, but was again arrested in 1965, this time for participation in an antigovernment riot. Meanwhile, the PDPA was formed in early 1965, with Khyber as one of its early leaders. Khyber subsequently moved to Kabul and became increasingly active in the Parcham wing of the PDPA (Parcham advocated a gradual transition to socialism, while its rival faction, Khalq, argued for the immediate imposition of a Soviet-style regime—the two factions split in 1967, along with a number of smaller groups). Khyber took over the editorship of the party's newspaper, the *Parcham*. Because of his background, he also undertook a clandestine effort to recruit members of the Afghan Army into the PDPA. By the 1970s, Khyber was generally regarded as the intellectual leader of the Parcham faction, although his group was outnumbered by the larger Khalq wing.

In March 1977, the Soviet Union facilitated a rapprochement between the Parcham and Khalq factions as part of a broader strategy of creating a viable Marxist opposition to the regime of Mohammed Daoud Khan, who had seized power in 1973.

On April 17, 1978, Khyber was assassinated in Kabul. The government initially blamed the killing on the Islamist *Hezb-e*

Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and claimed it was in retaliation for Khyber's promotion of secularism. However, the leader of the PDPA, Nur Muhammad Taraki, and other party officials accused the government of the assassination. Meanwhile, some in the Parcham wing asserted that the Khalq faction had orchestrated the killing in response to Khyber's success in recruiting supporters to Parcham.

On April 19, 1978, during Khyber's funeral, massive protests broke out in Kabul. Alarmed at the size and strength of the demonstrations, Daoud ordered security officials to suppress the PDPA and arrest its leaders. In response, the PDPA launched the Saur Revolution with support from the military. The uprising overthrew Daoud and created a socialist government with Taraki as president and Karmal as his deputy. Approximately 2,000 people were killed in the violence surrounding the coup, including Daoud and his family.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Karmal, Babrak; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Saur Revolution (1978–1979).

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Khyber Pass

The Khyber (also spelled Khaibar and Khaybar) Pass is a strategic location between Afghanistan and Pakistan at approximately 34.12°N and 71.09°E, which is a natural pass (a low point in a mountain range)

through the Spin Ghar, “White Mountains,” range of the Hindu Kush Mountains. The Khyber Pass stretches for about 52 kilometers (33 miles) and connects central Asia and south Asia through a series of arid hills in the last spurs of the Spin Ghar Range. The pass varies in width from a few meters to more than 130 meters (450 feet) with shale and limestone cliff faces more than 300 meters (1,000 feet) tall through the Khyber Gorge created by the Khyber River. The Khyber Pass is strategically important for trade and military control. The pass forms a natural “choke point” where ground traffic must travel to traverse the mountain range. Historically, the pass has been used as a source of tolls for safe conduct, for military incursions across the Spin Ghar Range, and as a part of the famed “Silk Road,” a trade network from China to the Middle East from 114 BCE to around 1450 CE.

The earliest references to the Khyber Pass as a strategic point are from the fifth century BCE when Darius I the Great of Persia used the pass to spread his area of control to the Indus River, and in 326 BCE when Alexander the Great of Macedonia attempted to conquer the Indian subcontinent in south Asia. The Sikhs held the Khyber Pass for years after Hari Singh Nalwa conquered it in 1798. The importance of the Khyber Pass was evident in the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839–1842, the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878–1880, and the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. In the first two wars, the British fought various skirmishes, eventually resulting in British control of the pass with the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879. The British mostly controlled the pass until their withdrawal from the area in 1947 when Pakistan gained independence as

East and West Pakistan, with a brief exception when the Pashtun Afridis held it for several months in 1897. Culturally, the Pashtun people have lived on both sides of the pass for centuries, leaving the Khyber Pass as the main connection between the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and the Pashtuns of northern Pakistan.

Currently, the Pakistani government is in control of the pass, which has been developed with a surfaced road for vehicular traffic, a caravan trail for traditional traffic, and a railroad, all of which require 34 tunnels and almost 100 bridges connecting the towns of Landi Khana, Afghanistan, and Jamrud, Pakistan. The Pashtuns, Mullagori Afridis, and Afghan Shinwaris remain the majority ethnicities of the Khyber Pass region. The Khyber Pass remains crucial for trade and communication between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The use of the pass is often a point of negotiation for aid, refugee transport, and military presence, requiring cooperation between the Pakistani government and the Pashtuns in the area.

David Harms Holt

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars) (1748–1837); Afridi (Khyberee) Tribe; Ranjit Singh, Maharaja; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Landmines

The use of explosive hazards in military operations spans almost three centuries. Landmines, unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are designed to destroy or damage civilian or military equipment, or to wound, kill, or incapacitate civilian or military personnel. In Afghanistan, explosive hazards resulted from military operations during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), and the current military operations involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Taliban, insurgents, and terrorist organizations. The level of explosive hazards land contamination in Afghanistan is one of the highest in the world, and it affects the food supply, human migration and resettlement, education, and economic and social development.

Landmines and IEDs may be detonated by the actions of victims, the passage of time, or by controlled means. Both are usually unmarked and unknown by military or civilian personnel, and the terms are often used interchangeably. Landmines are manufactured devices, including antitank and antipersonnel munitions, generally used in combat by recognized military forces. IEDs, in contrast, are makeshift, low-technology, low-cost devices utilized by antigovernment forces, criminal networks, or terrorist organizations.

Soviet and Afghan forces emplaced landmines during the 10-year Soviet occupation. Landmines of 50 different variations were scattered or buried across urban and rural terrain, beside roads and footpaths, on

mountainsides and in grazing areas, and in irrigation systems and houses. Characterized as “sleeping weapons,” landmines, such as the Soviet butterfly mine, may remain dormant for up to five decades, and maim adults and children who are unaware of their dangers. Thousands of Afghan amputees were victims of landmine explosions, precipitating the concept of humanitarian mine action. During the 1990s, an estimated 2,000–3,000 people were killed by landmines each year. By 2001, Afghanistan had an estimated 10 million landmines scattered through the country. Led by the United Nations (UN) Mine Action Service, Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan, almost 80 percent of legacy mine contamination has been addressed over the last two decades.

The proliferation of cheap and easy-to-use IEDs since 2003 in Afghanistan changed the military order of battle and formation, and influenced military medicine. IEDs, insurgents’ weapon of choice against NATO forces and local populations, are responsible for the majority of U.S. and coalition injuries and deaths since 9/11. The accessibility of IED materials and ease of placement continue to influence the military’s operating environment. In 2010, NATO developed a Counter-IED Action Plan with three main focus areas: defeating the device, attacking the network, and preparing the forces. A permanent U.S. Department of Defense agency, the Joint Improvised-Defeat Agency, was created to defeat IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence.

The UN, NATO, and other humanitarian organizations continue to resource landmine

and IED clearance in Afghanistan. The United States is the world's largest financial supporter of efforts of landmine removal and medical support for landmine victims around the world and in Afghanistan. However, the United States, along with China and Russia, is not a signatory to the Ottawa Convention. Initiated in 1999, parties to the convention commit to cease the use of antipersonnel landmines.

M. Annette Evans

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Lockhart, Sir William (1841–1900)

Born on September 2, 1841, at Milton Lockhart, Lanarkshire, William Lockhart was a British Army general. Lockhart joined the East India Company on October 4, 1858, as an officer in the 44th Bengal Native Infantry. He served in the Indian Mutiny in 1858–1859, the Bhutan campaign in 1864–1866, the Abyssinian expedition in 1867–1868, and with the Hazara Field Force in the Black Mountain campaign in 1868. At the outset of the Second Afghan War in 1878, Lockhart served as the road commandant in the Khyber Pass and in November 1879 was appointed to the staff at Kabul under Lord

Roberts. He served at the battle of Sherpore and other operations around Kabul. After serving on the staff of the Northern Afghanistan Field Force under Sir Donald Stewart, Lockhart returned to India in August 1880. In 1885 he served as an envoy on a political mission to Chitral, and in 1886–1887 he commanded a brigade in Upper Burma.

In November 1890 Lockhart was appointed commander of the Punjab Frontier Force and in 1891 he led the two Miranzai Field Forces that sought to pacify the Orakzais with the tribe submitting on May 9, 1891. In 1891 he also commanded the 3rd Brigade of the Hazara Field Force launched against the Black Mountain tribes. Lockhart commanded the Isazai field force in 1892 and led the three brigade-strong Mahsud expedition in 1894–1895. In 1895 Lockhart was appointed to lead the Punjab Command and was promoted to general the next year.

During the widespread unrest on the frontier in 1897, Lockhart was recalled from leave in England to command the Tirah Field Force against the Afridis and Orakzais. The largest expedition deployed on the frontier, Lockhart's command consisted of two divisions with a total strength of 40,000 soldiers. On October 20, 1897, the British captured Dargai, where the Gordon Highlanders famously stormed the heights against stiff resistance. The field force then seized the passes of Sempagha and Arhanga before entering the Maidan Valley, the heartland of Tirah. The town of Maidan was occupied on October 31, 1897. While the Orakzais submitted in November, the Afridis continued to resist as Lockhart dispatched columns throughout Tirah, burning villages and destroying food supplies. In December 1897, with the approach of winter, Lockhart divided his force and withdrew from the valley. One of his divisions encountered little resistance as it retired along the Mastara

Valley, while the other division experienced bitter fighting as it withdrew down the Bara Valley.

After the withdrawal from Tirah, Lockhart accompanied the 1st Division in late December 1897 as it conducted a punitive expedition against the Afridis in the Bazar Valley. Little opposition was encountered as the principal villages in the valley were destroyed. That month Lockhart also dispatched a column from Peshawar to reoccupy the Khyber Pass and restore the British positions. The Tirah campaign closed in March 1898 as the Afridis grudgingly submitted.

Having amassed a record as one of the most experienced and successful commanders in warfare on the frontier, in 1898 Lockhart was appointed commander in chief, India. He died from malaria while holding that appointment on March 18, 1900, at Calcutta.

Bradley P. Tolppanen

See also: Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Dargai Heights, Battle of (1897); Hazara Uprisings (1888–1901); Tirah Campaign (1897–1898)

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Loya Jirga

The Pashto term *Loya Jirga* (literally “a grand council”) has Turco-Mongolian origins and originally meant “great tent.” *Loya* (meaning great or grand) and *jirga* (meaning council, assembly, dispute, or meeting) subsequently became a phrase referring to large

meetings held among certain central Asian peoples. In Persian it translated to “grand assembly.”

In Afghanistan the councils served as a forum for political consensus-building among tribal elders. In Pashtun tradition, Loya Jirgas were held at critical moments to make or legitimize important decisions. The members of the Jirgas mostly belonged to the royal family, religious leaders, and Afghan tribal chiefs. Pashtun elders dominated the Loya Jirgas throughout most of Afghanistan’s history. Eventually, other ethnic groups, including Tajiks and Hazaras, were allowed to attend as observers.

In the 20th century Loya Jirgas were convened to deliberate about Afghanistan’s role in World War I (1915), to approve the rules of business for the national council (1930), to decide Afghanistan’s role in World War II (1941), and to resolve the Afghan relationship with Pakhtunistan in 1955 after Pakistan inherited the British role in the region. In 1977 Mohammed Daoud Khan convened a Loya Jirga to legitimize his rule, pass a new constitution, elect a new president, and obtain permission to found a new revolutionary political party. Following the Communist Revolution of 1978, and the subsequent Soviet invasion in December 1979, Afghanistan split into pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet factions.

From time to time during the period of Soviet occupation and subsequent Taliban rule, a variety of factions convened Loya Jirgas. Because the councils were either dominated by or heavily influenced by foreign powers, however, these Loya Jirgas did not enjoy popular credibility. The most influential of the rival Loya Jirgas was in Germany in 2001 and produced the Bonn Agreement, which was brokered by the United Nations (UN). The agreement, reached in December, following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan,

established an Afghan Interim Authority and prepared the way for the establishment of a new Afghan constitution.

Following the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban on June 13, 2002, an emergency meeting of the Loya Jirga took place in Kabul to select an interim government. In preparation for this meeting, the UN, in accordance with the Bonn Agreement, had supervised an initial round of elections for delegates to the Loya Jirga. Local power struggles influenced these elections, leading to inevitable accusations of corruption and coercion. Each of Afghanistan's 362 districts had at least one seat, with a further seat allotted for every 22,000 people. No group was excluded, except for those alleged to have committed acts of terrorism or suspected of crimes. International pressure helped influence the rule that the Loya Jirga would guarantee seats for 160 women.

The Loya Jirga also assigned current government officials 53 seats, reserved 100 seats for Afghan refugees, reserved 6 more seats for internally displaced Afghans, and provided 25 seats for nomads. The emergency Loya Jirga of 2002 then elected Hamid Karzai as head of state. Karzai won 83 percent of the 1,555 valid votes cast by members of the Loya Jirga. In his acceptance speech, Karzai referred to the historic tradition of the Loya Jirga by saying that "after 25 years, all the Afghans are gathering under one tent."

On December 13, 2003, 500 delegates convened at a Loya Jirga to deliberate the drafting of a constitution. The role of women proved particularly contentious. In many districts religious scholars opposed the election of women. Delegates to the Loya Jirga had to seek a balance between Afghanistan's deep-rooted Islamic traditions and its aspirations for democratic rule. Influencing the debate was the struggle for power among rival sects and factions.

International observers have noted that the Loya Jirga is a critical piece in the establishment of Afghanistan's political future. In January 2004 a second Loya Jirga ratified the newly drafted constitution of Afghanistan. The Taliban was not represented, although groups sharing some of their views did participate. A "peace" Jirga was held in June 2010 in Kabul to discuss ways to end the ongoing conflict with the Taliban. A Loya Jirga in November 2013 approved a proposed security agreement with the United States whereby a reduced number of U.S. troops would remain in Afghanistan until 2024.

James R. Arnold

See also: Bonn Agreement (2001); Karzai, Hamid; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Pashtunwali (Pukhtunwali); Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918); World War II and Afghanistan (1939–1945).

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Lytton, Edward Robert Bulwer, First Earl of Lytton (1831–1891)

Edward Robert Bulwer-Lytton was a noted British diplomat who served as the governor-general and viceroy of India from 1876 to 1880. Lytton dispatched forces into

Afghanistan after the refusal of a British diplomatic mission by Emir Sher Ali Khan following a visit to Kabul by an envoy of the Russian czar. This invasion began the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880).

Born November 8, 1831, to Edward Bulwer-Lytton, 1st Baron Lytton, and Rosina Doyle Wheeler, Lytton studied language at the University of Bonn for a year before accompanying his uncle, Sir Henry Bulwer, the British ambassador to the United States, to Washington, D.C., as his personal attaché. Lytton was 18 at the time. He went on to have a distinguished career as a diplomat. Lytton held a variety of posts in Vienna, Constantinople, Madrid, The Hague, and Lisbon, among others. Upon his father's death in 1874, he became Lord Lytton.

In 1875, Lytton declined the governorship of Madras. He intended to retire to private life following his time as minister at Lisbon, but was persuaded by Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli to accept the position of viceroy of India in 1876. During his time as viceroy, Lytton arranged Queen Victoria's coronation as empress of India. The event was criticized by the Liberal Party as an excessive expense. They were also critical of his restrictions on the press and administrative response to a famine in south India.

In the summer of 1878, a Russian envoy and his escort arrived in Kabul. Despite protests from the British, the delegation was received by Sher Ali. Lytton insisted that a similar British envoy be received by the emir. In anticipation of the expected invitation, Lytton sent a British mission to Kabul. However, they were refused entry into Afghanistan. This was interpreted as an insult to the British government. The viceroy responded promptly with an ultimatum to the emir demanding the establishment of a permanent

residence in Kabul and an official apology to be received no later than November 20, 1878. If these conditions were not met, the emir was informed that British forces would enter the country. With full support from the government in Britain, he dispatched Anglo-Indian forces to the border with Afghanistan. Sher Ali's response arrived after the deadline and, in the eyes of Lytton, without an appropriate apology. The British forces invaded Afghanistan from three fronts and took possession of the country quickly. With the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879, the British objective of direct influence over Afghan foreign policy was realized.

Lord Lytton retired from public life following his resignation as viceroy in 1880. For his service, Queen Victoria conferred upon him the title of earl. He was called back into service as the ambassador to France in 1887. He held this position until his death on November 24, 1891, of heart failure. He was given a state funeral in Paris.

Jorge Brown

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Disraeli, Benjamin; Gandamak, Treaty of (1879); Great Game, The; Khan, Sher Ali.

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Macnaghten, Sir William Hay (1793–1841)

Sir William Hay Macnaghten was a British colonial official whose support for Shuja Shah's claim to the Afghan throne led to the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Macnaghten was born on August 24, 1793. His father, a prominent jurist in colonial India, served on the Madras Supreme Court. In 1809, the younger Macnaghten was appointed a cadet in the military service of the East India Company. Five years later, he transferred to the company's civil service. Meanwhile, Macnaghten became proficient in a number of regional languages, including Hindi, Tamil, and Marathi. He was appointed a magistrate in 1818 and a judge in 1820. He subsequently passed examinations in Hindi and Muslim law, and became well known as an expert on both following a series of publications by the young scholar.

In 1833, Macnaghten met with Sikh leader Maharaja Ranjit Singh as part of a diplomatic mission. He subsequently pressed for better relations between the British and the Sikhs. That same year, Macnaghten was appointed head of the company's secret and political branch, overseeing intelligence operations throughout India. In 1837, he joined the staff of the newly appointed governor-general, Lord Auckland. Over the next year, Macnaghten argued that Afghan leader Dost Mohammad Khan should be deposed and replaced by Shuja Shah. In June 1838, Macnaghten was able to negotiate a treaty between Shuja Shah, Ranjit Singh, and the British in support of Shuja Shah's claim to

the throne. He assisted in the drafting of the Simla Manifesto of October 1838, in which Auckland announced that British policy was to replace Dost Mohammad with Shuja Shah.

Macnaghten was appointed envoy to Shuja Shah and accompanied the Anglo-Indian forces that invaded Afghanistan in 1839. During the advance to Kabul, Macnaghten frequently clashed with military leaders over issues of strategy. He also was at odds with Sir Alexander ("Sekundar") Burnes, the former British resident in Kabul. Burnes had argued that the British should continue to support Dost Mohammad. Once the British occupied the Afghan capital and displaced Dost Mohammad, Macnaghten worked to garner support for the new ruler. However, Shuja Shah was an unpopular leader and the country grew increasingly restive. Meanwhile, in January 1840, Macnaghten was knighted for his service. In November, Dost Mohammad surrendered to the envoy. Meanwhile, Macnaghten endeavored to implement a number of political and economic reforms in the Afghan capital.

Over the next year, the situation deteriorated in Kabul. Against the advice of the envoy, the British reduced their subsidies to the various Afghan chiefs in an attempt to reduce the costs of the occupation. The cut in funds eliminated the final incentives for many of the tribal leaders to remain loyal to Shuja Shah. On November 2, 1841, Burnes was killed at his residence in the capital. Macnaghten requested that the British commander in Kabul, Major General William George Keith Elphinstone, take strong

action, but the general demurred. As a general uprising against Shuja Shah and the British spread, the envoy again pressed for military intervention, to no avail. On December 8, Elphinstone informed Macnaghten that the Anglo-Indian troops would be unable to quell the revolt. Three days later the envoy began negotiations for the withdrawal of British troops from Kabul in exchange for the return of Dost Mohammad. On December 23, Macnaghten was killed as he negotiated with Dost Mohammad's son, Mohammad Akbar Khan. Elphinstone then led the remaining Anglo-Indian forces out of Kabul in a disastrous retreat in which almost all of the troops and camp followers were massacred.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of; Burnes, Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”); Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Elphinstone, William George Keith; Great Game, The; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Nott, Sir William; Pollock, Sir George; Ranjit Singh, Maharaja; Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”).

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Madrasahs

The term *madrasah* is simply the Arabic word for school. It can also mean a more

advanced academy or college of Islamic studies. In the past, the lower-level school of Islamic study was called a *kuttab*, where memorization of the Koran was taught, but in modern times a *kuttab* is sometimes confused with a *madrasah* as in the general meaning of the word. Mosques, or *masajid*, may also have a *halaqat*, or study circle. Early in Islamic history, *madrasahs* were attached to mosques. Those that were separate institutions came later. Nizam al-Mulk, an 11th-century ruler, is said to have institutionalized the system by building a great school, the *Nizamiyah*, that was then copied by others.

These separately established *madrasahs* were primarily created to teach Islamic law but included subjects other than *fiqh* (jurisprudence), such as Arabic, *tafsir* (study of the interpretation of the Koran), mysticism, and hadith science. They were open to traveling students, often from the poorer classes in society. Typically, these *madrasahs* were endowed to give stipends to students who might live there and to provide salaries to the faculty. The fortunes of the *madrasahs* rose and fell depending on the times. Thus, the *madrasahs* of Mecca were not as well endowed in the 19th century as later.

Particularly in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the entire system of Islamic education was heavily criticized in the West and blamed for the rise of the Taliban, for example. Certainly many, although not all, of the Taliban did come from the *madrasahs* in Pakistan, but the critique of all *madrasahs* as institutions teaching hatred for the West or seeking to institute a radical form of Islam is misinformed. Most acts of Islamic terrorism around the world have been the product of individuals trained outside of the *madrasah* system. Nevertheless, it is true that some *madrasahs* in Pakistan have provided jihadists

to the Taliban and Kashmiri militant groups. At least two of the suicide bombers who struck the London transportation system on July 7, 2005, had spent time at a Pakistani madrasah. However, it is also true that one cannot obtain advanced Islamic training outside of the Islamic education system, as the requisite subjects are not taught at all in universities or Western seminaries.

In some areas the madrasahs are being subjected to reforms imposed by the state, as in Saudi Arabia. In other countries they have long been under attack or even shut down by the government, as in Turkey. In Egypt's renowned Al-Azhar University system, the madrasah curriculum has evolved steadily, although this has not satisfied all critics of al-Azhar's broader educational system, which includes primary and secondary schools. In Iraq in the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf, the madrasah system is presided over by the *Hawzah al-Ilmiyya* (the certified Islamic scholars). In general, clerics of the Hawzah support a separation of the life and work of the Muslim scholar from politics, which is why clerics such as Ayatollah Sistani resist being identified with political parties and may express views divergent from those of the government.

Many of the madrasahs in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and areas outside of the Arab heartland maintain a connection with the Arab Middle East, both through idealizing the history and legacy of Islamic studies and by religious and educationally related travel. Hence, connections with Saudi Arabia, for example, are to some degree unavoidable and not necessarily radicalizing. On the other hand, Muslim state governments are now keeping a close watch on pilgrims and those who travel for religious studies. Realization that many suicide bombers and other terrorists involved in terrorist attacks are not products of the madrasah system could

contribute to critical thinking about the modern phenomenon of Islamist terrorism.

Clare M. Lopez and Sherifa Zuhur

See also: Al Qaeda; Deobandi School; Mujahideen; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban.

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Maiwand, Battle of (1880)

The Battle of Maiwand on July 27, 1880, during the Second Afghan War (1878–1880), was a major defeat for the British. The fall of the Conservative government in England on April 28, 1880, resulted in a policy change to withdraw British forces from many locations, including Afghanistan. To fill the power vacuum upon their imminent departure and to maintain stability, the British selected Abdur Rahman to rule the country. He was proclaimed emir on July 22, 1880.

Ayub Khan, a brother of Mohammad Yakub Khan who was then governing Kabul, believed he should rule Afghanistan, and he had been marching with a large force toward Kandahar to gain the throne by force since

early July 1880. Former Afghan Army soldiers and religious followers flocked to Ayub Khan's cause.

On July 2, 1880, a British brigade, commanded by Brigadier General G. R. S. Burrows, began to advance from Kandahar to the Helmand River to prevent Ayub Khan's force from crossing it. Burrows's brigade consisted of the 66th Foot (minus two companies); 1st Bombay and 30th Bombay Native Infantry Regiments; 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry; 3rd Sind Horse; 2nd Company Bombay Miners and Sappers; E Battery, B Brigade, and Royal Horse Artillery. This unit totaled 2,599 soldiers, six 9-pounder guns, and about 3,000 support and transport personnel.

Some 6,000 British-equipped local Afghans, manning a blocking position at Girishk, mutinied and joined Ayub Khan's advancing army, abandoning six of their artillery pieces to the British. With the Helmand River then indefensible, Burrows withdrew to Khushk-i-Nakhud, 50 miles from Kandahar. British intelligence ascertained that Ayub Khan's advance force was in Maiwand on July 26, and Burrows marched his brigade the following morning to that location to engage the Afghan force on the march.

The British first spotted the Afghan force, estimated at more than 25,000 (with about 8,500 regular troops) with 30 guns, at about 10:00 a.m. on July 27. British artillery deployed forward and started firing on the Afghans. Burrows deployed his brigade in two lines, with the 1st Bombay Native Infantry to the left of the guns, four companies of 30th Bombay Native Infantry to the right of the guns, and the 66th Foot at the extreme right. The two cavalry regiments were positioned to the left rear of the line, and four companies of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry were in reserve.

The British, by deploying into a defensive combat position, forfeited the initiative. Ayub Khan's cavalry attacked the exposed British left flank, and Afghan irregular infantry moved into a ravine to threaten the British right flank. The 66th, using their Martini-Henrys, repulsed the attacking *ghazis* on the right flank. Burrows ordered units on his left to advance and break up the impending Afghan attack, but heavy and accurate Afghan artillery fire limited their advance to about 500 yards.

The Afghans suffered considerably and then regrouped. At around 1:30 p.m. the British smoothbore artillery ran out of ammunition and withdrew. About an hour later, the Afghans, led by irregular soldiers, conducted an all-out attack on the British. Companies of the 30th, having lost all their officers, broke and ran to the 1st Bombay Native Infantry, throwing the latter into confusion. A British cavalry charge was ineffective, and the horsemen retreated. Only the 66th maintained a semblance of order and discipline, and about 100 soldiers of the rearguard, surrounded by the Afghans, fought to the death. Realizing the situation was hopeless, Burrows ordered a withdrawal. The survivors straggled into Kandahar the following day.

The Battle of Maiwand was one of the worst British Army disasters of the Victorian era. The British lost about 962 soldiers killed and another 161 wounded. Afghan casualties are difficult to estimate, but some sources state they lost more than 5,500 killed and 1,500 wounded. Ayub Khan's force then marched on and besieged Kandahar.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Anglo-Afghan Wars: Second (1878–1880); British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Mohammad Yakub.



At the Battle of Maiwand on July 27, 1880, Afghan forces defeated the British. Despite their loss, the British were able to withdraw and save most of their artillery. Depicted here is the retreat of E Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery. (Mansell/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)

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Malakand Field Force (1897)

The ambush and murder in the Tochi Valley of the political agent Mr. H. A. Gee and the commander and other soldiers of his military escort in early July 1897 sparked the general uprising of the Pathan tribes on the

North-West Frontier of India. A punitive expedition, the Tochi Field Force, was organized and sent to castigate the perpetrators from the Madda Khel of the Isazais tribe.

The wave of religious fervor, coupled with tribal concerns about growing British power and the possible loss of independence, spread quickly to the Swat Valley. A warning to prepare for tribal unrest was sent to the Malakand Brigade, commanded by Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn with elements in two garrisons astride the line of communication with Chitral. In the fort at Malakand were one squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers; No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery; No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners; and three infantry battalions: the 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry and the 45th Sikhs. Ten miles northeast of the Malakand Fort was the Chakdara Fort, established to protect the suspension bridge over the Swat River and garrisoned by 180 soldiers from the 45th Sikhs and 20 from the 11th Bengal Lancers.

Late on July 26, 1897, word of the approach of tribesmen—Swatis, Utman Khels, Mamunds, Salarzais, and others, later joined by Bunerwals—was received at the Malakand Fort. A detachment of the 45th Sikhs was sent to delay their advance and, reinforced by the remainder of its battalion, successfully maintained its position until the tribesmen withdrew at about 2:00 a.m. During that time, however, a determined attack had been made on the north and center sectors of the Malakand Fort, with tribesmen successfully occupying an outbuilding and stealing ammunition until withdrawing at about 4:00 a.m.

Ferocious attacks against the Malakand Fort and desperate counterattacks by the British were conducted throughout the following four days and nights. A relief column under Colonel A. J. Reid arrived at the Malakand Fort on July 31, reinforcing the

exhausted British defenders. Between the start of hostilities on July 26 and August 1, the Malakand garrison sustained 20 officers killed and wounded and 158 other ranks killed and wounded. Brigadier General (later General) Sir Bindon Blood, who was appointed to command an expeditionary force to punish the revolting tribes, arrived at Malakand on August 1 and assumed control of the operations. On August 2, a relief column from Malakand left for Chakdara. Meeting determined opposition along the way, this column was able to relieve Chakdara later that evening.

While the Malakand Fort had been under almost continuous attack from the tribesmen, the Chakdara Fort had also been holding out against tremendous odds. From July 26 until August 2, the disciplined, skilled Chakdara garrison, with 5 killed and 10 wounded, had killed an estimated 2,000 tribesmen. The tribesmen later admitted to having lost 3,700 killed, plus many more wounded.

The Malakand Field Force, under Blood's overall command, was quickly constituted and ready for operations on August 7. It consisted of three brigades plus divisional troops. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General W. H. Meiklejohn, consisted of the 1st Royal West Kents, 24th and 31st Punjabis, and 24th Sikhs. The 1st East Kents, 35th Sikhs, 38th Dogras, and Guides Infantry composed Brigadier General P. D. Jeffreys's 2nd Brigade. Commanded by Brigadier General J. H. Wodehouse, the 3rd Brigade consisted of the 1st West Surreys, 2nd Highland Light Infantry, 22nd Punjabis, and 39th Garhwal Rifles. This force advanced up the Swat Valley, dispersing opposition, and received the submission of the Swat Valley tribes on August 24.

Before Blood had a chance to pacify other tribes and restore order in the area, he was

ordered to advance into Bajaur and coordinate operations with the Mohmand Field Force, commanded by Brigadier General E. R. Elles. (On August 6, 11 days after the assault on the Malakand Fort, the Mohmands had attacked the border police fort of Shabkadr, 15 miles north of Peshawar.) Blood's brigades frequently operated independently in the systematic operations to punish the clans in the Mamund Valley. Numerous villages were destroyed and supplies were confiscated and used to feed the British transport animals while occasional attacks were made on the British camps.

On September 21, Blood's 3rd Brigade was attached to the Mohmand Field Force, and he reorganized his force before continuing operations. Twelve or 14 villages were burned by the 2nd Brigade on September 29. The Malakand Field Force attacked the villages of Agrah and Gat on September 31, but it encountered surprisingly stubborn resistance as "it soon became apparent that large numbers of the enemy were concealed amongst the crags on the spur between the two villages" (Nevill 1912, p. 242). Fighting became desperate, and a British counterattack with bayonets fixed captured Gat. British casualties that day were 12 officers and men killed and 49 wounded.

The village of Badalai was destroyed on October 3, and active operations against the Mamunds ended, although a settlement was not made until October 18. The Malakand Field Force had accomplished its mission and was then dissolved.

Winston L. S. Churchill, who served as a war correspondent with the Malakand Field Force, immortalized the operations of this punitive expedition and the generalship of its commander through the publication of his book *The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War*. In many respects, the Malakand operations (as noted on

the dustjacket of the 1990 reprint of *The Story of the Malakand Field Force*) were similar to those of many other savage British campaigns on the North-West Frontier: "The danger and difficulty of attacking these fierce hill men is extreme. It is a war without quarter: They kill and mutilate everyone they catch and we do not hesitate to finish their wounded off."

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Blood, General Sir Bindon; British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics; Churchill, Sir Winston; Durand Line; Tirah Campaign (1897–1898).

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Maratha Empire (1674–1818)

The Maratha Empire spread across India and Afghanistan in the late 1600s and early

1700s, and lasted from 1674 to 1818. The empire was founded in 1674 by Shivaji Maharaj. From the Maratha tribes of western Deccan at the time of the Mughal Empire, the Maratha Empire expanded to encompass most of the central part of the Indian subcontinent. The Maratha Empire would last until 1818, when it was defeated by the British in a series of wars.

The Marathas were Hindu and their chieftains served the Bijapur sultans. The initial Maratha kingdom was carved out of the territory surrounding the city of Pune. Shivaji Maharaj was crowned *Chhatrapati*, meaning sovereign, in 1674 at his capital in Raigad. The new ruler used guerrilla warfare to expand his territory, launching raids and strikes on neighboring chieftains in Bijapur and Golconda. The kingdom expanded to the coastline, pushing the Portuguese out of the area. As his kingdom grew, Shivaji revived ancient Hindu political traditions and used Marathi and Sanskrit instead of Persian. Shivaji died in 1680. He was succeeded by his son, Sambhaji, who continued to fight against the Mughal Empire.

Sambhaji's son, Shahuji, eventually claimed the throne and greatly expanded the empire. The Maratha Empire vied for control of northern India against an expanding Durrani Empire, which comprised all of modern-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, and part of India. The two expanding empires collided in 1759, but the Afghan forces were unable to stop the Maratha Army from taking Delhi. However, on January 14, 1761, Durrani forces led by Ahmad Shah Durrani faced the Maratha army at Panipat. Each army had somewhere between 70,000 to 80,000 troops. The battle lasted for a number of hours with no clear victor until Ahmad Shah led a counterattack that crippled the Maratha center, allowing the Durrani forces to slaughter the Maratha army as well as its camp followers.

The battle weakened the Maratha Empire's control of the region and allowed the Sikhs to rise in their place. The Maratha Confederation remained in a collection of semiautonomous states until the Anglo-Maratha Wars (1775–1818). Following the Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–1818), the British East India Company controlled most of India, largely territory formerly under the control of the Maratha Empire.

Jorge Brown

See also: Durrani Empire (1747–1818); Mughal Empire (1526–1857).

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Marja, Battle of (2010)

On February 13, 2010, U.S.-led coalition forces, as part of Operation Moshtarak, launched an offensive against the town of Marja, a Taliban stronghold in Helmand Province. The town was a major opium poppy production center and the headquarters of a large drug-smuggling operation. The population of Marja was approximately 100,000, distributed over a surface area of 125 square miles (324 square km). The region was primarily agrarian, with an

extensive network of irrigation canals crisscrossing the landscape.

The objective of the offensive was to free Marja from Taliban control while limiting civilian casualties in an attempt to strengthen the relationship between the government in Kabul and the local population. The battle was the “clear” stage in the U.S., International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) counterinsurgency strategy of clear, hold, and build. “Clear” meant removing the Taliban. “Hold” entailed tactics and programs that prevented a return of the insurgents. “Build” was the final stage and revolved around efforts to both rebuild infrastructure and implement long-term development initiatives.

A force of approximately 15,000 coalition troops, including 2,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers, took part in the operation. This was the first major operation that the ANA Army had been part of, including both the planning and execution. Considered the largest assault since the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the offensive also coincided with the first wave of some 33,000 U.S. reinforcements ordered to Afghanistan by President Barack Obama in replication of the successful 2007 troop surge in Iraq.

On the morning of the attack, three companies of U.S. Marines were inserted into the center of town via helicopter. They took control of three bazaars and fought out from the town center while two U.S. Army battalions approached from the northwest and east. The companies worked their way out until they linked up with the battalions, thereby securing most of the town. It is estimated that there were 400 Taliban fighters defending the town. Most are reported to have been killed or fled after the first major assault. The southwest of the town was the last holdout of Taliban fighters. The majority

of the town was secure in the first two weeks with sporadic resistance.

There were concerns that the remaining Taliban fighters not captured or killed were burying their weapons and blending into the local population. The IASF brought in an Afghan police force and two Marine battalions, one U.S. and one British, to provide continuing security.

Initial projections were that it would take 30 days to clear the insurgents from Marja. Progress in both the initial fighting and clearing the town was impeded by the presence of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Nonetheless, the Taliban were cleared much more quickly than anticipated. Afghan government administrators were brought in to support the local government. The success of the operation was later questioned as the Taliban resumed operations in the area within the year.

Jorge Brown

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Coalition, Forces and Tactics 2001–; Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Landmines; Taliban.

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Massoud, Ahmed Shah (1953–2001)

Known as the “Lion of the Panjshir,” Ahmed Shah Massoud was one of the leading

fighters in the campaign to expel Soviet troops from Afghanistan in the 1980s. He later entered politics, serving as minister of defense in the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani in the early 1990s. During the ensuing civil war, Massoud became the leader of the militias comprising the Northern Alliance, fighting against the radical Islamist Taliban movement. After a string of battlefield defeats, Massoud was assassinated by al Qaeda suicide bombers on September 9, 2001, just two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Massoud (b. 1953) was a young engineering student in Kabul when communists overthrew the Afghan monarchy and seized power in 1973. A devout Muslim, Massoud opposed the new regime's militant atheism and took part in an abortive revolt, fleeing to Pakistan when it failed. In Pakistan, Massoud, along with Rabbani and other exiles, received military training from the Pakistani intelligence services, eager to oust the Afghan communist government. In 1979, with the Afghan regime riven by infighting, Massoud and his colleagues crossed back into Afghanistan and launched a new rebellion. Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 in response, and the rebels subsequently declared a jihad (holy war) on the Soviet Union and its Afghan allies.

Massoud organized resistance to the invasion in his native Panjshir Valley, establishing a network of small bands capable of independent operation. These mujahideen successfully repulsed an assault on the strategically vital valley by Afghan communist forces and then beat off repeated attempts by Soviet troops to seize the valley. After the Soviets finally succeeded in taking the Panjshir in 1984, Massoud reorganized his troops from a redoubt in the Hindu Kush Mountains, harassing the occupiers

and goading them into a disastrous offensive that left the mujahideen once again in command of the Panjshir. These exploits led to the emergence of the legend of the "Lion of the Panjshir."

They also led to a growing rivalry among the various mujahideen commanders, and Massoud fell afoul in particular of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The more malleable Hekmatyar was favored by the Pakistanis and by a growing legion of Arab volunteers financed by the Saudi construction heir Osama bin Laden.

When the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan in February 1989, an all-out civil war between the Afghan communists and the competing mujahideen groups engulfed the country. Rabbani and Massoud were seemingly victorious by 1992, capturing Kabul and driving out the communists. Massoud became minister of defense in the new government, but the fighting continued, now largely along ethnic lines (Massoud was a member of Afghanistan's Tajik minority). By 1995, a new force had emerged in the civil war (again with Pakistani backing), a Pashtun-dominated Islamic fundamentalist group comprised of former seminary students known as the Taliban. With a reputation for piety and incorruptibility, the Taliban scored a series of stunning military successes, capturing Kabul in September 1996.

Massoud and Rabbani again retreated to the Panjshir. Now facing a common enemy, Massoud, Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and other veteran commanders combined their forces into the so-called Northern Alliance, continuing the battle from remote northern Afghanistan. The suave, French-speaking Massoud was the Northern Alliance's liaison with the outside world and most effective spokesman (in the West as well as with Iran and Russia). He repeatedly warned Western leaders that

Taliban-style extremism was a threat to them as well.

Meanwhile, the Taliban, under the leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar and with financial and logistical help from Pakistan, established an extreme theocracy across Afghanistan. It also provided a haven for the fugitive bin Laden and his al Qaeda jihadist network. In September 2001, with Northern Alliance fortunes at low ebb, Massoud agreed to a television interview with journalists from an Arab news organization. The two “journalists” were in fact al Qaeda operatives carrying a camera packed with explosives. The cameramen detonated their bomb at the start of the interview, killing themselves and Massoud on September 9, 2001.

Two days later, al Qaeda launched its attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. The killing of Massoud had removed the most effective potential partner the United States had in Afghanistan and cemented the alliance between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Nonetheless, U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, removing the Taliban and installing a Northern Alliance-led government, for whom Massoud remains a hero and martyr.

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See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Taliban.

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Mazari, Abdul Ali (1947–1995)

Abdul Ali Mazari was a political leader of the Hazara mujahideen group Victory Organization (*Sazman-i Nasr*) during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), and the cofounder of the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan*). Mazari, an ethnic Hazara, was born in 1947 in the small village of Nanwai, located in the Charkent District of Balkh Province, Afghanistan. He studied theology in various private religious academies located in Afghanistan and Iraq, including in Mazar-e-Sharif, Qom, and Najaf.

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Mazari returned to Balkh Province. He cofounded the Victory Organization, along with Muhammad Hussain Sadeqi and Shaykh Shafak, to fight the Soviets and the pro-Moscow People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government of President Mohammed Najibullah. The Victory Organization was one of eight mainly Shi’a mujahideen groups that were backed by Iran and collectively known as the Tehran Eight (*Shuray-e Eatelaf*). Under Mazari’s leadership, the Victory Organization earned a reputation as one of the more radical of the Iran-backed militant groups. It sought not only to defeat the Soviets, but also to reduce the political power of the dominant Pashtuns.

In 1988, when it became clear that the Soviets would withdraw, negotiations on a post-PDPA government were held under the auspices of Pakistan. However, the Tehran Eight were excluded from the talks. In response, Mazari spearheaded an effort to unite the main Shi’a groups into a single coalition. The result was the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, launched in 1988 from six of the Hazara mujahideen formations. Mazari initially supported the interim government of

President Burhanuddin Rabbani. However, he clashed with Rabbani over what he perceived to be a lack of Hazaras in senior political and military positions in the new government.

Frustrated at being marginalized within the government, Mazari offered his support to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was fighting the Rabbani government. That alliance proved short-lived as conflicts between Mazari's Hazara group and Hekmatyar's Pashtun organization led to repeated clashes. Mazari then turned to the Taliban for a possible alliance. On March 12, 1995, the Hazara leader accepted an invitation from Taliban leaders to discuss a joint effort against the Rabbani regime. On their way to the proposed talks, Mazari and a number of his senior lieutenants were arrested by the Taliban in Charasyab, about 25 kilometers (15.5 miles) south of Kabul. The next day, during a helicopter transport to Kandahar, Mazari was killed. Reports differ wildly on the exact nature of his death. The Taliban claim that Mazari was killed during an ensuing gun battle after the Hazara leader broke free and attacked his guards. Hazara sources maintain that Mazari was brutally tortured and then murdered by the Taliban.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Hazaras; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Victory Organization (*Sazman-i Nasr*).

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McChrystal, Stanley (1954–)

Stanley Allen McChrystal was a U.S. four-star general who commanded coalition forces in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010 when he was forced to resign following revelations of having made negative comments about President Barack Obama's management of the war. McChrystal was born on August 14, 1954, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (his father was a major general in the army). The future general attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1976. McChrystal was drawn to the elite forces of the army. After he was commissioned, he served in the 82nd Airborne Division. In 1979, McChrystal graduated from the special operations forces school at Fort Bragg and was attached to the 7th Special Forces Group.

McChrystal rose steadily through the ranks in the 1980s and was promoted to brigadier general in 2000 as operations officer for the 82nd Airborne. From 2003 to 2008, McChrystal commanded the Joint Special Operations Command, the headquarters unit for U.S. Special Operations Forces such as the army's Delta Force and the navy's Sea Air and Land (SEAL) Team Six. In 2004, he was made a major general, and then a lieutenant general in 2006. During his tenure, JSOC coordinated the operation that killed al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq in June 2006. His command also played a key role in operations during the Iraq War troop surge in which an additional 30,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Iraq to suppress insurgents.

In 2009, McChrystal was promoted to general and given command of U.S. and

coalition forces in Afghanistan. His background with special operations forces convinced Obama to appoint McChrystal to the position as part of a broader effort to reevaluate strategy against the Taliban insurgency. The general immediately began advocating for additional troops. He called for an additional 30,000–40,000 soldiers in a written report to the president. The general's recommendations were leaked to the press, creating external pressure on Obama, who subsequently approved a surge of 33,000 troops for Afghanistan.

In July 2010, an article in the magazine *Rolling Stone* reported that McChrystal and his aides had made comments that were highly critical and disparaging of Obama and senior members of his national security staff, including Vice President Joe Biden and National Security Adviser James Jones. The general resigned the day after the story was released. Obama appointed General David Petraeus to replace McChrystal.

After he retired from the army, McChrystal joined the boards of a number of corporations and was named a fellow at Yale University, where he taught a course on leadership. In 2013, he published his memoirs, *My Share of the Task*.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Obama, Barack; Petraeus, David; Special Operations Forces; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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McNeill, Dan K. (1946–)

U.S. Army general Dan K. McNeill was born in Warsaw, North Carolina, in 1946 and earned an undergraduate degree from North Carolina State University in 1968. A Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) student, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in November 1968 and saw duty in the Vietnam War. Returning stateside in 1969, he held a variety of posts in the United States, South Korea, and Italy. He attended the Army Command and General Staff College and graduated from the Army War College in 1989. McNeill also participated in the 1989 invasion of Panama and the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Promoted to brigadier general in September 1995, McNeill assumed command of the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; he held the command until July 1993, at which time he became assistant chief of staff, G-3 (Operations), XVIII Airborne Corps. McNeill left that post in March 1995 to serve as assistant division commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, a position that he retained until June 1996. Until August 1997, he was chief of staff, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg. From August 1997 to July 1998 McNeill served as deputy commanding general, I Corps; from July 1998 to July 2000 he was the commanding general of the 82nd Airborne Division. McNeill was promoted to major general in October 1998 and lieutenant general in July 2000.

In July 2000, McNeill took command of XVIII Airborne Corps. After Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001, he also acted as commanding general, Combined

Joint Task Force-180 in Afghanistan. He retained that command until August 2003, at which point he became deputy commanding general/chief of staff, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia. He was promoted to full general (four stars) in July 2004. He held this command until February 2007, at which time he became commander of the International Security Assistance Force–Afghanistan; he held that position until June 2008.

During his first tour in Afghanistan, in an attempt to defeat the Taliban and allied insurgents, McNeill was a strong proponent of coalition airstrikes. But these strikes killed many civilians, which outraged Afghans and raised concerns in the international community. Afghan citizens became even more disgruntled when, following a July 2002 attack on Deh Rawood, a number of Afghan wedding participants and guests were killed during an American attack on a suspected Taliban stronghold. McNeill offered compensation and assistance to those innocents killed or wounded by U.S. strikes, but he made no apologies. Afghans became even more alarmed when they began to hear rumors about torture and deaths in U.S. detainment camps, which they believed were being covered up by the American military.

While in command, McNeill also oversaw the prison at Bagram Air Force Base. In December 2002, two Afghan prisoners died while in custody at Bagram. McNeill maintained that the men had died of natural causes, but autopsy reports showed both had died from blunt-force injuries. As commander, McNeill should have known that prisoners were being treated harshly, but he insisted that no international laws of conduct had been broken. He also refused to acknowledge the autopsy reports of the dead prisoners.

On February 4, 2007, McNeill took command of the International Security

Assistance Force–Afghanistan (ISAF). With this command, he became the highest-ranking U.S. general in the region, which many surmised to be a demonstration of the renewed U.S. commitment to Afghanistan. Many hoped that McNeill's appointment would witness a reinvigorated effort to pacify the troubled Afghan-Pakistani border areas, rife with insurgent activity. Others, however, citing McNeill's past performance in Afghanistan, wondered if he were the right man for the job. Certainly many Afghans did not welcome his return. Nevertheless, all sides believed that McNeill would bring a more hardline approach to the growing Taliban insurgency. At the same time, McNeill was expected to boost Afghan reconstruction efforts, which had lagged in recent years.

When McNeill departed Afghanistan in June 2008, he admitted that insurgency activity had increased substantially over the preceding year, up 50 percent in April 2008 alone. He stated clearly that the insurgency could not be contained or defeated without significantly more "boots on the ground," a stance that many American politicians had taken, including then presidential candidate Barack Obama. McNeill also voiced concern with the growing Taliban insurgency in the border areas of Pakistan. McNeill retired from the army at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on June 20, 2008.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Al Qaeda; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Taliban.

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Metcalf, Charles (1785–1846)

Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalf, Baron Metcalf, was a British colonial official who encouraged the explorations of William Moorcroft in Central Asia and helped formulate imperial policy toward the Sikhs. He served in a variety of colonial positions, including acting governor-general of India, governor of Jamaica, and governor-general of Canada. Metcalf was born in Calcutta; his father was an officer in the East India Company Army and would later be a director of the company. The younger Metcalf attended Eton and then returned to India in 1801 where he held a variety of positions with the East India Company, including personal secretary to the governor-general of Bengal.

In 1808, he was dispatched to the court of the Sikh ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh. At the time, British leaders feared a French invasion of their Indian colonies throughout the Middle East and Persia, and Metcalf was tasked with developing an alliance with the Sikhs so that they might serve as a buffer for India. He went on to serve as the British resident in Delhi and later Hyderabad. While stationed in Delhi, Metcalf championed a plan by William Moorcroft to explore the regions to the west of the Sikh lands, including the areas that comprise present-day Jammu, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. Moorcroft journeyed throughout the region, visiting Jalalabad and Kabul, before dying of a fever in 1825 near the border of Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. Although there was no longer a threat of a French invasion, the expedition increased British interest in the region as a potential buffer against Russian expansion

and was part of the prelude to the imperial competition between Britain and Russia that would be labeled the “Great Game.”

In 1822, Metcalf inherited the baronetcy from his father. Five years later he was named to the governing council for the Indian colonies. Despite his earlier support for Moorcroft, Metcalf opposed plans to dispatch Alexander “Sekundar” Burnes to the region to further explore the area and assess its potential for commercial activity. Metcalf highly valued India’s relationship with Ranjit Singh and argued that Britain should concentrate on strengthening the Sikhs instead of acquiring influence with the Afghans. Metcalf was afraid that if Britain established commercial or military relations with Afghanistan, it would alienate the Sikhs, who had fought a series of wars with their neighbors to the west.

In 1835, Metcalf was appointed acting secretary-general of India. However, he resigned from the East India Company over policy differences with the company’s board of directors. In 1839 he was named governor of Jamaica, and then governor-general of Canada in 1842. His health failing, Metcalf resigned in 1845. He died on September 5, 1846.

Tom Lansford

See also: Burnes, Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”); Great Game, The; Moorcroft, William.

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Mohan Lal (1812–1877)

Mohan Lal, also known as Mohan Lal Kashmiri, was an adventurer and intelligence agent for the British during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Mohan Lal was born in Delhi in 1812. As a youth he demonstrated a knack for languages, becoming proficient in such tongues as English, Persian, and Urdu, among others. In 1831, the East India Company dispatched Alexander Burnes on an intelligence-gathering mission through Central Asia. Mohan Lal accompanied Burnes. The two traveled extensively, dressed in native garb, often passing themselves off as merchants or pilgrims. Burnes would publish a three-volume account of their adventures, which became enormously popular in Great Britain. Meanwhile, Mohan Lal also published a version of their journey, and the manuscript would be later expanded to include his other travels.

In 1839, Mohan Lal accompanied Burnes to Kabul during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). The British deposed Afghan ruler Dost Mohammad Khan and replaced him with Shuja Shah Durrani. Burnes was the British resident in Kabul and Mohan Lal his assistant. Both figures also played a major role in gathering intelligence during the invasion. In this capacity, Mohan Lal worked to convince local Afghan warlords to support the British or at least remain neutral in exchange for bribes or subsidies from the invading army. On November 2, 1841, a mob stormed Burnes's compound, killing him and his brother. Mohan Lal was able to escape following the intervention of a friendly merchant. He continued to provide intelligence to the British colonial authorities in India as the situation in Kabul deteriorated. After the British began their disastrous withdrawal from the Afghan

capital, Mohan Lal remained, sending secret dispatches when he could to the British. He was arrested by the Afghans, but freed when the Army of Retribution recaptured Kabul in 1842.

Upon his return to India, Mohan Lal found himself at odds with both the British and his community. Rumors that the Hindu had converted to Islam soured relations with his family. The adventurer was also peeved that the British had not offered him greater recognition for his actions in Afghanistan or compensated him for the outlay of considerable sums used to secure the freedom of captured British men and women during the war. In 1843, he left government service and traveled to Europe and the Middle East. He also published a biography of Dost Mohammad that was critical of senior British officers during the war. Mohan Lal lived through the Sepoy (Indian) Rebellion in 1857 with his 17th wife, and then died in obscurity in 1877.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Burnes, Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”); Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Great Game, The; Kabul, Retreat from (1842).

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Mohaqeq, Mohammed (1955–)

Mohammed Mohaqeq is an ethnic Hazara and was a Shi'a mujahideen leader and Afghan political figure who held a variety of government posts in the 1990s and 2000s. Mohaqeq was born in Mazar-e-Sharif. He studied in Iran and received a bachelor's degree in Islamic studies. He joined the mujahideen in 1978, fighting against the pro-Soviet regime. During the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), Mohaqeq emerged as one of the most important Hazara leaders fighting against the Soviets, and occasionally with other mujahideen groups. He was accused of committing atrocities against rival ethnic groups during the conflict.

Through the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), the Hazara leader tried to protect his people by forming alliances with other ethnic groups. After the fall of the pro-Soviet government in 1992, Mohaqeq supported Abdul Rashid Dostum and later joined the Northern Alliance. His willingness to work with Pashtun leaders alienated other minority populations, such as the Tajiks. Mohaqeq subsequently became a fervent enemy of the Taliban, especially after the group carried out a series of massacres and other atrocities against the Hazaras.

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Mohaqeq was appointed minister of planning in the interim government. He was subsequently appointed a vice president under President Hamid Karzai. Mohaqeq ran against Karzai in the 2004 presidential elections. He formed a new political group to support his candidacy, the mainly Hazara *Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Mardum-e Afghaniestan* ("People's Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan"), but actually ran as an independent in a bid to secure support from other ethnicities. The former mujahideen campaigned on promises of suppressing the drug

trade and uniting Afghanistan's fractious ethnic groups. The Hazara leader placed third with 11.7 percent of the vote in the first round of balloting. He was elected to the lower house of the Afghan parliament (the *Wolesi Jirga*, "House of the People"). Mohaqeq backed Karzai in the 2009 election. He went on to found a radio and television broadcast station to serve the Hazara community.

Mohaqeq resigned from the legislature in 2014 in order to run as the vice presidential candidate for presidential contender Abdullah Abdullah. The disputed election was won by Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, and Abdullah placed second in runoff balloting. A power-sharing arrangement was negotiated by U.S. secretary of state John Kerry whereby Ghani became president and Abdullah chief executive of the country. Mohaqeq was subsequently appointed Abdullah's second deputy, where he was tasked with overseeing relations with Iran.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf; Hazaras; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Karzai, Hamid; Mujahideen; Taliban.

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Mohmand Campaigns

The Mohmands are a Pashtun tribe in eastern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan.

Fiercely independent, the Mohmands were able to maintain a high degree of autonomy from both the Afghan government and the British Empire. The tribe had originally settled near Kandahar, but during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, it gradually moved into the region surrounding Peshawar. The tribe was nomadic and regularly traveled from Peshawar into the mountains of Afghanistan during the summer months. By the late 1800s, it was estimated that the Mohmands could field 15,000–20,000 warriors. Successive Afghan rulers endeavored unsuccessfully to bring the tribe under control. Meanwhile, between 1851 and 1880, the British conducted five major punitive expeditions against the Mohmands in response to border raids and other provocations.

The creation of the Durand Line in 1893 effectively divided the Mohmands in half and further complicated efforts to rein in the tribe. Mohmands would raid British-controlled India and cross the border into Afghanistan or attack rivals in Afghanistan and head back into British territory. In 1897 there was a widespread uprising by Pashtun tribes in the frontier region between Afghanistan and British India. The rebellion was sparked by concerns over the loss of autonomy under British rule and by a wave of religious fervor, stoked by figures such as Saidullah Khan (known as “Mullah Mastun” by the Pashtuns and “Mad Mullah” by the British). Saidullah and other clerics believed that the time was ripe for a holy war of jihad against the British, which would drive them from the Pashtun tribal lands. The uncoordinated and often spontaneous uprisings were covertly supported by Afghan emir Abdur Rahman Khan, who saw little to lose in the rebellions. If the tribes won, they would reduce British influence and perhaps allow the emir to regain lost territory. If the British prevailed, they

would subdue, even if only temporarily, the troublesome tribes.

In August 1897, British major general Sir Bindon Blood led the Malakand Field Force, which consisted of three brigades with some miscellaneous troops, to relieve besieged forts at Malakand and Chakdara. Future British prime minister Sir Winston Churchill served in the expedition. Meanwhile, the Mohmands attacked a village on the British side of the border, while other tribes, including the Afridis and the Swatis, struck at various forts and posts. The attack resulted in the Mohmand Campaign (1897–1898). Blood advanced through the Swat Valley with the majority of his troops, but one brigade was attached to the newly created Mohmand Field Force, commanded by Major General Edmond Elles. The Mohmand Field Force and the Malakand Field Force advanced to a juncture at Lakarai and then campaigned against the Mohmands, destroying villages and crops and confiscating weapons in retaliation for the Mohmand attack. Casualties on both sides were relatively light, with 30 killed among the Anglo-Indian forces and 200–300 Mohmands killed.

The Mohmands continued to fight both the Afghan and British governments in the 1900s. In 1928, the tribe rose in revolt against Afghan king Amanullah Khan as part of a broader rebellion that toppled the monarchy in 1929. The following year, the Mohmands, under the leadership of a cleric, the haji of Turangzai, launched a series of attacks on British posts along the frontier. Five years later, the haji led an even larger uprising, which prompted the Mohmand Campaign of 1935.

The haji gathered approximately 2,000 tribesmen who began raids on British military and administrative posts in 1935. In August of that year, the British assembled an Anglo-Indian force, dubbed the Mohmand

Force, which included both tanks and cavalry and was supported by aircraft. The force was led by Sir Claude Auchinleck, who commanded British forces in the Middle East, and later India, during World War II. Although the Mohmands conducted a spirited guerrilla campaign, by October they agreed to cease hostilities.

Despite their warlike history, the Mohmands remained largely neutral during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). They also generally refrained from involvement in the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001).

Tom Lansford

See also: Blood, General Sir Bindon; Churchill, Sir Winston; Durand Line; Malakand Field Force (1897); Tirah Campaign (1897–1898).

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Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah (1926–2016)

Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was the founder of the National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najati Milli*), and he served in a variety of government positions, including interim president of Afghanistan following the fall of the pro-

Soviet government in 1992. Mojaddedi was born in 1926 in Kabul. He studied Islam and earned a degree in Islamic religious studies at al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, specializing in Islamic law and jurisprudence. In 1952, Mojaddedi went back to Kabul to pursue an academic career, teaching at Kabul University, the Higher Institutions of Teacher Training of Kabul, and the Arabic Academy of Sciences.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mojaddedi became increasingly known as a fervent anticommunist at a time of growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan. He was arrested in 1959 and sentenced to four years and eight months in prison for participating in a plot to assassinate Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev during a visit to Kabul. After his release, in 1972 Mojaddedi formed the anti-communist Islamic Movement of Mohammadi Scholars (*Harakat-e Islami-e Jamiat-e Ulam-e Mohammadi*). Mojaddedi was in Saudi Arabia for a conference when Mohammed Daoud Khan overthrew the monarchy in 1973 with support from the pro-Soviet Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Fearing that he would again be arrested, the Islamic scholar remained in exile, first in Saudi Arabia and then in Denmark. When the PDPA seized power in 1978, Mojaddedi returned to the region and established a base in Pakistan. There he founded the National Liberation Front.

Mojaddedi used his fame as a religious scholar to attract recruits to fight the PDPA government and then the Soviets after the 1979 invasion. He was a prominent mujahideen leader during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). After the Soviets agreed to withdraw in 1989, a *shura* or council of mujahideen groups was established in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, to plan for a post-PDPA government. The *shura*, consisting of 454 mujahideen leaders, nominated Mojaddedi

as the president of an interim Afghan government in exile on February 23, 1989. He served in this position for three years until the PDPA fell, and his presidency was reaffirmed on April 24, 1992, when he was elected as the first president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. The post-PDPA presidency was initially supposed to rotate, and on June 28, 1992, Mojaddedi transferred executive power to the Leadership Council of Afghanistan, which in turn gave the presidency to Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Mojaddedi opposed the Taliban during the 1990s and went into exile in Pakistan after the organization seized power in 1996. He returned to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Mojaddedi was elected chair of the Loya Jirga in January 2004, which approved a new constitution for the country. Then in December 2005, Mojaddedi was elected speaker of the upper chamber of the Afghan parliament, the House of Elders (*Meshrano Jirga*). He was reappointed to the chamber in 2011. He reportedly formed a new political group in 2015. Reports indicate that Mojaddedi died on February 9, 2016.

Charlie Carlee

See also: National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*); People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Saur Revolution (1978–1979).

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Moorcroft, William (1767–1825)

William Moorcroft was a British adventurer who became one of the first Europeans to travel extensively through Central Asia. Moorcroft was born in 1767 in Great Britain. He was the illegitimate son of Ann Moorcroft, who was a member of a prosperous farming family. As a youth, Moorcroft was apprenticed to a surgeon, but found he had a remarkable way with animals. He traveled to Lyon, France, in 1789 to train as a veterinary surgeon since there were no veterinary schools in Britain at the time. He subsequently returned to Britain and opened a veterinary practice in London, specializing in treating horses. While his practice was lucrative, he lost most of his money in a failed effort to design a new manufacturing process for horseshoes. Nonetheless, the future explorer attracted the attention of a director of the East India Company, who offered Moorcroft a position overseeing the company's stud operations in Calcutta. Moorcroft journeyed to India in May 1808 to begin his new duties.

Moorcroft was given a high salary, 30,000 rupees (£3,000) per year, and provided with a 5,000-acre estate to manage. He was expected to provide 800 horses each year for the company cavalry, mounts that could swiftly carry a minimum load of 250 lbs (113.4 kg), including soldier and equipment. He quickly realized that he would not be able to breed that many because of the inferior stock of the horses on the estate. Moorcroft traveled throughout India in an unsuccessful effort to acquire better breeding horses. In 1812, he decided to explore rumors of better horses in areas such as Tibet and Bukhara.

In May 1812, Moorcroft and Captain Hyder Hearsey, an Anglo-Indian, journeyed to Tibet disguised as native traders. Moorcroft did not find horses, but he did pursue other commercial possibilities, including trade in

grain and wool. He also mapped the area. Company officials did not appreciate his accomplishments and were, instead, disappointed by his failure to find new sources of equine breeding stock. Moorcroft sought permission to undertake another exploration, but permission was not granted until 1819 when company intelligence official Charles Metcalfe recognized the value of the journey as a scouting mission and a means to check on any Russian efforts to gain influence in the region. Accompanying Moorcroft was George Trebeck, and more than 300 guides, porters, and Gurkha soldiers.

The expedition traveled to Ladakh in the present-day Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1820. Moorcroft spent the next two years exploring the surrounding countryside. The expense of the large party drained Moorcroft's cash, and he had difficulties accessing additional funds. His trade goods brought less revenue than expected, and Moorcroft steadily reduced the number of the expedition down to 40. The group then continued to Afghanistan. Moorcroft arrived in Jalalabad in June 1824 and traveled to Kabul. From the Afghan capital, Moorcroft journeyed north to Bokhara in present-day Uzbekistan, arriving in February 1825. Throughout his journeys, Moorcroft was unable to find new sources of horses, but he did extensively map the regions he explored. The expedition returned to Afghanistan later in 1825. Moorcroft died of a fever on August 27, 1825, and was buried on the border between present-day Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Burnes, Sir Alexander ("Sekundar"); Great Game, The.

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Mughal Empire (1526–1857)

The Mughal (Mogul) Empire (1526–1857) was centered on the Indus and Ganges River Valleys, but stretched throughout the subcontinent of India, extending into modern China, Afghanistan, and Iran. The Mughal Empire was founded when the Chagatai Turkic prince Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur, who claimed to be a descendant of Tamerlane and the second son of Genghis Khan on his mother's side, left central Asia after being driven out by the Uzbeks. Babur crossed the Hindu Kush and captured Kabul and eastern Afghanistan in 1504. He then went through the Khyber Pass in 1505 and raided near Tarbila. Babur was driven back to Kabul in 1512, where he remained until his conquest of India in 1519. Babur besieged Kandahar, which fell in 1522. Babur then captured Lahore, the capital of Punjab, in 1525.

In the First Battle of Panipat in 1526, Babur routed the forces of Sultan Ibrahim Lodi. Babur had around 12,000 men, compared to the estimated 100,000 soldiers of the sultan. However, the Mughals had superior artillery, matchlock guns, and better-trained forces. The Mughal forces inflicted heavy casualties on the sultan's troops and the battle turned into a rout. Babur used his superior military to expand the empire in 1527 by conquering the Rajput Confederacy of Mewar. The defeat of Rajput opened the opportunity for Babur's lieutenants to invade Afghanistan, Punjab, the Ganges plains, and conquer a string of fortresses in

central India. In 1529, Babur defeated the Afghans in the modern area of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. By the death of Babur in 1530, the Mughal Empire controlled much of modern northern India and the Indus River Valley.

Babur's son and heir, Humayun, took power when he was 23 and reigned over the empire from 1530 to 1540 and 1555 to 1556, but lost control of the empire to Afghan rebels during the period from 1540 to 1555. Humayun was driven west into Afghanistan in 1543, losing control of the empire's Indian territories. It was not until a civil war broke out in India in 1555 that Humayun was able to reclaim the throne in the battle of Sirhind. Humayun's son, Akbar the Great, defeated the Hemu at the Second Battle of Panipat (1556) to reestablish the empire in Hindustan. Akbar took the throne in 1556 when he was only 13 years old and ruled until his death in 1605. Akbar used warfare and conquest to expand the empire to cover the modern areas from Afghanistan to the Bay of Bengal to the Deccan region of India to the Gujarat state. Akbar established an administrative structure that carried the Mughal Empire for another century. Akbar included Hindus and Sikhs in political appointments and was tolerant of religion. The emperor even attempted to create a new faith called *Din-i-Ilahi*, a blend of Islam and Hinduism, Christianity, Jainism, and others.

Akbar's son and successor, Jahangir, reigned from 1605 to 1627 and espoused tolerance to the Hindu population in the empire. Jahangir was followed by his son, Shah Jahan (1628–1658), whose military expenditures nearly broke the empire, along with the costs of building the Taj Mahal of Agra and the Great Mosque, Jami Masjid of Delhi. When Jahan died in 1658, a war of succession broke out between his four sons. The two main claimants were Dara Shikoh, who

was championed by nobles and officers who espoused diversity, and Aurangzeb, who was backed by elites who were in favor of creating an Islamic state under sharia law. Jahan's successor was ultimately Aurangzeb, whose reign marked a period of religious intolerance that greatly hurt the balance of the empire, arguably leading to its decline. Aurangzeb destroyed Hindu temples and schools, persecuted the Sikhs of Punjab, excluded all but Muslims from public office, and heavily taxed the population. By Aurangzeb's death in 1707, the traditional date of the end of the Mughal Empire, rebellions were still active among the Hindus, Sikhs, Rajputs, and Marathas.

The Mughal Empire became increasingly fragmented after 1707. Muhammad Shah ruled remnants of the empire from 1719 to 1748, defending it against the Iranian invader, Nadir Shah, in 1739. In 1747, Ahmad Shah Durrani, a soldier in Nadir Shah's service, founded the Durrani dynasty, and modern Afghanistan, from territory captured by the invader. After 1748, Mughal control was reduced to a small area around Delhi, because the Marathas conquered most of northern India. Ultimately, even this area fell to Maratha control in 1785, then to the British in 1803 with the rule of the British East India Company. The last Mughal ruler was Bahdur Shah II, who ruled from 1837 to 1857, and who ended his reign by being exiled to Myanmar after his involvement with the Sepoy (Indian) Rebellion (1857–1858) against British rule.

David Harms Holt

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Shah, Nadir.

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Muhsini, Ayatollah Asef (1936–)

Muhammad Asef Muhsini was a prominent Twelver Shiite cleric and the founder of the pro-Iranian Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*). Muhsini was born to a Tajik family in Kandahar Province in 1936. He studied Islam in Iraq and founded a Shi'a movement, the Dawn of Knowledge (*Subh-i Danish*), upon his return. With support from Iran, he created the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan to oppose the establishment of the pro-Soviet regime following the Saur Revolution in 1978. The movement emerged as the most prominent Shi'a mujahideen group fighting the regime, following the 1979 Soviet invasion. Muhsini was briefly the leader of an umbrella group of Shi'a resistance groups, but his relationship with Iran deteriorated in the early 1980s over charges that his movement received funding from the United States. Nonetheless, the movement continued to receive support from Iran to fight the Soviets.

The movement attracted mainly Shi'a recruits. Through the 1980s, Muhsini led his mujahideen group against the Soviets. Muhsini subsequently brought the movement into the Northern Alliance after the withdrawal of the Soviets. Muhsini participated in the overthrow of the pro-Soviet government and the capture of Kabul in 1992. He subsequently opposed the Taliban, instead supporting the presidency of Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Muhsini participated in the 2001 Bonn Conference and endorsed the presidency of

Hamid Karzai after the fall of the Taliban. In 2005, he resigned as the leader of the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan. Although generally perceived as a moderate Islamist, Muhsini crafted a 2009 law for the Shi'a minority that was widely condemned for its subjugation of women. In 2011, Karzai appointed Muhsini as a presidential adviser on social affairs.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Bonn Agreement (2001); Hazaras; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*); Karzai, Hamid; Mujahideen; Northern Alliance; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Mujahideen

Afghan resistance fighters who fought against the Soviet-backed Kabul government and Soviet troops during the Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979–1989) were collectively known as the mujahideen. They were an alliance of seven Sunni political factions and eight Shiite organizations, as well as Muslim volunteers from various North African and Middle Eastern countries. Initially trained and funded by Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, and then later by the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the People's Republic of China (PRC),

as well as other Sunni Muslim nations, the mujahideen fought the Soviet Union to a bloody stalemate, forcing it to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 1989.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, and subsequent intervention in Afghan domestic politics in support of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had the unintended consequence of galvanizing a disparate Islamic opposition into a grassroots resistance movement. Indeed, the Soviet invasion triggered a backlash among Afghans that crossed kinship, tribal, ethnic, and geographic lines. It gave the conflict an ideological dimension by linking the Islamic insurgency with the goal of national liberation when mullahs issued declarations of jihad against the Soviet invaders. Islam and nationalism became interwoven as an Islam-ist ideology replaced tribal affiliations.

At the onset of the Soviet War in Afghanistan, the mujahideen were divided along regional, ethnic, tribal, and sectarian lines. Mobilization was linked to allegiances of the tribal *lashkar* (fighting force), as the mujahideen were loosely organized tribal militias under the command of traditional leaders at the local level. Membership was fluid, fluctuating by the season and family commitments, with no coordinated central command structure. Mujahideen commanders owed their position to social standing, education, leadership ability, and commitment to Islam.

Seven major Sunni mujahideen factions based in neighboring Peshawar, Pakistan, came to dominate the political and military landscape. These were Islamic Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan (IULI), *Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan* (HIA), *Jamiat-e Islami* (IA), *Hezb-i-Islami* (HI), *Harakati Inquilabi Islami* (IRM), *Mahaz-i Nijate Milli Afghanistan* (NIFA), and the *Jabha-i Najat-e Milli Afghanistan* (NLF). In addition to the Sunni mujahideen factions, there were Shi'a muja-

hideen organizations as well. These were *Shura*, *Nasr*, *Harlat-e Islami*, the Revolutionary Guards, and Hezbollah. The other organizations were either splinter factions or groups that joined larger movements. In March 1980 the Sunni mujahideen factions created an umbrella organization known as Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan to lobby for international recognition and support.

In the early days of the occupation, the Soviets waged classic large-scale armored warfare in Afghanistan. The mujahideen responded with traditional mass tribal charges. Disorganized, having limited military equipment and training, and facing overwhelming military superiority, the mujahideen were easily defeated in early skirmishes with the Soviet army in 1980 and 1981. As desertions and defections of Afghan Army units began to increase, however, the mujahideen military capacity increased.

By 1982 the mujahideen began to counter Soviet offensives with a change in tactics and increased firepower. Unable to pacify the countryside, Soviet troops deployed in strategic areas, occupying cities and garrison towns and controlling supply routes. This allowed the mujahideen to roam freely throughout the countryside, launching raids and ambushes at will. Having an insufficient number of troops to pursue the mujahideen, the Soviets attempted to deprive them of their base support by depopulating the countryside. Villages, crops, and irrigation systems were destroyed, while fields and pastures were mined. Undeterred by the loss of their support, the mujahideen continued to sabotage power lines, pipelines, and government installations as well as knocking out bridges, assaulting supply convoys, disrupting the power supply and industrial production, and attacking Soviet military bases throughout 1982 and 1983.



Poorly equipped and trained mujahideen were able to repeatedly defeat the Soviets and Afghan government forces during the Soviet Occupation (1979–1980). (AP Photo)

As the war broadened, the mujahideen appealed for arms and ammunition to counter the overwhelming Soviet military superiority. In 1983 the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the PRC became major contributors to the mujahideen cause. Money and weapons were funneled through Pakistan for distribution to the various Sunni mujahideen factions. The mujahideen were now able to counter the Soviet military superiority with increased firepower.

The year 1985 proved an important one for the mujahideen. The mujahideen withstood the massive deployment of Soviet forces designed to impose a favorable outcome within a Moscow-set timeframe, and the seven Sunni mujahideen factions formed the Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance to

coordinate their military operations against the Soviet Army. By late 1985 the mujahideen had closed in on Kabul, conducting operations against the Moscow-backed Kabul government.

In the spring of 1986, a combined Soviet-Afghan force captured a major mujahideen base in Zhawar, Pakistan, inflicting heavy losses. It was also about this time that the mujahideen acquired antiaircraft missiles as well as ground-to-ground rockets (the U.S. Stinger and the British Blowpipe) that altered the course of the war. The mujahideen were now able to take down Soviet helicopters, especially the heavily armored Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter, and airplanes. By the time Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to withdraw Soviet forces

from Afghanistan in the spring of 1989, the mujahideen were content to allow them an orderly retreat as they themselves readied to attack Kabul and replace the Soviet-backed government there. Many historians today credit the mujahideen, at least in part, for the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The war cost the Soviet state billions of dollars it did not have and called into question the wisdom of the government.

Keith A. Leitch

See also: Armored Vehicles; Artillery, Cannons, and Mortars; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan; Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*); Mujahideen; Reagan, Ronald W.; Reagan Doctrine; Rifles, Light Arms, and Machine Guns; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Special Operations Forces; Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich.

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Musharraf, Pervez (1943–)

Pervez Musharraf was a Pakistani military officer and president of Pakistan from 1999 to 2008. He was a key ally of the United States during the invasion of Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Musharraf was born in Delhi, India, on August 11, 1943. Following the division of the Empire of India into separate Indian and Pakistan states in 1947, Musharraf moved with his family to Karachi, Pakistan. In 1961 he entered the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, graduating in 1964. He then attended the Command and Staff College at Queta and the National Defense College. In 1971 Musharraf commanded a company in the Indo-Pakistani War of that year. In 1987 Musharraf was based in Kashmir in command of a mountain warfare unit at Khapalu. He was promoted to major general in 1991.

Musharraf achieved the rank of lieutenant general in 1995 and took command of a corps. He became Pakistan Army chief of staff in 1998 and organized the Pakistani military strategy in the Kargil War against India. The success of this operation was limited, and Musharraf came under criticism for his failure to achieve any substantial gains, while at the same time antagonizing India. During the war, Musharraf encouraged what were essentially terrorist actions in Indian-held Kashmir, and the Pakistani Army consequently became closely linked with these activities.

In early 1999 Musharraf clashed with the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif over two main issues: relations with India and the high level of corruption within the

government. In October 1999 Sharif sought to remove Musharraf as head of the army while he was out of the country. When Musharraf attempted to return to the country via a commercial jetliner, officials loyal to Sharif refused to allow the plane to land. Army officers supporting Musharraf then took over key government installations, including the airport, and Musharraf's plane landed.

Musharraf assumed control of the country, and Sharif was exiled. The October 12, 1999, coup had been a bloodless affair. Although many groups in Pakistan pressed for new elections, Musharraf refused to yield to the demands. President Rafiq Tarar remained as titular head of Pakistan, but Musharraf assumed this post as well on June 20, 2001.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, Musharraf

allowed U.S. forces access to three Pakistani airbases to prosecute Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In public, Musharraf expressed support for and unity with the George W. Bush administration's global war on terror. There is evidence, however, that the Bush administration strong-armed Musharraf into supporting the U.S. action. U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell presented a list of demands to Musharraf, which included access to Pakistani airspace and military facilities in exchange for renewed economic and military aid.

Following a terrorist attack against India's parliament building in December 2001 carried out by Pakistani militants, Musharraf distanced himself from Kashmiri separatists, who had previously enjoyed the support of the Pakistani government. He also launched an antiterrorist operation in the Wana region of Pakistan. On January 12, 2002, Musharraf made a pivotal speech in which he sharply criticized all acts of terrorism and explicitly withdrew support for any form of terrorist activity against India. Meanwhile, the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan led many militants to cross the border into Pakistan where they established bases and launched attacks back into Afghanistan and ignited a civil war with the Musharraf government. Musharraf's failure to suppress the Taliban and al Qaeda militants in the north-west provinces undermined the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan and eroded domestic stability in Pakistan.

During the October 2002 Pakistani elections, Musharraf mobilized sufficient support to remain in power. Although he promised to relinquish his command of the army, this did not occur until November 2007. His position was legitimized by a bill passed by the Pakistani parliament in January 2004.



Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf allied his country with the United States following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. (AP Photo)

Musharraf remained a less than enthusiastic ally of the United States, in part because of threats against his own government from Pakistani Islamic militants based primarily in the tribal regions of the northwest. He refused to commit troops to the Anglo-American war in Iraq and stated that he would not do so unless there was a resolution from the United Nations (UN). In 2004 Musharraf began a series of talks with India to reduce tensions between the two states and to resolve the ongoing problem of Kashmir. This tension was heightened by the development of nuclear weapons by both nations. Musharraf's government came in for considerable criticism from its citizens regarding its handling of relief operations following a large earthquake in northern Pakistan in October 2005.

By 2005, the Taliban had launched a nationwide terrorist campaign against the Musharraf regime. Military campaigns to suppress the militants were only marginally successful. Musharraf began to face increasing pressure from the United States to suppress the Taliban because of the group's continued efforts to foment instability in Afghanistan. The United States began to use unmanned aerial drones to target Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan. As civilian casualties from the drone attacks mounted, domestic opposition to Pakistani support for the U.S.-led coalition grew. Protests led to the closure of the main supply route through Pakistan for coalition troops in the neighboring country.

In March 2007 Musharraf precipitated a major crisis when he suspended from office Pakistan's chief justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Fearful that the court was going to successfully challenge his bid for reelection in the fall, Musharraf claimed that the suspension was in response to Chaudhry's "abuse of power."

The action led to major demonstrations and a boycott by many of Pakistan's attorneys. Chaudhry was reinstated in July. In October the Pakistani legislature elected Musharraf to another term as president, even though 85 legislators had resigned in protest. The Supreme Court ruled that the results of the election could not be validated until it ruled on the legality of the election itself.

On November 3, 2007, Musharraf declared a state of emergency and fired Chaudhry. Under much domestic and international pressure to restore constitutional rule, Musharraf lifted the declaration on December 15 but had clearly been wounded politically. In the meantime, his political opponents were allowed to return to Pakistan, including former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who would be running in the 2008 legislative elections, to which Musharraf was forced to accede. On November 28, 2007, he finally stepped down as chief of army staff and was replaced by General Ashfaq Kayani.

When Bhutto was assassinated on December 27, 2007, many blamed Musharraf for her murder; he has denied any involvement in the killing, however. The general elections were finally held on February 28, 2008, and the Pakistan People's Party won the majority of the votes. The party then formed a coalition with the Pakistan Muslim League. In spite of his efforts to cling to power, Musharraf resigned in August 2008 and was succeeded as Pakistani president by Asif Ali Zardari.

Musharraf left Pakistan and moved to London where he lived from 2008 to 2013. He returned to Pakistan that year and faced a range of legal challenges, including his arrest in 2014 for treason for his role in the 2007 state of emergency. By 2015, he remained under house arrest, and in mid-2016 his trial for high treason began.

Ralph Martin Baker

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afghan-Pakistani Border Raids (2002–); Bush, George W.; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban.

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N

Nadiri, Sayyid Mansur (1936–)

Sayyid Mansur Nadiri was a Tajik spiritual and political leader who supported the pro-Soviet government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989) and served as sayyed of Kayan, the leading cleric of the Tajik-Ismaili community in Baghlan Province. Nadiri was born in 1936 in Doshi in Baghlan to a leading Ismaili family. Whereas most Ismailis pledged allegiance to the Aga Khan, those in Baghlan swore fealty to the sayyed of Kayan who was always a member of the Nadiri, and whose bloodline stretched back to Muhammed. The Tajik Ismailis have long been the targets of discrimination and persecution in Afghanistan.

Sayyid Mansur served briefly in the military in the 1950s and then embarked on a political career, including tenure as vice president of parliament. After Mohammed Daoud Khan overthrew the monarchy in 1973, Sayyid Mansur and his followers faced persecution and repression. In 1976, the Tajik leader and 30 of his associates and family members were arrested for sedition. Sayyid Mansur remained in prison until he was released following the 1978 Saur Revolution, which deposed Daoud and installed the PDPA. After his release, Sayyid Mansur became the sayyed of Kayan.

During the Soviet occupation, Sayyid Mansur was loyal to the PDPA regime and was appointed governor of Baghlan. He even used his personal funds to raise and equip an armored division to fight against

the mujahideen. After the fall of the PDPA government, Sayyid Mansur backed the interim unity government of former mujahideen. He later joined the Northern Alliance, but was forced to flee by the Taliban. He returned to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. In 2003, Mansur established the National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Paiwand Milli Afghanistan*). In 2005, he was elected to the lower house of Parliament (*Woleshi Jirga*) and was reelected in 2010.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Northern Alliance; Taliban.

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Najibullah, Mohammed (1947–1996)

An Afghan politician and last president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Mohammed Najibullah was born in Gardiz, Afghanistan, on August 6, 1947, to parents of the Ahmadzai clan of the Ghilzai Pashtun tribe. In 1964 he undertook the study of medicine at Kabul University, finally earning a degree in 1975, although he never became a practicing physician.

In 1965 Najibullah began his political career by joining the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a communist organization supported by the Soviet government. He was jailed briefly on two separate occasions for his political activities, but by 1977 had become a member of his party's Central Committee. The following year the PDPA seized power in Afghanistan, and Najibullah became a member of the Revolutionary Council.

Soon after the PDPA took power, however, the Khalq faction of the party seized the majority of the power, pushing Najibullah's Parcham faction aside. For a very brief time Najibullah was the Afghan ambassador to Iran, but in a matter of months he had been dismissed from his post and was living in exile in Eastern Europe. After the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Parcham faction was placed in power and Najibullah was named the head of the secret police in 1980, with the rank of major general. This made him one of the most powerful and feared men in Afghanistan, and also gave him direct access to Kremlin policymakers.

Najibullah proved to be utterly ruthless while running the secret police, reportedly ordering the arrest, torture, and execution of tens of thousands of Afghan citizens. Soviet leaders were pleased with his performance during the early years of the Soviet occupation, which helped keep radicals and other troublemakers in check. Indeed, for his efficient bloodletting he became a member of the Afghan Politburo. As the Soviet War in Afghanistan continued and mujahideen fighters began to gain the upper hand, Moscow forced Afghan president Babrak Karmal to resign in 1986, replacing him with the loyal Najibullah.

As president, Najibullah presided over the writing of a new constitution that gave Afghans more rights and more access to the

political system, but he remained very much in charge and used his extensive police and military establishments to keep the country under his control. By 1987, however, the mujahideen were scoring victories. Despite an offer of reconciliation by Najibullah, they continued their struggle against the Soviet and Afghan government forces. Also by 1987, the Kremlin, beset by financial woes and a crumbling political structure, announced that it would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by 1989. Najibullah was thus left alone to deal with the potent insurgency, which would stop at nothing less than the overthrow of his regime.

It soon became clear that Najibullah was waging a futile struggle, and in 1990 he narrowly averted a coup d'état fomented by his own defense minister. In the meantime, his government engaged in United Nations (UN)-sponsored talks with the warring parties, but the negotiations quickly broke down. In March 1992, with his government on the verge of collapse and the capital city of Kabul drastically short of food and fuel supplies, Najibullah agreed to resign. The next month, he was ousted from his own political party. On April 17, 1992, fearing for his life, he took refuge in a UN compound in Kabul. He remained in the compound as a virtual prisoner until September 28, 1996, when he and his brother, having been captured, were hanged and their bodies mutilated by Taliban fighters. The following day, his bodyguards and personal secretary were also hanged.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Andropov, Yuri; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Ghilzai; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Karmal, Babrak; Mujahideen; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Reagan Doctrine; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979);

Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan; Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich.

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Narcoterrorism

Terrorism directly linked to the drug trade has increased substantially in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Since then, the cultivation and sale of opium has emerged as one of the primary sources of income for insurgent groups throughout Afghanistan. In addition, warlords and groups involved in the drug trade have taken up arms to oppose government-backed and international eradication efforts aimed at reducing poppy production.

A variety of factors combined to make Afghanistan the center of opium cultivation and the main source of the world's heroin. Opium poppies have been grown in Afghanistan for centuries, but until the 1960s, cultivation was limited. From the 1970s onward, drug interdiction efforts in other countries were successful in reducing opium production, first in Iran and Pakistan, and later in Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. The success of eradication efforts elsewhere increased the importance and profitability of Afghanistan's poppy crop. Furthermore, smuggling routes that were developed to supply the mujahideen with weapons and supplies have been repurposed to transport drugs, especially into Pakistan where brokers subsequently ship

heroin to Europe and North America. Meanwhile, almost four decades of internal strife eroded the nation's criminal justice system and undermined the already weak control exerted by the central government in Kabul.

After the Taliban were defeated in 2001, they initiated an insurgency from bases in Pakistan. Along with al Qaeda and other foreign fighters, the insurgents used various terrorist tactics, including assassinations of government and security officials, suicide bombings, and attacks on both civilian and military targets. To fund their campaign, the insurgents turned to the drug trade. The cultivation, transport, and sale of opium provided the Taliban with approximately 70 percent of its income. Funds were raised through a variety of methods. The Taliban imposed a "tax" on farmers who cultivated opium poppies. The group also required drug lords to pay protection fees in exchange for guarding shipments and using smuggling routes. The Taliban also conducted attacks on security forces and local officials. Finally, the Taliban also engaged directly in the sale of opium.

Local drug lords have formed formal alliances with the Taliban and aided the organization in recruiting. For instance, by 2014, some Taliban recruits were being paid the equivalent of \$200 per month at a time when the average Afghan officer made just \$70 per month. The high profits made through the drug trade have allowed the Taliban and drug lords to bribe public officials and security officers and increased the levels of corruption.

Direct violence has been one of the most significant results of the growing drug trade. A 2007 UN report found that 60 percent of villages in areas that were judged to have poor security had ongoing opium cultivation. Furthermore, the majority of coalition casualties from 2001 to 2014 occurred in

Helmand Province, which is the epicenter of opium cultivation in the country. Efforts to suppress narcoterrorism have largely failed, as have initiatives to eradicate opium production. In 2014, Afghanistan produced a record opium crop of 6,400 tons.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Helmand Valley; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Opium Poppy Production; Taliban; Warlords.

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Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–)

International efforts at nation building in Afghanistan have had only limited success since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Nation building refers to the application of external efforts to facilitate the establishment of state institutions and socioeconomic structures that are underdeveloped or degraded by major conflict or loss. Amartya Sen conceptualizes economic development as individual capabilities and functionings, which implicate quality and autonomy in life experience. Economic development is conventionally assessed through indicators for income, inequality, education, health care, mortality, and poverty. In the case of Afghanistan, severe

institutional degradation due to protracted internal conflict from 1979 to 2001 generated a consensus for the installation of an interim administration and an associated security force. Afghanistan’s ethnically diverse population was then estimated at approximately 20.5 million.

An outline for reconstruction was formalized in December 2001 by Afghan representatives from the Northern Alliance, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, and Kabul, and major donor states. At that juncture, an International Security Assistance Force was instituted to stabilize Kabul. The initial interim administration transferred political authority to the Transitional Administration in June 2002, and Hamid Karzai was selected as president. The reconstruction trajectory for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, as it is formally recognized, was paralleled by a new constitution and elections. In the fall of 2002 provincial reconstruction teams were deployed in Kabul with subsequent installations in several cities. From 2002 to the present, the United Nations (UN) Assistance Mission for Afghanistan facilitated external aid flows. Political benchmarks were reached in 2004 with the Afghan National Assembly’s establishment of a constitution in January and the fall 2004 election of Karzai as president.

Electoral processes and developmental gains continued in 2005. In 2006, tensions prompted by the Taliban insurgency corresponded with a dramatic increase in troop levels. Despite internal obstacles, in 2007 the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the UN Development Program for Afghanistan further formalized objectives to advance gender equality and institutional development. Developmental advances paralleled but were affected by major counterinsurgent offensives in 2008 and 2009. In December 2009, President Barack H. Obama pledged an increase of 30,000 troops, to be added

to the 68,000 stationed troops. From 2003 to 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) administered the security force and facilitated a transition phase across 2011–2014.

Since December 2001, several notable development markers have emerged. In 2001, the infant mortality rate, which refers to the number of children for each 1,000 born who die before reaching age one, was 93.4, but by 2015, the number had dropped to 66.3. The Human Development Index (HDI) provides a composite score for health, education, and living standard dimensions. In 2000, Afghanistan's score was .334, but it increased to .448 in 2010 and to .465 in 2014. The scores are contextualized by the HDI growth rate for 1990–2000, which was 1.20, versus an HDI growth rate of 2.97 for 2000–2010, and an incremental but positive increase of .97 from 2010 to 2014.

Education markers are indicated in expected years of schooling for children, with increases in 2000, 2006, and 2012, respectively, at 5.6, 8.0, and 9. Advances are also observed in gross primary education enrollment, which the World Bank refers to as those enrolled in primary education, irrespective of age, as a percentage of the domestic population within the primary education age range. For this measure, the World Bank indicates that a percentage may be higher than 100 percent. The approximate gross primary education enrollment percentages for 2001, 2007, and 2014 were indicated, respectively, as 21.12, 97.88, and 105.86.

Its relative progress notwithstanding, international system benchmarks indicate low institutionalization. The State Fragility Index (SFI) available through the Center for Systemic Peace measures governance legitimacy and effectiveness across domestic security, political, economic, and social spheres. Afghanistan continues to rank consistently near

the bottom, with a mean score of 22.47 for the period of 1996–2014, and a slightly improved mean score of 21.92 for the interval of 2001–2014, within the context of a 0–25 scale, where a higher score corresponds with higher state fragility. However, in 2001, its SFI score was 24, versus 21 in 2014. Transparency International's 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) rates Afghanistan's government as the world's third most corrupt.

Ted Ellis

See also: Bonn Agreement (2001); Civil Military Operations; Humanitarian Aid Operations; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Karzai, Hamid; United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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National Fatherland Front (*Jabha-yi Milli-yi Padarwatan*)

The National Fatherland Front (*Jabha-yi Milli-yi Padarwatan*) was a pro-government and therefore pro-Soviet coalition, formed during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). After the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in 1978, they faced a growing insurgency by various elements of Afghan society, ranging from Islamist conservatives to royalists to pro-Western liberals. The PDPA itself was relatively small, with a membership estimated to be about 15,000. In order to expand support for the new regime, the PDPA and the Soviets decided to create a broad umbrella organization. The result was the National Fatherland Front, established in June 1981. The new group was firmly under the control of the PDPA. A prominent PDPA politburo member, Salih Mohammad Ziari, was the first head of the Front, and the overwhelming majority of leadership positions were reserved for party members.

The Front faced a number of challenges. It proved difficult to find organizations willing to join it, and it did not attract opposition groups. It was able to recruit some trade unions, business groups, and women's and ethnic organizations. Even the PDPA government was not sure what tasks the group should undertake, so for its first few years, the Front did little more than meet regularly. By the mid-1980s, it had a membership of about 60,000.

In 1985, the Soviet Union and the PDPA initiated serious efforts to resolve the conflict through negotiations and national reconciliation. The Front was given a more prominent role and a nonparty member, Abdul Rahim Hatif, became its new leader. In 1986, the PDPA introduced a national reconciliation plan, which included an offer to allow mujahideen commanders positions in the government, including the powerful ministry of defense. A national reconciliation commission was created, but failed to draw in the mujahideen. In 1987, the Front was renamed the National Front of the Republic of Afghanistan. Its membership dropped sharply after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, and the organization ceased to exist after the fall of the PDPA government in 1992.

Tom Lansford

See also: Karmal, Babrak; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Operation Storm 333 (1979); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taraki, Nur Muhammad.

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National Front of Afghanistan (*Jabhe Melli*)

The National Front of Afghanistan (*Jabhe Melli*) was a political group that was formed in 2011 by various groups that had been a part of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the main

motivations that held the Northern Alliance together were weakened and some of the groups broke off from the coalition or were relaunched as political parties. The creation of the National Front was an effort to maintain the relevancy of the Northern Alliance, provide greater political influence, and create a united opposition.

The National Front was formed by three powerful anti-Taliban leaders: Ahmad Zia Massoud, an ethnic Tajik of the Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*), who served as vice president of Afghanistan from 2004 to 2009 and was the brother of legendary mujahideen leader Ahmad Shah Massoud; Abdul Rashid Dostum, a powerful Uzbek militia commander and leader of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan*), who served as the military's chief of staff after the fall of the Taliban; and Mohammed Mohaqeq, a Hazara leader of the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan*), who was a vice president in the interim government under President Hamid Karzai.

One purpose of the Front was to promote the rights of minority groups, such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. The organization also endorsed a governmental transition away from a presidential model to a parliamentary system. One of the primary goals of the National Front was to unite behind a single presidential candidate for the 2014 balloting. The Front found itself in competition with the newly formed National Coalition, led by former foreign minister and 2009 presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah. Abdullah Abdullah was the National Coalition candidate in 2014, but the member parties of the Front endorsed different presidential contenders. Dostum backed Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, campaigning as his running mate, and became vice president after Ghani won the 2014 balloting. Other member parties of the

Front backed Abdullah Abdullah, who placed second in the disputed election and was offered the newly created position of chief executive (prime minister) under Ghani in a deal brokered by U.S. secretary of state John Kerry.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf; Hazaras; Karzai, Hamid.

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National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*)

The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*) was a moderate, Sufi, royalist mujahideen grouping and political party in Afghanistan. The Front was established in 1979 in Pakistan by Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, a Sufi religious leader, after the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took power. The group was predominately Pashtun and drew in supporters of former king Mohammed Zahir Shah. It called for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy to replace the PDPA regime and was one of the most liberal mujahideen factions in terms of its support for democracy and civil liberties. The Front initially refused to join in a council of other mujahideen groups because not all of the participants had agreed that representatives in a post-PDPA government would be elected.

The Front was a member of the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*), commonly known as the Peshawar Seven, a coalition of

mujahideen groups that served as a quasi government in exile and a means of coordination among the anti-Soviet and anti-PDPA fighters. Seen more as a political organization than a fighting force, the Front received a smaller percentage of weapons and funding from the Pakistani government, which organized the distribution of foreign aid among the mujahideen.

After the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, the Front was one of the few mujahideen groups that supported a negotiated settlement with the PDPA. With the fall of the PDPA in 1992, the group unsuccessfully advocated for the restoration of the monarchy. Instead, Gailani joined the interim government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. When the Taliban took power in 1996, Gailani and senior Front leaders went into exile in Cyprus, while other members crossed the border back into Pakistan. During the remainder of the 1990s, the Front backed peace talks between the Taliban and opposition groups.

Following the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 by the U.S.-led coalition, the Front participated in the 2001 Bonn Conference and supported the resultant interim government under President Hamid Karzai. The group endorsed Karzai in the 2004 presidential contest, but backed former finance minister Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in the 2009 balloting. It also supported Ghani in the 2014 presidential race.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Bonn Agreement (2001); Gailani, Pir Sayyid Ahmad; Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*); Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan*)

The National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan*) was an Uzbek political and military group that emerged in the final days of the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). The Jumbish-e Milli was founded by Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum, who supported the pro-Soviet government of President Mohammed Najibullah. Dostum and his followers believed that Uzbeks would be treated more fairly under the Najibullah regime than the Pashtun-dominated mujahideen. In 1992, Dostum and his group switched allegiances and became allied with the mujahideen. When the Najibullah regime fell, Dostum led his forces into Kabul. In 1994, Jumbish-i Milli joined Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar's Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*) in a new segment of the nation's ongoing civil war against the government of interim president Burhanuddin Rabbani.

The Taliban exploited the infighting and were able to capture Kabul in 1996. Dostum's group joined with the Northern Alliance in fighting the Taliban, but by 1998, the majority of the movement's forces had retreated to Uzbekistan. Nonetheless, Dostum continued to fight alongside the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. His forces played a prominent role in the overthrow of the Taliban following the U.S.-led invasion in October 2001. At the December Bonn Conference, Dostum supported Rabbani, a Tajik, to be the president of a post-Taliban interim government, but the consensus choice was Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun.

Dostum was appointed a deputy defense minister in the initial Karzai cabinet. His inclusion was designed to secure his support, along with his group. The movement supported Dostum in the 2004 presidential election although he ran as an independent in an effort to broaden his appeal (he placed fourth in the balloting). The following year, the general became chief of staff of the armed forces, a post he held until 2008 when he was forced to resign. However, in exchange for supporting Karzai in the 2009 presidential balloting, Dostum was reappointed. In 2014, the movement backed Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in the presidential balloting after Dostum was appointed one of the former finance minister's vice presidential running mates. After Ghani won the election, Dostum became one of two vice presidents.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Karzai, Hamid; Northern Alliance; Rabbani, Burhanuddin.

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National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*)

The National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*) was a moderate mujahideen group that fought the Soviets and the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government. The movement

was founded by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi in 1979, after his release from captivity for antigovernment activities. Mojaddedi was a well-respected cleric whose leadership endowed the Front with a degree of influence that was out of proportion to the size of the organization.

The Front drew primarily from moderates and Sufis and was one of the most secular of the mujahideen groups. It did not draw the number of fighters that other groups such as Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar's Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*) did, but was one of the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*), or Peshawar Seven, mujahideen groups that received support from the Pakistani government and external donors such as the United States and the Persian Gulf states. It did not receive the same level of aid as larger groups. The Front operated primarily in the Kunar and Paktia provinces where its fighters could easily launch raids from Pakistan and retreat back to bases in that country. Partly because of Mojaddedi's standing and prominence, the Front fought less with other mujahideen groups than many of its sister organizations and regularly cooperated with other groups.

In 1989, following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Mojaddedi was named president by the mujahideen government in Pakistan. When the PDPA government fell in 1992, Mojaddedi was appointed interim president of the new government from April to June, when he was replaced by Burhanuddin Rabbani. The Front opposed Rabbani and joined three other mujahideen groups to create a new Sunni opposition alliance. The rise of the Taliban eclipsed the National Liberation Front, and Mojaddedi and other senior party leaders went into exile in Egypt and later Pakistan. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Mojaddedi returned to Afghanistan and chaired the Loya Jirga that finalized the

country's new constitution in 2003. The Front supported Hamid Karzai in the 2004 presidential election and Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in the 2014 balloting. In 2015, Mojaddedi reportedly formed a new political coalition that included eight opposition groups.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*); Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Nawaz Sharif, Muhammad (1949–)

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif has been prime minister of Pakistan since 2013, having served in the office on two other occasions. He was born on December 25, 1949, in Lahore, Pakistan, to Muhammad Sharif and Shamim Akhtar. The future prime minister attended Government College in Lahore. After he completed his education, Nawaz Sharif entered the family business, Itefaq Group, a steel conglomerate. He is one of the wealthiest industrialists in the country with an estimated net worth of \$1.4 billion. When the steel industry was nationalized, he went into politics along with several of his other relatives. He rose quickly through

the political system, serving in his home province of Punjab and eventually becoming chief minister of Punjab in 1985.

Nawaz Sharif is president of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), a conservative political party. He first served as prime minister from November 1990 to July 1993. His first term was marked with political struggles with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The rivalry resulted in the dissolution of the National Assembly by the president. With the assistance of the military and the Supreme Court, Sharif was able to have the National Assembly reinstated on grounds that the president's actions were unconstitutional. Continued unrest over the constitutionality of the government prompted the military to force both Sharif and the president to resign.

Nawaz Sharif became prime minister for a second term in 1997. He attempted to pass a constitutional amendment that would have allowed him to enforce sharia law. This was defeated. In 1999, he was ousted from the position by a bloodless coup. This was done partly in response to Nawaz Sharif's attempts to rein in the military. He sought to remove General Pervez Musharraf from command of the army. Instead, Musharraf deposed the prime minister, who was imprisoned for four months. The former prime minister was freed by a deal that allowed him and his family to go into exile in Saudi Arabia for 10 years.

Nawaz Sharif became prime minister for a third term in 2013 after a constitutional amendment removed the two-term limit for prime ministers. He has been a vocal critic of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and instead has sought to maintain Pakistan's role and influence in the country. He endeavored to bring the various warring Afghan factions together during the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001) and has attempted to facilitate

negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

Jorge Brown

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan.

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9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–)

On September 11, 2001, the worst terrorist attacks ever committed against the United States occurred. The terrorists had received some flight training in the United States, and on the morning of September 11 they seized control of four fully loaded commercial airliners, three of which were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Passengers on the fourth aircraft, informed by cell phone of what had transpired on the other three planes, battled with the hijackers and that plane crashed in a Pennsylvania field before it could reach its target, believed to be the White House. All but 1 of the 19 terrorists who carried out the deadly attacks were originally from Saudi Arabia, as was al Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden.

A total of 2,995 people died in the attacks: the 19 hijackers; 246 passengers on the four planes (there were no survivors); 2,605 in the collapse of the Twin Towers in New York

City; and 125 at the Pentagon, of whom 55 were military personnel. The terrorist actions crippled not only the city and economy of New York City, but also the U.S. economy. Particularly hard-hit were the airline and insurance industries, both of which suffered billions of dollars of losses. The death toll of the September 11 attacks surpassed that of the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks there was an outpouring of international sympathy and outrage. The United Nations (UN) Security Council denounced the attack on September 12 and called on all member states to assist in apprehending those responsible. Also, for the first time in its 52-year history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked its collective security mechanism, which states that an attack on any NATO member nation will be treated as an attack on them all. On September 11 at Camp David, President George W. Bush used the phrase “war on terror” in the course of an unscripted conversation, likening it to a “crusade” that would take some time. The word “crusade” carried unfortunate connotations in the Middle East and was not used again.

After an intensive intelligence investigation to determine the identities of the terrorists who had carried out the attacks, on September 20 President Bush announced in the course of a televised address to a joint session of Congress: “Our ‘war on terror’ begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” Bush demanded that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan immediately turn over bin Laden or risk military action by the United States and its allies. Within a few weeks, France, Great Britain, and other NATO members—including Turkey, Canada,

New Zealand, and Australia—become part of a U.S.-led antiterrorist coalition.

Bush administration objectives in the War on Terror included destroying terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, denying state sponsorship of terrorist activities, working with other nations to create an antiterrorist network, and seeking to diminish conditions in states that terrorists were able to exploit. Although the global war on terror was truly global, and included operations in places as far-flung as the Philippines, its centerpiece was the U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan, known as Operation Enduring Freedom.

Operation Enduring Freedom

With the Taliban intransigent and following a month of planning by U.S. Central Command (CENCTOM), headed by U.S. Army general Tommy Franks, on October 7, 2001, U.S. forces, with some NATO support, commenced air attacks against Afghanistan. This marked the opening of Operation Enduring Freedom, the goals of which included the toppling of the Taliban regime and the rooting out of terrorist enclaves in Afghanistan. High on the list of goals was the capture or death of bin Laden. (See President Bush's address to the nation in the Related Primary Document section below.)

Throughout history, Afghanistan has posed major challenges for any invader, not the least of which is the physical environment of deserts, high plateaus, and mountain ranges. The plan developed called for the employment of the most advanced military and communications technology in the world on what was certainly one of the world's most primitive battlefields. Special operations played a key role in allowing the anti-Taliban forces to seize and maintain the battlefield initiative. From the beginning, U.S. forces constituted the bulk of the NATO forces committed.

Cruise missiles and bombs from B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress aircraft flying from the United States and Diego Garcia concurrently quickly reduced the number of viable military targets, while on the ground, U.S. and allied Special Forces (especially the British and Australians), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives, and units of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) and Marine Expeditionary Unit 15 worked with Afghan soldiers of the Northern Alliance opposing the Taliban.

Initial operations were surprisingly easy, with some 15,000 members of the Northern Alliance and allied airpower defeating some 45,000 Taliban troops and an estimated 3,000 al Qaeda fighters. Critical to their success was American close air support (CAS) called in by the CIA and Special Forces teams. In order to win the struggle of “hearts and minds,” the military campaign was accompanied by a large-scale humanitarian effort, with cargo planes dropping food to starving Afghans in remote locations. Logistics problems were immense and prompted the seizure of airfields inside Afghanistan at earlier stages of the campaign. Despite difficulties, the Afghan capital, Kabul, was secured by mid-November.

Coalition forces suffered a major failure in military operations in the mountainous region of Tora Bora in December, however. Remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda, including bin Laden, had taken refuge in this area in extensive cave base complexes. Although U.S. aircraft pounded the region, the failure to provide a sufficient number of U.S. troops on the ground led to the escape into Pakistan of much of the Taliban and the al Qaeda leadership, including bin Laden.

In March 2002, U.S. and other NATO and non-NATO forces launched Operation Anaconda, designed to destroy any remaining Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the

Shah-i-Kot Valley and Arma Mountain regions. Although the Taliban sustained heavy casualties in this operation, it was able to regroup in the tribal regions of northwestern Pakistan, and by late 2002 was carrying out traditional guerrilla operations against NATO forces.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration had shifted resources. With the war not yet won in Afghanistan, it opened a larger military effort in the form of war with Iraq in 2003. There can be little doubt that this decision prolonged the war in Afghanistan and made it much more costly in the long run.

In Afghanistan, while U.S., NATO, and Afghan government forces responded to the Taliban and al Qaeda with military offensives and increased numbers of troops, they failed to halt the insurgents, who were able to take advantage of the porous Pakistani-Afghan border and regroup, recruit, train, and resupply in areas of northwestern Pakistan controlled by the Pakistani Taliban. Endemic and widespread Afghan government corruption and tribalism plagued the coalition military effort. Even as reports surfaced of peace talks between NATO and some Taliban leaders, NATO and other coalition partners announced plans to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the country by the end of 2014, with security turned over to the Afghan Army and police. On December 31, 2014, Operation Enduring Freedom officially came to an end, although some 13,000 U.S. and NATO forces remained in Afghanistan to train and support the Afghan National Army in Operation Enduring Freedom's Sentinel program.

Horn of Africa

In October 2002, the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. Numbering some 2,000 personnel, it includes

both U.S. military and special operations forces and coalition forces. It operated in conjunction with Combined Task Force 150, composed of the ships of a number of different nations that monitored and inspected ships entering the Horn of Africa region and that might be carrying cargoes that could affect operations in Iraq. The Horn of Africa operation also involved training some armed forces units of Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics. CJTF-HOA personnel also carried out humanitarian work, such as school and clinic construction and providing medical assistance to countries whose forces were receiving training.

This program was expanded under the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative to include training selected military personnel of Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali. It did not, however, include Sudan, where an ongoing civil war had killed more than 400,000 people and would ultimately result in the division of Sudan into two separate states.

In recent years, considerable attention has been focused on Somalia. Long dominated by warlords, it is considered a “failed state” because its central government has virtually no power. Somali pirates have been active, seizing ships in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and holding them and their crews for ransom. By late 2006, an Islamic faction secured control of much of the southern part of the country, including the capital, Mogadishu, and endeavored to impose sharia law. Ethiopian armed forces intervened on the side of the government when the Islamists launched an offensive against the government stronghold of Baidoa and blunted the Islamists, pushing them back north. On January 8, 2007, U.S. forces employed AC-130 gunships to attack Ras Kambon. Reportedly, U.S. and French forces were also involved in bringing about the death of Saleh Ali Saleh

Nabhan, a leader of Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda and sought in connection with the 2002 Mombasa attacks.

Philippines

U.S. Special Forces have also been ordered to the Philippines. In January 2002, the United States Special Operations Command, Pacific, assisted Philippine government forces fighting Islamic insurgents, most notably the Abu Sayyaf group and Jemaah Islamiyah on the island of Basilan. This operation saw Special Forces teams working with the Philippine Army in disrupting guerrilla activities and also providing medical and other humanitarian assistance (Operation SMILES).

Pakistan

Meanwhile, Washington had been applying pressure on Pakistan to move against the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan's northern Waziristan region. In 2004, the Pakistani government finally sent into the region some 80,000 troops, with the goal of removing al Qaeda and Taliban forces that had long enjoyed safe haven there, supported by elements of the Pakistani intelligence service. The Pakistani Army captured or killed numerous al Qaeda operatives such

as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, wanted for his involvement in the *Cole* bombing and the killing of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl. At the same time, the United States mounted drone aircraft attacks in the Tribal Areas.

On May 2, 2011, U.S. Special Forces carried out a spectacular attack, killing bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. This action, however, won the United States no friends in Pakistan, for it was carried out without the knowledge or support of Pakistani authorities. There were also questions about how bin Laden could have hidden in plain sight in Pakistan for so long without assistance from at least the Pakistani intelligence services.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Blair, Tony; Bush, George W.; Civilian Casualties; Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–); Obama, Barack; Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Operation Anaconda (2002); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban; United States, Relations with Afghanistan; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001).

Related Primary Document

President George W. Bush Address Announcing Air Strikes on Afghanistan, October 7, 2001

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, U.S. president George W. Bush spoke to the nation, explaining that he had ordered the country's military to attack the Taliban. The president stated that he had given an ultimatum to the regime to turn over al Qaeda's leaders or face military action. The Taliban had refused to comply, so the United States and a coalition of close allies were attacking the regime. Bush emphasized that the United States was not at war with the Afghan people and that the nation would provide humanitarian assistance to average Afghans. The president also commended

the men and women in uniform and the sacrifices they made and were likely to make in the upcoming war. Meanwhile, many countries had also agreed to cooperate with the United States in areas such as intelligence and law enforcement.

The following is the text of President George W. Bush's address on October 7, 2001, announcing airstrikes in Afghanistan.

Good afternoon. On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.

We are joined in this operation by our staunch friend, Great Britain. Other close friends, including Canada, Australia, Germany, and France, have pledged forces as the operation unfolds. More than 40 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and across Asia have granted air transit or landing rights. Many more have shared intelligence. We are supported by the collective will of the world.

More than two weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific demands: close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the Al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly detained in your country. None of these demands were met. And now the Taliban will pay a price. By destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans.

Initially, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding places. Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive, and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice.

At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine, and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan.

The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and we are the friends of almost a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith. The United States of America is an enemy of those who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name.

This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets, and the arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries. Given the nature and reach of our enemies, we will win this conflict by the patient accumulation of successes, by meeting a series of challenges with determination and will and purpose.

Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril.

I'm speaking to you today from the Treaty Room of the White House, a place where American presidents have worked for peace. We're a peaceful nation. Yet, as we have learned, so suddenly

and so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In the face of today's new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it.

We did not ask for this mission, but we will fulfill it. The name of today's military operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.

I know many Americans feel fear today. And our government is taking strong precautions. All law enforcement and intelligence agencies are working aggressively around America, around the world, and around the clock. At my request, many governors have activated the National Guard to strengthen airport security. We have called up Reserves to reinforce our military capability and strengthen the protection of our homeland.

In the months ahead, our patience will be one of our strengths—patience with the long waits that will result from tighter security, patience and understanding that it will take time to achieve our goals, patience in all the sacrifices that may come.

Today, those sacrifices are being made by members of our armed forces who now defend us so far from home, and by their proud and worried families. A commander-in-chief sends America's sons and daughters into a battle in a foreign land only after the greatest care and a lot of prayer. We ask a lot of those who wear our uniform. We ask them to leave their loved ones, to travel great distances, to risk injury, even to be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. They are dedicated, they are honorable, they represent the best of our country. And we are grateful.

To all the men and women in our military—every sailor, every soldier, every airman, every coast-guardsmen, every Marine—I say this: your mission is defined, your objectives are clear, your goal is just. You have my full confidence, and you will have every tool you need to carry out your duty.

I recently received a touching letter that says a lot about the state of America in these difficult times—a letter from a fourth-grade girl with a father in the military: “As much as I don't want my Dad to fight,” she wrote, “I'm willing to give him to you.”

This is a precious gift, the greatest she could give. This young girl knows what America is all about. Since September 11, an entire generation of young Americans has gained new understanding of the value of freedom, and its cost in duty and in sacrifice.

The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waver, we will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail.

Thank you. May God continue to bless America.

Source: *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush* (2001, Book II). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, pp. 1201–1202.

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Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are voluntary organizations whose members come together to achieve a common purpose, often oriented to a public good. Private volunteer organizations (PVOs) are usually tax-exempt, nonprofit entities that leverage their expertise and private funding to address development challenges. Both NGOs and PVOs can be critical change agents in promoting economic growth, human rights, and social progress and in addressing a broad range of developmental, humanitarian, and health challenges.

Civil society, the political space between the individual and the government, includes NGOs, PVOs, associations, and social groups that may contribute to a democratic society and nonviolent political transition from war to peace. The development of current civil society in Afghanistan was initiated after the country's first elections in 2004 and also includes traditional local councils called *shuras* or *jirgas* operating at the village or tribal level on an informal (unregistered) basis, usually to represent a community's interests to other parts of society or to the central Afghan government. Kabul is the center of registered civil society organizations (CSOs), with 38 percent having their central offices in the Afghanistan capital. This number shows centralization of CSOs; however, 91 percent of all CSO implementing offices in Afghanistan are located in only 6 out of 34 provinces.

Like other postconflict countries, Afghanistan witnessed a dramatic rise in the number

of NGOs and other CSOs after the fall of the Taliban, coinciding with an increase in foreign aid. Based on its national-level legislation, Afghanistan has two main categories of registered, nongovernmental, not-for-profit organizations with legal entity status: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and associations. As of March 2013, there were more than 2,000 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Economy of Afghanistan. More than 80 percent of these were locally based, and the remainder were international. An additional 1,716 social organizations were officially registered with the Afghan Ministry of Justice.

NGOs and PVOs deliver a variety of services to Afghan people at both national and subnational levels. Programs include health care, emergency relief, school reconstruction and educational programming, community development, capacity-building programs, and agricultural development efforts. NGOs are active in governance programs, mine action, peace building, and elements of security sector reform as well. NGOs and PVOs may be nondenominational, while others are faith based. Since 2001, NGOs and PVOs have increased their scope beyond humanitarian activities that were especially critical at the onset of military intervention following al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.

As an Islamic republic with a civil law tradition, Afghanistan has a hybrid legal system based on both civil and sharia law. Afghanistan's legal system has undergone several dramatic changes since 2002, with consequences for CSOs. First, in November 2002, the Transitional Government of Afghanistan adopted the Law on Social Organizations, which was enacted in accordance with Afghanistan's constitution and was subsequently revised in September 2013. Second, in January 2004, a new Afghan constitution

was adopted, with provisions recognizing fundamental rights and freedoms. Third, in June 2005, President Hamid Karzai signed a new Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Finally, in June 2014, the Council of Ministers approved a Regulation on Procedure of Establishment and Registration of Associations.

Several pending legislative initiatives will affect CSOs. Proposed amendments to the Law on NGOs address the formation, activities, and funding of NGOs, although agencies are concerned about additional burdens to their organizations if these amendments are passed. Other initiatives include a draft Law on Foundations for private giving; a draft Law on Volunteerism; and proposed amendments to the tax code, which would introduce tax incentives for donors to give to tax-exempt organizations.

NGOs and PVOs are not without criticism. Allegations of corruption, misuse and mismanagement of funds, and lack of accountability and effectiveness must be addressed by Afghan NGOs. Western paradigms, including those of CSOs, can also be injurious when forced upon local Afghan populations. CSOs are essential to Afghanistan's self-reliance, efficiency, and development results, contentious objectives for the primary development agreement between donors and the Afghan government, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.

M. Annette Evans

See also: 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on August 11, 2003, with a charter to provide security, governance, reconstruction, and development to Afghanistan. On January 1, 2015, the ISAF mission ended and was replaced by the NATO-led Resolute Support mission, marking the transition from a combat role to one emphasizing training, advisement, and assistance to Afghan security forces.

Al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, precipitated NATO members' invocation of Article V, a provision of the organization's founding Washington Treaty (1949), which specifies that an attack on one member of the alliance is considered an attack on all and, consequently, each member must come to

that counterpart's defense. When NATO assumed responsibility for operations in Afghanistan from the UN-mandated ISAF response, the transatlantic alliance became responsible for the command, coordination, and planning of the force. Its responsibilities in that context included the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan so that country's government could provide the requisite security to ensure it would never again be a safe haven for terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Taliban.

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1510 permitted ISAF to expand out of Kabul in 2003, in order to address the complexities of the Afghan state development and insurgent activities undermining governance. UNSCR 1510 did not forbid NATO troops from conducting offensive combat operations; however, ISAF operated under Chapter VII's peace-enforcement mandate. This nuance contributed to friction between the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom's counterinsurgency campaign and NATO's stability and security mission. Many of the NATO allies that contributed troops to the ISAF mission specifically sought to avoid having their troops participate in combat operations.

ISAF's expansion in Afghanistan was a four-stage process that unfolded from late 2003 to October 2006 by region. NATO expanded the ISAF mission to Regional Command (RC) Capital (Kabul and its environs) in 2003, RC North in 2004, RC West in 2005, RC South in July 2006, and RC East in October 2006. The expansion enveloped the operations of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), one of NATO's core initiatives in Afghanistan. Developed as part of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the PRTs were designed to help Afghanistan extend its authority in developing

a stable and secure environment to better facilitate reform and reconstruction efforts. By summer 2006, the expanded ISAF led a total of 13 PRTs in the north, west, and south, covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan's territory. Later that year, in October, ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion by taking over command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the U.S.-led coalition.

In 2010, NATO and Afghanistan signed the *Declaration on an Enduring Partnership* at the NATO Lisbon Summit. The *Enduring Partnership* provides a framework for long-term political consultations and practical cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan. Subsequently addressed at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014 and again at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Turkey in 2015, the declaration's tenets provide the strategic context for NATO's commitment to Afghanistan.

A critical assessment of NATO's performance in Afghanistan yields both positive and negative points. Consistent NATO member troop contributions; improvements in governmental, health, education, and economic development sectors; and the recruitment and subsequent structure of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are at least in part attributable to NATO. Wasteful spending on reconstruction, strict national rules of engagement that forbade some NATO troops from engaging in combat, and a misplaced focus on the establishment of Western-style liberal democratic institutions as the basis for Afghan governance are among the criticisms facing NATO.

NATO's longest (and one of its most challenging) missions to date, ISAF at its height comprised 130,000 troops from 51 NATO and partner nations from across the world. On January 1, 2015, Afghans assumed full responsibility for security when NATO

launched the noncombat Resolute Support Mission (RSM). RSM's presence was to be sustained through 2016, focusing on budgeting, accountability, force generation, strategic planning and communication, sustainment, and civilian governance as the bedrock for the Afghan National Security Forces. Following the end of RSM, NATO will maintain a civilian-led presence and financial support to Afghanistan through 2020.

M. Annette Evans

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Civil Military Operations; Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Taliban.

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Northern Alliance

The Northern Alliance, a league established by several predominantly non-Pashtun nationalities in northern Afghanistan to oppose the Pashtun-dominated Taliban movement in the mid-1990s, is also known as the United Islamic and National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (United Front). The Northern Alliance fought in tandem with U.S. and allied troops against the Taliban regime in the

autumn of 2001 during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Afghanistan is a multiethnic country. Pashtuns account for approximately 42 percent of the population and have traditionally held political power. Other groups include the Tajiks (30 percent), Hazaras (10 percent), Uzbeks (8 percent), and numerous smaller groups.

Four coups d'état and widespread unrest in the 1970s set the stage for the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a decade of subsequent resistance by mujahideen (warriors of God) groups. After a disastrous 10-year occupation, the Soviets departed in 1989 and Afghan communists were defeated in 1992. Instead of another Pashtun government, however, it was the Tajiks, commanded by Ahmed Shah Massoud, and the Uzbeks, led by Abdul Rashid Dostum, who seized control of Kabul and established a government with Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik Islamist, as president.

Fighting between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns had begun before the communist defeat and escalated into a civil war in 1992, but Pashtuns under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar failed to capture Kabul. Hekmatyar was only one of many Pashtun warlords whose followers were too divided to succeed. Consequently, Massoud and other leaders were able to keep Pashtun forces at bay.

Leaders in neighboring Pakistan, however, distrusted the non-Pashtun government. They wanted a Pashtun-dominated group to control the country and provide stability along lucrative trade routes emerging between Pakistan and Central Asia. Consequently, they supported the Taliban (Islamic students) when they emerged in 1994. These students were Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns from madrasahs (Islamic schools) in Pakistan. Led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, they sought to establish strict Islamic rule

throughout Afghanistan. Many Pashtuns accepted the Taliban's harsh version of Islamic law, but that changed as the Taliban moved against non-Pashtun groups in the north. The Taliban were also offering aid and safe haven to terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda.

The Northern Alliance evolved in the mid-1990s from the Tajik Islamist Rabbani-led government. Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Shi'a Hazaras provided more than 90 percent of the alliance's fighters. Although the Northern Alliance scored a number of early victories, ethnic diversity and rivalries worked to the advantage of the Taliban, which gradually seized control of most of central and northern Afghanistan. India, Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian states provided assistance to the Northern Alliance, but Pakistan and Saudi Arabia matched that with support for the Taliban. Furthermore, the Taliban benefited from a continuing supply of new recruits from the madrasahs and refugee camps located in Pakistan.

Although the international community continued to recognize the Rabbani government, by 2000 the Northern Alliance controlled less than 10 percent of the country. The Northern Alliance suffered one of its last setbacks on the eve of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States when two al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as Belgian journalists assassinated Ahmed Shah Massoud.

The September 11 attacks changed everything, however, preventing the Taliban from capitalizing on Massoud's death. The United States quickly sent supplies and advisers to the Northern Alliance in preparation for its successful offensive against the Taliban and al Qaeda during Operation Enduring Freedom, which began on October 7, 2001. Members of the Northern Alliance, along with anti-Taliban Pashtuns, subsequently formed a transitional government in Afghanistan,

although it faced an insurgency by the Taliban. The Northern Alliance subsequently dissolved into various political groups and parties.

Chuck Fahrer

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Mujahideen; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Taliban.

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Nott, Sir William (1782–1845)

Sir William Nott was a British general who won a series of victories during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Nott was born on January 20, 1782, in Wales. At 18 he traveled to India and became a cadet in the East India Company Army. In 1801, he was promoted to lieutenant, a quick advance for a cadet at the time and an indication of his growing military skill. However, Nott was court-martialed in 1804, at his request, to clear himself of charges that he was absent from duty. While acquitted, Nott would not be promoted again until 1814. During this period, the lieutenant served in a variety of administrative posts, including garrison

paymaster. Meanwhile, Nott married Letitia Swinhoe in 1805 and the couple had 14 children (only 5 survived to adulthood). In December 1815, he was promoted to captain. In 1822, he received a lengthy furlough and returned to Wales, before resuming his service in India and being promoted to major the following year.

Nott became a lieutenant colonel in 1825 and was given command of a native infantry regiment. He went on to lead a series of other units and rose to the rank of colonel in 1829. In 1838, just prior to the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839, Nott was appointed a major general and given command of a brigade. In the midst of preparations for the upcoming conflict, Nott's wife died unexpectedly, leaving the general deeply depressed. He advanced through the Bolan Pass to Quetta in December 1838, where he was appointed to oversee the region and maintain the supply lines for the forces invading Afghanistan.

In October 1839, Nott was ordered to Kandahar to pacify the region. He undertook a series of operations to reduce resistance by capturing key fortresses and strongholds. Nott's efforts were so successful that in 1841 he had begun to transfer troops under his command back to India when news arrived of the Afghan uprising in Kabul. He recalled most of the Anglo-Indian troops from their posts throughout the region and concentrated them in Kandahar. After the massacre of Major General William Elphinstone's forces during their retreat from Kabul, Nott was able to inflict a series of defeats on the Afghans, before being ordered to withdraw to British-controlled India. Nott transferred some of his forces but set out with a force to attack Ghazni and Kabul. In September, Nott's forces captured Ghazni and then defeated a large Afghan force during a two-day battle, September 14–15, before

rendezvousing with British forces under Sir George Pollock at Kabul on September 17. The British remained in Kabul for almost a month before retiring to India.

In February 1843, Nott was knighted and in June of that year, he married Rosa Wilson. Illness forced Nott to return to Britain in October 1843. He died on January 1, 1845.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Bolan Pass; Dost Mohammad; Elphinstone, William George Keith; Ghazni, Battle of (1839); Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Pollock, Sir George.

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Nur, Atta Mohammad (1965–)

Atta Mohammad Nur is a former Tajik mujahideen commander and member of the Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*) who fought with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and was later named governor of Balkh Province. Nur was born in 1965 in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in Balkh Province. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Nur was a high school teacher in Mazar-e-Sharif. As fighting spread through the countryside, Nur joined the Islamic Society. He became well known as a mujahideen leader. After the Soviets withdrew in 1989, Nur continued fighting against the pro-Soviet government of Mohammed Najibullah.

After the fall of the Najibullah regime, Nur became allied with the militia forces of

Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum. However, within a year, ideological differences between the two figures prompted Nur to break with Dostum. Over the next several years, Nur and Dostum would repeatedly clash. The ascent of the Taliban in 1996 prompted a reconciliation among the major mujahideen groups. Nur joined other leading anti-Taliban figures in the Northern Alliance.

Nur fought against the Taliban during the U.S.-led campaign in 2001 and 2002. He supported the interim government of President Hamid Karzai and was given command of a corps of pro-government troops in northern Afghanistan. Nur again clashed with Dostum, who had been appointed a deputy defense minister. Fighting broke out between forces loyal to the two commanders and continued throughout 2002 and 2003. That year a power-sharing agreement was reached whereby Nur controlled Balkh and agreed not to interfere with Dostum's authority in other areas of northern Afghanistan.

After Karzai won the 2004 presidential election, he appointed Nur governor of Balkh. He appointed trusted subordinates to positions of power, many of whom had been mujahideen or Northern Alliance fighters. While this tactic had backfired in other provinces, it provided a degree of stability and order in Balkh that was uncommon in other areas. After Karzai left office in 2014, Nur remained governor of the province.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Islamic Society (JIA) (*Jamiat-e Islami*); Northern Alliance; Taliban.

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Obama, Barack (1961–)

Barack Hussein Obama was president of the United States (2009–2017). Also an attorney, he has been a law school professor, a Democratic Party politician, a state senator, and U.S. senator from Illinois (2005–2008). As president, Obama's main foreign policy objectives were ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Obama was born on August 4, 1961, in Honolulu, Hawaii, the son of a white American woman and an African from Kenya. Obama's parents separated when he was just two years old, and they divorced in 1964. Obama's father returned to Kenya and had limited contact with his son after that time; Obama saw his father, who died in a car accident in 1982, only once after his father left for Kenya. Obama's maternal grandparents were a major force in his life, and in many ways served as his surrogate parents.

Obama's mother subsequently married a man from Indonesia, and Obama moved to Jakarta, Indonesia, where he attended several schools until he returned to live with his grandparents in Hawaii in 1971. In 1979 Obama entered Occidental College before transferring to Columbia University, from which he graduated in 1983. From 1985 to 1988 he worked as a community organizer on the South Side of Chicago; his experiences there led to his adoption of Chicago as his home city.

In 1988 Obama entered Harvard Law School, where his keen intellect and engaging personality earned him the presidency of the *Harvard Law Review*; he was the first African American ever to hold the position.

In 1991 he secured his law degree and returned to Chicago; the following year he led a successful voter-registration drive in Illinois that registered as many as 150,000 previously unregistered African American voters. In 1992 Obama joined the faculty of the University of Chicago School of Law, serving in various teaching capacities until 2004. From 1993 to 2004 Obama was also a member of a small Chicago law firm that specialized in civil rights issues and local economic development. In 1997 Obama became an Illinois state senator, a post he held until 2004. As a state senator, Obama garnered much praise for his grasp of important issues and his ability to sponsor and guide bipartisan-backed legislation through the senate.

In 2004 Obama, a gifted orator, made a run for the U.S. Senate, winning by the largest landslide in Illinois electoral history. He campaigned on a platform that was sharply critical of the Iraq War and that promised to reorder America's social and economic priorities. He also vowed to help unite Americans and heal racial, social, and economic divisions.

In July 2004 Obama delivered the keynote address at the Democratic National Convention, as a result of which he became a national phenomenon. His electrifying speech caught the attention of many and helped prepare the way for his run for the White House in 2008. Obama was sworn in as a U.S. senator in January 2005. He worked closely with Republican senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; the two visited nuclear

missile launch sites in Russia in an effort to ensure the safety of the armaments. Obama also continued his criticism of the Iraq War, arguing that it had been an unnecessary operation and badly managed by the George W. Bush administration.

In February 2007 Obama announced his intention to run for the U.S. presidency on the Democratic ticket in 2008. At the time many dismissed his intentions, pointing to his relative inexperience and the likely candidacies of such heavy-hitters as senators Hillary Clinton, Joseph Biden, Christopher Dodd, and John Edwards, among others. But Obama ran an impressively earnest and well-executed primary campaign, and by the mid-winter of 2008 his many rivals had all dropped out of the race, except for Senator Clinton. Meanwhile, the Obama campaign's brilliant use of the Internet to raise money and get out his message began to tell, and in early June 2008 Obama became the presumptive Democratic nominee when Clinton conceded the race. From then on, Obama, who eschewed public funding of his campaign, continued to raise massive sums of money and garnered an impressive list of endorsements from both Democrats and Republicans, including former secretary of state and Republican Party stalwart Colin L. Powell. By the early fall, Obama had raised more money by far than any other presidential candidate in history.

In the general election Obama faced off against Republican senator John S. McCain, a war hero and prisoner of war during the Vietnam War, and the son and grandson of U.S. Navy admirals. Until September the tenor of the race focused chiefly on Obama's insistence that U.S. troops be withdrawn from Iraq as expeditiously as possible, his calls for energy independence, his desire to implement universal and affordable health care, and his hope to lessen the power of

Washington lobbyists and special interests. He traveled to the Middle East and several European nations in July 2008 amidst much fanfare in an attempt to bolster his foreign policy bona fides. The McCain camp sought to portray Obama as too inexperienced and naive to be president, and McCain argued that the troop surge in Iraq, begun in early 2007, had made a quantifiable difference in the course of the conflict. He suggested that Obama's plan for a specific timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq represented a "cut and run" mentality that would play into the hands of the insurgents. Obama's suggested timetable ended up being embraced by the Iraqi government and became the basis for the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement, finalized in late 2008.

Obama continued to argue that the Iraq War had been unnecessary from the start and was based on flimsy intelligence and poor judgment on the part of the Bush administration. He also asserted that the conflict had caused the United States to dilute its efforts in the Afghanistan War, resulting in the increasingly deadly Taliban insurgency there. Obama promised to redouble U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and to dispatch significantly more troops there.

In August, Obama named Senator Joseph Biden, from Delaware, to be his vice presidential running mate. Biden added his years of governmental experience to the ticket, and the choice was generally hailed as a wise move. Just a few days later, McCain revealed his choice for a running mate: Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska, a 44-year-old with no experience in national politics. She had been governor for only 20 months and before that had been the mayor of a small town in Alaska. The choice proved controversial, although it energized media coverage of the McCain campaign that, until then, had largely been dominated by Obama. Meanwhile, Obama

continued to run a highly disciplined campaign, which portrayed McCain as another version of George W. Bush, who by the autumn of 2008 had the lowest approval ratings in modern presidential history. McCain's not infrequent gaffes, mixed debate performances, and unfocused messages began to work against him, while Obama's tactics and campaign strategy aided his own campaign.

In September the focus of the campaign shifted dramatically as the U.S. economy plunged into a downward spiral. By mid-month, the Iraq War had taken a distant second place to the struggling economy. Each day brought more bad news: the financial system was paralyzed by a series of spectacular bank and investment house failures; the stock market gyrated wildly but in a persistently downward trajectory; unemployment rose dramatically; and the housing market was in full-fledged crisis. Obama made the most of the situation, asserting that a vote for McCain would be a vote for more economic chaos. By Election Day, Obama enjoyed a comfortable lead over McCain, and he went on to win the presidency, winning 52.9 percent of the popular vote and 365 electoral votes.

Obama's transition to power went smoothly, although Republicans, in the now well-established pattern of U.S. partisan politics, consistently challenged both his appointees and statements. His nomination of former rival Senator Hillary Clinton for secretary of state proved an adroit move, and she won easy confirmation in the Senate. Choosing stability over change, Obama chose to keep Robert M. Gates, a holdover from the Bush administration, in the key post of secretary of defense. He addressed the State Department in early 2009 about his plans for the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including his

appointment of Richard Holbrooke as his special representative. (See Related Primary Document below.)

Obama's early efforts to solve the financial crisis through massive government bailouts to the financial and auto industries generated some opposition, but nothing like the opposition to his health care plan, which passed in March 2010 amidst much acrimony among the Republicans, who rejected it en masse. Obama's public approval ratings began to sag late in 2009 and continued to fall into 2010. Internationally, Obama's taking over the reins of the U.S. government was generally well received, particularly his apparent willingness to reach out to European and other allies, "reset" deteriorating relations with Russia, and undertake new diplomatic initiatives and approaches to the Muslim world. In December 2009, after much study and internal debate, the Obama administration announced a troop surge in Afghanistan. The surge would deploy as many as 33,000 additional troops to deal with the worsening Taliban insurgency and occur over a six-month period, from January to June 2010. Obama, however, stipulated that troop withdrawals from Afghanistan would begin 18 months after the surge ended in June 2010. Obama's strategy met some opposition. Many Democrats disagreed with the surge, and many Republicans found a mandated timetable for troop withdrawals ill-advised. The surge ultimately lasted longer than anticipated. U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan peaked at 100,000.

In July 2010, Obama accepted the resignation of his Afghan commander, U.S. Army general Stanley McChrystal, after the magazine *Rolling Stone* published comments by the general's staff that were critical of the president and his national security team. Meanwhile, Obama's relationship with Afghan president Hamid Karzai was strained

over U.S. tactics, including aerial bombings and drone strikes, which caused civilian casualties, along with U.S. pressure to implement reforms and reduce corruption.

Obama subsequently announced his intention to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. U.S. troops began to be redeployed from the country in 2011, falling to 88,000 by the end of the year and 38,000 by the end of 2013. As security conditions in

Afghanistan deteriorated, Obama agreed to maintain a training and support force of 9,800 troops in the country through the remainder of his presidency, decreasing to 8,400 in 2017.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Karzai, Hamid; McChrystal, Stanley; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–); United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

Related Primary Document

President Barack Obama, “Remarks at the State Department,” January 22, 2009

Following his inauguration, President Barack Obama spoke at the U.S. State Department. In the following excerpt, the president states that he is appointing veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke as his special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and pledges that his administration would refocus on Afghanistan after reviewing U.S. policy and developing new priorities and objectives.

Another urgent threat to global security is the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the central front in our enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism. There, as in the Middle East, we must understand that we cannot deal with our problems in isolation. There is no answer in Afghanistan that does not confront the Al Qaida [sic] and Taliban bases along the border, and there will be no lasting peace unless we expand spheres of opportunity for the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is truly an international challenge of the highest order.

That’s why Secretary Clinton and I are naming Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to be Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Holbrooke is one of the most talented diplomats of his generation. Over several decades, he served on different continents and as an outstanding Ambassador to the United Nations. He has strengthened ties with our allies, tackled the toughest negotiations, and helped deliver a hard-earned peace as an architect of the Dayton Accords. He will help lead our effort to forge and implement a strategic and sustainable approach to this critical region.

The American people and the international community must understand that the situation is perilous and progress will take time. Violence is up dramatically in Afghanistan. A deadly insurgency has taken deep root. The opium trade is far and away the largest in the world. The Afghan Government has been unable to deliver basic services. Al Qaida and the Taliban strike from bases embedded in rugged, tribal terrain along the Pakistani border. And while we have yet to see another attack on our soil since 9/11, Al Qaida terrorists remain at large and remain plotting.

Going forward, we must set clear priorities in pursuit of achievable goals that contribute to our collective security. My administration is committed to refocusing attention and resources on

Afghanistan and Pakistan and to spending those resources wisely. And that's why we are pursuing a careful review of our policy. We will seek stronger partnerships with the governments of the region, sustained cooperation with our NATO allies, deeper engagement with the Afghan and Pakistani people, and a comprehensive strategy to combat terror and extremism. We will provide the strategic guidance to meet our objectives. And we pledge to support the extraordinary Americans serving in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, with the resources that they need.

These appointments add to a team that will work with energy and purpose to meet the challenges of our time and to define a future of expanding security and opportunity. Difficult days lie ahead. As we ask more of ourselves, we will seek new partnerships and ask more of our friends, and more of people around the globe, because security in the 21st century is shared. But let there be no doubt about America's commitment to lead. We can no longer afford drift, and we can no longer afford delay. Nor can we cede ground to those who seek destruction. A new era of American leadership is at hand, and the hard work has just begun.

You are going to be at the frontlines of engaging in that important work. And I am absolutely confident that with the leadership of Secretary Clinton, with wonderful envoys like Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell, with the dedicated team that is before me today, that we are going to be able to accomplish our objectives, keep America safe, and bring better days not just to our own country, but all around the world.

Thank you very much, everyone.

Source: *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack Obama* (2009, Book 1). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, pp. 8–11.

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Omar, Mullah Mohammed (1959–2013)

Mullah Mohammed Omar was a radical Islamic cleric and a leader of the Taliban

regime in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Mohammed Omar (Umar), usually known to the West as Mullah Omar and in the region as Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahid, was born near Kandahar, either just outside of Singesar or in Naduh, in Afghanistan sometime in 1959. He grew up in this impoverished area. His father died when he was young, leaving Omar as the primary breadwinner for his family, although some reports suggest that his mother remarried.

Mohammed Omar was a Pashtun from the Hotak tribe. The Pashtuns make up approximately 40 percent of the Afghan population and are concentrated in the southern portion of the country. Even before the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the Pashtuns expended considerable energy fighting one another. Eventually they split

into pro- and antimonarchical factions. They also engaged in fighting the northern Tajiks and Uzbeks.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Omar joined the mujahideen faction *Harakat-i Inqilabi-i Islami* (the Islamic Liberation Movement), guerrilla fighters opposing the Soviet forces and commanded by Muhammad Nek. The mujahideen received the support of much of the Islamic world and even some elements of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Omar was wounded four times in actions against the Soviets, most famously from shrapnel that damaged his eye. Red Cross doctors surgically removed the eye, although the Taliban claim that Omar himself removed his damaged eye and sewed shut his eyelid.

Omar was a spiritual leader and not simply a commander of the Taliban, as indicated by the term “mullah,” meaning a cleric or religious leader in the Dari and Farsi languages. Omar taught in madrasahs outside of Kandahar and in Quetta, was schooled in Arabic, and thought highly of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a founder of al Qaeda. He was observed leading prayers at the Binoori Mosque in Karachi, where he met Osama bin Laden.

With the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the various tribes and factions there continued to be united in their opposition to the Afghan communist government in Kabul. With the collapse of that government in 1992, the country entered a state of civil war. Omar and others were outraged by public figures, including former mujahideen commanders, who were sexually victimizing women and children, and otherwise engaged in corruption. Omar began the Taliban movement with about 50 followers from madrasahs and refugee camps. In early 1994 he led a small group of 30 Pashtun followers to

rescue 2 kidnapped girls. This success led to more recruitment from Islamic religious schools and refugees in neighboring Pakistan. Omar and his followers considered themselves reformers trying to rid Afghanistan of the evils and corruption of the warlords. With the Taliban’s growth through that year, Omar took control of Kandahar Province by September 1994 and Herat the following year.

In 1996 Omar publicly assumed the important title of *emir al-muminin* (commander of the faithful), the title accorded to the Prophet Muhammad and not used since the fourth caliph, indicating his military leadership of Muslims. He appeared wrapped in what was said to be the Prophet Muhammad’s own cloak as a sign of that office. That same year the Taliban captured the Afghan capital city of Kabul and declared their intent to transform a secular nation into an Islamic emirate. Omar, however, remained in Kandahar, visiting Kabul during this period. From 1997 to 2001, Omar was recognized internationally as the head of the Supreme Council of Afghanistan.

The Taliban strenuously enforced sharia (Islamic law), which promotes moral behavior by heavily restricting the interaction of men and women, and limits all Islamically forbidden substances and actions. World human rights groups were very critical of the new regime and especially its brutal treatment of women. One reporter sought in vain to persuade Omar not to destroy the great Buddhas at Bamiyan.

Omar had become acquainted with al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden when he was in Pakistan fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The two became close friends and associates and spoke often, perhaps daily, on satellite phones. Some reports claim that Omar married Osama bin Laden’s eldest daughter and that one of Omar’s

daughters is bin Laden's fourth wife, although Taliban spokesmen deny this. Bin Laden was instrumental in financing the Taliban and thus made a significant contribution to its eventual takeover of Afghanistan. In turn, Omar allowed al Qaeda operatives and terrorist training camps to operate within Taliban territory.

Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Omar defended the Taliban as a moderate regime and argued that bin Laden had played no role in the 9/11 attacks. There is some evidence that a number of Taliban leaders had concerns about the presence of al Qaeda and were dissatisfied with Omar's decision to allow the group to be located there in the first place. These individuals urged cooperation with the United States, but Omar remained firmly in control and refused to comply with U.S. demands. His refusal to hand bin Laden over to the U.S. government, a demand that would have violated Islamic and Pashtun tribal mores of politics and hospitality, led to the American military intervention Operation Enduring Freedom, which drove the Taliban from power in the late fall of 2001. In October Omar's home was bombed, killing his stepfather and 10-year-old son.

After the Taliban's fall from power in Afghanistan in late 2001, Omar eluded capture, although it was widely assumed that he was hiding in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan or Pakistan. The U.S. government offered a \$10 million bounty for his capture. Omar retained the loyalty of many Taliban factions within Afghanistan. The Taliban denied that he was in hiding, but said that he was merely moving frequently for his own security. Omar never met with a Western journalist and typically spoke through a Taliban governmental intermediary. It was claimed that Omar remained active in directing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan,

and numerous statements in his name were released urging the Afghan and Iraqi insurgents to fight on in their struggle against "American imperialism." In January 2007 Omar exchanged e-mails and communications via courier with a journalist. He claimed that the Taliban had religious sanction for the many suicide attacks carried out in Afghanistan that year. He issued another statement via an intermediary in April 2007 encouraging more suicide attacks. On the occasion of Eid al-Fitr, the conclusion of Ramadan, on September 30, 2008, Omar's internationally circulated speech expressed sorrow at the loss of Afghan lives since 2001 and from the U.S. air attacks that season. He decried the corruption of the current Afghan government and American efforts to create *fitna* (division, loss of faith) in the region, setting Afghans against each other, as, according to Omar, U.S. authorities had done in Iraq and Palestine. He also called on the Afghan people not to cooperate with the National Army, Security Services, and police because these were "slave institutions." But he also called for them not to engage in such vicious actions as mosque bombings or summary punishments of brigandry, as had occurred in attacks blamed on the Taliban, which he attributed to the influence of anti-Islamic elements.

In 2015, the Taliban announced that Omar had died in April 2013. Some reports indicated he died of tuberculosis. He was succeeded by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.

Michael K. Beauchamp and Sherifa Zuhur

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Mujahideen; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Taliban.

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Operation Anaconda (2002)

Operation Anaconda was a U.S.-led coalition campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan during March 1–18, 2002. The offensive was part of Operation Enduring Freedom and took place in the Shah-i-kot Valley in Paktia Province in eastern Afghanistan. Although the December 2001 Battle of Tora Bora had routed most of the Taliban and al Qaeda from the region, by February 2002 insurgents and foreign fighters had begun to return to the Shah-i-Kot Valley and the Arma Mountains and were initiating new attacks on coalition forces. In response, the allies launched Operation Anaconda in an effort to dislodge the insurgents and to prevent a more significant enemy offensive from unfolding in the spring. The coalition was also responding to reports that senior insurgent leaders, including Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, might have been present in the area.

Operation Anaconda began on March 1, 2002, after special operations forces from the United States, Australia, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway had been inserted into the region and had established forward observation posts. These were followed by a ground assault that included elements of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division as well as the Canadian Army's Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, British Royal Marines, and Afghan National Army forces. The United States furnished about 1,200 troops, the Afghan National Army furnished 1,000 troops, and the other coalition partners furnished 200 troops. Aircraft from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France provide air support. U.S. Army major general Franklin Hagenbeck had command of the operation.

The difficult terrain in the region complicated the operation. The mountains ranged up to 12,000 feet and were dotted with caves and ravines, which provided hiding places for insurgent forces. The valley floor was between 7,000 and 8,000 feet in elevation. Temperatures during the offensive ranged from 60°F during the day to as low as 0°F at night.

The offensive suffered from a number of intelligence errors. Planners estimated the total number of insurgents at around 250; however, there were actually about 1,000, under the command of Saifur Rahman Monsoor of the Taliban. In addition, coalition officers underestimated their opponents' firepower. The insurgents were equipped with heavy machine guns, mortars, and artillery. One result was that the allied ground forces did not begin the operation with significant artillery support. Instead, they relied on mortars and airpower. Intelligence reports also falsely indicated that the majority of the enemy were on the valley floor, when most

were actually in heavily fortified bunkers and caves in the mountains.

Reports also indicated the presence of some 800 civilians in the valley, although there were actually none. In an effort to minimize civilian casualties, the original plans called for the Afghan National Forces to enter the valley from the west on March 2, supported by airpower and special operations forces, and help differentiate between the Taliban and al Qaeda and the civilians. Planners expected the insurgents to flee before the advancing Afghans while U.S. and coalition conventional forces blocked their escape routes to the east and south. Most of the conventional forces were transported into the valley by helicopter.

The allied Afghan column was soon halted by heavy insurgent fire during its advance, and the coalition had to shift tactics. Allied special operations forces coordinated airstrikes by bombers, Lockheed AC-130 Spectre gunships, and cruise missiles on Taliban and al Qaeda positions. The coalition used more than 3,500 aerial bombs and cruise missiles during the offensive. The coalition also used 2,000-pound thermobaric bombs against caves and bunkers. Supported by airpower, the coalition ground forces were redeployed and advanced into the mountains. On March 4 a U.S. helicopter carrying Navy SEALs came under fire near the peak of Takur Ghar, and one SEAL fell from the aircraft; he was killed. The SEALs were to be inserted on the peak but found that the Taliban had a significant concentration of forces, including heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. During the subsequent rescue attempt, another helicopter was hit and crashed. In the ensuing firefight, seven U.S. troops were killed before the rescue mission was concluded. Although intense combat continued following the incident, the Taliban and al Qaeda began to withdraw from the region.

On March 12 U.S. and Afghan forces initiated an advance through the valley and met little organized resistance. Operation Anaconda officially ended on March 18, although there continued to be minor skirmishes in the region for the next month. During the operation, the coalition lost 15 killed and 82 wounded. The majority of the casualties were Americans, including 8 killed and 72 wounded. The Taliban and al Qaeda lost between 300 and 400 killed; however, the majority of the enemy forces were able to escape.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Al Qaeda; Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Special Operations Forces; Taliban; Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Taliban Insurgency; Tora Bora, Battle of (2001); United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014)

Operation Enduring Freedom was the code name given to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan that began on October 7, 2001, and officially ended December 31, 2014. The purpose of the invasion was to topple the Taliban government and kill or capture members of the al Qaeda terrorist group,

which had just carried out the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The Taliban had sheltered al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, on Afghan territory and provided the terrorists with bases, training facilities, and quite possibly financial support.

The United States faced major problems in planning a war against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Prime among these were logistical concerns, for Afghanistan is a landlocked country quite distant from U.S. basing facilities. American planners decided that an alliance would have to be forged with the Afghan United Front (also known as the Northern Alliance), an anti-Taliban opposition force within Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance would do the bulk of the fighting but would receive U.S. air support, along with assistance, advice, and cash from U.S. Special Operations Forces.


The war began on October 7, 2001, with American airstrikes from land-based B-52 and B-1 bombers, carrier-based F-14 Tomcat and F-18 Hornet aircraft, and Tomahawk cruise missiles. These attacks were intended to knock out the Taliban's anti-aircraft defenses and communications infrastructure. However, desperately poor Afghanistan had a very limited infrastructure to bomb, and the initial air attacks had only minimal impact. Al Qaeda training camps were also targeted, although they were quickly abandoned once the bombing campaign began. U.S. Special Operations Forces arrived in Afghanistan on October 15, at which time they made contact with the leaders of the Northern Alliance.

The first phase of the ground campaign was focused on the struggle for the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif, which fell to the



A U.S. Navy fighter-bomber is launched from the deck of the aircraft carrier *Carl Vinson* on October 7, 2001, as part of the aerial campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Operation Enduring Freedom. (Department of Defense)

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, 2001



Northern Alliance forces led by generals Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad Nur on November 10, 2001. The fighting around Mazar-e-Sharif was intense, but U.S. airstrikes, directed by special operations forces on the ground, did much to break Taliban and al Qaeda resistance.

As the fighting progressed, the Taliban and al Qaeda improved both their tactics and combat effectiveness. Camouflage and concealment techniques were also enhanced, helping to counter American airpower. However, the Taliban's limited appeal to the population meant that the regime could not withstand the impact of a sustained assault. The repressive rule of the Taliban ensured that the Taliban never widened its base of support beyond the Pashtun ethnic group from which they originated.

Northern Alliance forces captured the Afghan capital of Kabul without a fight on November 13. On November 26 a besieged garrison of 5,000 Taliban and al Qaeda soldiers surrendered at Kunduz after heavy bombardment by American B-52s. Meanwhile, an uprising by captured Taliban fighters held in the Qala-e-Gangi fortress near the Mazar-e-Sharif prison was suppressed with great brutality in late November.

The scene of the fighting then shifted to the city of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Because the Taliban had originated in Kandahar in the early 1990s, they were expected to put up a stiff fight for the city. Kandahar was attacked by Northern Alliance forces led by generals Hamid Karzai and Guyl Agha Shirzai, with U.S. Special Operations Forces coordinating the offensive. The Taliban deserted Kandahar on December 6, and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and the surviving Taliban elements went into hiding in the remote mountain regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The fall of Kandahar marked the end of Taliban rule

in Afghanistan, only nine weeks after the beginning of the bombing campaign. On December 22, 2001, an interim administration chaired by Hamid Karzai took office.

Despite the rapid and efficient progress of Operation Enduring Freedom, Taliban and al Qaeda elements remained at large in Afghanistan, and the operation failed to capture or kill either Osama bin Laden or Mohammed Omar. Bin Laden was believed to be hiding in mountain dugouts and bunkers located in the White Mountains near Tora Bora. A 16-day offensive in early December 2001 failed to find bin Laden. For this offensive, the United States once again relied on Northern Alliance ground troops supported by U.S. Special Operations Forces and American airpower. Later there would be charges that this offensive was mishandled and an opportunity to take bin Laden was lost. Bin Laden escaped, probably into Pakistan through the foreboding but porous border that separates Afghanistan from Pakistan.

Despite the failure to capture or kill bin Laden, the United States could point to notable success in the so-called War on Terror by the end of 2001. The Taliban had been deposed and al Qaeda was on the run, with many of its members and leaders having been killed or captured. This occurred despite the fact that the United States deployed only about 3,000 service personnel, most of them special operations forces, to Afghanistan by the end of the year. The U.S. death toll was remarkably light, with only 2 deaths attributed to enemy action. Estimates of Afghan fatalities are approximate, at best. As many as 4,000 Taliban soldiers may have been killed during the campaign. Afghan civilian deaths have been estimated at between 1,000 and 1,300, with several thousand refugees dying from disease and/or exposure. Another 500,000 Afghans were

made refugees or displaced persons during the fighting.

The United States attempted a different approach in March 2002, when al Qaeda positions were located in the Shahi-Kot Valley near Gardez. On this occasion, U.S. ground troops from the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division led the way, along with special operations forces from Australia, Canada, and Germany, and Afghan government troops, in an offensive code-named Operation Anaconda. Taliban reinforcements rushed to join the al Qaeda fighters, but both were routed from the valley with heavy losses.

Since 2002 the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants have maintained a low-level insurgency in Afghanistan. Troops from the United States and allied countries, mainly from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, remain in Afghanistan operating ostensibly under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom. An upsurge of Taliban insurgent activity beginning in 2006, however, necessitated a series of coalition offensives. Beginning in 2006, forces of the International Security Assistance Force, led by NATO, led combat missions in southern Afghanistan. Coalition military units also undertook a number of nation-building operations to increase support for the central government. Nonetheless, the Taliban insurgency continued.

Operation Enduring Freedom officially came to an end on December 31, 2014, when the United States and NATO forces formally turned security operations over to the Afghan national army. Some 13,000 NATO troops, mainly U.S. forces, have remained in Afghanistan to support the Afghan Army and provide security for nation-building and humanitarian operations. The new mission was dubbed Operation Freedom's Sentinel. Critics of the transition asserted that the

Afghan Army was not yet capable of ensuring security and defeating the Taliban.

Paul W. Doerr

See also: Al Qaeda; Armored Vehicles; Artillery, Cannons, and Mortars; Bagram Air Base; Bin Laden, Osama; Blair, Tony; Bush, George W.; Civilian Casualties; Communications in Military Operations; Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Humanitarian Aid Operations; Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Obama, Barack; Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Operation Anaconda (2002); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban; Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Taliban Insurgency; Tora Bora, Battle of (2001); United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–); United States, Relations with Afghanistan; Warlords.

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Operation Storm 333 (1979)

Operation Storm was an assault by Soviet special operations forces to depose Afghan president Hafizullah Amin in December 1979. The operation was followed by the full Soviet invasion. Relations between Amin and the Soviet Union had worsened rapidly after he seized power on September 14,

1979, by assassinating then president Nur Muhammad Taraki. Tensions were exacerbated by Amin's inability to quell a growing insurgency against his government. In response, the Soviets turned to a political rival, Babrak Karmal, as a potential replacement.

On December 12, 1979, Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev approved a plan to intervene in Afghanistan by first killing or capturing Amin and then launching a formal invasion. Soviet officials justified the invasion through the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted the right of the Soviet Union and its satellite states to intervene to maintain socialist regimes. They also pointed to a 1978 Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty. Members of the Soviet intelligence agency, the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB), were inserted into Kabul, while special operations forces and elite airborne units were deployed in the capital and other strategic areas, including Bagram air field just north of the capital. The Soviets already had a large number of military advisers in the country, and those were bolstered while some advance equipment was transported to Afghanistan as well. In all, approximately 1,200 Soviet personnel participated in the operation. Meanwhile, other Soviet troops were stationed on the outskirts of Kabul to prevent the Afghan Army from intervening in any effort to oust Amin.

On December 27, 1979, Soviet forces attacked the Tajberg palace in central Kabul where Amin was in residence. Other Soviet troops took control of various other strategic positions, including the Ministry of the Interior and communications facilities. Amin initially mistook the attackers for mutinous Afghan troops and tried to appeal to the Soviets for assistance. The palace was heavily defended. The main routes in and out were mined and covered by machine-gun emplacements. The Soviet attack was based on

the element of surprise, but the assault troops quickly faced heavy fire. However, the Afghan defenders began to surrender or desert once it became clear that they were fighting Soviet troops.

Amin was either killed during the assault or was wounded and died soon afterward (there are conflicting accounts of his death). Amin's 11-year-old son was also killed, along with 100–200 Afghan soldiers and regime officials. Estimates of Soviet losses vary widely, ranging from 20 to 100 killed. The palace was secure after less than an hour's fighting, although some Afghan military units and regime officials continued to fight overnight. After Amin's death, the Soviets launched a full-scale invasion of the country and installed Babrak Karmal as president. Amin's remaining family, and those suspected of being loyal to Amin, were arrested or executed. In April 1980, a new accord between the two nations legalized the Soviet occupation.

Tom Lansford

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Special Operations Forces; Taraki, Nur Muhammad.

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Operations Red Wings I, II, and Whalers (2005)

Operations Red Wings I, II, and Whalers were a series of U.S. military campaigns

in the Pech District of Kunar Province in Afghanistan during the summer of 2005. The operations were designed to disrupt an insurgent group, led by Mullah Ahmed Shah, prior to the Afghan elections in September of that year. U.S. forces were able to defeat the insurgent group and stop its operations in Kunar, but only after significant fighting and casualties.

Operation Red Wings I was launched in June 2005 (the mission was named after the Detroit Red Wings hockey team). A four-man SEAL team was inserted into Pech on Sawtalo Sar Mountain to undertake a reconnaissance mission. The team was ambushed by a group of about 50–100 of Shah's fighters on June 28. SEAL team members Michael Murphy, Danny Dietz, and Matthew Axelson were killed. Murphy was the team commander and was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the battle, while Dietz and Axelson were each posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. The fourth SEAL, Marcus Luttrell, was seriously wounded (he was also awarded the Navy Cross). Approximately 35 of the insurgents were killed, although some accounts placed the figure much lower.

A rescue mission, dubbed Red Wings II, was launched with six helicopters, including two MH-47 Chinook transport helicopters. While searching the area for the SEAL team, one of the MH-47s was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). The aircraft crashed, killing its eight crew members and eight SEALs on board, including the mission commander. The 19 U.S. service personnel killed represented the largest one-day loss of life since Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001. Meanwhile, the insurgents were able to capture a significant amount of sophisticated weapons, ammunition, and tactical gear from the downed helicopter.

Luttrell was subsequently rescued by a villager who sheltered him from repeated attempts by the insurgents to capture the SEAL. A messenger from the village sheltering Luttrell eventually reached a U.S. base at Nangalam. Luttrell was subsequently rescued. U.S. forces also retrieved the bodies of those killed.

In August 2005, a follow-up mission, Operation Whalers (named after the Hartford Whalers hockey team), was launched. Companies of U.S. Marines, including sniper teams and heavy weapons, were inserted into the mountains and valleys in Pech. Shah's forces attempted to ambush a Marine platoon in the Chowak Valley, leading to a series of engagements. Shah was wounded and approximately 40 militants killed. The operation destroyed the insurgent network and forced Shah and his remaining forces to withdraw to Pakistan (Shah would later be killed in 2008 in a gun battle with Pakistani security forces).

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Shah, Mullah Ahmed; Special Operations Forces; Taliban; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Opium Poppy Production

Despite intensive efforts to suppress the drug trade, Afghanistan is the world's largest producer and exporter of opium. Opium cultivation began in Afghanistan as early as

the 1100s. However, for most of the country's history, production was limited, as was use. Cultivation was mainly in the valleys of the Hindu Kush Mountains. During the 19th century, the British sought to suppress poppy production in the border regions between Afghanistan and the Indian colonies. Afghan poppy production was perceived as a threat to Indian cultivation for the Asian markets. The British did allow some imports of Afghan opium, especially during periods when the Indian harvests were bad. By 1908, Afghan poppy production was limited to four principal areas: the Herat Valley, Jalalabad, Kabul, and Kandahar.

Through the early years of the 20th century, Iran increasingly became an export market for Afghan opium. In 1955, a rising addict population led the Iranian government to prohibit poppy production. The constriction in local supply prompted a substantial increase in imported opium from Afghanistan and led to a rise in cultivation in that country. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a growing number of drug tourists traveling to Afghanistan from Europe and North America also spurred the development of additional poppy fields. By the late 1970s, Afghan poppy production had increased significantly, especially after traditional supply routes from Southeast Asian growers were blocked following the fall of regimes in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

After 1979, Afghan poppy growers faced new pressures. The new Shi'a regime in Iran suppressed drug use, while the Soviet occupation resulted in initiatives to suppress production and disrupt smuggling routes. The Soviets found that some opium production was used to finance the mujahideen. There was a major shift in the Afghan drug trade as growers began to convert opium into heroin, which was easier to

transport and far more lucrative (a kilogram of heroin provided up to 10 times the profit of an equal amount of opium). By the 1980s, Afghanistan was the world's second largest producer of opium. The withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989 removed the remaining constraints on cultivation, and opium production more than tripled between 1990 and 1994, rising from 415 to 1,278 metric tons. The majority of the opium was grown in the Helmand Valley. Growth continued through the 1990s, with production peaking in 1999 at approximately 4,500 metric tons. After the Taliban assumed power in 1996, they began taxing opium farmers, securing approximately \$20 million in revenue. In 2000, the Taliban implemented a ban on poppy cultivation, reducing production by more than 90 percent, as part of an effort to gain recognition from countries including the United States.

The fall of the Taliban in 2001 resulted in a dramatic rise in cultivation, and Afghanistan became the largest producer of opium. Between 2001 and 2014, opium production increased by more than 150 percent. In 2014, production remained concentrated in the Helmand Valley region, but occurred in 19 of Afghanistan's 32 provinces and involved 2.4 million Afghans, almost 10 percent of the population. Approximately 6,400 metric tons were produced. Production increased despite an aggressive eradication effort financed by the United States. By 2014, poppy cultivation and heroin production was worth \$3 billion annually. A significant portion of the proceeds was used by the Taliban and other insurgent groups or warlords to fund operations against the government and the international coalition. Estimates were that the Taliban alone collected about \$50 million annually from illicit drug production.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Helmand Valley; Narcoterrorism; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Taliban; Warlords.

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P

Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan

To understand the origins of antagonistic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is necessary to review the anthropological antecedents and complex historical context that dates back to the “Great Game,” where the strategic economic and political rivalry and conflict between the British and the Russian Empires for supremacy in Central Asia came at the expense of Afghanistan and the regions of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The British Empire, in order to secure colonized India’s North-West Frontiers against the increasing threat perceptions from the imperial Russian Empire, fought a series of Anglo-Afghan Wars and transformed Afghanistan into an independent buffer state between the Russian Empire and British India. The Wakhan Corridor and the Durand Line, which cut through the tribal areas and politically divided the ethnic Pashtuns, came into existence in 1893 as a political creation to ensure that no common border would be subject to disputes and clashes between the two imperial forces.

India’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which came into existence in 1901, includes regions inhabited by independent tribes, predominantly Pashtuns. The ardent Pashtun nationalists and Afghan officials staunchly opposed the NWFP and started supporting ethnic Pashtun nationalist political parties in the NWFP region for a sovereign Pashtunistan. At the time of the partition of British India in 1947, the devout Pashtuns,

given the only choice of joining either a predominantly Hindu India or a Muslim Pakistan, opted for the latter, and the tribal Jirga of all major tribes, held in November 1947, transferred their allegiance to the state of Pakistan. However, Afghanistan remained a staunch supporter of Pashtunistan, and consequently became the only nation in the world to oppose Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations. The anti-Pakistan posture of Afghanistan added to the difficulties of Pakistan’s transition into statehood, especially in the presence of the existential threat from India. The leaders of Pakistan felt that enemies on all sides beset the country, complicating the defense calculus on the eastern borders with India. The continuous cross-border incursions from Afghanistan led to the bombing of an Afghan village in 1949, in response to which the Afghan parliament Loya Jirga repudiated all the treaties, including the Durand Line Agreement. No Afghan government since has ever recognized the validity of the Durand Line, the internationally recognized frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The assassination of Pakistani prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951 by an Afghan citizen led to a crucial standstill between the two countries, but the crisis was averted when no involvement by the Afghan government was found. However, the continuous Afghan-sponsored tribal incursions led Pakistan to impose a 1951 economic blockade on landlocked Afghanistan, including the access to port facilities in Karachi, which led to a thaw in relations with the Soviet Union, allowing Afghanistan a free

transit through its territory. The declaration of a nonalignment foreign policy by India in 1949 positioned Pakistan as an ally of the United States in South Asia and led to its inclusion into the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Afghanistan and India, while remaining formally nonaligned, received considerable support and assistance from the Soviet Union. China viewed Soviet assistance to India and Afghanistan as a policy of strategic encirclement aimed against it, and so it developed friendly relations with Pakistan. The introduction of the one-unit system by Pakistan in 1955 was viewed by Afghanistan as further tightening the integration of Pashtun territories into Pakistan, and riots broke out in Kabul, leading to the sacking of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul and the consulate in Jalalabad. The cross-border Afghan-sponsored tribal incursions escalated and led to a 1961 break in diplomatic relations with the closure of the border. The dismantling of the one-unit system in Pakistan in 1970 combined with the fact that Afghanistan refrained from taking advantage and rather provided material and moral support to Pakistan in its wars with India in 1965 and 1971 thawed the relations between the two countries. The overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 in Afghanistan led to an increase in proxy intervention in Pakistan. As a reciprocal interventionist policy, Pakistan decided to arm and support traditional Islamists, a strategic policy initiative that was later expanded and exploited by the United States.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 positioned Pakistan as a frontline state in the war for freedom and democracy. Pakistan provided covert and carefully calibrated support to the mujahideen, not from fear of the Soviet troops at its doorstep, but rather to offset Indian predominance

in the region and to achieve strategic depth against India that would overcome the deficiency of Pakistan's geographic narrowness and enable it to launch a counteroffensive. The resistance against the Soviet Union had a disastrous toll on the people of both countries, with societies becoming more fractured; inundated with sophisticated weapons; overwhelmed by violence, terrorism, and sectarianism; and plagued with drug trafficking and narcotics. In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and with the 1991 Persian Gulf War on the horizon, there was no interest in the region left, with any earnest efforts to broker long-term peace and reconciliation and to rebuild the war-torn region. Violent clashes ignited as various ethnic groups, warlords, and local commanders entered a power struggle to fill the void. The United States withdrew its aid from Pakistan and sanctioned the state for its nuclear program that had been conveniently ignored during the war against the Soviets. The economic sanctions in the early 1990s provided Pakistan the necessary reasons to explore lucrative trade and energy routes through the former Central Asian republics, which led to its support of the Taliban. The Taliban received heavy military assistance from Pakistan and economic aid from Saudi Arabia. In 1996 they marched into Kabul. Pakistan was quick to recognize the Taliban government, whose puritan Islamic neo-fundamentalism made it vehemently opposed to India, and General Pervez Musharraf called the support of the Taliban government a "national security interest."

Internationally, the prolonged stay of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War led to criticism of the Saudi monarchy by al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who was then sent into exile in Sudan. In 1996, under pressure from the Clinton administration, Sudan forced Osama bin

Laden into exile into Afghanistan. The twin bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, by al Qaeda in August 1998 resulted in the launch of retaliatory cruise missile strikes by the United States in Afghanistan, which elevated the status of bin Laden as a hero and a champion of the anti-Americanism forces. As the West shunned Afghanistan, the Taliban was transformed into a transnational community with a diverse set of aspirations and became infiltrated by international terrorists, criminals, jihadists, and Pashtun nationalist networks.

Al Qaeda's September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States renewed international interest in Afghanistan and positioned Pakistan as a frontline state. Islamabad promptly declared support for Washington in its War on Terror. With support from the United States, the Northern Alliance moved into Kabul and overthrew the Taliban government in November 2001. This situation created panic in Pakistan since historically the Northern Alliance had been supported by Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and India. The Northern Alliance was seen as a profound strategic threat by Pakistan and a complete failure of its costly investment in cultivating the friendly Taliban regime. Afghan president Hamid Karzai dubbed the Durand Line a "line of hatred." There were border clashes between Pakistani and Afghan troops, and protesters in Kabul ransacked the Pakistani Embassy in July 2003. The increase in Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan further deteriorated the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the president of Afghanistan publicly accusing Pakistan of supporting the terrorism and sheltering insurgent leaders in its cities, and Pakistani leaders vehemently denying the charges, as Pakistan itself suffered hundreds and thousands of casualties by the Taliban and lost control of

large swathes of territories in the FATA, the NWFP, and Baluchistan.

Recently, Pakistan has undertaken earnest military efforts to contain the terrorism threat; however, it still perceives an Afghanistan that is friendly to its archnemesis India as a strategic threat. The growing influence of India in Afghanistan has caused increased concern in Islamabad, especially with India providing military and economic assistance to Afghanistan. The historic antipathy and mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan runs deep. Any road to diffuse the tensions between the two countries goes through bilateral cooperation, recognition of national security interests, and an earnest and honest dialogue.

Hassan A. Khan

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afghan-Pakistani Border Raids (2002); Durand Line; Karzai, Hamid; Musharraf, Pervez; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–).

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Panipat, Battle of (1761)

The Battle of Panipat on January 14, 1761, was a major victory for Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Durrani, and it affirmed the rise of the Durrani as the most powerful dynasty in Afghanistan. The massive battle also began the decline of the Maratha Empire and marked the final demise of the Mughals. The political vacuum created by the defeat of the Marathas paved the way for the advance of the British East India Company in the region.

The Mughal Empire had been in decline since the early 1700s, ushering in a period of instability in India as principalities and smaller states secured independence or greater autonomy. Ahmad Shah took advantage of the growing anarchy to annex areas that had been part of the empire and conducted raids into other areas of India. In 1757, Ahmad Shah captured the Mughal capital of Delhi. Meanwhile, the Maratha Empire had been consolidating its power in India, following the Mughal-Maratha War (1680–1707). In 1758, the Marathas seized areas of Punjab, forcing Ahmad Shah's son, Timur Shah, to withdraw from recently conquered lands. In retaliation, Ahmad Shah led an army, including Pashtun allies from Rohilla, that occupied Lahore and Delhi the following year. The Afghan leader left troops to garrison the captured territory, and then withdrew the bulk of his army.

In response, the Marathas raised an army of more than 75,000 under the command of Sadashivrao Bhau and set out in March 1760 to defeat the Afghans. Their force was swelled by a large number of camp followers and Hindu pilgrims. However, Bhau was unable to secure more troops from potential allies. The Marathas did recapture Delhi in August 1760 and then massacred the Afghan garrison. Ahmad Shah crossed the Yamuna

River on October 25 and placed his army of 100,000 between Bhau's forces and their main supply route from Delhi. He then conducted a series of attacks, which left the Maratha army completely cut off from supplies or reinforcements. Malnutrition and disease began to take its toll on the Marathas.

On January 14, 1761, Bhau led his forces in an effort to break through the encircling Afghans. The numerically superior Afghans were better placed on the field, although the Marathas had more, and more modern, artillery pieces, as well as the element of surprise. The battle began at about 8:00 in the morning. The Maratha initially gained an advantage and drove the Afghans' lines back. However, Ahmad Shah committed his reserve units around noon, and the weight of the additional troops forced the Maratha lines to collapse. By the afternoon, the battle had turned into a slaughter. Bhau was killed during the fighting. Estimates of the dead varied greatly, from 20,000 to 30,000 Afghans and from 30,000 to 40,000 Marathas. In addition, more than 40,000 Maratha camp followers were also killed over the next several days.

The Maratha defeat ushered in a period of decline for the empire, which was superseded by the East India Company. Ahmad Shah subsequently supported Shah Alam II as the Mughal emperor after his predecessor, Shah Jahan III, was overthrown in the aftermath of the Battle of Panipat. Shah Alam would be defeated by the British three years later and eventually forced to cede Bengal to the East India Company. Ahmad Shah continued to consolidate the Afghan kingdom until his death in 1772.

Tom Lansford

See also: Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Durrani, Timur Shah; Maratha Empire (1674–1818); Mughal Empire (1526–1857).

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Panjdeh Crisis (1885)

The Panjdeh Crisis was a dispute between Russia and Great Britain over a Russian incursion into Afghanistan in March 1885. The roots of the crisis lay in the ill-defined nature of the border between the British protectorate of Afghanistan and the expanding Russian Empire. In 1882, Russian officials approached the British about delineating the border, but it was not until 1884 that the two empires agreed to establish a joint commission on border issues.

In 1884, Russian and Afghan troops were deployed to the disputed border region at the junction of the Kushk and Murghab Rivers in northern Afghanistan. Central to the dispute was the oasis of Panjdeh, along with adjacent salt lakes and the strategic Robat Pass, which led to the Afghan city of Herat. Russia sought the fertile region for both economic and strategic reasons. The territory had been traditionally used by Turkmen herders who were now under the sovereignty of Russia. Control of the region around Panjdeh allowed Russia to threaten both Afghanistan and Persia.

In February 1885, Russian forces advanced approximately three miles across what had been the *de facto* border. The Afghans withdrew to Panjdeh but informed the Russians that any further advance would be met by force. Following protests by the British, the Russian foreign ministry pledged not to advance any further. British officials be-

gan to mobilize troops. On March 24, 1885, some 50,000 troops in India were ordered to prepare to deploy to support the Afghans. Plans were also drawn up to mobilize 70,000 reservists in Great Britain. In addition, naval forces were ordered to the area.

Meanwhile, there was a disconnect between Moscow and General Alexander Komarov, the officer commanding Russian forces on the border. Moscow sought to reduce tensions with Great Britain, but Komarov continued to escalate the crisis. By the end of March, Russian troops were on the east bank of the Kushk River, and Afghan forces on the west bank. On March 29, Komarov dispatched an ultimatum to his Afghan counterpart, demanding the withdrawal of his forces. The Afghans refused.

Early on the morning of March 30, 1885, approximately 2,500 Russian forces launched a surprise attack on the 600 Afghan troops. Russian casualties were minimal, with 40 killed, while the Afghan garrison was massacred. Russian troops then continued to advance further into Afghan territory. The incident prompted calls for war in the British press and within the cabinet of Prime Minister William Gladstone. Gladstone, however, was committed to a peaceful resolution and launched a series of diplomatic cables between the two imperial capitals to prevent escalation.

The crisis was defused through the work of the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission. Negotiations over the status of the disputed territory were turned over to the commission, which began a series of surveys of the region with concurrent negotiations over territory. Gladstone correctly assumed that the delays involved in the surveys would reduce tensions. Talks continued until 1887 when a final settlement was accepted by both governments. Under the terms of the agreement, Russia retained the Panjdeh

oasis and territory around it, giving the empire a toehold on the western side of the Kushk River. The Russians did withdraw from other territory that had been captured during the crisis. Moscow also pledged to respect Afghan territorial sovereignty.

There were no Afghans on the joint boundary commission, and Emir Abdur Rahman Khan had little or no influence over the negotiations. He initially sought to downplay the Panjdeh Crisis for fear of giving the British justification to deploy troops in Afghanistan. The emir also did not want to antagonize the Russians.

Although the crisis marked the end of Russian expansion into Afghanistan (until the 1979 invasion), Gladstone's strategy was not especially popular in Britain or India. Sir Peter Lumsden, the officer appointed to lead the British delegation to the joint commission, resigned after the Panjdeh Crisis and was highly critical of the government's handling of the incident, as was the conservative opposition.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission; Great Game, The; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Panjshir Campaigns (1980–1985)

The Panjshir Campaigns were a series of military offensives by Soviet forces and Afghan government troops in the Panjshir Valley against mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). The valley is located about 100 miles (160 km) north of Kabul. It is a rich agricultural area that is populated mainly by ethnic Tajiks. The Panjshir River runs through the valley, which is about 70 miles (112 km) in length.

The campaigns demonstrated the flaws in Soviet military strategy, which relied on conventional operations against a very conventional foe. In their initial invasion, the Soviets captured the major Afghan cities and other strategic objectives, and they were able to hold those areas during the war. The Soviets and the forces of the pro-Soviet government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) were unable to maintain control of the countryside. Instead, the Soviets and DRA forces relied on a strategy based on large, conventional offensives in rebel-held areas. The Soviet-led troops, using overwhelming ground and air power, would attack mujahideen-held villages and towns, drive out the insurgents, and then retreat back to heavily fortified bases. The Soviets sought to capture or kill the mujahideen, not control territory. They also sought to depopulate areas, driving out civilians who could provide supplies or other assistance to the rebels. However, the mujahideen learned quickly to avoid regular battles against the Soviets and instead withdrew from contested areas before they could be encircled. The rebels typically only fought the Soviets when they had strategic advantages such as battlefield superiority in numbers or the element of surprise or clear lines of retreat.

Ahmed Shah Massoud commanded the predominately Tajik mujahideen in the valley. He divided his men into small, mobile units of about 70–75 fighters. Each unit was assigned a specific geographic area to patrol and defend. Massoud's forces varied in number, averaging about 3,000. The Soviets conducted three campaigns from September 1980 through March 1981. They met little resistance, but also inflicted few casualties on the rebels, who avoided contact. As soon as the Soviet and DRA troops withdrew, the mujahideen resumed operations. A fourth offensive in September 1981 met heavy resistance and was forced to withdraw. Meanwhile, the civilian population of the region was devastated. Fighting and aerial bombardment drove noncombatants away in droves. The population of the area declined from more than 100,000 at the time of the initial Soviet invasion to less than 30,000 by the mid-1980s.

In May 1982, the Soviets and DRA troops launched their largest attack to date in the valley. The attacking forces numbered more than 15,000 with significant air support. The advance began with heavy bombing of the region. The objective was to establish bases within the valley to allow Soviet and DRA forces to continue patrols after the main body withdrew. The invading forces suffered heavy casualties and the bulk of the mujahideen were able to escape, but the Soviets did establish a series of forts on the valley floor. A subsequent operation was launched in August with little additional progress. Casualties were high on both sides during the 1982 campaigns with an estimated 3,000 Soviet and DRA soldiers killed. In addition, more than 1,000 DRA soldiers deserted. Some joined the mujahideen, others fled back to their villages. Furthermore, after the offensives ended, the mujahideen launched a continuous series of attacks on the forts, which

were manned mostly by DRA forces. Several of the outposts were abandoned.

A six-month cease-fire was negotiated by Massoud in 1983. The terms stipulated that government forces withdraw from the valley, while the mujahideen agreed to end attacks on government sites outside of the region. The Soviets used the truce to redirect resources to other campaigns, while Massoud gathered new recruits for his forces, dug defensive fortifications, and consolidated his authority among the mujahideen forces in the region. His success against the previous offensives made Massoud a legendary figure among the resistance leaders and drew new fighters to the valley.

In April 1984, the Soviets began a new campaign with about 14,000 Soviet and DRA troops. Again the offensive commenced with widespread aerial bombardment. With overwhelming force, the government forces were able to move into the valley and build a new series of outposts. They suffered heavy casualties; the mujahideen had laid an extensive system of mines and engaged in ambushes and raids. The bulk of the rebels were once again able to escape. Significant numbers of the DRA forces defected. When the main body of the government forces withdrew, the DRA forts came under repeated attack and were slowly abandoned. The Soviet and DRA forces retreated from the majority of their gains in September.

The Soviets launched another smaller offensive in September 1984, and a final, limited campaign in June 1985. Thereafter, the Soviets maintained garrisons in the lower valley, but generally avoided contact with Massoud's forces. Massoud was able to shift his focus and forces and launch attacks on government areas outside of the valley, slowly expanding the area under his control and solidifying his reputation as one of the most effective mujahideen commanders.

The last occupying troops withdrew from the valley during the summer of 1988 as the Soviet forces left Afghanistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Airborne Units and Tactics; Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics.

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Pashtunization

“Pashtunization” (also known as “Afghanization”) is the process by which Pashtun culture and language are systematically applied to non-Pashtun people or traditionally non-Pashtun-held areas. Pashtunization results in the diminution of traditional religions, cultures, and languages, and their replacement by the same elements of Pashtun society. The Pashtun are the largest ethnic group and often the leadership in Afghanistan and follow a tradition of *pashtunwali*, or the tribal honor code that has governed Pashtun clans

for centuries. Members of the mujahideen, the Taliban, and the government of Hamid Karzai are members of subclans of the Pashtun and follow the tradition of *pashtunwali*. The process of Pashtunization can be voluntary, imposed, assimilated by smaller tribes, or just dominance by Pashtun culture.

Pashtunization can be traced back to Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of modern Afghanistan who reigned from 1747 to 1772. He conquered much of modern Afghanistan and created the Afghan Empire. Territory was given to ethnic Pashtuns to settle in an effort to bolster his power. The beginning of large-scale forced Pashtunization was started by Abdur Rahman Khan, who reigned from 1880 to 1901. During this period, groups such as the Hazaras were forcibly displaced to make room for Pashtuns. Modern attempts at Pashtunization have occurred with the Musahiban (1929–1973) and were revived by the Taliban from 1994 to 2001. Modern Afghanistan has been defined by a political expansion of the Pashtuns into non-Pashtun areas where ethnic Pashtuns are displacing other ethnicities by taking control of land and local political systems, expanding Pashtunization. The opposite of Pashtunization is called de-Pashtunization. It focuses on changing the traditional system to a more modern, inclusive system.

David Harms Holt

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Hazaras; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Pashtunwali (Pukhtunwali); Taliban.

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Pashtuns (Pushtuns)

The Pashtuns (also known as Pashtoons, Pushtuns, Paktuns, Pathans, Hindustani Pathans) are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. They live mainly in southeastern Afghanistan and the northwestern province of Pakistan. Traditionally, the Pashtuns are a collection of pastoral nomadic groups divided into individual clans, subclans, and patriarchs that are unified by a cultural history, a bloodline, and the Pashtun language. Many modern Pashtun clans have gone through the process of sedentarization, the act of establishing permanent homes rather than practicing nomadism, both in cities like Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar in Afghanistan and Peshawar and Quetta in Pakistan and on farmland, practicing animal husbandry and mixed cultivation. The origin of the Pashtuns is not known, but tradition claims they are descended from Afghana, the grandson of King Saul of Israel, in the 11th century BCE. Evidence of the Pashtuns predates the 8th century CE when Islam was introduced. Currently, the majority of the Pashtuns are Sunni with a few tribes favoring Shi'a Islam and Sufism.

The Pashtuns follow the Islamic lunar calendar and celebrate Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, and observe the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson. Pashtun children are born into Islam by the whispering of the call to prayer in the baby's ear, but children do not join formal rituals until they mature. Pashtun society is based around the concept of *Pashtunwali*, a code of conduct expected by members of the clan. *Pashtunwali* consists of *melmastia* (hospitality/protection), *Jirga* (tribal council), *ghayrat*

(honor), *tureh* (courage), and *tarr* (resolving differences by relying on the group's elders). Typically, the eldest male is the head of the household and the family acts as a single unit that includes the husband and wife, all unmarried children, and all married sons with their families. Social welfare is the requirement of the family unit.

The Pashtuns have lived in the area between Persia and the Indian subcontinent for hundreds of years. They originally were called Afghans until the formation of Afghanistan, when the definition of "Afghan" changed to mean anyone from the area of Afghanistan. Pashtun clans often established areas of control and spheres of influence based on the clan's size, power, and traditions. Tribal history and tradition typically define Pashtun rights to use tribal lands, negotiate with other tribes, and participate in the tribal council. Tribal councils and clan leaders often settle disputes; historically there has been violence when issues are not settled.

Modern Afghanistan is marked by a process called "Pashtunization," in which the Pashtuns have endeavored to impose the Pashtun language, customs, and religion upon the whole country. There are an estimated 60 different Pashtun tribes of varying size with a total population of more than 35 million in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are seven main tribes of Pashtuns: the Durrani, Ghilzai, Jali, Mamunds, Mangals, Mohmands, and Safis. The Pashtuns make up about 40–45 percent of modern Afghanistan's population, though the percentage was higher before the Soviet invasion (1979–1989). The largest of the Pashtun tribes are the Ghilzai and the Durrani. The Ghilzai are the largest group, but the Durrani have been the political elite. The Afghan monarchy was established in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani and most of Afghanistan's royal

family and current political elites are from the Durrani. The current Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, is from a subclan of the Durrani. The Ghilzai are the rivals of the Durrani. Many Ghilzai allied with the communist revolution in 1978 that led to the Soviet invasion. However, during the Soviet occupation, many Ghilzai worked with the mujahideen groups, and eventually the Ghilzai took leadership roles in the Taliban. After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, the Durrani reclaimed the leadership of Afghanistan, but the Taliban continue to challenge that primacy.

David Harms Holt

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Barakzai; Durrani Empire (1747–1818); Ghilzai; Karzai, Hamid; Mujahideen; Pashtunization; Pashtunwali (Pukhtunwali); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Pashtunwali (Pukhtunwali)

Pashtunwali translates as “the way of the Pashtuns,” and it is the centuries-old social

code of conduct for Pashtun clans. Pashtunwali is currently practiced by Pashtun clans mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but it can be practiced anywhere the Pashtuns live. The practice predates the Afghan conversion to Islam and supersedes the tradition of the Qur’an in several cases. For example, the Qur’an states that inheritance is to be shared equally among all children, but Pashtunwali only divides inheritance among the male children following the Pashtun tradition. Pashtunwali has succeeded and failed in various parts of Afghanistan, but the intent is to establish a uniform code of conduct following the dominant ethnic traditions. Understanding Pashtunwali is key to understanding Pashtun culture.

There are many Pashtunwali traditions including, but not limited to, *sabat*, *imandari*, *zamaka*, *melmastia*, *ghundi*, *itbar*, *badal*, *teega*, *Jirga*, *tarr*, and *nanawatay*. The concept of *sabat* is the idea of loyalty to family, tribal members, and friends and is a bond that ties the Pashtuns together. *Imandari* is the desire to strive for righteousness in both deed and action with respect for all. All Pashtuns are expected to follow *zamaka*, the protection of one’s property, which includes extending hospitality and protection to all who are guests. This level of hospitality, called *melmastia*, is the foundation of Pashtun society and transcends race, creed, religion, and conflict, once granted.

Pashtunwali extends to the areas controlled by the Pashtuns and the delicate balance of power that each clan holds. This balance of power is called *ghundi* and is similar to political alliances among the clans and subclans, Pashtun and others. *Ghundi* often defines which tribes share common interests and enemies. *Itbar* is a code of trust or a gentlemen’s agreement that is usually verbal and in front of witnesses, and that encompasses all business and social transactions.

Breaking itbar is a severe breach of Pashtunwali and is the equivalent of breaking one's word, which is a dishonorable act.

Violence and discord can enter the system through badal, or an "eye for and eye"—style vengeance for wrongs against honor or property. Badal can be a form of payback from theft to insult to murder. Because of badal, Pashtunwali is very sensitive to potential insult because badal can lead to badal and create a cycle of violence. Teega is the cessation of bloodshed between parties. Teega translates as "putting down the stone" and usually is initiated by a Jirga. A Jirga is an assembly of tribal elders who render decisions and laws that must be obeyed without question. The tribal elders must be respected in Pash-tunwali. Jirgas often settle disputes from badal to criminal offenses to peace treaties. Tarr is a mutual accord between clans or individuals that can be initiated through a Jirga as a code of conduct over day-to-day issues. Individuals who are not in the favor of the clan or who have broken tarr or are the target of badal may seek nanawatay, or mercy from their enemies. Nanawatay may be requested from another clan or even their enemy and, if granted, the requester is protected in a similar fashion as melmastia. Those seeking nanawatay are expected to ritually humiliate themselves as an act of requesting mercy and will remain protected as long as they remain in the granter's land or receive peaceful resolution.

Pashtunwali is a code of conduct that includes many other cultural traits than those listed above. It has developed over the centuries as a foundation of acceptable Pash-tun behavior. Pashtunwali dominates conduct in areas where the Pashtuns are the majority. The process of Pashtunization is the act of enforcing Pashtunwali in a new area.

David Harms Holt

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Barakzai; Ghilzai; Loya Jirga; Pashtunization; Pashtuns (Pushtuns).

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Peiwar Kotal, Battle of (1878)

The Battle of Peiwar Kotal on December 2, 1878, was a major British victory during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). The 6,500-man, 18-gun Kurram Valley Force, commanded by Major General (later Field Marshal Earl) Sir Frederick S. Roberts, was one of three British columns that marched into Afghanistan at the beginning of the Second Afghan War on November 21, 1878. After marching through the Kurram Valley, Roberts's force found its advance blocked by Afghans (estimated at eight regiments) with artillery at the Peiwar Kotal (Pass), about 3,800 feet above the valley floor. On November 28, 1878, elements of the 29th Punjabis attempted to rush the Afghan position but were forced back. Roberts then reconnoitered the area for two days before deciding on a plan of action.

At 10 p.m. on December 1, 1878, Roberts led a 2,263-man assault force (consisting of the 2nd and 29th Punjabis, the 5th Gurkhas, half the 72nd Highlanders, the 23rd Pioneers, a mountain battery, and four artillery pieces on elephants) on a 12-mile trek up a steep path that ended at the Spingawi Kotal to the left of the Afghan position. The column took a wrong turn and had to retrace its steps and lost even more time ascending in a boulder-strewn streambed. As dawn approached, the force had not reached its objective and was almost compromised when two shots were fired, reportedly by traitorous Pathan sepoys. Roberts halted the column and put the Gurkhas and a Highlander company in the lead.

At first light, the Gurkhas and Highlanders pressed forward, orienting on enemy rifle flashes and “pausing only to bayonet the defenders” (Tanner 2002, p. 207). By 8:00 a.m. on December 2, 1878, the British had secured the head of the Spingawi Kotal. Heavy fighting followed, and at about 1:00 p.m., the British found a location to emplace their artillery and fire on the Afghans. The tide of battle was turning. As the British rolled up the Afghan position and threatened its rear, the 8th King’s Regiment and the 5th Punjab Infantry conducted a frontal assault. The Afghans abandoned their positions and guns, and they left about 300 dead on the field. British casualties were 21 dead and 75 wounded. The victory at the Battle of Peiwar Kotal made Roberts’s reputation as a field commander and cleared the route to Kabul.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Anglo-Afghan Wars: Second (1878–1880); British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics; Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Kandahar, Battle of (1880); Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Mohammad Yakub; Khan, Sher Ali; Khyber Pass.

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People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was an Afghan communist party that seized power in 1978 and ruled the country with Soviet support until 1992 when the organization was dissolved. The PDPA was formed by the consolidation of several smaller socialist and Marxist organizations on January 1, 1965. The roots of the party were in the Awakened Youth movement, which formed in the late 1940s and advocated secularization, redistribution of wealth, women's rights, universal education, and the establishment of a Pashtun state within the newly independent nation of Pakistan. Mohammed Daoud Khan was one of the founding members of the Awakened Youth. Daoud became prime minister in 1953.

Future national leaders Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal were instrumental

in the creation of the PDPA. Taraki was the PDPA's first general secretary and Karmal its first deputy general secretary. The party was organized as a pro-Soviet opposition group to the monarchy, and it received significant monetary assistance from Moscow. The party's constitution was essentially copied from that of the Soviet Communist Party.

The PDPA initially drew its support from professional Afghans in urban areas such as Kabul. The party worked with trade unions and other workers' groups to advocate for higher pay and better working conditions. It organized a series of strikes in Kabul, including a month-long general strike in 1969 that ended with most of the workers' demands being met. The PDPA also established antigovernment newspapers, creating new publications as existing ones were closed by security officials.

The two leading publications gave their names to the two main factions in the party. *Khalq* ("Masses") advocated a Soviet-style revolution and imposition of a socialist regime. It was the larger of the two factions and regarded as much more radical. It drew most of its support from ethnic Pashtuns in rural areas. *Khalq* was led by Taraki. *Parcham* ("Banner") was led by Karmal and supported a gradual transition to a socialist economy. *Parcham* continued to draw mainly from urban areas, as well as ethnic groups such as the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Despite being the smaller group, *Parcham* initially enjoyed more popularity. In national balloting in 1965, four of five *Parcham* candidates won their elections, but all three *Khalq* candidates were defeated.

Both *Khalq* and *Parcham* launched aggressive recruiting efforts among government officials and the military. *Khalq* was particularly effective within the military. In 1967, the two factions formally split. In 1969, *Parcham* entered into a quasi-secret

alliance with Daoud and subsequently supported his coup in July 1973 in which King Mohammed Zahir Shah was deposed. Daoud became president and appointed a number of *Parcham* members to government positions. However, he ordered *Parcham* to cease its recruiting efforts. *Khalq* continued its recruitment efforts.

In 1977, the Soviet Union launched an initiative to reconcile the two factions in order to create a united opposition toward Daoud, who was increasingly seeking improved relations with the West. In March, Taraki and Karmal signed a formal unity agreement. The two factions began finalizing plans for a coup to overthrow Daoud and establish a socialist republic. The total size of the PDPA at the time was estimated to be somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000.

On April 17, 1978, Mir Akbar Khyber, a leading *Parcham* intellectual, was assassinated. The PDPA blamed the regime. Following massive protests in Kabul, Daoud ordered the arrest of leading party members. Pro-*Khalq* military officers led by Hafizullah Amin launched a coup, and Daoud and his family were killed on April 28. According to a prearranged agreement, Taraki became leader of Afghanistan, with Karmal as his deputy. However, in July Taraki began to purge the government by reassigning *Parcham* officials. For instance, Karmal was appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Taraki and Amin became locked in a bitter dispute for power. Amin enjoyed the support of the majority of the military and used his power to arrest Taraki on September 14, 1979 (he was later executed).

Meanwhile, a popular revolt against PDPA rule steadily increased, and the government lost control of as much as two-thirds of the country. In December 1979, the Soviets launched Operation Storm 333, deposing Amin, who was executed on December 27.

Karmal was appointed president and Parcham officials assumed control of the government, under Soviet tutelage. Although he promised to abandon unpopular policies advocated by Taraki and Amin, Karmal failed to implement reforms such as free elections and a general amnesty. As a result, the rebellion continued, requiring an increased number of Soviet troops.

In 1986, in the midst of the stubborn insurgency, Karmal launched a series of reforms, but the Soviets replaced him in September 1987 with the head of the Afghan secret police and Parcham member Mohammed Najibullah. The new president faced a series of coup attempts by disaffected Khalq members from 1988 to 1990. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, the PDPA remained in power until Kabul fell to mujahideen groups. Najibullah took refuge in the United Nations compound in Kabul, where he remained until he was taken by the Taliban and executed on September 28, 1996.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Amin, Hafizullah; Karmal, Babrak; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Khyber, Mir Akbar; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Operation Storm 333 (1979); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; Taraki, Nur Muhammad; Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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Peshawar, Treaty of (1855)

The Treaty of Peshawar reopened diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Great Britain. Under its terms, the two countries pledged to respect each other's territories, while Britain agreed to come to Afghanistan's aid if London "saw fit to do so." Both the Afghans and the British saw the accord as a means to counter Iranian influence in the region. It also ended 12 years of minor warfare between the Afghans and British India.

By the early 1850s, the British were increasingly concerned over Russian influence with Persia (Iran) and feared that Moscow's efforts to expand in the region would threaten the colony of India. The advent of the Crimean War (1853–1856) exacerbated concerns that Russia would invade India through Central Asia. Policymakers in Britain and India increasingly believed that a strong, stable, and unified Afghanistan would not only provide a buffer between Persia and India, but would be the best way to counter Russian influence. Concurrently, Afghan emir Dost Mohammad Khan sought British support to expand his territory. In 1854, he captured Kandahar and expanded his control over the southern areas of Afghanistan. Dost Mohammad next planned to either annex or otherwise gain control of Herat, and he wanted British backing.

Following the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848–1849), the British commissioner for Peshawar, Sir Herbert Benjamin Edwardes, emerged as the foremost proponent of an accord with Afghanistan. However, Sir Henry Lawrence, the British chief commissioner of Punjab, opposed a friendship treaty with Afghanistan because of Dost Mohammad's

support for the Sikhs during the conflict (the Afghan emir had dispatched more than 1,500 soldiers to fight alongside the Sikhs). Edwardes was able to convince Lord Dalhousie, the governor-general of India, of the utility of an agreement with Afghanistan, clearing the way to launch the negotiations that resulted in the Peshawar Treaty. Talks began after Ghulam Haidar Khan, the oldest son and heir to Dost Mohammad, arrived in Peshawar in 1855.

Signed on March 30, 1855, by Ghulam Haidar and John Lawrence (who had succeeded his older brother, Sir Henry, as chief commissioner), the Peshawar Treaty marked the formal reopening of diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Britain for the first time since the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). The accord also recognized the emir's sovereignty over Kandahar and implied British consent for Dost Mohammad to conquer Herat. Both parties pledged perpetual friendship and noninterference in the possessions of the other party. Finally, the parties agreed to be the “friends of the friends” and the “enemy of the enemies” of each other (although the British were insistent that the treaty did not commit them to provide military assistance to Afghanistan in the event of a conflict). The younger Lawrence was knighted for his role in negotiating the agreement.

The treaty prompted Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar, the king of Persia, to attempt to reassert control over Herat in 1856 after its governor, Said Mohammad Khan, was assassinated and a young prince, Mohammad Yusuf, installed as ruler of the province. The Persians recaptured Herat in October. Dost Mohammad subsequently joined Britain in a war with Persia (the Anglo-Persian War, 1856–1857) to wrest Herat from the Persians. On January 26, 1857, an addendum to the treaty was signed near the Khyber Pass,

granting the British the right to establish a military mission in Kandahar in order to support military efforts against the Persians, as well as installing a political agent in Kabul. The addendum also committed the British to supplying a monthly cash subsidy to the Afghan emir and providing the Afghans with 4,000 muskets. Following the defeat of the Persians, Dost Mohammad gained control of Herat, installing a prince from his clan as ruler of the province (six years later, the province was formally annexed by Afghanistan). As a result of the war, Nasir al-Din Shah was also forced to recognize Afghanistan.

The treaty was critically important for the British during the Sepoy Rebellion (1857–1858). Because of the enhanced ties with the British, Dost Mohammad refused to support the rebels. In addition, with the border secure, the British were able to redeploy troops from the region to help suppress the insurgency. Relations between Afghanistan and Britain remained relatively good. Following the death of Dost Mohammad in 1863, relations deteriorated, culminating in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880).

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan Wars: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan Wars: Second (1878–1880); Dost Mohammad; Great Game, The; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Peshawar Accords (1992)

The Peshawar Accords (1992) were signed on April 24, 1992, in an attempt to create a new government after the collapse of the communist government of Mohammed Najibullah, which had held onto power after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The Najibullah government had been fighting the Afghan mujahideen, but controlled less than 10 percent of the country by 1992. Mujahideen from the Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*), led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, along with the militia forces of Abdul Rashid Dostum, were on the outskirts of Kabul by April 1992. Massoud halted his forces to allow the senior mujahideen leaders in Pakistan to create a transitional government.

Under the auspices of the Pakistani government the major mujahideen factions began meeting in Peshawar to craft a compromise acceptable to all parties. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*) was the main outlier in the talks. Hekmatyar was convinced that he could defeat the other mujahideen groups and become sole ruler of Afghanistan. While he had the backing of Pakistan's main military intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, and his group was one of the largest insurgency formations, Hekmatyar did not have the backing of the other mujahideen leaders, making a protracted civil war very likely. While the talks continued in Peshawar, Hekmatyar advanced on Kabul.

The Peshawar negotiations resulted in an agreement whereby the mujahideen leaders agreed to create an interim governing body that would be succeeded by a permanent, elected government known as the Islamic State of Afghanistan. In an effort to gain Hekmatyar's support, the negotiators agreed to offer him the post of prime minister, the second most powerful political position

behind the president. Hekmatyar refused the post. The initial president of the new government was Sibghatullah Mojaddedi of the National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*). He served from April 28 to June 28, when Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Islamic Society, became president. Rabbani was also supposed to be an interim president, but as civil war engulfed the country, he remained in office, serving until September 1996.

The Peshawar Accords were composed of 12 articles. The first created a 51-person council, headed by a president (Mojaddedi), who would serve for two months. The second article named Rabbani as Mojaddedi's successor and stipulated that he would remain in office for four months. The third clause declared that the terms of the first and second presidents would not be extended. Articles 4 through 10 assigned specific ministries among the main mujahideen groups, including assigning the prime minister to Hekmatyar's Islamic Party, and decreed that the ministers would come from the council. For instance, article 9 assigned the ministry of defense to Rabbani's Islamic Society. Article 11 pledged that the smaller mujahideen formations would be granted less significant ministries. The 12th and final clause stated that the time to implement the other articles would be six months, with the transitional government having a maximum term of two years.

The Peshawar Accords brought together the majority of the former insurgent groups. They also laid the basis for Afghanistan's post-Soviet government. However, the agreement failed to prevent the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001).

David Harms Holt

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Party (*Hezb-i*

Islami); Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Najibullah, Mohammed; Northern Alliance; Rabbani, Burhanuddin.

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Petraeus, David (1952–)

David Howell Petraeus was a U.S. general who commanded coalition forces in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2011, and who served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 2011 to 2012. Petraeus was born on November 7, 1952, in Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1974, and later earned a master's degree in public administration and then a PhD in international relations from Princeton University. The young officer began his military career in the infantry and rose through the ranks to lieutenant colonel in 1991, commanding a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division. In 2000, he was promoted to brigadier general, and he commanded the 101st during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a major general. In 2004, he was made a lieutenant general.

Petraeus was appointed to command Fort Leavenworth where he coauthored a new

manual on counterinsurgency tactics. In 2007, he was promoted to general and given command of the Multi-National Force in Iraq. The general was tasked with suppressing the rising tide of violence. Petraeus oversaw the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops as part of a broad and successful effort to stabilize the country. In 2009, Petraeus was diagnosed with prostate cancer and underwent radiation treatment. He was subsequently placed in charge of Central Command and then became commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan in 2010, following the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal.

Petraeus replicated his approach from the Iraq conflict in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama authorized a 33,000 troop surge in Afghanistan. As a result, coalition forces were able to dislodge the Taliban from bases in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces. However, the success he enjoyed in Iraq eluded Petraeus in Afghanistan. The Taliban were able to retreat to bases in Pakistan to regroup and resupply after combat with U.S.-led troops. Also, the increased use of airstrikes led to more civilian casualties, which undermined support for the coalition. In response, Petraeus issued new guidelines designed to minimize civilian casualties and increase cooperation with Afghan national forces.

In April 2011, Petraeus was nominated to be CIA director and was easily confirmed by the U.S. Senate on a vote of 94–0. He retired from the army in August and began his tenure in September. A little more than a year later, the former general resigned as CIA head after revelations surfaced over an extramarital affair with Paula Broadwell, who had written a biography of Petraeus. An investigation of the affair led to charges of mishandling classified information. Petraeus pleaded guilty to the charges and was

sentenced to a \$100,000 fine and two years' probation. On January 29, 2016, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter decided not to demote Petraeus from his four-star rank as general or to pursue any further action against him.

After leaving public service, Petraeus taught part-time at the City University of New York and was a fellow at Harvard University. He also joined the boards of a number of corporations and public service organizations.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Civilian Casualties; Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Iraq War (2003–); McChrystal, Stanley; Obama, Barack; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Pollock, Sir George (1786–1872)

Born on June 4, 1786, at Westminster, Pollock attended the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich from 1801 to 1803. He was selected for the Bengal artillery and sailed for India in September 1803. Pollock served in the Second Anglo-Maratha War, including at the battle of Farrukhabad and the sieges of Deig and Bhurtapore, as well as in the Anglo-Nepalese War. Promoted to lieutenant-colonel in 1824, he commanded the British artillery in the First Anglo-Burmese War. In 1838 Pollock was appointed commander

of the Agra district and promoted to major general later the same year.

In January 1842 Pollock was given both military and political powers and appointed to command the expeditionary force at Peshawar with instructions to relieve the besieged garrison under Sir Robert Sale at Jalalabad. The British had suffered a disaster in the First Anglo-Afghan War with the annihilation of Elphinstone's Kabul force, the taking of British captives, and the besieging of its scattered garrisons in the country.

Pollock arrived at Peshawar on February 5, 1842, and found his army in a poor condition with low morale and many soldiers ill. Despite receiving messages from Sale describing the urgent situation at Jalalabad and pressing for a rapid advance, he refused to make a hasty move. Pollock remained calm as he patiently spent two months restoring morale, building up his supplies, and receiving reinforcements. On March 30, 1842, cavalry and horse artillery reinforcements reached Peshawar, and the following day Pollock advanced to Jamrud within two miles of the Khyber Pass.

On April 5, 1842, Pollock stormed the well-defended entrance to the Khyber Pass and advanced through the pass. Jalalabad was relieved on April 16, 1842. At Jalalabad Pollock undertook negotiations with Akbar Khan for the release of the British captives. Lord Ellenborough, who had assumed office as governor-general of India in February 1842, had little enthusiasm for continuing the war in Afghanistan and ordered Pollock at Jalalabad and Sir William Nott at Kandahar to withdraw all British forces from the country. Both generals vehemently disagreed, with Pollock writing to Nott to urge him to remain at Kandahar. Pollock also protested to Ellenborough that an

immediate withdrawal would be thought a defeat and noted that he assumed he possessed discretionary powers in the decision. Ellenborough vacillated and the British remained in Afghanistan. In July 1842 the governor-general again ordered a withdrawal from Afghanistan, although he permitted Pollock and Nott discretion in making the retreat by way of a combined movement on Kabul as a demonstration of British strength.

Nott began his march from Kandahar in early August 1842 and Pollock began his advance on Kabul on August 20, 1842, with a force of 8,000 men, leaving a force to hold Jalalabad. Marching along the path of Elphinstone's retreat, with much evidence of the disaster that had befallen the British, Pollock's army was a punitive expedition burning villages and destroying crops. Pollock defeated the Afghans at Jagdalak Pass and at Tezin Pass before making an unopposed march on Kabul, which was occupied on September 15, 1842. Nott, disappointed not to have reached the city first, arrived two days later. Pollock assumed overall command at Kabul and remained in the city until October 12, 1842. Having secured the release of the captives, defeated Emir Ullah Khan at Isalif, and, as an act of retribution, demolished the Kabul bazaar where Sir William Macnaghten's corpse had been displayed, Pollock began the withdrawal of the British from Kabul and Afghanistan. Retiring by way of Jalalabad and the Khyber Pass, Pollock's army reached Peshawar in November 1842. By the end of the next month his command had crossed the Sutlej River and reached Ferozepore, where they were met with great ceremony by Ellenborough.

Although he received a sword of honor from Ellenborough, votes of thanks from both houses of Parliament, and made a

Grand Commander of the Order of the Bath, Pollock believed he had been denied adequate recognition for the campaign due to his disagreement with Ellenborough on the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In India Pollock assumed command of the Dinapore division and in 1843–1844 was appointed acting political resident at Lucknow. In September 1844 he was named military member of the supreme council of India. Pollock resigned due to ill health in 1846 and returned to England. In retirement Pollock received many honors, including promotions to lieutenant general in 1851, general in 1859, and field marshal in 1870. In 1871 he was appointed constable of the Tower of London and the following year was created a baronet. Pollock died on October 6, 1872 at Walmer, Kent.

Bradley P. Tolppanen

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Jagdalak Pass; Jalalabad, Siege of (1842); Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Khyber Pass; Nott, Sir William; Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”).

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Popalzai

The Popalzai are one of the most powerful Pashtun clans in Afghanistan. They also have

a presence in Pakistan. The Popalzai are a branch of the Abdalis. The Abdalis were a prominent tribe; one member, Ahmad Shah Durrani, was the founder of modern Afghanistan in 1747 and of the Durrani dynasty (the Durrani were part of the Popalzai). Among the main rivals of the Popalzai were another Abdali subtribe, the Barakzai, and a separate clan, the Ghilzai. In 1826, Dost Mohammad Khan seized the throne from the Durrani and established the Barakzai (Mohammadzai) dynasty. Dost Mohammad was briefly overthrown in 1839 by Shuja Shah Durrani with British support. Shuja Shah was a Popalzai and former emir. He held the throne for his second reign from 1839 until he was assassinated in 1842. Dost Mohammad regained the throne in 1845 and ruled until 1863. His descendants ruled until the last monarch of Afghanistan, King Mohammed Zahir Shah, was overthrown in 1973. Contemporary, well-known members of the Popalzai include the Karzai family, most prominently Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. One of the criticisms of President Karzai was that he was a figurehead for foreign powers like his ancestor, Shuja Shah. One recruiting theme of the Taliban was to declare that they were “Sons of Dost Mohammad,” who fought the British, rather than “Sons of Shuja Shah,” who was allied with the invaders. Meanwhile, Mullah Mohammed Omar, leader of the Taliban until his death in 2013, was a member of the Ghilzai tribe.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Barakzai; Ghilzai; Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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Pottinger, Eldred (1811–1843)

An Anglo-Irish soldier, adventurer, and diplomat who helped the Afghans defeat the Persians at Herat in 1841, Pottinger was born in County Down, Ireland, on August 12, 1811. At age 14, he entered the East India Company’s military training academy at Addiscombe, Surrey. Two years later, he received a commission and joined the headquarters unit of the Bombay Artillery in India. Pottinger was subsequently appointed a political officer with his uncle Henry Pottinger, who was the East India Company’s resident agent in Sindh. In 1837, the younger Pottinger covertly traveled to Afghanistan to explore the region. He arrived in Kabul in August and then set off for Herat, disguised as a pilgrim. He was briefly captured by Hazaras, but eventually freed, and managed to arrive in Herat in September only to find the city about to be attacked by a Persian force led by Russian and other European officers. Pottinger revealed his identity to Yar Mohammed Khan, the Afghan vizier commanding Herat, and volunteered to help with the defense. Pottinger initially led cavalry units in reconnaissance missions and skirmishes. Beginning in February 1838, Pottinger was dispatched as an envoy to the Persian leader, Mohammed Shah, to negotiate an end to the siege, but the talks were unsuccessful. By June, the Persians had completely cut off Herat and food and water were in short supply.

The Persians launched a major assault on June 24, 1838. The attack was preceded by an artillery barrage. At noon, five columns

moved against the city. Pottinger later recounted that the infantry assault surprised the defenders after months of relative inaction. One Persian column was able to breach the southeast defenses. Pottinger heroically rallied the Afghan defenders, and along with Yar Mohammed, repulsed the attackers. The defeat of the assault ended the siege and the Persians withdrew. In recognition of his service and bravery, Pottinger was promoted to brevet major and made a Companion of the Order of the Bath. Pottinger also became the British resident in Herat.

On November 2, 1841, Pottinger was the resident in Kohistan, north of Kabul, when the Afghans rose against Shuja Shah Durrani and the British. The insurgents attacked Pottinger's compound, forcing him to flee to a nearby Gurkha garrison. Pottinger helped lead the defense of the post after the commander of the Gurkhas was killed. He was wounded during the fighting, but managed to reach Kabul on November 15. After the British envoy in Kabul, Sir William Macnaghten, was killed on December 23, Pottinger took Macnaghten's post and helped negotiate the withdrawal of the British forces from the capital. He was one of three hostages kept in in the Afghan capital after the disastrous retreat from Kabul in January 1842. Freed on September 17 by the British Army of Retribution, Pottinger faced an inquiry over his role in the retreat. He was cleared of any wrongdoing and instead praised for his actions. Pottinger died of a fever on November 15, 1843, while in Hong Kong visiting his uncle.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Durrani, Shuja Shah; Herat, Siege of (1837–1838); Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Macnaghten, Sir William Hay; Pottinger, Sir Henry.

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Pottinger, Sir Henry (1789–1856)

An Anglo-Irish soldier, colonial official, and the first governor of British Hong Kong, Pottinger was born near Belfast, Ireland, on October 3, 1789. After attending the Belfast Academy, Pottinger traveled to India in 1804 and was commissioned as a cadet in the military service of the East India Company. Pottinger fought in the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–1805). From 1820 to 1811, he traveled extensively through Baluchistan (southern Afghanistan and Pakistan) and southern Persia (Iran). Pottinger disguised himself as the commercial agent for an Indian merchant, although he would later recount that most Afghans easily discerned that he was a European. The young explorer mapped the area and later recounted his adventures, and the history and geography of the region, in a popular memoir, *Travels in Beluchistan and Sinde* (1816). Much of the region was unknown to Europeans at the time, and Pottinger's travels helped stir interest in the area. He also confirmed British fears of the potential Persian threat to western India.

Pottinger rose rapidly through the ranks and was promoted to colonel. In 1820, Pottinger became the British resident in Sindh. Five years later, he was transferred to Cutch. While there, Pottinger became aware of large coal deposits and oversaw the establishment of the first commercial mine in the region.

In 1831, Pottinger undertook a series of negotiations to form a political and trade alliance between the principalities along the Indus River. The main goal of the coalition was to reduce Sikh influence in the area. The talks were followed in 1838 by a stronger defensive alliance among the principalities. Pottinger's diplomacy was credited with preventing the expansion of Ranjit Singh's kingdom without having to resort to military force. For his service, Pottinger was made a baronet. He also became widely regarded as one of Britain's foremost colonial diplomats.

Pottinger was dispatched to the Pacific in 1841 to end the First Opium War (1839–1842), following a series of British military victories against the Chinese. He negotiated the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which ended the conflict and opened China to foreign trade. He also secured an agreement that granted the British sovereignty over Hong Kong, despite opposition from the Foreign Office. The foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, initially argued that the acquisition of the territory would complicate Britain's relations with other powers and that the new colony would be too expansive. In 1843, Pottinger was appointed the first governor of Hong Kong. The following year, Pottinger returned to Great Britain where he became a privy councilor to Queen Victoria. However, he soon returned to colonial service. Pottinger served briefly as the governor of Cape Colony in 1847, before accepting an appointment as governor of Madras, a post he held from 1848 to 1854. Meanwhile, in 1851, he was promoted to lieutenant general. After retiring from colonial service, Pottinger died in Malta on March 18, 1856.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars) (1748–1837); Iran (Persia), Relations

with Afghanistan; Pottinger, Eldred; Ranjit Singh, Maharaja.

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Precision-Guided Weapons

The United States employed an increasing number of precision-guided weapons during its invasion and combat operations in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The leverage gained from successful employment of precision-guided weapons has resulted in brief, decisive battles against the modern-day enemy. However, this success has also generated complex questions about whether the use of precision-guided weapons has degraded the ability of U.S. military forces to discern critical differences between adversaries and civilians.

Historically, the Air Force has succeeded in conducting effective strike missions against al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan. During the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Air Force almost exclusively used precision-guided weapons on targets such as early warning radars, ground forces, command and control facilities, al Qaeda infrastructure, training facilities, airfields, and aircraft. Additionally, during the first few months of air operations, B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15E, F-16, and AC-130H/U aircraft flew more than 6,000 sorties and dropped 10,000 tons of munitions; more than 75 percent of the munitions

expended were precision-guided. From the start of operations in October through the battle of Shah-i-Kot in March 2002, the United States dropped around 20,000 bombs on Afghanistan. By the end of March 2002 a total of 21,000 bombs and missiles had been dropped, the bulk of them precision-guided. As of mid-September 2002 it was reported that about 12,000 of the 24,000 bombs dropped in Afghanistan were guided munitions.

Traditionally, most military munitions were built around a set of standard warheads such as the Mark 82 (500 lb.), Mark 83 (1,000 lb.), and Mark 84 (2,000 lb.). Other warhead variants, such as the BLU-109 (bomb live unit; 2,000 lb.) and BLU-113 (5,000 lb.) offered greater penetration of hard and deeply buried targets. As far back as the 1950s and 1960s, these warheads were employed as “dumb bombs” in slick (standard, ballistic fins) and retarded (high-drag folding or ballute-equipped tail kit) configurations. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) extended this practice by adding guidance kits with sensors (laser, infrared, TV, or GPS/inertial) and movable fins to the nose and tail of standard warheads. Operational use of these guidance kits in the latter years of the Vietnam War ushered in the age of PGMs that eventually shaped U.S. military strike missions in the 1980s (Libya, Grenada, and Panama).

The extensive use of standard GBU (guided bomb unit) weapons and GPS/inertial guided cruise missiles in Operation Desert Storm formed a critical shift in political-military strategy as well as tactics. Tactically, it became possible to destroy large numbers of discrete targets from the air with a smaller number of aircraft and warheads. Video recordings from the targeting pod’s or weapon’s camera made assessment of strike results timelier and more accurate,

resulting in fewer restrikes. PGMs also allowed precise, direct engagement of targets in heavily populated areas where attacks with dumb bombs would be precluded by unacceptably large civilian casualties or damage to sensitive infrastructure. Strategically, it brought more pressure on governments and military leaders to reject mass casualties as an inevitable side effect of bombing and to focus more on precisely discerning combatants and military infrastructure from noncombatants and purely civilian infrastructure.

In the late 1990s the advent of GPS/inertial guided bombs enabled another step-change in military capabilities. For the first time in the history of air warfare, air forces had the ability to accurately strike targets in poor weather and to attack multiple targets simultaneously from one fighter or bomber. Assuming accurate coordinates for the target were known (this sometimes stressed U.S. intelligence), one B-2 bomber could release, in a few seconds, up to twenty 2,000 lb. bombs against 20 discrete targets with each bomb destroying a building or bunker or cratering a runway or taxiway. Precision bombs were now free from the limitation of one or two heavily tasked aircrew and one laser targeting pod on previous aircraft. The standard Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits that turned standard dumb warheads into PGMs were also hundreds of thousands of dollars cheaper, per unit, than purpose-built 1,000-mile cruise missiles and allowed a wider range of explosive and penetration effects on a wider range of targets.

Of the 12,000 PGMs employed in Afghanistan in 2001–2002, about 9,000 were equipped with JDAM kits. Continued use of 500 lb., 1,000 lb., 2,000 lb., and 5,000 lb. laser-guided bombs allowed more accurate engagement of moving targets and targets in close proximity to friendly forces or civilians.

Additional warhead options for these kits were developed to have better effects against caves and bunkers. Additionally, smaller purpose-built stand-off weapons such as the 250 lb. small-diameter bomb (SDB), the Hellfire laser-guided missile, and the Maverick TV-guided missile enabled attack of smaller targets with less collateral damage. The smaller sized Hellfire missile and 500 lb. laser and GPS-guided bombs were also integrated with the Predator and Reaper remotely piloted vehicles, allowing persistent engagement capability against fixed or moving counterterrorism and counterinsurgency targets.

There is no doubt that smart bomb technology has increased the U.S. military's lethality. However, while its effectiveness in the first phase of conflict is unmatched, there is still much debate about how we can discriminate between soldiers and civilians and the value of these weapons during the nation-building, peacekeeping phase of conflict. We must know a target precisely before we can engage it precisely, and the appropriate use of lethal force is very much a gray area at the peacekeeping end of the military spectrum. Moreover, precision-guided weapons will continue to radically evolve in the coming years. Their ability to be directly linked to the information systems that gives them their precision is invaluable. Currently such munitions as the JDAM rely on satellites, but as weapon sensor technology becomes more miniaturized and capable, it can be combined with other advanced technologies such as nano energetics in combinations such as 81MM mortars with 50-mile ranges, accurate on a moving target, with the explosive power of 500 lbs. of TNT—in essence, PGMs are in their infancy.

Joy S. Patton

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Operation Enduring Freedom

(2001–2014); United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Psychological Operations in Afghanistan

The initial psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign conducted by the United States during the invasion of Afghanistan in the months after al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against America on September 11, 2001, had two objectives. The first objective set by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was to isolate the Taliban and al Qaeda from their sources of support among the Afghan population. The second objective was to build and strengthen the resolve of the Afghan people to expel the Taliban and foreign terrorists. To accomplish these objectives, the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) for Afghanistan was established on September 14, 2001, at CENTCOM headquarters. The JPOTF sought to create materials that would persuade the Taliban and al Qaeda forces to surrender and the Afghan people to question the legitimacy of the Taliban.

In the campaign to oust the Taliban from October to December 2001, the United States used several types of media and delivery methods to disseminate these products. The majority of the products disseminated

by the United States in Afghanistan were created at media production facilities of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, or at satellite facilities and transported into Afghanistan for delivery. In the first months of the war U.S. Air Force planes dropped more than 75 million leaflets and 7,500 portable radios and EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft broadcast more than 3,000 hours of radio programs in Afghanistan. Radio broadcasts were found to be more effective than printed materials because of the high illiteracy rate in Afghanistan and the Afghan people's desire to hear music, previously banned by the Taliban, interspersed with the psychological operations messages.

As the U.S. focus after December 2001 shifted from ousting the Taliban and capturing al Qaeda operatives to installing the Afghan Interim Authority and transitioning to civilian governance, PSYOP strategic and operational-level messages transitioned to themes designed to build the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan (GIROA), promote the benefits of coalition military operations, and provide directions for receiving humanitarian and development aid. As the communication infrastructure of Afghanistan developed, the method of message dissemination also changed as coalition forces rented time on civilian television and radio broadcasts to deliver their messages.

Tactical PSYOP teams also provided support to conventional and special operations during all phases of the war. The messages of these teams, delivered as prerecorded messages broadcast over portable loudspeakers or leaflets dropped from aircraft, appealed to fighters to surrender and civilians not to interfere with military operations, as well as offering rewards for the capture of al Qaeda leadership. The first two types of messages were effective early in the conflict

with tactical PSYOP teams assisting in mass surrenders of Taliban forces in cities such as Kunduz. The messages offering rewards for information about al Qaeda leadership were less effective because most Afghans did not know what al Qaeda or Taliban leaders looked like; and if they were harboring them, turning over their al Qaeda or Taliban guests would violate key principles of the Pashtun code of Pashtunwali.

The effectiveness of U.S. and later coalition PSYOP efforts were hampered throughout the process by several weaknesses in the PSYOP message design and approval process. These issues included misunderstandings of Afghan culture and mindsets by coalition personnel, coalition-inflicted civilian casualties, and GIROA corruption, which all contributed to a reduction in the saliency of PSYOP messages. In addition, cumbersome approval processes, which often required the approval of senior leaders, delayed dissemination of PSYOP products and placed U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PSYOP efforts behind the more nimble Taliban propaganda operations.

The Taliban also instituted an effective PSYOP campaign soon after the fall of their government. Taliban PSYOP messages centered on themes designed to build support for the Taliban and degrade the legitimacy of coalition forces and the Afghan government. They did this by highlighting civilian casualties caused by coalition operations and the endemic corruption in the Afghan government. The Taliban disseminated these messages using methods ranging from leaflets to clandestine radio stations and, increasingly, social media. Using these methods, the Taliban often broadcast their message ahead of coalition forces, thereby setting the initial narrative of an event.

Alexander D. Stephenson

See also: 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Special Operations Forces; Taliban; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Qala-i-Jangi, Battle of (2001)

An uprising by Taliban prisoners that resulted in a fierce battle between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, which was being assisted by American and British forces, the Battle of Qala-i-Jangi unfolded from November 25 to December 1, 2001. Qala-i-Jangi, meaning “house of war” in Farsi, is a sprawling, 19th-century fortress surrounded by massive mud-baked, crenellated walls nearly 100 feet high. It is located just west of Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan and served as the personal headquarters of Northern Alliance commander General Abdul Rashid Dostum. The compound contained stables and an armory and ultimately became a prison for hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters after coalition forces captured Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001 as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The resulting clash was one of the bloodiest episodes of the Afghan War.

To understand the reasons for the uprising, it is important to understand how the fortress’s prisoners had been captured. On the previous day, November 24, a substantial number of Taliban fighters had surrendered to Northern Alliance forces under General Dostum following airstrikes and a coalition assault on the northern city of Kunduz. Dostum negotiated a deal whereby most Afghan prisoners were to go free and the 300 foreign fighters were to be handed over to Dostum. Nobody informed the foreign fighters of the arrangement, however, and these men had surrendered expecting to be released. Now they found themselves betrayed and

transported by flatbed trucks to Qala-i-Jangi, where they now expected to be tortured and murdered. Significantly, their captors had failed to conduct thorough body searches, and some of the prisoners had managed to conceal weapons.

In two incidents that occurred shortly after the detainees arrived at the fort, prisoners detonated grenades and killed themselves as well as two Northern Alliance officers, Nadir Ali Khan, who had recently become chief of police in Balkh province, and Saeed Asad, a senior Hazara commander. The angry Uzbek captors in the meantime herded the prisoners into overcrowded cells in the basement of the stables in the fortress compound without food, water, or sanitary facilities, there to join other Taliban prisoners who had been taken earlier. Despite the above incidents, security was not increased.

The next morning a full-scale battle broke out. The exact circumstances of how the fighting began late the next morning remain unclear. As the detainees filed out of the building, the handful of Uzbeks who served as their guards made them sit on the ground in rows and began to bind their hands behind their backs. Meanwhile, other guards took the prisoners in small groups to the courtyard before two Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents: Johnny “Mike” Spann, a former U.S. Marine Corps captain, and Dave Tyson. The two Americans were conducting interrogations to gather intelligence on al Qaeda and the whereabouts of the organization’s leader, Osama bin Laden. Suddenly, some of the prisoners made use of what concealed weapons they had and rushed and



Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance fighters were instrumental in the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. The fighters helped recapture the prison during the Battle of Qala-i-Jangi (2001). (The Asahi Shimbun via Getty Images)

overcame the guards. While Tyson managed to escape the onslaught, Spann fell to his attackers and was kicked, beaten, and shot to death. He thus became the first American to die in combat in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Intense firefights followed, as some of the foreign fighters used arms taken from their captors to try to take control of the fort, while others remained bound in the courtyard. Foreign fighters remaining in the cells were released. Three tried to escape through a drain underneath a wall, only to be shot by Northern Alliance guards outside the fort. Others stormed a small armory and there seized mortars, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, AK-47 assault rifles, and other weapons and ammunition.

Northern Alliance forces then reorganized and mounted a counterattack, which

killed many of the Taliban. Two Northern Alliance tanks, which were outside the fort, began to pound the prisoners' positions. In the meantime, Tyson, who had joined a trapped German film crew in another part of Qala-i-Jangi, managed to contact the American Embassy in Tashkent with a plea for help. Early in the afternoon, a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) team of British Special Boat Service (SBS) and U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) arrived at the fortress in a pair of Land Rovers and engaged the Taliban fighters. One SOF team member directed air support in the form of F-18 Hornet aircraft, which dropped several 500-pound bombs that missed the armory but forced the Taliban fighters to take refuge in the stable's cellar. At dusk on that first day of fighting, Tyson and members of the film crew managed to escape by climbing over one of the

fortress walls. Because the QRF team did not know of their escape, the SBS team leader organized a rescue force, which braved Taliban fire only to find that Tyson was gone.

Over the next days, coalition forces attempted to subdue the stubborn Taliban fighters. Northern Alliance forces directed fire from tanks as well as mortars at the besieged, who continued a tenacious resistance. During the melee, a misdirected 2,000-pound bomb dropped by an American aircraft destroyed a tank and killed or injured several coalition soldiers. This was followed by another strike and an air-to-ground attack conducted by an AC-130 Spectre gunship. Finally, with the surviving prisoners running out of ammunition and having nothing to eat but horseflesh, about 100 Northern Alliance troops, joined by SBS and SOF teams, mounted an assault on what remained of the Taliban defenses. With resistance apparently over, some of the Afghan soldiers reportedly looted the bodies of the fallen prisoners, only to discover them booby trapped.

There were still Taliban fighters who had been driven underground beneath the rubble of the ruined stables. These were dispatched with rifle fire, rockets, and grenades. Northern Alliance fighters also poured oil into the basement and lit it. Ultimately, Dostum's men flooded the underground hiding places with ice-cold water, finally forcing the surrender of those who remained alive. Some 86 prisoners were taken, including the so-called "American Talib," John Walker Lindh.

For his activity, Lindh was later tried, convicted, and assessed a 20-year prison sentence. Many of his comrades were later transferred to Camp X-Ray at the American detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Besides Spann, the only American to die in the uprising, the coalition suffered 40 to 50

combat deaths with a similar number wounded. The Taliban death toll has been variously estimated at 200 to 500, many of these being foreign fighters determined to fight to the death.

The action at Qala-i-Jangi has been the subject of some controversy. Some critics charged that a massacre took place; others, such as Amnesty International, questioned the proportionality of the force employed against the revolting prisoners and demanded an investigation. The U.S. and British governments refused, claiming that their forces had acted according to the rules of engagement and international law.

Larry Simpson

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Al Qaeda; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Special Operations Forces; Taliban.

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Qizil-Bash

The Qizil-Bash are an ethnic minority in Afghanistan. They are descendants of Azerbaijani Turks who were part of Nadir Shah's

Persian forces that invaded Afghanistan in 1738. Unlike the majority of Afghans, the Qizil-Bash were Twelver Shi'a and spoke either Dari or Turkish. They were colloquially named Qizil-Bash (meaning crimson, or red-headed, in Turkish) by their detractors due to their signature red 12-gored headwear, with each specific point representing one of the Twelve Imams. This distinctive piece was an important component of their culture and signified the tribe's strict adherence to the Twelver Doctrine. Although the term was originally pejorative in nature, in time the title of Qizil-Bash was taken as a symbol of true dedication to the Safaviyya teachings.

The majority of the Qizil-Bash in Afghanistan settled in the central regions of the country and near Kabul. Since they were a religious and ethnic minority, the Qizil-Bash allied themselves with the rulers of Kabul, serving as government administrators and officials, or more commonly as soldiers. During the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), many of the tribes supported the British-backed Shuja Shah Durrani, who was perceived as being more tolerant of religious minorities. The Qizil-Bash also believed that if they fought on the side of the British, the invading troops would supply weapons and ammunition to use against their Pashtun foes. When the British withdrew from Afghanistan and Shuja Shah fell, the Qizil-Bash faced reprisal attacks and persecution. The tribe lost its privileged

position and faced suppression throughout the remainder of the 19th century. Most remained in the cities and towns.

During the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), Qizil-Bash and Hazaras in Kabul rose against the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul in February 1980 in an urban rebellion that was brutally repressed. Throughout the remainder of the occupation, Qizil-Bash fought with the mainly Tajik mujahideen groups against the Soviets. Many fled to Iran. During the Taliban regime, the group continued to face significant discrimination and repression, as did other Shi'a groups. Estimates in 2015 put the Qizil-Bash population in Afghanistan at about 200,000.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Hazaras; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Rabbani, Burhanuddin (1940–2011)

Burhanuddin Rabbani was an ethnic Tajik intellectual and political leader who served as president of Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996 and again in 2001, and was president of the Northern Alliance from 1996 to 2001. Rabbani was born on September 20, 1940, in Feyzabad, in the northern regions of Afghanistan. The future scholar studied religion and Islamic law at Kabul University, graduating in 1963. Rabbani served as a professor at the university for three years, before pursuing a master's degree in Islamic philosophy at the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo. While in Egypt, Rabbani interacted with members of the Muslim Brotherhood. After completing his degree in 1968, Rabbani traveled back to Afghanistan where he became active politically. A staunch Islamist, he opposed government reforms and in 1972 became leader of the conservative group *Jamiat-e Islami* (Islamic Society). Rabbani fled to Pakistan two years later to avoid arrest. He spent the next several years developing his party and cultivating relationships with Pakistani Islamists.

Following the Soviet invasion in 1979, Rabbani's *Jamiat-e Islami* emerged as one of the leading mujahideen groups. Using his connections in Pakistan, Rabbani worked to create a series of bases in that country from which to launch attacks against the Soviets. One of the former professor's early supporters, and a former student, Ahmed Shah Massoud, became the commander of the military wing of the party. Another former student,

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had previously formed *Hezb-e Islami* (Islamic Party), which also emerged as a major mujahideen group. Although *Jamiat-e Islami* was predominately Tajik, Rabbani reached across Afghanistan's traditionally rigid ethnic groups to build an anti-Soviet coalition.

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Rabbani continued to play a major role in the war to overthrow the pro-Soviet regime of Mohammed Najibullah. However, there was increasing rivalry among the mujahideen groups, and even open combat between *Jamiat-e Islami* and *Hezb-e Islami*. When the Najibullah regime collapsed in 1992, a power-sharing agreement made Rabbani president. His four-year tenure as interim leader of the country was marked by an increasingly fierce civil war. The rise of the Taliban after 1995 eroded Rabbani's power. After the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, Rabbani helped form a new coalition, the Northern Alliance, which included *Jamiat-e Islami*. He became president of the group.

Rabbani backed the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, attacks. He was appointed to serve as interim president from November 13 to December 22, when Hamid Karzai was selected president at the Bonn Conference. Rabbani was subsequently appointed in 2010 to lead the Afghan High Peace Council, a body charged with developing a political solution to the Taliban insurgency. He was killed by two Taliban suicide bombers on September 20, 2011.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Bonn Agreement (2001); Hazaras; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*); Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*); Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Najibullah, Mohammed; Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Rabbani, Mullah Muhammed (1955–2001)

Mullah Muhammed Rabbani was one of the founders of the Taliban, and second in power only to the group's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar. He was the de facto prime minister of Afghanistan during the period of Taliban rule. Rabbani was born in 1955 in the city of Pashmol in the Zhari district of Kandahar Province. He attended a madrasah where he studied Islam, but his education was interrupted by the Soviet invasion in 1979. Rabbani joined the mujahideen and became noted as a guerrilla fighter. He led a large insurgency group, but after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 he returned to his studies.

Increasingly angered by the actions of warlords and the growing instability in Afghanistan, Rabbani and 30 other students banded together to form the Taliban (Pash-tun for “students”) in Spin Boldak in 1992. They embraced a fundamentalist form of Wahhabism and quickly grew in size. Rabbani's exploits as a mujahideen leader drew recruits to the Taliban, which soon spread

through Kandahar. Rabbani was one of the moderates within the group and backed negotiations with the interim government or other factions in Afghanistan. He served as a balance to the more hardline Mullah Omar.

The Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 and became the government of Afghanistan. Rabbani was named head of the Supreme Council of the Taliban in September, a position equivalent to that of prime minister, the second most powerful member of the Taliban after its leader, Mullah Omar. Rabbani was reportedly behind the Taliban raid on the United Nations compound where former president Mohammed Najibullah and his brother had taken refuge after the collapse of his pro-Soviet government in 1992. Both the former president and his brother were executed by the Taliban, despite international condemnation.

The relationship between Rabbani and Mullah Omar worsened after the Taliban seized power. Rabbani sought a more formal governmental structure, something opposed by Mullah Omar and his supporters. Rabbani's health also began to decline. On April 15, 2001, Rabbani died from complications arising from liver cancer in a military hospital in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; Warlords.

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Raj, British (1858–1947)

The British Raj (loosely translated from Hindi as “rule”) was the period of direct imperial sovereignty over India and surrounding territory from 1858 to 1947. The Raj followed the era when the British East India Company ruled the subcontinent. The company was founded in 1600 and led British efforts to colonize India as a quasi-commercial entity. However, after the Sepoy Rebellion (1857–1858), the British crown assumed control over the governmental functions, including the security of the colonies. Some native rulers, especially those who sided with the British during the rebellion, retained sovereignty over their territory and pledged allegiance directly to the monarch.

The company had divided its territory into three regions or “presidencies”: Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, along with the North-Western Provinces, which bordered Afghanistan, and Burma. When the company was superseded, the government in London created the India Office, overseen by a secretary of state. A governor-general or viceroy was appointed by the monarch to oversee the colony on the spot, along with governors for the various provinces and an executive cabinet, known as the Council. By 1900, the colony had been reorganized into eight major regions: Assam, Bengal, Bombay, Burma, the Central Provinces and Berar, Madras, Punjab, and the United Provinces. There were also a number of minor provinces, including the North-West Frontier Province (which had been the North-Western Provinces), and various semi-independent princely states. Additional provinces would be created in the 1900s, and Burma became a separate colony from India in 1937.

By the time of the Raj, India had emerged as the most important of Britain’s colonies. It was the largest colony in terms of popula-

tion and provided a variety of economic benefits for the British, ranging from natural resources to markets for manufactured goods. A key component of British foreign policy through the 1800s and early 1900s was the protection of India from other imperial powers. For most of this period, the greatest perceived threat was czarist Russia. Russia was expanding southward, threatening British influence in Afghanistan and Iran. After Russia’s victory over the Ottoman Empire in 1878, its policy toward Afghanistan became more aggressive. Moscow dispatched a mission to the court of Afghan emir Sher Ali Khan. Sher Ali, who was in the midst of a civil war with his cousin Abdur Rahman Khan, rejected a British mission, leading to the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). Abdur Rahman secured the throne with British support. However, the threat of Russian interference continued. In 1885, Russian troops occupied the Afghan town of Panjdeh and the surrounding area. The incident almost resulted in a war between the British and Russians. Negotiations led to a border settlement between Afghanistan and Russia’s southern colonies.

By the late 1800s, the Raj’s concerns had shifted away from the threat of Russia to the destabilizing impact of Afghanistan on the colonies that bordered it. Border raids were common and prompted a series of military expeditions in the 1890s, including the Tirah Campaign (1897–1898) and the Malakand Field Force. Concurrently, there was growing nationalism within the Raj. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 to advocate for autonomy and eventual independence. This was followed by the creation of the Muslim League in 1906. In 1909, the British initiated a series of limited democratic reforms, which allowed Indians to be elected to legislative councils.

When World War I broke out in 1914, Britain raised large numbers of troops from its colonies and dominions. More than 1.4 million Indians served in the British Army. In an effort to maintain support for the war, the Raj initiated another round of political reforms. The Government of India Act (1919) created new local councils, increased suffrage, and reduced the authority of colonial officials. Indians were permitted greater access to the civil service and to the officer corps in the military. However, the nationalist movement continued to gain strength.

Meanwhile, during the war, the Raj sought to prevent Afghan entry into the conflict on the side of Germany. Afghan neutrality allowed the British to deploy more Indian troops overseas. At the end of the global war, the Third Anglo-Afghan War broke out (1919). The British achieved a series of tactical victories, and the Durand Line was confirmed as the border between the Raj and Afghanistan. However, Britain ceded full control over Afghan foreign and security policy to Kabul.

The 1920s and 1930s were marked by the rise of Mahatma Gandhi, who advocated peaceful civil disobedience against the Raj, and Jawaharlal Nehru, both of whom advocated independence. During the interwar period, Britain increased political autonomy in India, establishing provincial legislatures and expanding the franchise. The 1935 Government of India Act granted limited self-government to the Indian colonies.

During World War II, the British Indian government was again successful in keeping Afghanistan neutral. The main focus of the Raj was Japanese expansion into Burma and efforts to maintain Indian support for the war effort. Indian independence leader Subhas Bose organized the Indian National Army, comprised mainly of captured soldiers,

which served under the Japanese Army during the war. After the war, Britain began negotiations for full independence. Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last British viceroy, arrived in India in 1947 and oversaw talks that created two countries from the colony: a predominately Hindu state, India, and a predominately Muslim state, Pakistan. Full independence occurred on August 15, 1947.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; Great Game, The; Khyber Pass; Malakand Field Force (1897); Panjdeh Crisis (1885); Pashtuns (Push-tuns); Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919); United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Ranjit Singh, Maharaja (1780–1839)

Ranjit Singh was the founder of a Sikh state in Punjab, organized by bringing smaller groups of Sikhs into a compact kingdom. He achieved this goal in spite of the opposition of the Afghans, the British, and even some unwilling Sikhs, making him one of the most

outstanding political figures in British India's history.

Ranjit Singh was born on November 13, 1780, the only child of Maha Singh, the chief of the Shukerchakias Sikhs. The Sikhs were distinguished by their religion from both Muslims and Hindus and had defended themselves against the Mughal Empire during preceding centuries. Settled primarily in Punjab, the Sikhs were divided into 12 confederations of which the Shukerchakias was one of the smallest. When his father died in 1792, Ranjit Singh, at the age of 12, became the leader of this group with a small territory and few military resources. Three years later, he married the daughter of another chief and subsequently also married the daughter of the leader of another Sikh clan.

The Sikhs had entered a period of interne-cine tensions that Ranjit Singh would begin to reverse even as a young man. Having endured the disorder caused in his region by the incursions of the Afghan king Zaman Shah Durrani in 1799, Ranjit Singh invaded and captured the important city of Lahore. Zaman Shah declared Ranjit Singh the governor of the city. Ranjit Singh had bigger plans, and two years later, he declared himself the maharaja (king) of Punjab. Like most kings before him, he had coins made, but not in his name. Instead, he had them struck in the name of the Sikh gurus, the historic religious leaders of the Sikhs. The Sikh faith, much younger than Hinduism or Islam, had begun in India from the teachings of the gurus. Initially a passive faith, it turned militant when the Sikhs were persecuted by the Mughal rulers of India. The Sikh men took the last name Singh, or Lion, and the women, Kaur or Princess.

Subsequently, Ranjit Singh began a successful military career that made him an effective maharaja. In 1802, he seized Amritsar, the most holy city for Sikhs even

today and also the most important center of commerce in northern India of that time. He then began to capture and consolidate the smaller groups of Sikhs. In 1809, he avoided war with the British through clever diplomacy that ended with the Treaty of Amritsar, in which the British recognized his sovereignty over all Punjab west and north of the River Sutlej. He continued to expand his kingdom north and west and fought against the smaller Afghan tribes. By 1820, he had captured Multan, Peshawar, forced the Afghans from Kashmir, and consolidated Punjab into one strong kingdom. After modernizing his army, he added Ladakh to his kingdom in 1834.

Much of Ranjit Singh's military success was due to his brilliance as a strategic thinker. This gift was particularly apparent in his dealings with the British, whose own territorial ambitions were very strong during this period. Ranjit Singh understood British imperial ambitions well and was as willing as they were to enter into agreements whether or not he intended to honor them. He was also very realistic about what could not be accomplished against the British and never undertook ill-advised military action against them.

In 1838, for example, Ranjit Singh signed the Tripartite Treaty with the British government and Shuja Shah, the long-deposed leader of Afghanistan. The British agreed to restore Shuja to power as a means of gaining control of Afghanistan for the empire. The British believed they could persuade Ranjit Singh to do most of their fighting for them in what would become the first of the Anglo-Afghan Wars. He not only refused to provide Sikh troops to the British effort, however, but also refused them permission to pass across his domain, once again preserving his people from war with the British without any sacrifice of territory.

Unfortunately, soon after the beginning of the war, Ranjit Singh became ill and died on June 27, 1839. The kingdom he had welded together only lasted a few years after his death, and the British used the crumbling empire to launch two wars to annex Punjab into British-held India.

Sangeeta Gupta

See also: Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars) (1748–1837); Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of; Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Zaman Shah; Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Khyber Pass; Macnaghten, Sir William Hay.

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Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919)

The 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi ended the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) and granted Afghanistan full independence in its foreign affairs, while reaffirming the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and the British Indian colonies. The war began in May 1919 when Afghan forces crossed the border into British-controlled areas in an effort to recapture territory that was home to ethnic Pashtuns. The Afghan ruler, Amanullah Khan, believed that Pashtuns in the British colonies would rise up and war-weary Britain would be unwilling to engage in a protracted conflict to keep the territory. However, the British responded quickly,

stopped the Afghan advance, and drove the invading troops back across the border. Meanwhile, the Pashtun uprising never materialized on the scale the Afghans had hoped for. By the end of May, Amanullah had requested a cease-fire and formal hostilities ended in early June (although sporadic fighting along the frontier continued until 1920).

Once the cease-fire was agreed upon in June 1919, formal negotiations to end hostilities commenced at Rawalpindi in British-occupied Punjab. The main goals of the Afghan negotiators were to end British control over Afghan foreign policy, but gain a new treaty with Britain that would serve to check potential Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. British diplomats sought to formalize the border between Afghanistan and British India, and they were open to a new relationship with Afghanistan, but still wanted to preserve some influence over the country's foreign affairs.

In the Treaty of Rawalpindi, signed on August 8, 1919, the diplomats agreed that the Durand Line would serve as the basis for a border between Afghanistan and the British colonies. In addition, Britain agreed to surrender authority over Afghan foreign policy, but it also ended the 2 million rupee annual subsidy paid to the Afghan monarch and halted arms sales to Afghanistan. The British also cancelled the payment of funds that had been promised to Afghanistan for its neutrality during World War I. The two sides agreed to resume negotiations within six months on a new friendship treaty.

In April 1920, a new round of talks was launched in Mussoorie in British India. Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarzi headed the Afghan delegation, while the British were led by the Indian government's foreign secretary, Sir Henry Dobbs. The Afghans were eager to gain British support for the return of territory in Bokhara and Khiva, which

had been taken by imperial Russia in the late 1800s. They sought a formal defensive treaty with Britain, something the British were reluctant to grant. Consequently, after three months, the negotiations proved to be inconclusive.

A third round of discussions began in Kabul in January 1921. Meanwhile, the Afghans finalized a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union on February 28. The agreement soured the Anglo-Afghan talks. The British shifted their demands to include a formal statement from the Afghans that no Soviet consulates or formal facilities would be allowed near the border with British India. The Afghan government agreed to this demand. Revisions to the treaty were finally completed and signed on November 22. (See the treaty below in the Related Primary Document section.)

Under the new terms, Britain again accepted Afghan autonomy in foreign policy. The British also agreed to resume arms sales

and return a small area of territory near the Khyber Pass to Afghan control. In addition, a portion of the funds promised for Afghan neutrality during World War I was restored. Afghanistan reaffirmed its acceptance of the Durand Line as the border with the Indian colonies. No formal friendship treaty was concluded. Both nations expected new negotiations to be undertaken. Therefore, the accord was supposed to remain in force for just three years, and then either party could cancel the agreement with one year's notice. The treaty remained in place until Indian independence in 1947.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Durand Line; Frontier Corps; Great Game, The; Khan, Amanullah; Khyber Pass; Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Panjdeh Crisis (1885); Roos-Keppel, George Olaf; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Tarzi, Mahmud; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

Related Primary Document

The Treaty of Rawalpindi (Treaty of Peace between Governments of India and Afghanistan), August 8, 1919

The Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) was concluded with the Treaty of Rawalpindi. The accord banned arms sales or transfers to Afghanistan from India and ended an annual subsidy paid to the Afghan emir. In return, the Afghans gained control of their foreign policy and the 1893 Durand Line was set as the border between Afghanistan and British India. The agreement would be revised on several occasions and not finalized until 1921.

The following Articles for the restoration of peace have been agreed upon by the British Government and the Afghan Government:

ARTICLE 1.

From the date of the signing of this Treaty there shall be peace between the British Government, on the one part, and the Government of Afghanistan on the other.

ARTICLE 2.

In view of the circumstances which have brought about the present war between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan, the British Government, to mark their displeasure, withdraw the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs of importing arms, ammunition or warlike munitions through India to Afghanistan.

ARTICLE 3.

The arrears of the late Amir's subsidy are furthermore confiscated, and no subsidy is granted to the present Amir.

ARTICLE 4.

At the same time, the British Government are desirous of the re-establishment of the old friendship that has so long existed between Afghanistan and Great Britain, provided they have guarantees that the Afghan Government are, on their part, sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. The British Government are prepared, therefore, provided the Afghan Government prove this by their acts and conduct, to receive another Afghan mission after six months for the discussion and settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments and the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis.

ARTICLE 5.

The Afghan Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early demarcation by a British Commission of the undemarcated portion of the line west of the Khyber, where the recent Afghan aggression took place, and to accept such boundary as the British Commission may lay down. The British troops on this side will remain in their present positions until such demarcation has been effected.

ALI AHMAD KHAN,

*Commissary for Home Affairs and Chief
of the Peace Delegation of the Afghan
Government.*

A. H. GRANT

*Foreign Secretary to the Government of
India and Chief of the Peace Delegation
of the British Government.*

ANNEXURE

No. 7-P.O., dated Rawalpindi, the 8th August 1919.

From—The Chief British Representative, Indo-Afghan Peace Conference,

To—The Chief Afghan Representative.

After compliments—You asked me for some further assurance that the Peace Treaty which the British Government now offer, contains nothing that interfered with the complete liberty of Afghanistan in internal or external matters.

My friend, if you will read the Treaty carefully you will see that there is no such interference with the liberty of Afghanistan. You have told me that the Afghan Government are unwilling to

renew the arrangement whereby the late Amir agreed to follow unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. I have not, therefore, pressed this matter: and no mention of it is made in the Treaty. Therefore, the said Treaty and this letter leave Afghanistan officially free and independent in its internal and external affairs.

Moreover, this war has cancelled all previous Treaties.—*Usual conclusion.*

Source: C. U. Aitchison, ed. *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads: Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*. Vol. XIII. Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1933, 286–88.

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Reagan, Ronald W. (1911–2004)

Ronald Wilson Reagan was president of the United States from 1981 to 1989. During his tenure, he pursued a hawkish foreign policy toward the Soviet Union that included support for the mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Reagan was born in Tampico, Illinois, on February 6, 1911. He graduated from Eureka College in 1932 and went on to a career in radio and then film, ultimately starring in more than 50 movies.

Reagan joined the Republican Party in 1962 and gave a speech at the 1964 Republican presidential convention that catapulted him into the national spotlight. Two years later, he was elected governor of California. He was reelected four years later. The California governor was the Republican presi-

dential nominee in 1980. He emphasized national defense and economic reforms in his campaign and won the general election with 50.8 percent of the vote to incumbent president Jimmy Carter's 41 percent. At 69, he was the oldest person elected as the nation's chief executive. Reagan would be easily reelected in 1984.

The Reagan administration sought to grow the U.S. economy through a combination of reforms. For instance, the tax code was revised and simplified. However, the core of Reagan's economic approach was what became known as supply-side economics or Reaganomics. Reaganomics emphasized the need to free capital in order to bolster investments and job growth. The country experienced a sustained period of economic growth, but the combination of increased defense spending and reduced tax revenues led to record budget deficits at the time.

The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan had led to a reintensification of the Cold War. When Reagan entered office, he embarked on a strategy of aggressively challenging the Soviets. The new president genuinely believed that the United States had a duty and mission to challenge the Soviets throughout the world. He not only wished to prevent the spread of Soviet influence around the world, but also reverse gains the Soviets had achieved during the 1960s and 1970s. An eloquent and charismatic speaker, Reagan

was nicknamed the “Great Communicator.” He was able to restore confidence among the U.S. public in the role of the nation in world affairs. Reagan also forged close relationships with allied leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister of the United Kingdom; Helmut Kohl, the chancellor of Germany; and Brian Mulroney, the prime minister of Canada.

The president’s approach to the Cold War conflict was codified through the Reagan Doctrine. The Reagan Doctrine pledged U.S. support for anti-Soviet groups in an effort to undermine or topple pro-Moscow regimes in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. Under the direction of William Casey, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) directed funds, weapons, and other resources to the mujahideen and other anti-Soviet rebels.

During the Afghan conflict, the CIA and the State Department worked with various governments to develop other sources of support. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states provided significant monetary backing, while the CIA arranged weapons transfers from nations including China. U.S. officials also worked closely with the government of Pakistan to facilitate the distribution of assistance and to establish bases and training for the anti-Soviet fighters. A significant escalation in U.S. support for the mujahideen occurred in 1986 when the CIA began to provide advanced Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the rebels. The weapons inflicted heavy losses on Soviet aircraft, especially helicopters, and reduced the regime’s air superiority.

Supported by a broad bipartisan consensus on defense policy, Reagan oversaw a dramatic expansion of military spending and a concurrent increase in the size of the U.S. military. He also backed new weapons programs such as the Strategic Defense

Initiative (SDI), dubbed “Star Wars.” SDI was an effort to create a space-based anti-missile system. Although it was not realized, the program prompted fear and trepidation among the Soviets, who launched their own research to create a similar program. SDI and the broader U.S. military buildup contributed to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision to seek new arms control agreements with the Reagan administration, beginning in 1985. During Reagan’s second term, negotiations were relaunched on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the two superpowers finalized the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, eliminating medium-range atomic missiles in Europe.

Reagan’s second term was marred by the Iran-Contra scandal, an outgrowth of the administration’s staunch anticommunism. In 1982, Congress forbade the administration from providing direct military support to Contras, Nicaraguan rebels fighting the pro-Soviet Sandinista regime. However, officials within the administration created a complicated scheme to continue funding the insurgents. Funds from missile sales to Iran, undertaken to gain Tehran’s support for the release of U.S. hostages held in Lebanon, were diverted to the Contras. Eleven members of the administration pleaded guilty or were convicted of crimes related to the Iran-Contra scandal. The president always maintained he had no knowledge of the illicit scheme.

Reagan retained extraordinarily high approval ratings during his presidency and left office as one of the most popular ex-presidents in modern U.S. history. His policies were generally credited with helping end the Cold War. Reagan’s vice president, George H. W. Bush, was elected as his successor in 1988. After leaving office Reagan retired to private life. In the 1990s, it was revealed that the former president was suf-

fering from Alzheimer's disease. He died on June 5, 2004, at his home in Los Angeles.

Tom Lansford

See also: Bush, George H. W.; Cold War (1947–1989); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Reagan Doctrine

The Reagan Doctrine was the foundation of President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy and the basis for U.S. assistance to the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan. Reagan won the 1980 presidential election over incumbent Jimmy Carter partly by emphasizing his intention to pursue aggressive policies toward the Soviet Union. Reagan sought to prevent any new Soviet gains and to reverse some of the Soviet successes of the 1970s, when pro-Soviet regimes seized

power in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. The doctrine was formally promulgated during the president's 1985 State of the Union speech, but the core elements of the approach were in place soon after Reagan entered office. In 1983, the National Security Council stated that U.S. policy should be to roll back Soviet gains where possible. The vehicle for the rollback would be indigenous anti-Soviet fighters. The United States would provide aid and assistance to rebels fighting the pro-Soviet regimes and force the Soviets to divert resources to various guerrilla conflicts in a reversal of Moscow's approach in Vietnam and other states during the 1970s. However, the United States would also use direct intervention when necessary.

In 1983, the prime minister of Grenada was assassinated and a new regime invited Cuban troops and advisers to the island. In response, the United States and a small force of Caribbean allies invaded the island in an early manifestation of the doctrine. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration began to supply arms, ammunition, and funding to antiregime fighters in Angola and Nicaragua, and dramatically expand U.S. support for the mujahideen.

After the Soviet invasion in 1979, the United States began to provide support for the mujahideen. Under the Reagan Doctrine, that support increased substantially. The administration sought to turn the Afghan conflict into the USSR's "Vietnam," a long and protracted conflict that would squander resources and erode public support for the regime. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led the U.S. effort, and agents helped coordinate the movement of weapons and supplies from training bases in Pakistan into Afghanistan in what became known as Operation Cyclone. U.S. funding for the mujahideen rose from \$20 million per year in 1980 to

\$630 million annually in 1987 before declining. Meanwhile, U.S. officials worked with other governments to secure additional aid, including funding from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. A significant escalation of U.S. involvement occurred with the introduction of sophisticated Stinger missiles beginning in 1986. These weapons helped the mujahideen reduce Soviet air superiority, forcing the Soviets and government aircraft to operate from higher altitudes.

Support for the antigovernment Contra rebels in Nicaragua undermined the credibility of the Reagan Doctrine after it was revealed that officials within the administration had created an elaborate scheme to divert funding to the group. The money came from missile sales to Iran in exchange for that country's help in freeing Westerners held hostage by radical groups in Lebanon. At the time, Congress had restricted aid to the Contras to nonlethal support. The resultant Iran-Contra scandal led to televised congressional hearings and charges against a number of administration officials.

Tom Lansford

See also: Cold War (1947–1989); Mujahideen; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Reagan, Ronald W.; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Richards, Sir David (1952–)

Sir David Richards was a British general who commanded the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and served as chief of the Defense Staff, the United Kingdom's highest military post. Richards was born on March 4, 1952. He attended Eastbourne College and joined the Royal Army in 1971 with a commission in the Royal Artillery. Richards had a distinguished career, including command of operations in Sierra Leone in 1999 and 2000, and in East Timor in 2000. In 2005, he was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) rapid reaction corps.

In 2006, Richards was named commander of ISAF and given the temporary rank of general. During his time in command of ISAF, Richards was critical of the U.K. government for not providing requested equipment and criticized the preparedness of the troops under his command. In 2006, NATO undertook a mini-surge of troops in an effort to rout the Taliban in Helmand Province. The offensive failed to dislodge the militants in the long term, and Richards asserted that his troops did have the proper equipment and training. Richards also developed a reputation for being very open with the press about the problems faced by coalition troops in Afghanistan. By the end of his time in command, the British general became convinced that the only way to end the fighting in Afghanistan was through a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, otherwise he predicted that allied forces would be in the country for decades. Richards was knighted for actions in Afghanistan.

Richards was confirmed as a full general in 2008 and transferred back to the United Kingdom as the commander of the nation's land forces. The following year, he was appointed head of the British Army, and in 2010, Richards became the chief of the Defense Staff, head of all branches of the British military. Richards supported the withdrawal

of coalition combat troops beginning in 2011 and the gradual transfer of security operations to the Afghan Army following the U.S. troop surge that added an additional 33,000 soldiers to the theater. Richards backed NATO participation in military operations to support rebels fighting to overthrow Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, and he called for direct support of Syrian rebels seeking to depose Bashar al-Assad.

Richards retired in 2013. He published his autobiography, *Taking Command*, in 2014. That year he was made a life peer, becoming Baron Richards.

Tom Lansford

See also: Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Helmand Valley; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

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Rifles, Light Arms, and Machine Guns

A variety of rifles, light arms, and machine guns have been used in the various conflicts in Afghanistan. Throughout much of its history, Afghanistan's soldiers were often equipped with outmoded or obsolete weapons. Yet, the nation's warriors made excellent use of their firearms.

At the time that Afghanistan was founded in 1747, the most common long weapon was the jezail, a smoothbore flintlock musket that was fairly heavy at 12–14 pounds (5.44–6.35 kg). The jezails were often handmade in

local villages and personalized with ornamentation and decoration. Calibers ranged from .50 to .75, and the muskets had long barrels, improving their range and accuracy (beginning in the 1800s, an increasing number were rifled). While there were a small number of regular Afghan Army troops, including the royal guard, most Afghans were expected to supply their own weapons. The highly personalized nature of the guns made resupply of ammunition or repair difficult. Nonetheless, the Afghans gained a fearsome reputation for their accuracy and long-range fire. The jezails were typically accurate up to 200 yards (182.9 m), or about four times the range of British muskets in the first half of the 1800s.

The Brown Bess musket was the standard infantry rifle of the Anglo-Indian forces during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). It was a .75-caliber, smoothbore flintlock, which weighed about 10 pounds (4.5 kg), and had an effective range of about 50 yards (45.7 m), with a maximum range of 200 yards (182.9 m). During the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British used the Martini-Henry, a single-shot, breech-loading, .455-caliber rifle. It was accurate to 400 yards (370 m), but had an extreme range of 1,900 yards (1,700 m), it weighed nine pounds (4.1 kg). The Lee-Enfield Mark I was used during World War I and the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The Lee-Enfield was a bolt-action, .303-caliber rifle with a 10-round magazine. It had an effective range of 550 yards (503 m) and weighed 8.8 pounds (4 kg). Afghans often used captured British rifles. The Lee-Enfield became a common weapon used by Afghan tribes in the 1900s, and it was used against the Soviets during the occupation (1979–1989).

The nature of warfare in Afghanistan with its long-range sniping reduced the value and need for handguns, even among cavalry.

Nonetheless, the British employed a range of pistols through the succession of wars, ranging from smoothbore, flintlock pistols to revolvers. The smoothbore, muzzle-loading, double-action .442-caliber Beaumont-Adams percussion revolver was widely used during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. It would be replaced by the .476-caliber Enfield Mark I revolver, and then the various models of the .455-caliber Webley. Both Afghan government forces and Soviet troops utilized the Makarov 9 mm semiautomatic pistol, which had an 8-round magazine. The Makarov was not very accurate, but it was highly rugged and reliable. During Operation Enduring Freedom, coalition troops also used 9 mm pistols, such as the M9 Beretta carried by U.S. forces, which had a 15-round magazine.

The Afghan military began to acquire Soviet-made AK-47s in the 1970s. The assault rifle became the most common weapon used by all sides from the Soviet invasion until the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. The rugged, inexpensive AK-47 was simple and highly dependable. It fired a 7.62 mm round with a standard 30-round magazine. The mujahideen were able to capture the weapons from government and Soviet forces, while external supporters provided weapons to the insurgents through Pakistan. The AK-47 also became the primary infantry weapon of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. When the United States attacked the Taliban after the September 11, 2001, attacks, it arranged with Russia to supply AK-47s and ammunition to the Northern Alliance. The 7.62 mm Soviet Dragunov rifle became the primary sniper weapon. The rifle was accurate to 875 yards (800 m).

The U.S.-led coalition typically used NATO standard 5.56 mm round assault rifles. The United States employed the M16 and its variants, including the lightweight

M4 carbine. The M16 was highly accurate, but more prone to misfire or jam than the AK-47, especially in muddy or dusty conditions. Its smaller round also had less topping power than the larger 7.62 mm AK-47 bullet. The coalition began to equip Afghan security forces with the M16, partly in an effort to prevent unscrupulous soldiers from trading weapons or ammunition with the Taliban or other insurgents. The use of sniper rifles was critically important given the terrain and the long-range engagements that were often fought. Coalition sniper weapons included, among others, the U.S. 7.62 mm bolt-action M24 Sniper Weapon System (SWS), with accuracy to 875 yards (800 m), and the long-range .338-caliber L115A3 used by the U.K. forces with an effective range of 1,640 yards (1,500 m). In 2009, a British sniper with the L115A3 was credited with two kills at a range of 1.53 miles (2.47 km). The U.S. also utilized the Barrett M82, a massive .50-caliber rifle used against both material targets, including vehicles, and personnel, with an effective range of 1,950 yards (1,783 m). For close combat, coalition forces also utilized shotguns, such as variants of the M870 pump-action, 12-gauge shotgun used by Australia and the United States.

During the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), both sides used machine guns. The Afghans used a small number of four-barreled, crank-turned, Gatling-style .45-caliber Gardner machine guns. The British had more modern weapons, mainly the .303-caliber, tripod-mounted Vickers machine gun with a maximum rate of fire of 500 rounds per minute, and the lighter .303 Lewis Gun, which had a maximum rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute. Along with aircraft and armored cars, the machine guns played a decisive role in the British tactical victories in the war. The Afghans would later adopt the Vickers. By the time of the Soviet invasion,

various models of the Soviet-made, 7.62 mm Pulemyot Kalashnikova or PK were widely used. The PK variants were highly dependable and had a maximum rate of fire, depending on the model, of 650–800 rounds per minute. The U.S. and coalition forces introduced a range of machine guns after 2001. As their main light machine gun, U.S. troops used the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), a lightweight, 5.56-caliber weapon with a maximum rate of fire of 800 rounds per minute. The 7.62 mm M240 was the most common main machine gun used by U.S. forces. Typically mounted on a bipod or tripod or on a vehicle, the weapon had a maximum rate of fire of 950 rounds per minute.

Tom Lansford

See also: Artillery, Cannons, and Mortars; British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics; Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Roberts, Sir Abraham (1784–1873)

A British Army general, born on April 11, 1784, at Waterford in Ireland, Abraham Roberts was appointed an ensign in the Waterford militia in 1801 and joined the 48th Foot

in 1803. The next year he entered service with the East India Company and in March 1805, upon reaching India, was assigned to the Bengal European Regiment. He served in the Second Anglo-Maratha War and in the 1807 sieges of Komona and Ganauri. With the slow pace of promotion in the Bengal Army, Roberts sought more lucrative employment with the public works department. He was seconded to the department from 1813 to 1832, save for service in the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814–1815 and in minor operations at Bareilly in 1816. In 1832 he returned to military service with his appointment to command the Bengal European Regiment.

At the outset of the First Afghan War, Roberts received command of the 4th Brigade in the Army of the Indus and served with distinction at the capture of Ghazni on July 23, 1839. In November 1839, he was appointed to command Shuja Shah's contingent. Roberts, however, was only nominally in command of the contingent as the overconfident British resident agent Sir William Macnaghten attempted to exercise control of the force. The relationship between the two deteriorated as Macnaghten disregarded Roberts's advice on military matters and treated him with little respect. They disagreed about the scope, size, and organization of Shuja Shah's contingent. During 1840 Roberts grew increasingly concerned about the British military situation in Afghanistan, protested to Macnaghten, and wrote to Lord Auckland, the governor-general of India. He was concerned with the British lines of communication, the scattered deployment of small detachments in remote areas of Afghanistan, and the cantonment being constructed at Kabul, which he believed was impossible to defend in the event of an attack. With the relationship between Roberts and Macnaghten untenable and receiving

letters of complaint from both, Auckland chose to retain Macnaghten and dismiss Roberts. Auckland treated one of Roberts's letters of complaint as a resignation and in November 1840 relieved him of his command. Remaining until his replacement arrived, Roberts departed Afghanistan in March 1841. His concerns about the British position in Afghanistan were fully vindicated with the disaster that befell the Kabul garrison in 1841–1842.

On his return to India, Roberts commanded the 72nd Bengal Native Infantry followed by the 15th Bengal Native Infantry and in 1844 went to England on leave. In 1852, after eight years' leave, Roberts was appointed to command the Punjab Division with the rank of brigadier general. With the reorganization of the Punjab Division into two separate divisions later that year, Roberts received command of the Peshawar Division. At Peshawar he employed his son, Frederick Sleigh Roberts, the future field marshal Lord Roberts, as an aide-de-camp. Abraham Roberts retired due to ill health in 1853. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1857, he was advanced to the rank of general in 1864. Roberts died on December 28, 1873, at Bristol.

Bradley P. Tolppanen

See also: Anglo-Afghan Wars: First (1839–1842); Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Ghazni, Battle of (1839); Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Macnaghten, Sir William Hay.

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Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleigh (Lord) (1832–1914)

A renowned British general, Frederick Sleigh Roberts was born on September 30, 1832, at Cawnpore, India. He was the son of Sir Abraham Roberts, who was a brigade commander in the First Anglo-Afghan War. He attended the Royal Military College, Sandhurst and the East India Company's military college at Addiscombe before being commissioned to the Bengal artillery in 1851. Upon his arrival in India in 1852, Roberts was posted as an aide-de-camp to his father at Peshawar. During the Indian Mutiny, he served at the siege of Delhi, the relief of Lucknow, and at Khudraganj, for which he was later awarded the Victoria Cross. In 1859 Roberts joined the quartermaster-general's department. He served in the Umbeyla campaign on the Northwest frontier in 1863, the Abyssinian campaign in 1868, and the Lushai expedition in 1871–1872. In 1875 Roberts was appointed the quartermaster general, India with the temporary rank of major general, and in 1878 he was appointed commander of the Punjab Frontier Force.

At the outset of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, Roberts was appointed to command the 6,600-strong Kurram Field Force, one of the three columns that invaded Afghanistan. In this appointment he possessed both military and political authority. After the declaration of war on November 21, 1878, Roberts advanced into the Kurram Valley and captured

the heavily defended position at Peiwar Kotal in a night action on December 2. An ensuing expedition into Khost conducted in January 1879 accomplished little. The death of Afghan prisoners during the expedition, however, led to criticism of Roberts and questions being asked in the British parliament.

The first stage of the war was brought to an end in mid-1879 with the Treaty of Gandamak, and Roberts returned to army headquarters at Simla. After the massacre of the Cavagnari mission at Kabul on September 3, 1879, Roberts assumed command of the Kabul Field Force and began an advance on Kabul on September 27, 1879. He defeated the Afghans at Charasia Heights on October 6 and formally occupied Kabul seven days later. At Kabul Roberts established his army's base at Sherpur, a cantonment north of the city, and oversaw the military commission that tried and executed those involved in the massacre of the British mission. The executions again led to criticism of Roberts with concern being expressed in parliament. Following instructions from India, he accepted the abdication of Mohammad Yakub Khan as the Emir of Afghanistan, with the renunciation being proclaimed on October 28, 1879. Roberts had suspected Khan of involvement in the massacre of the mission and possibly forced the offer of abdication.

After a brief lull, Afghan opposition to the British occupation quickly grew and an uprising occurred in early December 1879. Roberts's attempt to seize the initiative by dispatching two columns to disperse the Afghan formations resulted in a near disaster on December 11, 1879. Roberts retrieved the situation and then withdrew all British forces to Sherpur. On December 23, he repulsed a major attack on Sherpur with heavy Afghan losses. The battle ended the

insurrection and Roberts reoccupied Kabul without opposition.

Reflecting a loss of confidence in his political judgment, Roberts was superseded in overall command at Kabul in spring 1880 by Sir Donald Stewart. He remained at Kabul as a subordinate commander. After the Afghans under Ayub Khan defeated a British brigade at Maiwand on July 27 and laid siege to Kandahar, Roberts quickly recommended sending a relief column. The expedition was approved on August 3, and Roberts's force consisting of 10,000 soldiers departed Kabul five days later. The 313-mile march through difficult and hostile country was completed in three weeks. Roberts reached Kandahar on August 31, 1880, and assumed command of the British forces. The following day he inflicted a complete defeat on Ayub Khan at the Battle of Kandahar. The dramatic march from Kabul to Kandahar made Roberts a hero throughout the British Empire. On his return to Britain later that year, he was feted and invited to Windsor by Queen Victoria.

After commanding at Madras in 1881–1885, Roberts was appointed commander in chief, India in 1885. In this appointment he exercised direct command during the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1886–1887 as well as advocated a forward policy on the north-west frontier to counter the possible Russian threat to India. Leaving India in April 1893, Roberts wrote his memoirs on his return to England. In 1895 he was promoted to field marshal and later in the year was appointed to the Irish Command in succession to his rival in the army, Sir Garnet Wolseley.

After the string of British defeats at the start of the Anglo-Boer War, Roberts was sent to South Africa as the new commander in chief. Arriving on January 10, 1900, he reorganized the reinforced British command and launched an offensive that relieved Kimberley on February 15 and defeated the

Boers at Paardeberg that same month. Bloemfontein fell to the British on March 13, followed by Johannesburg on May 31 and Pretoria on June 5. Roberts handed over command in South Africa in November 1900. The war, however, continued until the Boer surrender in 1902.

In January 1901 Roberts was created an earl, and he served as commander in chief of the British Army from 1901 to 1904. He died of pneumonia while inspecting the Indian army contingent during the first months of World War I on November 14, 1914, at St. Omer, France.

Bradley P. Tolppanen

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); British Cantonment, Kabul; Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Kandahar, Battle of (1880); Khan, Mohammad Yakub; Maiwand, Battle of (1880); Peiwar Kotal, Battle of (1878); Roberts, Sir Abraham; Sherpur, Battle of (1879); Stewart, Sir Donald.

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Rodionov, Igor (1936–2014)

Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov was a Russian general who commanded the 40th Army in Afghanistan (1985–1986) and was defense minister (1996–1997). Rodionov was born on December 1, 1936. In 1957, he was commissioned a lieutenant in an armored

division. Rodionov rose rapidly in rank to become a major general in 1977. He subsequently attended the General Staff Academy from 1978 to 1980 and was then given command of a corps in Czechoslovakia (1980–1983). In 1983, Rodionov was promoted to lieutenant general. Two years later, he took command of the 40th Army in Afghanistan.

At the time of Rodionov's appointment, the war in Afghanistan had reached a stalemate. The new general was ordered to change the situation on the ground and produce victories. Soviet and Afghan government forces launched a series of new offensives. However, little progress was made, although casualties increased substantially in what was some of the most significant combat of the occupation. Rodionov's efforts in Afghanistan were seen as a failure, and he was transferred back to Moscow. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev initiated negotiations over a withdrawal.

In 1988, Rodionov was given command of the Transcaucasus Military District. In August of the next year, he was relieved of command following riots in Tbilisi, Georgia, in which 20 protesters were killed. He led the General Staff Academy from 1989 to 1996. He was then named minister of defense and charged with reforming the officer corps and reducing corruption within the military. Rodionov was dismissed less than a year later after disputes with civilian defense officials. Rodionov was elected to the Russian parliament (the Duma) in 1999. He died on May 22, 2014.

Tom Lansford

See also: Cold War (1947–1989); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Rutskoi, Alexander; Shevardnadze, Eduard; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; United States,

Relations with Afghanistan; Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich; Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich.

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Roos-Keppel, George Olaf (1866–1921)

A British military officer and diplomat who fought in the Third Afghan War (1919), George Olaf Roos-Keppel was born on September 7, 1866, of Dutch, English, and Swedish ancestry. Roos-Keppel joined the Royal Scots Fusiliers as an ensign in 1886 and served in Burma from 1887 to 1889 during the anti-insurgency campaign that followed the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885). He was promoted to lieutenant in 1892 and became a captain three years later. He was transferred to the Indian Army and participated in the Tirah Campaign (1897–1898) against the Afridis in the Khyber region. In 1899, Roos-Keppel fought against the Chamkhannis and was made a brevet major and a Companion of the Indian Empire for his heroism and leadership (he became a full major in 1904).

During his time along the Afghan frontier, Roos-Keppel became an expert in the Pashtun language and was the presiding officer of the regional examining board on Pashtun. In 1901 he produced new versions of the standard texts used by the British Army on the language and wrote *The Pashto Manual* as a supplemental guide for officers (he produced a second edition of the *Manual* in 1907).

Roos-Keppel was promoted to brevet lieutenant colonel in 1907 while serving as the political agent for the governor-general of Khyber. He established a reputation as a firm but fair colonial administrator who maintained good relations with the tribes on both sides of the Afghan border. The following year he was appointed the chief commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province of British India, along the border with Afghanistan, a post he held on three occasions, 1908–1909, 1910–1913, and 1915–1919. In 1908, Roos-Keppel commanded an operation to suppress the Zakka Khel clan of the Afridis. That year, in recognition of his service, he became a Knight Commander of the Indian Empire, and then was awarded the more prestigious Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India in 1915, and then a Knight Grand Commander in 1917. Meanwhile, in 1912, Roos-Keppel was confirmed as a lieutenant colonel. In 1913, Roos-Keppel cofounded Islamia College in Peshawar, along with Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum. When World War I broke out in 1914, Roos-Keppel worked to identify potential threats to British India along the border and neutralize them, especially after the entry of the Ottoman Empire in the conflict raised the specter of a broad Islamic alliance against the British. Roos-Keppel used a variety of means to keep the frontier quiet. For instance, he doubled the subsidy paid to the Afridis as a way to ensure their neutrality.

Roos-Keppel played an important role in the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Alerted to the impending Afghan invasion, Roos-Keppel was instrumental in mobilizing British forces following the Afghan seizure of the town of Bagh on May 4, 1919. Roos-Keppel subsequently ordered Peshawar surrounded and cut off the supply of water, food, and electricity to the town to forestall a planned uprising. British forces were able to quickly

arrest the principal conspirators and reassert control of the town by May 8. He then worked to maintain the loyalty of other tribes and clans in the region. Following the Afghan conflict, Roos-Keppel retired from the army in 1920. He died on December 11, 1921.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Pashtuns (Pushtuns); Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919); Tirah Campaign (1897–1898); World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918); World War I and Afghanistan, Turko-German Missions (1914–1918).

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Rumsfeld, Donald (1932–)

Congressman, government official, ambassador, and U.S. secretary of defense (1975–1977, 2001–2006), Donald Henry Rumsfeld was born in Chicago, Illinois, on July 9, 1932. He graduated from Princeton University in 1954. He was commissioned in the navy through the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps (NROTC) and served during 1954–1957 as a pilot and flight instructor. Rumsfeld remained in the reserves, retiring as a navy captain in 1989.

Rumsfeld began his long association with Washington as an administrative assistant to

Representative David S. Dennison Jr. of Ohio during 1957–1959, then joined the staff of Representative Robert Griffen of Michigan. During 1960–1962 he worked for an investment banking firm. In 1962 Rumsfeld was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a Republican from Illinois and served until 1969, when he resigned to accept an appointment as director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and assistant to President Richard M. Nixon (1969–1970). He was then counselor to the president and director of the Economic Stabilization Program (1971–1973). During 1973–1974 he was U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and thus avoided any involvement with the Watergate scandal.

When Nixon resigned and was succeeded by Gerald Ford, Rumsfeld returned to Washington in August 1974 to serve as chair of the new president's transition team. He was then Ford's chief of staff. During 1975–1977 Rumsfeld served as secretary of defense. At age 43, he was the youngest person to hold that position. During Rumsfeld's 14 months in office, he oversaw the transformation of the military to an all-volunteer force, as well as post-Vietnam War reforms. He also actively campaigned for additional defense appropriations and for the development of weapons systems, such as the B-1 bomber, the Trident missile system, and the MX missile. Ford honored Rumsfeld for his government service in 1977 with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award.

Rumsfeld left government service when President James (Jimmy) E. Carter took office in January 1977. Following a brief period as a university lecturer, Rumsfeld entered private business. He was chief executive officer, then chair, of G. D. Searle, the pharmaceutical company, from 1977 to

1985. From 1990 until 1993 Rumsfeld served as chair and chief executive officer of General Instrument Corporation. During 1997–2001, Rumsfeld was chair of Gilead Sciences, Inc. Concurrent with his work in the private sector, Rumsfeld served on numerous federal boards. He also served in the Ronald Reagan administration as special presidential envoy to the Middle East during 1983–1984.

In January 2001 newly elected President George W. Bush appointed Rumsfeld to be secretary of defense for a second time. At age 68, Rumsfeld then became the oldest individual to hold the post. Bush charged him with transforming the military from its Cold War emphasis on major conventional warfare into a lighter, more efficient force capable of rapid deployment around the world.

Rumsfeld worked to develop network-centric warfare, an approach to military operations that relies on technological innovation and integration of weapons and information systems to produce more firepower with fewer personnel. In addition, Rumsfeld initiated the restructuring of the U.S. military presence throughout the world and the closure and consolidation of bases. Rumsfeld also refocused the strategic forces of the United States by emphasizing missile defense and space systems following the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He made certain of the loyalty of top officers by personally reviewing all higher promotion decisions at the three-star level and above. He angered a number of congressmen when he canceled such weapons programs as the Comanche



Donald Rumsfeld served as secretary of defense from 1975 to 1977 and from 2001 to 2006. He led U.S. military forces during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led occupation of the country. (Department of Defense)

helicopter and Crusader self-propelled artillery system.

Rumsfeld's reform efforts and his restructuring of the military were overshadowed by his role in the post–September 11, 2001, global war on terror. As secretary of defense and a proponent of neoconservatism, Rumsfeld oversaw the military operation that overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), although the failure to capture Osama bin Laden tarnished the otherwise successful military campaign.

Rumsfeld was one of the foremost proponents of military action against Iraq, teaming up with President Bush and Vice President Richard Cheney to overcome opposition from within the cabinet by Secretary of State Colin Powell. Indeed, Rumsfeld was a major architect of the Bush Doctrine, which called for preemptive military action against potential adversaries. Rumsfeld then directed the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In the campaign, Rumsfeld employed a strategy that relied on firepower and smaller numbers of “boots on the ground.”

While the overthrow of the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was highly successful, the subsequent occupation of Iraq did not go well. Within the Pentagon, there were complaints of Rumsfeld running roughshod over those who disagreed with him. Certainly he was much criticized for his outspoken, combative management style, as when he pointedly referred to the French and German governments, which had opposed the war, as “Old Europe.” But there was good reason to criticize his military decisions and specifically his overly optimistic assessment of the situation that would follow the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Disbanding the Iraqi Army to rebuild it from scratch came to be seen in retrospect as a major blunder. Rumsfeld had also ignored previous recommendations that

400,000 U.S. troops would be required for any occupation of Iraq. The actual number of troops involved was only about one-third that number. As a consequence, Iraqi arms depots, oil production facilities, and even the national museum were looted in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.

Occupation troops were unable to halt a growing insurgency. As U.S. casualties escalated and Iraq descended into sectarian violence, calls for Rumsfeld's ouster came from Republicans as well as Democrats, and even a number of prominent retired generals. Just prior to the 2006 midterm elections, an editorial in all the *Military Times* newspapers demanded his removal.

Rumsfeld resigned on November 8, 2006. This came a week after President Bush had expressed confidence in his defense secretary and said that he would remain until the end of his term, but it was also one day after the midterm elections, in which the Republican Party lost its majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The election was widely seen as a referendum on the Iraq War and, by extension, Rumsfeld's leadership of it. President Bush named former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Robert Gates to succeed Rumsfeld. After leaving office Rumsfeld published his memoirs, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir*.

Tom Lansford and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Bush, George W.; Iraq War (2003–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Taliban.

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Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan

Russia has long had significant strategic interests in Afghanistan. The country emerged as a pawn in the colonial “Great Game” for power and influence in the region between Russia and Great Britain. Imperial Russia was an expansionist power that sought both formal colonies and spheres of influence on its southern borders. One strategic imperative of successive Russian and Soviet leaders was access to a port on the Indian Ocean.

In 1801, Russian czar Paul planned a joint invasion of India with French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. A Russian contingent of troops began to move south, but the assassination of Paul stopped the offensive from taking place. Nonetheless, the specter of a Russian invasion prompted the British to seek a buffer zone to protect their Indian colonies. Russian victories in the 1820s against the Ottoman Empire and the Persians exacerbated British concerns, as did Russian support for Persia in a series of wars with Afghanistan, culminating in the Siege of Herat (1837–1838) in which the Afghans defeated the invading Persians, who were supported by Russian troops.

In 1837, a Russian diplomatic mission to Kabul precipitated the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), as the British sought to depose Afghan Emir Dost Mohammad and

replace him with the pro-British Shuja Shah Durrani. Although the war was a strategic defeat for the British, the Russians did not seek to exploit the loss and instead concentrated on acquiring territory in Central Asia. Over the next few decades, Russia continued to move south, conquering Samarkand, Bokhara, Khiva, and Kokand, while the British moved west, absorbing the Punjab.

After its victory in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), Russia acquired new territory in the Caucasus and once again turned its attention to Afghanistan in an effort to challenge British influence in the region. An uninvited diplomatic mission was dispatched to Kabul to meet with Afghan emir Sher Ali Khan. The British demanded the emir also receive a British envoy. The refusal of the emir to do so led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). One result of the war was that Afghanistan surrendered control of its foreign policy to the British in exchange for an annual subsidy.

Through the 1880s, Russia continued to seek territorial expansion. In 1885, Russian troops occupied Panjdeh in Afghanistan. The incident almost led to war between Russia and Britain. Instead, the crisis was solved through diplomacy. The Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission was created to set the boundary between Afghanistan and Russia. In 1893, the Durand Line became the official boundary and in 1907, through the Anglo-Russian Convention, Russia formally accepted the borders of Britain's Indian colonies and confirmed that Afghanistan was part of the British sphere of influence.

The former imperial rivals worked together to ensure Afghan neutrality during World War I. However, after the war, Afghan emir Habibullah Khan was assassinated and succeeded by his son Amanullah Khan, who promptly went to war with Great Britain in the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) in a bid

to gain control of his country's foreign policy. Although defeated militarily, the Afghans secured complete independence. Diplomatic relations were opened with the new Soviet Union and a Friendship Treaty was signed between the two nations in 1921. The accord marked the beginning of closer relations between the two countries as Amanullah endeavored to use the Soviets to balance against British influence. The Soviets provided military aid including aircraft to the Afghans. Meanwhile, through the 1920s, trade between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union increased substantially. However, Germany and Italy also increased their influence in the 1930s.

The Soviet Union again worked with Britain, and later the United States, to ensure Afghan neutrality in World War II. After the war, Afghanistan sought military and economic aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. However, growing ties between the United States and Pakistan nudged Afghanistan toward the Soviet Union. In 1950s, the Soviet Union began providing substantial economic and military assistance to Afghanistan, including a \$100 million development loan in 1955. Soviet military advisers were dispatched to train the Afghan military, while Afghan soldiers were sent to the Soviet Union for training.

The Soviets backed the creation of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965. The PDPA backed the 1973 coup that deposed Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah, and they increasingly infiltrated the Afghan military. In 1978, the PDPA seized power and established a pro-Soviet regime. The number of Soviet technical and military advisers in Afghanistan rose dramatically. A treaty of "Friendship" and "Neighborliness" was signed by the president of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, and Afghan's pro-Soviet president, Nur Muhammad Taraki, giving Soviet support for the new PDPA

leaders of Afghanistan, who had claimed power that year through a coup. (See part of the treaty in the Related Primary Document section below).

Opposition to the PDPA led to a growing insurrection that was exacerbated by infighting among party officials. Afghan president Nur Muhammad Taraki was overthrown by party rival Hafizullah Amin on September 14, 1979. In response, the Soviets intervened. Amin was killed by Soviet special operations forces on December 27, while Soviet troops invaded and took control of the country. Babrak Karmal was installed as president of a Soviet client government.

From 1979 to 1989, the Soviets and their PDPA allies fought a bloody and bitter war against the mujahideen. The Soviets and the PDPA held the major urban areas, but were unable to secure the countryside from the insurgents, who received substantial military and financial assistance from the United States and its allies. The mujahideen launched attacks from bases in Pakistan. The conflict created an estimated 5–6 million refugees and left approximately 1 million Afghans dead, in addition to some 14,500 Soviet dead and 53,700 wounded. By the mid-1980s, the main goal of the Soviet Union was to withdraw from the conflict, while ensuring that the PDPA regime remained in power. The 1988 Geneva Accords paved the way for the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Moscow continued to provide economic and military support to the PDPA regime until 1992. The PDPA fell in 1992, but a civil war continued through the 1990s.

Russia supported the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban in 2001. It supplied weapons and military equipment to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The Russians also endorsed the use of military facilities by the U.S.-led coalition in former Soviet states such as Kazakhstan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; Great Game, The; Mohan Lal; Operation

Storm 333 (1979); Panjdeh Crisis (1885); Taraki, Nur Muhammad; Vitkevich, Ivan Viktorovich.

Related Primary Document

The Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, December 5, 1978

The Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was signed in Moscow on December 5, 1978, by Leonid Brezhnev and N. M. Taraki. It entered into force on January 7, 1979. An excerpt of the agreement appears below. It essentially guaranteed Soviet support for the newly installed communist leaders of Afghanistan, who had claimed power earlier in the year through a coup. When they were in turn ousted by a second coup in 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and attempted to establish its hold over the country during the following decade through puppet rulers.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Reaffirming fidelity to the purposes and principles of the Soviet-Afghan Treaties of 1921 and 1931, which laid the foundations for friendly and good-neighborly relations between the Soviet and Afghan peoples and which respond to their fundamental national interests. Desiring to consolidate in every way possible the friendship and all-round cooperation between the two countries,

Resolved to develop the social and economic achievements of the Soviet and Afghan peoples, to safeguard their security and independence . . . ; steadfastly for the unity of all forces striving for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress. . . .

Have decided to conclude this Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness, and Co-operation and have agreed as follows:

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare their determination to consolidate and deepen the unshakable friendship between the two countries and to develop co-operation in all fields on the basis of equality of rights, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. . . .

Article 4. The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good-neighborliness and in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations shall consult with each other and shall, by agreement, take the necessary steps to safeguard the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries.

In the interest of strengthening their defensive capacity, the High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop their co-operation in the military field on the basis of the relevant agreements concluded between them. . . .

Article 13. This Treaty shall remain valid for a term of 20 years from the date of its entry into force.

Source: *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 30, No. 49, January 3, 1979.

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Rutskoi, Alexander (1947–)

Alexander Vladimirovich Rutskoi was a Soviet military officer who served in Afghanistan and was later vice president of Russia, and who in 1993 declared himself acting president during a failed attempt to oust Russian president Boris Yeltsin. Rutskoi was born in Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine, on September 16, 1947. His father and grandfather had served in the Soviet military, and Rutskoi joined the Air Force and graduated from the

Barnaul Air Force Academy in 1971. In 1985, Rutskoi, now a lieutenant colonel, was deployed to Afghanistan in command of an air regiment of Sukhoi Su-25 “Frogfoot” fighter-bombers, which provided close-air support against the mujahideen. On April 6, 1986, Rutskoi was shot down leading a squadron against ground targets near Zhawar. He ejected from the aircraft but injured his back and broke an arm upon landing. The pilot was sent back to the Soviet Union to recover. He was promoted to colonel and returned to Afghanistan in April 1988. Although he was appointed the deputy air commander for the 40th Soviet Army, Rutskoi continued to fly combat missions.

On August 4, 1988, Rutskoi led a mission to attack a mujahideen training camp six miles inside Pakistan. He was shot down by a Pakistani Air Force F-16 fighter in one of a series of escalating confrontations in the skies above the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Rutskoi ejected and was captured by Pakistani forces, who were also able to salvage his airplane after it crashed with relatively little damage. The CIA's lead agent in the region, Milton Bearden, purchased the aircraft from the Pakistanis and tried to induce Rutskoi to defect. He refused and was released about six weeks later.

Upon his return to the Soviet Union in 1988, Rutskoi was awarded the Hero of the

Soviet Union, the nation's highest award. He also became vice chair of a new political group, "Fatherland." Two years later, he was elected to the Soviet parliament. When Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the newly independent Russia on June 12, 1991, Rutskoi was concurrently chosen vice president. The new vice president worked with Yeltsin during the unsuccessful 1991 coup against Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev. Rutskoi subsequently formed a new political party, the People's Party—Free Russia.

Relations between Rutskoi and Yeltsin deteriorated and the president tried to dismiss the vice president in September 1993, while he also dissolved parliament. Rutskoi declared Yeltsin's actions unconstitutional and tried to assume the office of the presidency. Two weeks later, after negotiations failed to resolve the crisis, military units loyal to Yeltsin captured Rutskoi and his supporters, who had taken control of the parliamentary building and other government facilities. The former vice president was imprisoned, but released in February 1994 during a general amnesty.

In 1996, Rutskoi was elected governor of Kursk, a post he held for one term. In 2000, he was banned from seeking reelection following charges that he had misrepresented his candidacy paperwork.

Tom Lansford

See also: Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Andropov, Yuri; Bearden, Milton; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Chernenko, Konstantin; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Saidullah (“Mullah Mastun”) (d. 1917)

Saidullah Khan was a Pashtun fakir (a religious ascetic) best known for his fanatical hostility toward the British. Saidullah was known to the Pashtuns by a number of nicknames, “Mullah Mastun,” “Sartor Fakir,” “Sartor Baba,” “Fakir Baba,” and “Lewanay Fakir.” To the British, Saidullah was the “Mad Fakir” or the “Mad Mullah.” Little is known of Saidullah’s early life. At some point in his youth, he killed his brother, although whether on purpose or by accident is disputed. The incident prompted Saidullah to flee from his Pashtun hometown in the Buner region of the Northwest Frontier Provinces to Ajmer in India. He underwent religious training and became a wandering cleric, residing in Mazar-e-Sharif and later Kabul, for periods of time. In 1895, he returned to Buner.

During his travels, Saidullah became increasingly convinced of the need for a jihad or holy war against the British. He began preaching jihad and calling for an end to the British occupation of Pashtun lands. Saidullah’s message resonated with leading Afghans, including the emir, Abdur Rahman Khan, who generally had good relations with the British. Abdur Rahman would even write a pamphlet in Saidullah’s honor echoing his call for the frontier tribes to rise up against the British and reunite with the Pashtuns of Afghanistan.

In 1897, Saidullah, convinced he possessed an invisible spiritual army consisting of all the previous deceased fakirs, declared a jihad against the British troops stationed

within the Malakand region. Though Saidullah had tried to spur previous jihads without success, this particular exhortation rallied as many as 20,000 followers, drawn by tales of his heavenly army and magical abilities. Border tribal leaders recognized the fakir’s usefulness in inspiring anti-British sentiment and rallied to his cause. Saidullah chose two targets for his initial attack: the garrison at Malakand and a small fort at Chakdara.

The attack began on July 26, 1897. Although heavily outnumbered, both garrisons were able to withstand the attacks. On July 29, Saidullah was wounded during an attack on Malakand. Two days later, a relief column arrived at Malakand, and then marched to Chakdara, arriving there on August 2. During the fighting the Pashtuns lost more than 3,000 dead or wounded, while the Anglo-Indian forces lost 173 killed or wounded.

Saidullah continued to advocate against the British, but his credibility was undermined by the heavy losses during the battles. His continuing call for jihad fell on deaf ears as local tribal leaders accepted subsidies from the British to refrain from making raids. In 1900, the fakir vowed to abstain from further hostility toward the British. He died in 1917.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Blood, General Sir Bindon; British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics; Churchill, Sir Winston; Khan, Abdur Rahman; Malakand Field Force (1897); Pashtuns (Pushtuns).

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Sale, Florentia (1790–1853)

Florentia Sale was held hostage for nine months, along with her daughter, by Afghans loyal to Mohammad Akbar Khan, after the massacre of British forces during the retreat from Kabul (1842). Her diary of her captivity was widely read and made her famous in Britain. She was the wife of Major General Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”) Sale.

Florentia Wynch was born on August 13, 1790, in India. Some in her family were prominent members of the East India Company civil service (her grandfather was governor of Madras). She married Robert Sale in 1809 and accompanied her husband as he served at various postings throughout India and Burma. The couple had eight children.

Her husband commanded a brigade during the invasion of Afghanistan in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Sale and her youngest daughter, Alexandrina, accompanied the troops during the advance and settled in Kabul. Her husband was promoted to major general, and given command of the garrison at Jalalabad in late 1841. She and her pregnant daughter remained in Kabul; however, the situation deteriorated rapidly in the Afghan capital following the murder of British envoy Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”) Burnes in December 1841. In January 1842, following pledges of safe conduct, the British agreed to withdraw from Kabul to Jalalabad. Lady Sale kept a diary throughout her

ordeal and documented the disorganization and subsequent horrors of the retreat as Afghans carried out continuous attacks on the column. At one point, when the column ground to a halt, Lady Sale rode forward and came under fire, and was shot in the arm. During the retreat, she took charge of the British women and children and kept the group going through extraordinarily difficult circumstances, including temperatures below freezing. Her son-in-law, Alexandrina’s husband, was killed during the withdrawal.

On January 8, 1842, Akbar Khan came forward under a flag of truce and offered to take the European women and children to a nearby fortress and then escort them to India. The offer was reluctantly accepted and Lady Sale and about 12 other women, 20 children, and some servants left the column, only to become hostages, as the Afghans refused to release them. The remnants of the Anglo-Indian force from Kabul was massacred on January 13, near Gandamak. The captives were moved from fort to fort through the remainder of the winter and spring. They were joined by a small number of British officers who had been captured and were being held for ransom. Meanwhile, in April, British forces, dubbed the “Army of Retribution,” set out to avenge their earlier defeat. Major General Sale was able to lift the siege of Jalalabad following a surprise attack against the besieging forces on April 7.

On July 24, Lady Sale’s daughter delivered a baby girl, Julia Florentia. With news of the approaching British forces, Lady Sale was able to negotiate the release of the hostages in exchange for a promise of 20,000 rupees and a pledge of 1,000 rupees annually to the local Afghan chief, Saleh Mohammed Khan. On September 16, the hostages were released. Three days later, they were able to make contact with British forces under the command of her husband.

Lady Sale’s diary, *A Journal of the First Afghan War*, captivated Britain after its publication in 1843. (See the end of the entry, “Gandamak, Battle of,” in this book for an excerpt from her diary.) Her husband was killed in action in 1845. She lived the rest of her life in India, but died on July 6, 1853, during a trip to South Africa.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Bolan Pass; Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Elphinstone, William George Keith; Gandamak, Battle of (1842); Ghazni, Battle of (1839); Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Nott, Sir William; Pollock, Sir George; Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”).

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Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”) (1782–1845)

A brave soldier who served in uniform for 47 years, Major General Sir Robert Sale, nicknamed “Fighting Bob,” was a hero of the First Afghan War (1839–1842).

Sale, born on September 19, 1782, saw considerable active service in India, during the First Burma War, and in Mauritius. In 1839, he was promoted to colonel and commanded the 1st Bengal Brigade in the expeditionary force, dubbed the Army of the Indus, marching from Ferozepore to Kabul at the beginning of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). The fortress of Ghazni guarded the approach to Kabul. At age 57, Sale personally led a storming party on July 23, 1839,

to blow up a main gate as a prelude to a general British assault on the fortress at Ghazni.

The British entered Kabul the following month, where Sale became the second in command and was promoted to major general. In late 1841, Sale’s brigade was ordered back to India, but it met resistance and had to seek refuge in Jalalabad, where it fought off numerous Afghan attacks. The remaining Kabul garrison and families, about 4,500 troops and 12,000 camp followers, were forced to evacuate Kabul in January 1842 and were massacred attempting to return to India. Meanwhile, Sale’s wife and daughter were captured and held hostage by Dost Mohammad’s son, Mohammad Akbar Khan, for nine months. They were rescued in September 1842 by a party led by the general himself as the British advanced on Kabul.

After being besieged for five months, on April 7, 1842, Sale marched his 5,000-man brigade out of Jalalabad to engage an approaching Afghan force and to lift the siege of the fortress. Sale was successful, and Jalalabad was reached on April 16 by the “Army of Retribution” marching from India.

Sale, as the quartermaster general in India in 1845, attached himself to the leading infantry at the Battle of Mudki (December 18, 1845) during the First Sikh War (1845–1846). The general was mortally wounded during the battle and died three days later.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Bolan Pass; Dost Mohammad; Durrani, Shuja Shah; Elphinstone, William George Keith; Ghazni, Battle of (1839); Kabul, Retreat from (1842); Khan, Mohammad Akbar; Nott, Sir William; Pollock, Sir George; Sale, Florentia.

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Saragarhi, Battle of (1897)

The Battle of Saragarhi on September 12, 1897, occurred during the Tirah Campaign (1897–1898) in which forces of the British Indian Army suppressed a major rebellion by Afridis and Orakzais along the border between Afghanistan and colonial India. The Khyber Pass had been captured by the British in 1891, and Saragarhi was one of a series of forts built to hold the strategic passage. It was a small signal post that relayed messages between two major installations, Fort Lockhart and Fort Gulistan. Saragarhi consisted of a signal tower and blockhouse. A fourth fort, Sangar, was also a small outpost. All of the forts were garrisoned by about 500 troops of the 36th Sikh Regiment.

After days of minor sniping, on August 27, 1897, a large force of more than 4,000 Orakzais approached Fort Gulistan and its 200 troops. A sortie dispersed the Afridis and Orakzais, who returned on September 3 in greater numbers. Sporadic combat continued over the next few days, before a British relief column arrived on September 9. However, increased fighting prompted the British column to withdraw (the forts were too small, and did not have enough supplies to accommodate the additional troops).

The Orakzais were joined by Afridis, swelling their numbers to more than 10,000.

Groups of the tribesmen attacked Sangar on the night of September 11. The post was on a high ridge and well fortified. Although there were only 44 Sikh troops, the garrison repulsed the attack. The following morning, the natives attacked Saragarhi. The garrison numbered 21 Sikhs, led by Havildar (Sergeant) Ishar Singh. Instead of withdrawing to one of the other posts, the Sikhs decided to remain in an effort to maintain communications between the two main forts. Firing from loopholes in the blockhouse, the Sikhs were initially able to keep the tribesmen at bay. However, a group of natives was able to reach one corner of the post and begin digging away at the foundation of the wall. The Sikhs were unable to fire down on the attackers. Meanwhile, the garrison signaled Fort Lockhart that it was running low on ammunition. The main fort launched a desperate attack to relieve Saragarhi, but the natives were able to undermine and collapse one wall of the blockhouse. In the subsequent hand-to-hand fighting, all of the garrison was killed. Estimates were that 180 Afridis and Orakzais were killed in the attack on the post.

The tribesmen subsequently attacked Gulistan through the night of September 12. Their strike was repulsed by heavy fire. A new relief column with cavalry and artillery was able to begin shelling the tribesmen. The column reached Sangar on September 14, prompting the Afridis and Orakzais to withdraw. Total imperial casualties during the engagement were 25 killed, including those at Saragarhi. Approximately 400 tribesmen were killed (some reports put the casualty figure closer to 600). In October 1897, a force of more than 34,000 British and Indian troops invaded Tirah. By April 1898, the imperial forces had subjugated the Tirah region.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Khyber Pass; Lockhart, Sir William; Malakand Field Force (1897); Tirah Campaign (1897–1898).

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Sarandoy

The Sarandoy (“Defenders of the Revolution”) was a paramilitary force within the Afghan Ministry of the Interior during the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) (1978–1992). The Sarandoy was initially established by President Mohammed Daoud Khan as a national gendarme force to support local police. In 1978, it was reconfigured as an internal security force, and then grew in size and scope during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). It provided security for intelligence operations to identify and arrest opponents of the regime and secure government facilities.

When it was first formed, the Sarandoy numbered approximately 8,500. By the middle of the 1980s, the force had grown to 100,000, organized into six brigades with a total of 20 battalions. A goal of 115,000 was never reached. The unit grew in size as the mujahideen insurgency spread. The failure of the DRA Army or Soviet military forces to suppress the mujahideen prompted the increase.

The Sarandoy had two broad functions. The first was to protect and defend government personnel, facilities, and programs. This mission included investigations and operations to identify enemies of the regime and suppress dissent. Sarandoy personnel also served in bodyguard units for senior DRA officials. The second mission involved direct combat, usually in support of regular army troops or Soviet forces. Some Sarandoy units were equipped with heavy weapons, including artillery and armored vehicles. The Sarandoy also trained progovernment militias and oversaw some of their operations.

At its peak, some 5,000 Soviet advisers worked with the Sarandoy. In addition, officers and some personnel were sent to the Soviet Union for advanced training. The force was perceived as more loyal and dependable than the Afghan Army. It was a mainly volunteer force, although conscription was used in later years. The pay for the Sarandoy was higher than in the regular army and the equipment and training better. The result was lower desertion rates. Toward the end of the occupation, some Sarandoy units were converted to Afghan Army formations.

However, the force was undermined by rivalries within the ruling People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (PDPA). The PDPA was split into two main factions, *Khalq* (“Masses”) and *Parcham* (“Banner”). The Sarandoy was dominated by the Khalq, while the Afghan secret police, the *Khadamat-e Etela’at-e Dawlati* (KhAD), was a stronghold for Parcham. The result was diminished cooperation and collaboration between the two branches of internal security. Colonel Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoy, the minister of the interior and a staunch Khalq, used the Sarandoy against his Parcham rivals.

With the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Sarandoy took on a greater role in combat operations. However, by 1990, a growing

number of Sarandoy troops deserted. By 1992, the force had diminished in size considerably and was disbanded after the fall of the PDPA government.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Gulabzoy, Sayyed Mohammad; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Mujahideen; People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Saur Revolution (1978–1979)

The Saur Revolution was a revolt in Afghanistan in April 1978 in which the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power. The revolution precipitated the 1979 Soviet invasion. The PDPA was formed in 1965 from several smaller opposition groups. It split into two main factions: *Khalq* ("Masses"), which supported a Soviet-style regime and was led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, and the more moderate *Parcham* ("Banner") wing led by Babrak Karmal. *Khalq* had significant success in infiltrating the Afghan military.

Mohammed Daoud Khan led a coup that overthrew the monarchy in Afghanistan in 1973. He declared himself president with the support of the PDPA and then relied on the party as he suppressed Islamist conservatives.

However, after 1975, Daoud endeavored to remove the PDPA as a potential threat to his regime, especially as the party grew more powerful through financial and other support from Moscow. In 1977 and early 1978, a succession of street demonstrations in Kabul were suppressed with increasing brutality. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union facilitated a rapprochement between *Khalq* and *Parcham* in 1977. The two wings of the PDPA signed a cooperation agreement and began planning to overthrow Daoud, relying on pro-PDPA elements in the army. By 1978, Daoud was endeavoring to reduce ties with the Soviet Union and enhance relations with the West and moderate Persian Gulf states.

Mir Akbar Khyber, the intellectual leader of *Parcham*, was assassinated on April 17, 1978. The PDPA accused the regime of carrying out the attack, while the government blamed the *Khalq* faction. The killing prompted new protests in Kabul and other cities. Daoud ordered the arrest of senior PDPA leaders and suppression of the party. Although senior leaders such as Taraki and Karmal were detained, Hafizullah Amin, a senior *Khalq* official, was simply placed under house arrest. Amin had led the recruitment efforts within the Afghan military and was able to launch the planned coup from his home. At the time of the revolution, the PDPA's membership was estimated to be about 15,000–20,000.

The coup began on April 27 as pro-PDPA military units and party loyalists began moving into Kabul. The rebels were able to capture the presidential palace on the morning of April 28. Daoud and his family were killed in the attack. Under the terms of the reconciliation agreement between the two factions, Taraki became president, while Karmal was appointed prime minister. Government positions were divided between the *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions. Divisions quickly

emerged within the PDPA after they seized power. In August, Taraki purged most of the Parcham members from the government, including Karmal, who was named ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Amin then led a coup against Taraki, who was arrested on September 14 and killed sometime between then and October 8.

The PDPA had never enjoyed widespread support. Opposition to its rule grew steadily as the regime attempted to implement controversial reforms. With many areas of the country in open revolt, the Soviets decided to intervene in December 1979. Operation Storm 333 overthrew Amin, who was killed, and made Karmal president. The Soviets remained in Afghanistan until 1989.

Tom Lansford

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Karmal, Babrak; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Khyber, Mir Akbar; Operation Storm 333 (1979); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taraki, Nur Muhammad.

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Sayaf, Abdurab Rasul (1949–)

Abdurab Rasul Sayaf (also spelled Abdul-Rab Rasul Sayyaf) was the founder of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (*Ittihad-i-Islami Barye Azadi Afghani-*stan**). During the rule of the pro-Soviet

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's (PDPA), Sayaf was a mujahideen leader, and he later joined the Northern Alliance to fight the Taliban after the fall of Kabul. He was a member of the 2003 constitutional Loya Jirga and a presidential candidate in 2014.

Sayaf was born in 1946 in the city of Paghman in the Kabul Province of Afghanistan. He studied Islam, obtaining a bachelor's degree in religious studies from Kabul University and a master's degree from Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. After concluding his studies, Sayaf pursued a career in academia and served as a professor at Kabul University.

During his tenure, Sayaf became affiliated with Buhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and joined the *Sazman-i Jawanan-i Musulman*, or the Muslim Youth. The organization opposed the growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Following a failed attempt to overthrow the regime of Mohammed Daoud Khan, Sayaf was forced to flee into Pakistan. Upon his return to Afghanistan in April 1978, Sayaf was promptly arrested by the PDPA.

In 1980, Sayaf was released from prison. The following year, he formed the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan in response to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). He emerged as a well-known and respected mujahideen leader. He also established a number of madrasahs, which taught a radical, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The schools produced a number of fighters for the mujahideen. However, several alumni would also emerge as major international terrorists. One school founded by Sayaf in 1985 was located outside Peshawar and named *Dawa'a al-Jihad* ("The Call of Jihad"). Its graduates included Ramzi Ahmad Yousef of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended, Sayaf continued to use his mujahideen

forces in an effort to secure power and influence. The Islamic Union was accused of a variety of atrocities and war crimes by human rights groups in the 1990s. For instance, Sayaf conducted several operations against the Hazara population of Kabul; notably, facing opposition from the *Hezb-e Wahdat*, Abdul Ali Mazari's conglomeration of the six main Hazara groups. In 1996, despite his past ties to both the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership, Sayaf joined the Northern Alliance.

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Sayaf became involved in mainstream Afghan politics. In 2003, he was elected to the constitutional Loya Jirga. Two years later, he registered the Islamic Union with the Ministry of Justice under the new name of *Tanzim-e Dahwat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan* ("The Islamic Mission Organization of Afghanistan") and was elected to the *Wolesi Jirga* (House of the People), the lower house of the Afghan national assembly. He failed to secure reelection to the Wolesi Jirga in 2014 and was subsequently named his new party's presidential candidate in the 2014 national elections. However, he only received 7 percent of the vote in the first round.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Hazaras; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Madrasahs; Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Taliban.

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Schroen, Gary (1941–)

Gary Schroen was a U.S. intelligence officer who led the initial Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) team into Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Schroen joined the army in 1959, then went to college where he was recruited into the CIA in 1969. He held a variety of posts as an operations or field officer and became fluent in Farsi and Dari. In 1989, Schroen was appointed head of the CIA's operations in Afghanistan. He worked out of Pakistan and maintained relations with a network of about 40 mujahideen leaders, including Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. The CIA station chief funneled stipends and weapons from the agency to the mujahideen leaders and collected intelligence.

In 1992, Schroen was transferred back to CIA headquarters where he directed the agency's activities in Iran. Four years later, he was back in Islamabad as the CIA station chief for Pakistan. Schroen and other CIA officials with experience in the region warned about the rise of the Taliban and the influence of Osama bin Laden, who had traveled to Afghanistan in 1996. As a result, the agency had Schroen revive his connection with Massoud and begin surveillance of bin Laden. Schroen helped secure intelligence for the 1998 cruise missile strikes against bin Laden and al Qaeda in the aftermath of the African embassy bombings. Although the strikes failed to kill bin Laden, Schroen unsuccessfully argued for additional attacks, but the requests were denied by the administration of President Bill Clinton because of concerns over collateral damage and civilian casualties.

In 2001, Schroen launched the paperwork to retire from the CIA, but he was still with the agency when the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks occurred. He was recalled to active

duty and led a small covert team into Afghanistan on September 26. The veteran CIA officer met with Northern Alliance leaders and secured their cooperation for a military offensive that would be spearheaded by their troops, supported by U.S.-led special operations forces and aerial bombardments. Schroen later estimated that the CIA spent about \$10 million to gain the cooperation of the anti-Taliban forces and free the northern half of the country. Once the coalition began achieving victories and the fall of the Taliban was more or less assured, Schroen left Afghanistan in November 2001. He was replaced by Gary Berntsen.

Schroen subsequently retired from the CIA, but continued to work for the agency as a contractor. In 2005, he published an account of his experiences after 9/11, titled *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan*.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Berntsen, Gary; Bin Laden, Osama; Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998); Massoud, Ahmed Shah; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Special Operations Forces; Taliban.

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Security Firms and Defense Contractors

In its military campaign against the Taliban after the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States employed a significant number

of private security firms and defense contractors. Typically private military contractors provide armed security in areas where aggression by terrorists or criminals is highly probable. Contractors are also often employed in war zones to conduct repairs and maintain crucial infrastructure for a particular mission. There is a strong distinction between contractors, who act solely in a defensive role, and “mercenaries,” who are enlisted to conduct offensive attacks where armed aggression is the primary objective. In Afghanistan, approximately 50 percent of contractors were former U.S. and European special operations forces soldiers or other veterans, and civilian trained technical and trade employees. The other half of the contractors were Afghan locals.

With each passing year, the numbers and roles of civilian contractors grows exponentially, as the ever-increasing hot zones around the world take on their own respective political significance, both domestically and internationally. By 2013, there were more than 40,000 private security contractors operating in Afghanistan. During 2013, two of the largest companies were Academi (formerly Blackwater) and Dyncorp International. Academi received \$22 million from the U.S. government to support special operation forces in Afghanistan, while Dyncorp was contracted to train the Afghan police, receiving \$2.5 billion from 2002 to 2013, or 69 percent of the U.S. State Department's total funding for Afghanistan during this period. In all, 87 percent of State Department contracts during the decade went to just five firms.

Since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, 1,592 contractors have died serving there. As the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan shrinks, contractors take on a larger role in security operations. In 2015, 56 U.S. service members died, while 101 contractors were killed. The administration of

President Barack Obama came under increasing scrutiny over the role of military contractors, especially over efforts to prevent details of missions or combat actions from becoming public.

Public perceptions of contractors in the post-9/11 world were often negative, most notably as a result of the global conglomerate Blackwater's involvement with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Blackwater was involved in the establishment and operation of numerous black sites used to interrogate and intern enemy combatants in the greater Middle East and Eastern Europe. In 2009, Blackwater Worldwide attempted to disassociate itself from its activities in Iraq by changing its name and that of its two dozen related subsidiaries simply to Xe. The new business plan was re-focused from security to training, and later the company again changed its name to Academi.

By the end of 2015 there were approximately 30,000 Department of Defense contractors in Afghanistan, in addition to some 10,000 employed by other agencies or firms. This represents a decrease of 6.5 percent from the previous year and reflects the smaller U.S. military presence and the reduced need for support missions. One result is that these contractors have taken on an expanded role in training Afghan security forces and providing security for government facilities and officials. However, these firms lack the accountability and discipline of regular military forces, which has created tensions with the Afghan population. The firms also do not have the over-the-horizon capabilities of regular forces, putting them at greater risk in combat (and providing an incentive to avoid armed fights when possible).

Matthew Orzechowski

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–).

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Shah, Mohammed Nadir (1883–1933)

Mohammed Nadir Shah was king of Afghanistan from 1929 to 1933. Mohammed Nadir was born on April 9, 1883, in British India (his family was in exile at the time). He was allowed to return to Afghanistan by Emir Abdur Rahman Khan and became a military officer. Mohammed Nadir established a reputation as an efficient and capable commander. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1906. The future king led troops in a successful campaign to suppress a revolt in 1912, and two years later was made commander of the Royal Afghan Army. He endeavored to improve the training and capabilities of the army by advocating for the purchase of more modern equipment and the use of foreign military advisers. He was briefly arrested after the assassination of Emir Habibullah Khan, but exonerated of any involvement in the regicide. During the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), Mohammed Nadir oversaw the military operations of the Afghan forces, but was unable to defeat the

British. Nonetheless, he was appointed minister of war that year by Emir Amanullah Khan.

Over the next few years, relations between Mohammed Nadir and Amanullah worsened. The emir sought to dramatically modernize Afghan society, while Mohammed Nadir was much more conservative, though he did support some economic and military reforms. In 1924, Amanullah appointed Mohammed Nadir ambassador to France in order to remove him as an obstacle to ongoing liberalization programs. Meanwhile, dissent in Afghanistan grew. The emir was overthrown in January 1929 and forced into exile while a tribal leader, Habibullah Kalakani, seized the throne.

After Habibullah gained power, Mohammed Nadir traveled from Europe to British-controlled India where he organized a military force of disaffected former soldiers and tribal fighters to invade Afghanistan. He won a series of victories and his forces captured Kabul on October 13, 1929. The former general declared himself king three days later. Habibullah Kalakani was captured and executed on November 1. Amanullah attempted to return to Afghanistan and reclaim his throne, but Mohammed Nadir's forces defeated the few allies that backed the former emir. A Loya Jirga endorsed his right to rule in September 1930.

The new emir reversed many of his predecessor's reforms and undertook steps to gain the loyalty of religious conservatives. He also launched a series of infrastructure projects, including road construction, and established Kabul University. In 1931, a new constitution was promulgated. Nevertheless, the emir faced a number of revolts and other challenges to his reign. In response he redoubled efforts to increase the size and efficiency of the military, which had suffered greatly during Habibullah's rebellion. The emir also increased ties with Germany in an

effort to balance against British and Soviet influence in the region.

Mohammed Nadir was assassinated on November 8, 1933, at a high school graduation ceremony. He was succeeded by his son Mohammed Zahir Shah, who ruled for 40 years.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Kalakani, Habibullah (Bacha-i Sqaqao); Khan, Amanullah; Khan, Habibullah; Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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Shah, Mullah Ahmed (1970–2008)

Mullah Ahmed Shah, also known as Mullah Ismail, was an Afghan insurgent commander who rose to fame in 2005 for leading an ambush of a U.S. Navy Sea Air and Land (SEAL) special operations force and shooting down a U.S. MH-47 Chinook helicopter on its way to rescue the surrounded troops. Shah was born sometime around 1970 in the eastern Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan. He fought in the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001) as an ally of Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar.

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Shah fought alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda against the U.S.-led coalition forces and the pro-Western government of Hamid Karzai. He emerged as a major rebel leader in the Kunar Province. He guided foreign fighters traveling from Pakistan to existing al Qaeda

and Taliban forces in northeastern Afghanistan. Shah was estimated to command between 70 and 100 fighters, known as the “Mountain Tigers.”

In June 2005, the coalition launched Operation Red Wings to disrupt Shah’s network. A four-man SEAL team was deployed to the Pech District of Kunar. On June 27, the team was attacked by Shah’s forces. Three of the four SEALs were killed (the fourth was wounded, but was rescued by a local Pash-tun—the story was the basis for the 2013 film *Lone Survivor*). A rescue mission was dispatched by helicopter, but as the aircraft approached Shah fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at one of two MH-47 Chinooks carrying U.S. special operations forces. The rocket struck the helicopter and caused it to crash, killing eight crew members and eight SEALs, including the mission commander. The shoot-down of the helicopter made Shah a hero and a sensation among the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other insurgent groups. The insurgents were able to recover a significant amount of weaponry from the downed MH-47. Shah’s forces fled to Pakistan after the United States launched Operation Red Wings II, but returned to launch new attacks. In August, the United States commenced Operation Whalers to destroy Shah’s group. The insurgent commander was wounded during the operation and fled to Pakistan with the remainder of his men. Operation Whalers effectively destroyed Shah’s network in Afghanistan.

In April 2008, Shah kidnapped a local merchant in Pakistan and tried to take him across the border back into Afghanistan. He tried to avoid a Pakistani security checkpoint and was killed when security forces opened fire on him.

Tom Lansford

See also: Al Qaeda; Operations Red Wings I, II, and Whalers (2005); Special Operations

Forces; Taliban; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Shah, Nadir (1698–1747)

Nadir Shah rose to power in Iran in the wake of the declining Safavid dynasty in the 18th century. He gained the gratitude of Iranians who hoped that he would reunite the realm, but his ultimate failure to accomplish that stability brought his people increasing despair. The taxation necessary to support his armies caused great sacrifice among Iranians who cared less about Nadir’s foreign conquests than he did. However, his convincing expulsion of the Ghilzai Afghans and his defeat of the Ottoman Empire helped to shape the identity of Iran as a separate modern state.

Nadir was probably born on August 6, 1698, in a fortress at Dastagird where his father, Imam Quli, was stationed. The region of Darra Gaz is in Khurasan in the northeastern reaches of Iran, or Persia as it was then called. Nadir was born as Nadr Quli Beg into the Qiriqu clan of the Afshar tribe, a group that had once lived in Azerbaijan. Nadir’s family was not wealthy, but he was named after his grandfather, a fact that indicated great family continuity in the unsettled conditions on the fringe of the Safavid Empire. By the time he was 10 years old, Nadir was already an accomplished horseman and was acquiring the skills of archery, javelin throwing, hunting, and horse racing.

It had long been the practice of the Safavid monarchs to move peoples they had conquered

to new places in the empire as a means of reducing future threats to central power. Nadir's people, the Afshars, who were forced to leave Azerbaijan to guard the borders of Khurasan, spoke Turkish, the same language as many of the Turkmen and Uzbeks against whom they were supposed to fight. However, they remained loyal to the Safavids because they were Shiite Muslims, not Sunni like the other Turkic tribespeople. The embrace of Shiism as the official faith of the Safavids had been extremely important in earlier centuries, as it had brought unity to the empire. As in Khurasan, the divide between Shiite and Sunni was often more important than potential ethnic loyalties.

One of Nadir's first patrons was Baba Ali Beg Kusa Ahmadlu, a royal governor stationed in Khurasan. Recognizing Nadir's talents, he employed him as a musketeer in the forces guarding the border. Though historians sometimes portray Nadir as a robber, it seems more likely that he worked to maintain security along the trade routes that passed through that area, which sometimes caused him to attack the bandits and predators who preyed on merchants. He also fought with Baba Ali against Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Kurds.

Baba Ali further extended his paternal protection to Nadir by marrying Nadir's widowed mother. In turn, Nadir, who wished to further cement those relations, asked for the hand of Baba Ali's daughter in marriage. That move prompted the opposition of several of the other Afsharid chiefs, and there was considerable fighting before Nadir finally married. His first son, Riza Quli, was born before 1719. Nadir's first wife died within five years, and he married her sister, who produced two more sons. One sign of Nadir's power in Khurasan was his seizure of Kalat, a high, bowl-shaped plateau that commanded the neighboring regions. By

1721 or so, Baba Ali had ceded his power to Nadir.

Throughout those early years of Nadir's life, Safavid central control was weakening. In 1722, a host of Ghilzai Afghans swept into Iran and laid siege to the capital, Isfahan. During the six-month siege, the reigning Shah Husayn was able to smuggle his third son, Tahmasp Mirza, out of the city in the hope that the dynasty would not be extinguished. On October 12, 1722, however, the city fell and the Safavids along with it. In the period of confusion that followed, Nadir maneuvered carefully.

In his dealings with other tribal groups in Iran, Nadir's actions alternated between friendliness and ruthlessness. As he gained more power, he received the allegiance of



Nadir Shah defeated the Afghan Hotaki Empire and united the Persian Empire but was unable to build a lasting dynasty. His death led to the rise of Ahmad Shah Durrani, considered the "father of modern Afghanistan." (Los Angeles County Museum of Art)

many chiefs who were attracted to the side of a successful leader. Capable of great restraint, Nadir expanded his forces not just through fighting but through conciliation as well. However, in his unsentimental society, people offered their allegiance not out of patriotism but rather in the belief that they would benefit from the relationship. Thus, as Nadir acquired more dependents and mercenaries, he was pressed toward ever greater exploits in order to convince his subordinates of his limitless capacity to satisfy their needs.

Nadir's stated goal at that point was the restoration of the Safavids to power. In 1726, he finally met and allied with Tahmasp. Nadir was able to defeat the Ghilzai Afghans in a series of important victories, and Tahmasp assumed the throne as the new shah. As part of the reward for his services, Nadir was renamed Tahmasp Quli Khan. In the shah's service, Nadir pushed back the forces of the Ottoman Empire that had moved into Azerbaijan and Iraq during the years of chaos after the first fall of the Safavids. He also sought to gain official Ottoman recognition of the new Safavid government. Nadir again scored important victories but had to withdraw to attend to a revolt in Khurasan.

While Nadir was thus employed, Tahmasp undertook to negotiate with the Ottoman government and concluded a treaty that was very prejudicial to Iran. Angry at such a turn of events, Nadir returned to Isfahan in 1732 and instigated a palace coup against Tahmasp, who was sent to Khurasan. Tahmasp's infant son was proclaimed Abbas III, and Nadir continued to serve in his name for a brief period. Early in 1736, however, Nadir invited all the important leaders of Iran to gather at a huge camp he had constructed at the union of the Aras and Kur Rivers. His idea was to acquire the consent of those men to his own accession to power. The gathering lasted for three months, and several key

chiefs who did not convince Nadir of their loyalty were executed in ways that made an impression on others in attendance.

The religious aura of the Safavids, however, made it very difficult to seize power in any way that could be interpreted as legitimate. Nadir thus proclaimed a new sect of Islam to be known as Jafari. One of the questions that divided Sunni from Shiite was the Shiite claim that the first three historical caliphs (successors to the Prophet Muhammad) had been usurpers, and the Shiite practice of cursing the caliphs was very offensive to the Sunni. In Nadir's new Jafari sect, such practices were eliminated as Nadir sought to improve the possibilities of peace with the Sunni Ottomans.

By March 1736, Nadir was shah of Iran. He continued to involve himself in constant military activity by defending the frontiers and building a navy. By 1738, he began the famous campaign to conquer Afghanistan and the Mughal Empire of India. Leading his tremendous army into India accomplished several things. Nadir always worked to prevent his troops from looting; by taking them into India, he removed them altogether and gave his own subjects a break from their presence. In addition, the wealth he was able to gather from the Mughal court enabled him to provide some tax relief to his own subjects and still distribute bonuses to his loyal fighters. Nadir defeated the Mughal forces at the Battle of Karnal on February 24, 1739. After the sack of Delhi, he finally retired from India in possession of the famous Koh-I-Noor diamond, the jewel-encrusted peacock throne, and a new wife, who was the great-granddaughter of the late emperor Aurangzeb.

Despite his foreign conquests, however, Nadir faced continued problems in the northwestern region of Iran where he had hoped to establish the fulcrum of his empire. The

stubborn refusal of the Lezgis to accept his rule led to chronic warfare in that region. Nadir's son Riza Quli was his deputy there, but Nadir came to suspect his son's ambitions. After an attempt on his life in 1741, Nadir became convinced that his son had somehow taken part in the attack, and he eventually ordered that Riza Quli be blinded. Though he recovered quickly from the physical bullet wound, Nadir's emotional health began to deteriorate around that time.

As Nadir continued his warfare with the Ottoman Turks in 1743, new revolts occurred in Iran. After putting those revolts down, Nadir was able to defeat the Ottoman forces near Yerevan and conclude a favorable peace in 1746. The Sublime Porte (as the Ottoman government was called) did not recognize Nadir's new Jafari sect of Islam, but it secured the safe passage of Iranian pilgrims to Mecca.

Ongoing war caused Nadir to continually extract resources from Iranians whose resources were growing scarce. Nadir's later wars did not seem to benefit anyone but him, and the crushing tax collections generated increasing resentment. Iranians no longer saw Nadir as a benign force and no longer offered him their gratitude. As his tax collectors became ever more exacting and his own acts ever more capricious and cruel, one historian, a contemporary of Nadir's, wrote that Nadir's conduct had "fallen from the natural order, and the way of compassion was shut." On the night of June 30, 1747, with the connivance of some of Nadir's highest officials, Nadir was murdered in his tent by members of his own guards.

Karen Mead

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Durrani, Ahmad Shah; Hazaras; Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan; Mughal Empire (1526–1857).

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Sherpur, Battle of (1879)

The Battle of Sherpur was a major British victory on December 23, 1879, during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). Major General (later Field Marshal Earl) Sir Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., was given command of the hastily formed Kabul Field Force in September 1879 when hostilities again broke out in Afghanistan. Roberts's force began its advance on September 27 and defeated a large Afghan force at Charasia, on the route to Kabul, on October 6, 1879. The 7,000-man Kabul Field Force occupied the large, heavily fortified Sherpur Cantonment near Kabul.

Roberts ruthlessly applied martial law, and Afghans increasingly came to resent the presence of a foreign occupying force. Rebel Afghan troops began to converge on Kabul. British troops were sent on December 11, 1879, to disperse an Afghan column, but the 300 British soldiers rode unwittingly into a group of about 10,000 Afghans and had to hurriedly retreat, leaving behind four guns. Heavy fighting continued for the following three days. By December 14, the British force was effectively besieged.

On December 22, 1879, Roberts learned from a spy that the Afghans were planning a full-scale attack on the Sherpur Cantonment the next morning. Roberts was informed of the exact enemy plan, and that the attack would be initiated by the lighting of a beacon fire on the nearby Asmai Heights. Accordingly, the British forces remained vigilant and

manned their defensive positions on the 15-foot cantonment walls through the night.

Just before dawn on December 23, 1879, a large flare was expectedly fired from the As-mai Heights, and Afghan musket and artillery fire poured into the east and south walls of the British defenses. *Ghazis* (Muslim warriors) with scaling ladders charged across the snow as the 28th Punjabis and Guides on the east wall opened fire on the attackers. The 67th Foot and 92nd Gordon Highlanders on the south wall then commenced firing, and all British guns concentrated their fire on the advancing masses. Waves of relatively uncoordinated assaults were mowed down, and there was a lull in the attacks at about 10:00 a.m., although attacks began again an hour later. Roberts was able to send four guns with a cavalry escort outside the cantonment to shell Afghan assembly areas, and by 1:00 p.m., the Afghans were fleeing. The 9th Lancers, Guides, and 5th Punjab Cavalry conducted an energetic, although not especially creditable, pursuit. Three lancers were reportedly assigned to each Afghan straggler, who was killed after being run down.

The result of the Battle of Sherpur was basically a foregone conclusion, as the Afghans were unable to cross the open areas in the face of superior and disciplined British rifle and cannon fire from a well-defended position. Of the 100,000 Afghans purportedly involved in the attack, about 3,000 dead littered the battlefield. British casualties sustained between December 15 and 23, 1879 were, according to Roberts, 2 officers, 9 other ranks, and 7 followers killed, and 5 officers, 41 soldiers, and 20 followers wounded.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics; Cavalry and Cavalry Tactics; Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleight (Lord).

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Shevardnadze, Eduard (1928–2014)

Eduard Shevardnadze was the Soviet foreign minister (1985–1990, 1991), chair of the Georgian State Council (1992–1995), and president of Georgia (1995–2003). Born on January 28, 1928, in the Georgian village of Mamati, Eduard Shevardnadze graduated from the Party School of the Communist Party Central Committee in 1951 and from the Kutaisi Pedagogical Institute in 1959. He then became an instructor for the Komsomol (Communist Union of Youth). Joining the Communist Party in 1948, he rose quickly through its ranks and became a member of the Georgian Supreme Soviet in 1959.

During 1961–1964 Shevardnadze served as a party regional secretary, and during 1964–1965 he was deputy minister of internal affairs for Georgia. He became minister of internal affairs of Georgia in 1965, a post

he held until 1972. During this period he reformed Georgian agriculture, creating new incentives for farmers and boosting production. He was also responsible for firing and imprisoning hundreds of officials in his fight against bureaucratic corruption, earning him the reputation of a merciless opponent of corruption and inefficiency. He also forced government officials to give up properties that they had attained through bribery and other illegal means. Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet economy would never move forward if corruption continued to plague the system.

In 1972 Shevardnadze was appointed first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, a post he occupied until 1985. There too he continued his fight against corruption. He became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1976. In 1977 Soviet authorities conducted a series of crackdowns against human rights activists, jailing many of the movement's top figures. Shevardnadze's Georgian government participated in the crackdowns, and among those jailed was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who in May 1991 would become the first democratically elected president of the independent Republic of Georgia. In 1978 Shevardnadze was promoted to candidate member status of the Soviet Politburo, which functioned as the central policymaking and governing body of the CPSU. That same year he was awarded the Order of Lenin.

In 1985 the new reform-minded Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev appointed Shevardnadze minister of foreign affairs after the resignation of Andrei Gromyko. Shevardnadze also became a full member of the CPSU Politburo. As foreign minister, he played an important role in ending the Cold War. He reformed Soviet foreign policy making, implementing Gorbachev's policies. These included developing new arms control and Middle East

peace strategies, establishing ties with Israel, negotiating German reunification, and allowing for the democratization of Eastern Europe. Shevardnadze rejected all aid requests by communist leaders in Eastern Europe when revolutions and democratization swept their countries, allowing for a smooth and relatively bloodless transition to democracy in the region.

Shevardnadze oversaw the negotiations over the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Of particular concern to the Soviets was that the pro-Moscow government remain in place after Moscow withdrew its troops. Shevardnadze, Gorbachev, and other Soviet leaders were afraid the mujahideen would unite under pressure from the United States and Pakistan and overthrow the government. The foreign minister tried unsuccessfully to convince his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of State George Shultz, to end U.S. aid to the mujahideen. Shevardnadze also sought to have both superpowers play a role in a national reconciliation process in Afghanistan, but the United States rebuffed his proposals. One result was that both superpowers continued military and economic aid to the warring parties after the 1989 withdrawal.

These actions, however, made Shevardnadze many enemies in Moscow. Nevertheless, he adhered to a strict policy of liberalization, which gradually separated him from Gorbachev's incrementalist policy of preserving a socialist system. Because of these differences and growing criticism from Communist Party hardliners, Shevardnadze resigned his post in December 1990 and warned that the nation was headed toward dictatorship. Following his resignation, an unsuccessful coup against Gorbachev by communist hardliners in August 1991 seemed to prove that Shevardnadze's prediction was correct. He returned to the post of foreign minister in November 1991 but resigned

together with Gorbachev in December when the Soviet Union was officially dissolved.

In March 1992 Shevardnadze became head of an interim Georgian government following the ouster of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. In 1995 Shevardnadze survived an assassination attempt and that same year was elected president of the Republic of Georgia by a comfortable margin. He survived a second assassination attempt in 1998. In 2000 he won a controversial presidential election that was immediately followed by accusations of vote rigging. In November 2003 Shevardnadze was forced to resign the presidency after huge demonstrations showed that he had lost much of his political support. He was succeeded by the ardently pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili. In 2006 Shevardnadze published his memoirs, titled *Thoughts about the Past and the Future*. He died on July 7, 2014.

Arthur M. Holst

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Cold War (1947–1989); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Reagan Doctrine; Shultz, George.

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Shultz, George (1920–)

George Pratt Shultz was U.S. labor secretary (1969–1970), treasury secretary (1972–1974), and secretary of state (1982–1989). As

secretary of state, Shultz helped implement the policies of the administration of President Ronald Reagan toward Afghanistan and the mujahideen. Shultz was born in New York City on December 13, 1920. He graduated from Princeton University in 1942 and joined the U.S. Marine Corps. Shultz fought in the Pacific theater. After the war, he returned to university and earned a doctorate in 1949 in industrial economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

Shultz had a distinguished career in academia, teaching at MIT and the University of Chicago. In 1969, newly elected President Richard M. Nixon named Shultz secretary of labor, a post he held for a year before becoming head of the Office of Management and Budget. In 1972, Nixon moved Shultz to secretary of the treasury. He resigned in 1974 and worked in private industry for the next eight years.

In 1982, Reagan asked Shultz to become secretary of state. Shultz was the antithesis of his fiery predecessor, Alexander M. Haig. The new secretary employed a low-key, consensus-based approach to foreign policy that reduced tensions within the administration, but also left him at odds on occasion with more hardline cabinet members, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and CIA director William Casey. Shultz engaged in a series of negotiations on arms control that produced the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty that eliminated intermediate-range atomic missiles in Europe.

Shultz worked to maintain the U.S.-Pakistani relationship during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). He also negotiated with the Soviets over Afghanistan in an effort to convince them to withdraw their troops. However, Casey and others in the administration genuinely believed the Soviets would never willingly leave Afghanistan and urged ever more military and financial

support. In 1987, Shultz learned from his Soviet counterpart that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was beginning to plan for a withdrawal. In December, Gorbachev informed Reagan of his intent to end the occupation, but urged the U.S. president to cease support for the mujahideen. The Soviets ultimately withdrew their last troops in 1989 under the auspices of the Geneva Accords.

Though not as hawkish as Weinberger or Casey on the Soviet Union, Shultz did endorse military action to counter terrorist attacks, including airstrikes against Libya in 1986. Throughout his tenure, he strove unsuccessfully for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. After leaving office in 1989, Shultz became a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He was a vocal critic of the Afghan policies of President Barack Obama.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Cold War (1947–1989); Geneva Accords (1988); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Reagan, Ronald W.; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Shutargardan Pass

The Shutargardan Pass is a strategic mountain pass in Afghanistan. With elevations of 11,500 feet (3,505 m), the pass offers a pathway from

Kohat to Kabul through the Kurum Valley in the northeast of Afghanistan. The route played a major role in a succession of military conflicts. During the late 16th century, Shutargardan was used by the forces of Muhammad Hakim Mirza to ambush the army of Jalal ud-Din Muhammad Akbar, more commonly known as Akbar I.

The British occupied the pass in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), and defeated an Afghan force trying to break their way through. However, the British failed to garrison the pass, allowing Afghans to move back and forth. During the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), the pass was used by Major General Frederick Roberts and the Kabul Field Force in their advance on Kabul. The Anglo-Indian forces were attacked by a strong Afghan force, but managed to fight their way through. Roberts would subsequently advance to relieve Kandahar.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Kandahar, Battle of (1880); Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleight (Lord).

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Sokolov, Sergey (1911–2012)

Sergey Leonidovich Sokolov was a Soviet general who led the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and subsequently served as minister of defense of the Soviet Union during the height of the Afghan occupation. Sokolov was born on July 1, 1911, into a military family in Yevpatoria, Ukraine. He joined the Soviet Army as a cadet in 1932 and was commissioned a lieutenant three years later. During World War II, Sokolov rose rapidly through the ranks and was a colonel by the end of the conflict, and a major general by 1953. He served in a variety of positions over the next two decades and became a marshal in 1978.

Sokolov helped plan the invasion of Afghanistan and personally oversaw Operation Storm 333 in December 1979. The operation was successful with minimal casualties. In 1980, he was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union, the USSR's highest decoration for bravery, for his command of the invasion. However, he underestimated the tenacity of the mujahideen and overestimated the fighting capabilities of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's (DRA) military. Sokolov's strategy of keeping Soviet ground forces in garrisons, except for large combat operations, ceded control of much of the country to the mujahideen. Nevertheless, he was appointed minister of defense in 1984 after the unexpected death of his predecessor, Dmitry Ustinov. Sokolov endeavored to implement a strategy of shifting combat responsibilities to the DRA. The DRA troops proved capable of holding heavily fortified positions, but were unable to expand their control into the countryside.

On May 30, 1987, Sokolov was dismissed as part of a broad cabinet reshuffle following an embarrassing incident in which a young West German piloted a small plane from Hamburg to Moscow without being stopped by Soviet air defenses. Sokolov was appointed an adviser to the Russian minister of defense in 1992. He died on August 31, 2012.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Operation Storm 333 (1979); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich.

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Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989)

The Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan destroyed the U.S.-Soviet détente of the 1970s; inaugurated a new, dangerous stage in the Cold War; destabilized Afghanistan; and badly weakened the Soviet military and economic establishments. The Afghan-Soviet War represented the culmination of events dating to April 1978, when Afghan communists, supported by left-wing army leaders, overthrew the unpopular, authoritarian government of Mohammed Daoud Khan and proclaimed the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Although the extent of Soviet involvement in the coup remains unclear, Moscow certainly welcomed it and quickly established close relations with

the new regime, which was headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki. He was committed to bringing socialism to Afghanistan.

With the ambitious, extremely militant foreign minister Hafizullah Amin as its driving force, the Taraki regime quickly alienated much of Afghanistan's population by conducting a terror campaign against its opponents and introducing a series of social and economic reforms at odds with the religious and cultural norms of the country's highly conservative Muslim, tribal society. Afghanistan's Muslim leaders soon declared a jihad (holy war) against "godless communism," and by August 1978 the Taraki regime faced an open revolt, a situation made especially dangerous by the defection of a portion of the army to the rebel cause.

As Afghanistan descended into civil war, Moscow grew increasingly concerned. Committed by the Brezhnev Doctrine to preventing the overthrow of a friendly, neighboring communist government and fearful of the effects that a potential Islamic fundamentalist regime might have on the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia, specifically those in the republics bordering Afghanistan, the Soviets moved toward military intervention. During the last months of 1979, the Leonid Brezhnev government dispatched approximately 4,500 combat advisers to assist the Afghan communist regime while simultaneously allowing Soviet aircraft to conduct bombing raids against rebel positions. Although Soviet deputy defense minister Ivan G. Pavlovski, who had played an important role in the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, counseled against full-scale intervention in Afghanistan, his superior, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, convinced Brezhnev to undertake an invasion, arguing that only such an action could preserve the Afghan communist regime. He also promised that the Soviet presence there would be short.

Brezhnev ultimately decided in favor of war, the pivotal factor arguably being the September 1979 seizure of power by Hafizullah Amin, who had ordered Taraki arrested and murdered. Apparently shocked by Amin's act of supreme betrayal and inclined to believe that only a massive intervention could save the situation, Brezhnev gave approval for the invasion. Beginning in late November 1979 and continuing during the first weeks of December, the Soviet military concentrated the Fortieth Army, composed primarily of Central Asian troops, along the Afghan border. On December 24, Soviet forces crossed the frontier, while Moscow claimed that the Afghan government had requested help against an unnamed outside threat.

Relying on mechanized tactics and close air support, Soviet units quickly seized the Afghan capital of Kabul. In the process, a special assault force stormed the presidential palace and killed Amin, replacing him with the more moderate Babrak Karmal, who attempted, unsuccessfully, to win popular support by portraying himself as a devoted Muslim and Afghan nationalist. Soviet forces, numbering at least 50,000 troops by the end of January 1980, went on to occupy the other major Afghan cities and secured major highways. In response, rebel mujahideen forces resorted to guerrilla warfare, their primary goal being to avoid defeat in the hopes of outlasting Soviet intervention.

Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan had immediate and adverse international consequences, effectively wrecking détente that was already in dire straits by December 1979 thanks to recent increases in missile deployments in Europe. A few weeks later, the United Nations condemned the action, as did the Organization of the Islamic Conference, an international group made up of Muslim nations, or countries with large Muslim populations. Having devoted much effort to



improving relations with Moscow, U.S. president Jimmy Carter believed that he had been betrayed. He reacted swiftly and strongly to the Afghan invasion.

On December 28, 1979, Carter publicly denounced the Soviet action as a “blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior.” Three days later, he accused Moscow of lying about its motives for intervening and declared that the invasion had dramatically altered his view of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy goals. On January 3, 1980, the president asked the U.S. Senate to delay consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks II (SALT II) treaty. Finally, on January 23, in his State of the Union address, Carter warned that the Soviet action in Afghanistan posed a potentially serious threat to world peace because control of Afghanistan would put Moscow in a position to dominate the strategic Persian Gulf and thus interdict at will the flow of Middle East oil.

The president followed these pronouncements by enunciating what soon became known as the Carter Doctrine, declaring that any effort to dominate the Persian Gulf would be interpreted as an attack on U.S. interests that would be rebuffed by force if necessary. Carter also announced his intention to limit the sale of technology and agricultural products to the Soviet Union, and he imposed restrictions on Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters. In addition, he notified the International Olympic Committee that in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, neither he nor the U.S. public would support sending a U.S. team to the 1980 Moscow Summer Games. The president called upon U.S. allies to follow suit.

Carter also asked Congress to support increased defense spending and registration for the draft, pushed for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force that could intervene in the Persian Gulf or other areas threatened by



Soviet military forces in Kabul, Afghanistan, on December 31, 1979, after they overthrew the Afghan government. The inability of the Soviets to suppress the Afghan insurgency was one of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. (Francois Lochon/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images)

Soviet expansionism, offered increased military aid to Pakistan, moved to enhance ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), approved covert CIA assistance to the mujahideen, and signed a presidential directive on July 25, 1980, providing for increased targeting of Soviet nuclear forces.

Carter's sharp response was undercut to a certain extent by several developments. First, key U.S. allies rejected both economic sanctions against the Kremlin and an Olympic boycott. Second, Argentina and several other states actually increased their grain sales to Moscow. Third, a somewhat jaded U.S. public tended to doubt the president's assertions about Soviet motives and believed that he had needlessly reenergized the Cold War.

Ronald Reagan, who defeated Carter in the November 1980 presidential election, took an even harder stand with the Soviets. Describing the Soviet Union as an "evil em-

pire" that had used détente for its own nefarious purposes, the Reagan administration poured vast sums of money into a massive military buildup that even saw the president push the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—labeled "Star Wars" by its critics—a missile defense system dependent on satellites to destroy enemy missiles with lasers or particle beams before armed warheads separated and headed for their targets. The Soviet response was to build additional missiles and warheads, further straining the Soviet Union's already heavily militarized economy.

Meanwhile, confronted with guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, the Soviets remained committed to waging a limited war and found themselves drawn, inexorably, into an ever-deeper bloody quagmire against a determined opponent whose confidence and morale grew with each passing month. To make matters

worse for Moscow, domestic criticism of the war by such prominent dissidents as Andrei Sakharov appeared early on, while foreign assistance in the form of food, transport vehicles, and weaponry (especially the FIM-92 Stinger man-portable antiaircraft missile launchers) from the United States began reaching the mujahideen as the fighting dragged on.

Neither the commitment of more troops, the use of chemical weapons, nor the replacement of the unpopular Karmal could bring Moscow any closer to victory. Accordingly, by 1986 the Soviet leadership, now headed by the reformist general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, began contemplating ways of extricating themselves from what many observers characterized as the “Soviet Union’s Vietnam.”

In April 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a United Nations mediation proposal providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops over a 10-month period. One month later, the departure of Soviet military forces, which had grown to an estimated 115,000 troops, commenced—a process that was finally completed in February 1989.

Although the Soviets left Afghanistan with a procommunist regime, a team of military advisers, and substantial quantities of equipment, the nine-year-long war had exacted a

high toll, costing the Soviets an estimated 50,000 casualties. It seriously damaged the Red Army’s military reputation, further undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet system, and nearly bankrupted the Kremlin. For the Afghans, the war proved equally costly. An estimated 1 million civilians were dead, and another 5 million were refugees. Much of the country was devastated. The social and political chaos in postwar Afghanistan paved the way for more civil war there, fostered the rise of the Taliban, and ultimately embroiled the country in the global war on terror after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks prompted the United States to topple the Taliban regime during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Bruce J. DeHart

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Andropov, Yuri; Brezhnev, Leonid; Carter, Jimmy; Carter Doctrine; Chernenko, Konstantin; Cold War (1947–1989); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Karmal, Babrak; Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Mujahideen; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Operation Storm 333 (1979); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Reagan, Ronald W.; Rutskoï, Alexander; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Shevardnadze, Eduard; Shultz, George; Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Taliban; Taraki, Nur Muhammad; United States, Relations with Afghanistan; Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich; Wilson, Charles Nesbitt; Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich.

Related Primary Document

United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution ES-6/2, January 14, 1980

In response to the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the United Nations General Assembly Council on January 14, 1980, voted on a resolution affirming the sovereignty of Afghanistan, condemning the invasion, and calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The resolution passed on a vote of 104 to 18. U.S.-led efforts to secure a Security Council Resolution along similar lines had previously been vetoed by the Soviets. The vote was a significant diplomatic defeat for the Soviets. An excerpt of the resolution follows.

Expressing its [the General Assembly's] deep concern at the dangerous escalating of tension, intensification of rivalry and increased recourse to military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States which are detrimental to the interests of all nations, particularly the non-aligned countries,

Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the responsibility of the General Assembly under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950,

1. Reaffirms that the respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations, any violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and purposes;
2. Strongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with that principle;
3. Appeals to all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country;
4. Calls for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;
5. Urges all parties concerned to assist in bringing about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees to their homes.

Source: UN General Assembly Official Records. ES-6/2 January 14, 1980; online at <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20ARESES6%202.pdf>. © 1980 United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations.

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Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics

The Soviet Union deployed between 115,000 and 120,000 troops at the peak of its war in Afghanistan (1979–1989). The initial Soviet invasion emphasized the use of special operations forces, airborne units, and armored columns. Approximately 1,200 special operations

forces, airborne troops, and members of the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB) were inserted in and around Kabul in December 1979, while two airborne regiments seized control of key facilities, including Bagram air base, north of Kabul, and the strategic Salang Pass. On the 27th of the month, the Soviets in Kabul attacked the residence of Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin, killing the president and taking control of the government in Operation Storm 333. Meanwhile, Soviet armored units moved into Afghanistan.

The Soviet occupying force was the 40th Army, initially under the command of Marshal Sergey Sokolov, who was succeeded in 1985 by General Igor Rodionov. The Soviets initially employed large traditional conventional offensives against the mujahideen, who were able to retreat or avoid contact with superior forces. When the Soviets passed through an area, the mujahideen would return or redeploy. For example, the Soviets undertook multiple offensives in the Panjshir Valley, but were unable to secure the areas as the Afghan rebels retreated and then launched attacks when the bulk of the Soviet and government forces withdrew. The mujahideen relied on asymmetric warfare, attacking the Soviets when they outnumbered the invading forces or where they were most vulnerable, in supply convoys, for instance. The centralized command structure of Soviet forces undermined their effectiveness in fighting the mujahideen. When small frontline units were attacked, there were often delays in securing the fire support or reinforcements needed because of the need to obtain multiple levels of approval.

The rugged Afghan terrain made troop movements difficult and slowed reinforcements. The terrain was one of the principal reasons for a shift in Soviet strategy away from reliance on large armored columns, led by main battle tanks (MBTs) (a Soviet

armored division had about 280 MBTs and 240 infantry fighting vehicles [IFVs] and numbered 10,500). The Soviets shifted to emphasizing the faster IFVs to move troops and made extensive use of airborne units, which were highly mobile and could be rapidly deployed. Speed was especially important because of the nature of the war, which typically included surprise attacks by Afghan rebel mujahideen forces on Soviet or Afghan government bases or convoys. Helicopters were commonly used to deploy the airborne troops, although the Soviets also undertook parachute drops. Airborne units were also an effective way to overcome the difficult terrain, which slowed conventional infantry and armored columns, or was impassable in some cases. A Soviet airborne division consisted of about 8,500 troops.

Throughout the campaign the Soviets enjoyed air superiority. The mujahideen lacked any real aircraft, giving the Soviets almost complete freedom to conduct bombing campaigns or to use airpower for close infantry support during the first half of the conflict. The introduction of advanced Stinger anti-aircraft eroded the Soviet air superiority and forced the Soviets to fly higher, making their attacks less accurate. Stingers also interfered with other aerial missions such as combat resupply or casualty evacuations. The Soviets also had a commanding advantage in armor, including both MBTs and IFVs, and artillery. However, the shift of the Soviets to airborne operations and an increasing reliance on IFVs meant that their MBTs often became static and were often used for base protection or for artillery support.

A significant miscalculation on the part of Soviet military leaders was a brutal scorched earth policy designed to deny the mujahideen supplies and shelter. Soviet troops destroyed crops, fields, and villages. They also engaged in carpet bombing and used chemical weap-

ons. The result was an almost complete lack of popular support for the government and Soviet forces outside of the major urban areas. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet political leadership increasingly sought a solution that would allow them to withdraw, even without defeating the mujahideen. Under the 1988 Geneva Accords, the Soviets began withdrawing troops in 1988. By February of the next year, the last Soviet combat troops had left Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal, the 40th Army was reduced in strength and designated the 59th Army Corps.

Tom Lansford

See also: Airborne Units and Tactics; Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Armored Vehicles; Panjshir Campaigns (1980–1985); Special Operations Forces; Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986).

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Soviet Union, Relations with Afghanistan. See Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan

Special Operations Forces

Special operations forces have played a major role in the fighting in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989) and the current conflict, which began in 2001. Special operations forces are highly trained military personnel that carry out unconventional

missions, typically with small numbers of troops and minimal support. Their operations are often covert, involve deployments behind enemy lines, and are extraordinarily risky. Missions range from search and rescue to targeted killings. Special operations forces units are typically composed of some of the best personnel in their respective country's armed forces.

The primary Soviet special operations forces were the *Spetsialnogo Naznacheniya* (“Special Purpose”) or Spetsnaz. Near the end of December 1979, approximately 650 Spetsnaz were inserted in and around Kabul. On December 27, along with Soviet secret police personnel from the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB) and some airborne troops, the special operations forces donned Afghan uniforms and seized control of strategic positions in the capital city and then attacked Tajbeg Palace, the residence of Afghan president Hafizullah Amin. Amin was killed in the assault, code-named Operation Storm 333. The attack marked the beginning of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal was subsequently appointed Afghan president by the Soviets.

During the occupation of Afghanistan, Spetsnaz units were frequently deployed on covert missions against the antiregime mujahideen. They were also used for reconnaissance operations and missions in terrain where conventional Soviet troops were unable to operate. The special operations forces were one of the few Soviet formations that were able to launch surprise attacks on insurgent bases or supply convoys.

The United States made even greater use of special operations forces during Operation Enduring Freedom following the al Qaeda terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. U.S. Special Operations launched coordinated attacks against the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters that combined air and missile

attacks by coalition aircraft with ground assaults by the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. U.S. Special Operations Forces were initially commanded by Rear Admiral Albert M. Calland III. Calland divided Afghanistan into two areas of operation, the north, Task Force Dagger, and the south, Task Force Sword. The U.S. Army's 5th Special Forces Group were deployed in Task Force Dagger and coordinated training and the flow of weapons to Northern Alliance troops led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum. When Dostum's troops attacked the Taliban and al Qaeda, the army special forces coordinated airstrikes and other support. They also supported the efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to recruit anti-Taliban fighters and to identify and capture enemy commanders and other high-value targets. Task Force Sword was centered around a U.S. Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) team. The SEALs launched a series of attacks on Taliban facilities, including supply depots and training facilities. They also sought to capture or kill Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden. Special operations forces from other coalition nations, including the United Kingdom's elite Special Air Service, were also deployed.

By November 2001, the Taliban had fallen and the mission of the coalition special operations forces shifted. In December 2001, coalition forces and Northern Alliance troops endeavored unsuccessfully to capture al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Operation Jawbreaker in the Tora Bora Mountains. Coalition special operations forces subsequently took on a greater role in training Afghan security forces, while continuing to undertake covert missions against the Taliban and al Qaeda. One of the most widely publicized operations was the raid by SEALs on May 2, 2011, in which bin Laden was killed at his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

The importance of special operations forces was heightened as conventional coalition combat troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan beginning in 2011. Special operations forces remained to conduct undercover missions and train Afghan security personnel.

Tom Lansford

See also: Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Tora Bora, Battle of (2001); United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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State Information Service (KhAD) (*Khidamat-i Ittilaat-i Dawlati*)

The State Information Service (*Khidamat-i Ittilaat-i Dawlati* [KhAD]) was the state security service of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). The DRA used the service to repress dissent, and the KhAD developed a reputation for brutality and torture. When the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in the Saur Revolution in 1978, a new security service was created to purge the government,

military, and civil society of loyalists to the old regime and potential opponents to the Marxist DRA. The new agency was named the Afghanistan Security Service Department (*Afghanistan Da Gatay Satanay Edara*—AGSA). It began arresting prominent intellectuals, clerics, and military leaders, prompting opposition figures and those who might be suspected of opposition to the regime to flee to Pakistan or Iran. The actions of the AGSA helped fuel a growing insurgency against the regime.

When Hafizullah Amin deposed President Nur Muhammad Taraki in September 1979, he initiated a purge of the AGSA. It was renamed the Workers' Security Institution (*Kargarano Amniyati Mu'asasa* [KAM]), and former senior officers found themselves under arrest or surveillance. The KAM did not last long. When the Soviets invaded in December 1979, the KAM was also purged and reorganized. It was relaunched as the KhAD under Mohammed Najibullah.

Throughout the Soviet occupation, the KhAD ruthlessly endeavored to suppress dissent and undermine the antigovernment mujahideen. The agency used arrest, torture, and extrajudicial killings to intimidate opponents of the regime and to collect intelligence on the insurgency. The Soviet secret service, the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB), worked closely with the KhAD and provided training, equipment, and cooperation on operations. However, both the KhAD and the KGB failed to develop an efficient intelligence system among the mujahideen. Nor were their efforts to suppress dissent effective since the mujahideen exercised de facto control over 75–80 percent of the Afghan countryside during much of the occupation. In contrast, Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate was able to penetrate the DRA and establish a much broader intelligence network.

In addition to intelligence officers, the KhAD also had paramilitary units and paid subsidies to tribal militias to fight for the DRA. These units took on greater importance as the regular forces of the DRA weakened as the result of desertion and dissatisfaction. At its peak, the KhAD had approximately 10,000–15,000 officers, agents and operatives. In addition, its paramilitary forces numbered an additional 5,000–10,000.

Najibullah was a close ally of the Soviet Union and was well regarded by the KGB. In 1986, he was made president of the DRA. Once in office, he expanded the KhAD in size and budget, renaming the organization the Ministry of State Security (*Wizarat-i Ettela at-i Daulati* [WAD]). The enlarged WAD was no more successful than its predecessors. By 1990, the DRA only controlled about 10 percent of Afghanistan. When the DRA fell in 1992, the WAD was disbanded. Many of its officers and agents were killed in retaliation for their service during the occupation and civil war.

Tom Lansford

See also: Amin, Hafizullah; Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate; Kabulov, Zamir; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Taraki, Nur Muhammad.

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Stewart, Sir Donald (1824–1900)

Sir Donald Stewart was a decorated British officer who commanded the Kandahar Field

Force during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880) and was made a baronet for his service during the campaign. He later rose to the rank of field marshal. Stewart was born on March 1, 1824, in Mount Pleasant, Moray, Scotland. At 16, he was accepted as a cadet in the East India Company's Bengal Army, and arrived in India to accept his commission in 1841. Three years later, Stewart was promoted to lieutenant and subsequently became adjutant for his regiment. In 1847, Stewart married Marina Dabine, the daughter of a naval officer, and the couple went on to have four children. Stewart met Frederick Roberts in 1852, and the two developed a lifelong friendship.

Although Stewart was promoted to captain in 1854, he had seen little combat during his career to that point. However, he had attracted the attention of a variety of senior officers through his efficiency and diligence. The future field marshal distinguished himself during the Sepoy Rebellion (1857–1858) and was promoted first to major in January 1858, and then to lieutenant colonel later in the year. Five years later he was a colonel, and then a major general in 1868.

In 1877, on the eve of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, Stewart was promoted to lieutenant general. When the war began, the British invaded Afghanistan with three columns. The northernmost and largest column was the Peshawar Field Force commanded by Lieutenant General Samuel Browne. Stewart's old friend Roberts commanded the center and smallest column, the Kurram Valley Field Force, while Stewart was in charge of the southernmost column, the Kandahar Field Force, also known as the Quetta Army. Stewart led his forces through the Bolan Pass. His column faced less formal resistance than the other British formations, and logistics proved to be his greatest challenge. Most

of the pack animals used by his column were unsuited to the terrain and weather and a large percentage died. In addition, the Afghans launched repeated attacks on his supply lines. Nonetheless, Stewart reached and captured Kandahar, while the other two columns inflicted major defeats on the Afghan forces. The first phase of the war ended with the withdrawal of the bulk of the British forces, but a subsequent uprising prompted Stewart to lead a new campaign and advance from Kandahar to Kabul beginning in March 1880. On April 19, Stewart won his greatest victory at the Battle of Ahmed Khel where he led 7,200 British and Indian troops against more than 15,000 Afghans. Also, in April Stewart was appointed commander of all the British forces in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Roberts won a series of victories that ultimately subdued the Afghans and ended the war.

Stewart was promoted to general in 1881, and then appointed commander in chief of India where he oversaw a variety of reforms to the Indian Army. In 1894 he became a field marshal. He died in Algiers on March 26, 1900.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Bolan Pass; Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Kandahar, Battle of (1880); Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Mohammad Yakub; Khan, Sher Ali; Khyber Pass; Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleight (Lord).

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Stoddart, Charles (1806–1842)

Charles Stoddart was a British military officer and diplomat who was dispatched to Bukhara in present-day Uzbekistan to craft an anti-Russian alliance with the region's leader, Emir Nasrullah Khan. The mission failed and Stoddart was executed, along with a fellow officer, Captain Arthur Conolly, who was sent to rescue him. Stoddart was born on July 23, 1806, in Ipswich, England. He attended the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and obtained a commission as an ensign in the British Army. Stoddart was promoted to lieutenant two years later, and then captain in 1834. He was appointed military secretary to the British ambassador to Persia (Iran) in 1835. The young diplomat was present during the Siege of Herat (1837–1838) and involved in the negotiations over the British ultimatum, which prompted the Persians to lift the siege.

Following the siege, Stoddart was promoted to lieutenant colonel and dispatched to Bukhara to attempt to obtain the release of a number of Russians held prisoner and negotiate a treaty of friendship with Nasrullah Khan. Upon his arrival on December 17, 1838, Stoddart managed to repeatedly offend the emir. For instance, he remained seated on his horse and saluted the emir from the saddle when local custom dictated that he dismount and bow. The emir was also insulted that Stoddart did not offer him the expected gifts and tokens of esteem on behalf of the British. Within four days of his arrival, Stoddart had been arrested and cast into an infamous dungeon known alternatively as the “Black Well” or the “Bug Pit” because it was infested with vermin. He was imprisoned until July 1839 when he was released, according to some accounts, because he converted to Islam. However, he was again imprisoned in September, although he was held in a less

severe confinement. Stoddart was able to send letters during this period and British authorities became aware of his plight. For a brief period in 1841, Stoddart was allowed to reside at the Russian mission.

Meanwhile, Conolly had been dispatched to try to organize local rulers into an anti-Russian coalition. He became aware of Stoddart's captivity and set out to negotiate his release. Conolly arrived in Bukhara in November 1841. The emir, who feared a potential Russian invasion, imprisoned Conolly after the officer tried to convince him to oppose Russian influence in the region. When news arrived in January 1842 that the Afghans had risen against the British in Kabul and massacred the retreating garrison, the prisoners' conditions steadily worsened.

On June 17, 1842, both officers were brought before the emir and forced to dig their own graves. Stoddart was beheaded. Conolly was given the choice of converting to Islam or also being killed. He refused to renounce Christianity and was also executed. When news of the executions reached Britain, there were calls by the press and parliamentarians for reprisals, but after the debacle of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), there was little appetite for a new military expedition in Central Asia.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Great Game, The; Herat, Siege of (1837–1838); Iran (Persia), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Takur Ghar, Battle of (2002)

The Battle of Takur Ghar was a military engagement fought between coalition forces and Taliban and al Qaeda fighters that occurred on Takur Ghar Mountain in Afghanistan during March 3–4, 2002. The battle was part of the much broader Operation Anaconda, an effort early in the Afghanistan War to drive al Qaeda and Taliban forces from the Shah-i-Kot Valley and the Arma Mountains. Takur Ghar is a high mountain (approximately 10,500 feet) located in the Arma Mountains of southeastern Afghanistan. The peak is on the eastern border of the Shah-i-Kot Valley.

It was near the summit of Takur Ghar that fierce fighting between U.S. Special Operations Forces and al Qaeda and Taliban soldiers took place. For the Americans, the battle proved the deadliest engagement of Operation Anaconda. It saw three helicopter landings by U.S. forces on the mountaintop, each greeted by hostile fire.

Late on the evening of March 3, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Blaber of the U.S. Army's Delta Force was notified by Brigadier General Gregory Trebon, commander of TF-11, that two SEAL teams commanded by Lieutenant Commander Vic Hyder were to arrive in Gardez for immediate insertion into the Shah-i-Kot Valley. The two teams, known as Mako 30 and Mako 21, were to establish an observation point on or near the peak of Takur Ghar, which afforded a commanding view of the valley. Because of time constraints, however, the SEALs would have to be inserted by helicopter in order to reach

the peak before daybreak. While the original insertion plan had suggested an insertion at a point some 1,400 yards east of the peak, the SEALs eventually decided upon an insertion on the peak itself.

The two teams boarded Razor 03 and Razor 04, two Boeing MH-47 Chinook helicopters, at 11:23 p.m. on March 3. However, Razor 03 experienced engine problems, and so two new MH-47s were dispatched to replace the original aircraft. The delay meant that the SEALs could not be inserted into the landing zone (LZ) east of the peak until 2:30 a.m. on March 4, which would not permit adequate time to reach the peak before dawn. Blaber was not notified that the SEALs were now planning to insert at the peak that night.

Meanwhile, a Lockheed/Boeing AC-130 Specter gunship reconnoitered the peak and saw no enemy activity prior to the landing. However, that plane was called away to support other troops before Razor 03 and Razor 04 could arrive at the LZ. At about 2:45 a.m. Razor 03 landed at the LZ and was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). The damaged helicopter was able to lift off, but Petty Officer First Class Neil C. Roberts fell out of the open ramp. It is believed that he died from the fall, although his ultimate fate remains in question. Some reports suggested that he was taken alive by insurgents and later killed. Razor 03 subsequently attempted to return and retrieve him, but the damaged helicopter was forced to make a crash landing in the valley below, some four miles away. Razor 04 now returned to the peak to attempt to rescue Roberts, in the process inserting Mako 30. The team immediately came under small-arms

fire, and U.S. Air Force combat controller Technical Sergeant John A. Chapman was killed; two SEALs were wounded. Mako 30 was forced off the peak and requested the assistance of the Ranger quick-reaction force (QRF) located at Bagram Air Base and led by Captain Nate Self.

The QRF consisted of 19 Rangers, a Tactical Air Control Party, and a 3-man U.S. Air Force special tactics team carried by two Chinooks, Razor 01 and Razor 02. Due to satellite communications difficulties, Razor 01 was mistakenly directed to the hot LZ on the peak of Takur Ghar. Because U.S. Air Force rules prohibited AC-130 aircraft from remaining in hostile airspace in daylight, the AC-130 support protecting Mako 30 had been compelled to leave before Razor 01 had reached the LZ. Further communications problems meant that the pilot of the AC-130 was unaware that Razor 01 was incoming. At approximately 6:10 a.m. on March 4, Razor 01 reached the LZ. The aircraft came under fire, and the right door minigunner, Sergeant Phillip Svitak, was killed by small-arms fire. An RPG then hit the helicopter, destroying the right engine and forcing it down. As the Rangers and special tactics team exited the aircraft, Private First Class Matt Commons (posthumously promoted to corporal), Sergeant Brad Crose, and Specialist Marc Anderson were killed.

The surviving crew and quick-reaction force took cover on a nearby hillock, and a fierce firefight began. Razor 02, which had been diverted to Gardez as Razor 01 was landing on Takur Ghar, returned with the rest of the quick-reaction force and Lieutenant Commander Hyder at 6:25 a.m. With the newly arrived men and close air support, the force was able to consolidate its position on the peak. An enemy counterattack around noon mortally wounded Senior Airman Jason D. Cunningham, a pararescueman. The

wounded were refused medevac during the daylight hours because it was unsafe to operate evacuation helicopters.

Fortunately, Australian Special Air Service soldiers had infiltrated the area undetected prior to the first helicopter crash. They remained undetected in an observation post through the firefight and proved critical in helping to coordinate coalition air strikes to prevent the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters from overrunning the downed aircraft.

At approximately 8:00 p.m. the QRF and Mako 30 were taken from the Takur Ghar peak. U.S. and Afghan sources reported at least 200 Taliban and al Qaeda fighters killed during the initial assault and subsequent rescue mission. Although coalition forces eventually captured Takur Ghar, 8 U.S. soldiers were killed and several dozen were wounded.

Richard M. Edwards

See also: Aircraft, Types and Tactics; Al Qaeda; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Anaconda (2002); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Special Operations Forces; Taliban.

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Taliban

The Taliban is a political and religious movement begun in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The word Taliban, which means “students,” is an Arabic word used in many Muslim countries to signify students from madrasahs (Islamic schools). In the mid-1990s, however, Afghan

students from Pakistani madrasahs adopted the name for a movement that eventually established an Islamic theocracy in much of Afghanistan.

When Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979, many young Afghan boys and other noncombatants fled the country and were lodged in refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan. During the 10-year Soviet occupation, more than 2 million refugees, mainly Pashtuns, found refuge in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), especially the tribal areas. The NWFP was also home to hundreds of fundamentalist madrasahs run by the Deobandi sect, as well as Wahhabi schools established by wealthy Saudi donors. Tens of thousands of Afghan and Pakistani boys thus received a fundamentalist education in these madrasahs.

Soviet forces departed Afghanistan in 1989 and Afghan communist forces met defeat in 1992, but civil war between rival mujahideen leaders erupted soon afterward. Much of the fighting pitted Pashtuns against ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras of northern and central Afghanistan. Pakistan, which hoped to establish lucrative trade routes with Central Asia, sought a strong Pashtun-dominated government to provide stability.

By the mid-1990s, many refugee children were old enough to fight, and their strict Islamic education made them ideal recruits for the Taliban. The Taliban emerged in 1994 when Mullah Mohammed Omar led a small group of fighters in liberating several villages from local warlords. In late 1994, Pakistan enlisted their support. Omar and approximately 200 fighters overran Spin Boldak and Kandahar and in the process captured many weapons, including tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Their success prompted thousands of Afghan and Pakistani students to join them. By early 1995, the Taliban controlled much of the Pashtun regions of the country.

Thereafter, the Taliban confronted better-organized non-Pashtun forces in northern Afghanistan. Both sides committed numerous atrocities, mainly against rival ethnic groups. Despite several defeats, the Taliban captured Herat in 1995, Kabul in 1996, Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, and Taloqan in 1999. By 2000, fighting had largely stalemated with the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance bottled up in northeastern Afghanistan and portions of central Afghanistan although it still controlled Afghanistan's United Nations (UN) seat. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries to recognize the Taliban government. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and various Arab Gulf states provided weapons to the Taliban, while India, Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian states supported the Northern Alliance. Ironically, the United States initially leaned toward supporting the Taliban, but that changed after the Taliban offered sanctuary to the terrorist group al Qaeda.

Widespread human rights violations provoked international condemnation, but the Taliban consistently ignored outside criticism. Their version of an Islamic theocracy was perhaps the harshest ever seen in the Muslim world. Women were virtually imprisoned in their homes, medieval-like Islamic punishment became routine for criminal offenses, and international aid organizations were expelled, with no attempt to provide for millions of destitute Afghans. The Taliban even went so far as to destroy such priceless historical and cultural treasures as the Buddhas of Bamiyan, which they claimed were blasphemous to Islam.

The Taliban's downfall came following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, when the Americans and other allies launched major military operations in support of the Northern Alliance in October 2001. Disenchanted Pashtuns rose up

as well and established a Southern Alliance. Within weeks, most of the Taliban and foreign jihadists fled to the tribal areas, where they found sanctuary. This autonomous region historically had resisted British and Pakistani control. Fearing the internal consequences, the Pakistani government refused to conduct sustained counterinsurgency operations there. Consequently, the Taliban used the area to rebuild its forces.

The Taliban's fighting strength during the October–November 2001 battles with the Northern Alliance was about 45,000, and many of these were killed or captured. The remnants (numbering in the hundreds) retreated, along with al Qaeda fighters, into mountain refuges in eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. U.S. efforts to blast them out of the rugged terrain proved difficult and could not totally eliminate Taliban bands that survived there and across the border in Pakistan's North and South Waziristan provinces. Taliban strategy shifted to terrorist tactics, and they conducted a guerrilla-style insurgency launched in earnest in 2003. The insurgency expanded after 2003 and the Taliban reestablished a presence throughout the areas in Afghanistan from which it was swept in October–November 2001. Estimates of current Taliban military strength range from 7,000 to about 11,000, but these figures do not include thousands of supporters (who sometimes participate in terrorist attacks) who are opposed to the pro-Western Afghan regime or who resent the presence in Afghanistan of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops (referred to as “foreign crusaders” in Taliban propaganda to evoke historical images of the Christian assault on Islam in the 11th through 13th centuries).

Taliban insurgency tactics include suicide bombers, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and launching rockets at urban areas. During the run-up to the August

2009 and 2014 Afghan elections, the Taliban increased terrorist attacks throughout the country and demanded that Afghans boycott the election—actions that kept voter turnout lower than the 2004 election in 2009, but were less effective in subsequent balloting. Taliban recruitment, particularly of Pakistanis, has increased, despite U.S. and NATO targeting of Taliban leadership through air attacks and drone strikes.

In 2013, Taliban founder and longtime leader Mullah Muhammed Omar died in Pakistan, reportedly of tuberculosis. His death was kept a secret for two years to prevent a leadership struggle. He was succeeded by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. Meanwhile, in 2015, the Taliban announced it would meet with representatives of the government of President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani for peace talks, hosted by Qatar. However, no real action for peace has occurred, and relations between the Taliban and the Afghanistan government continue to be adversarial. On May 23, 2016, President Barack Obama confirmed that an American drone strike had killed Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour in Pakistan; it is unclear whom the Taliban's next leader will be, or how this might affect any possible peace talks between President Ghani and the Taliban.

Daniel E. Spector and Jerry D. Morelock

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998); Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf; Gul, Hamid; Hazaras; Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan; Karzai, Hamid; Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Mujahideen; Narcoterrorism; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Omar, Mullah Muhammed;

Operation Anaconda (2002); Pashtuns (Push-tuns); Takur Ghar, Battle of (2002); Taliban, Forces and Tactics; Taliban Insurgency; Terrorism; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Wahhabism.

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Taliban, Forces and Tactics

The military of the Taliban was loosely organized, trained, and led, and it more closely resembled militia forces when the United States initiated a campaign to overthrow the regime following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. After the ouster of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan in December 2001, the organization embraced guerrilla tactics to conduct a long-running insurgency against the subsequent pro-Western government. The Taliban also began to adopt terrorist tactics, including suicide bombings, which were previously unknown in Afghanistan.

The Taliban was initially formed by fundamentalist Pashtun Sunnis during the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001) to fight against

the warlords and former mujahideen commanders who were blamed for the continuing chaos and strife that accompanied the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989. Many of the recruits had undergone strict Islamist training at madrasahs in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989). They fought with a zeal that many other militia groups lacked. There was little or no formal training for most recruits. Still, by 1995, the Taliban had control of most of the traditionally Pashtun areas of the country. The organization brought order to areas that had been wrecked by constant warfare for more than a decade. However, it also engaged in atrocities and ethnic cleansing, especially against religious and ethnic minorities.

As the Taliban grew and gained early victories, the organization acquired a growing amount of weaponry, mainly Soviet-era small arms, artillery, missiles, and armor. Pakistan began supplying the Taliban with weapons in 1995, and its military assistance increased after the group captured Kabul the following year. By the late 1990s, the Taliban controlled most of Afghanistan, but was only recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. These countries provided some military aid, but the Taliban army's arsenal was relatively obsolete by most standards of the time.

At the time of the U.S.-led invasion, the military wing of the Taliban numbered approximately 45,000–50,000. In addition, there were about 10,000–15,000 tribal militia fighters who were allied with the Taliban and somewhere between 4,000–5,000 al Qaeda or al Qaeda-affiliated militants. The Taliban had approximately 400 tanks. These were all older Soviet tanks, mainly T-55s and T-62s. The T-55s had a crew of four, with a 100 mm main cannon and a heavy and light machine gun, with a speed of 30 miles per hour (48 km per hour). The larger, more

modern T-62s also had a crew of four, with a 115 mm cannon and a light and heavy machine gun. They had a top speed of 31 miles per hour (50 km per hour). In addition to their tanks, the Taliban had about 200–300 armored vehicles, mainly armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. For transport, the Taliban had a motley collection of Soviet military trucks and various civilian vehicles. The Taliban also had a small air force that included five MiG 10 fighters and 10–12 fighter bombers, along with 40 helicopters. Small and obsolete as these forces were, the Taliban had significantly more armor and artillery than their main rivals, the opposition Northern Alliance.

When the U.S.-led offensive against the Taliban began on October 7, 2001, the coalition quickly established air superiority and destroyed most of the Taliban air force on the ground through a combination of aerial strikes and missile attacks. Coalition attacks also destroyed radar facilities and communications sites. When ground combat began, the United States and its allies utilized tactics that relied on Northern Alliance fighters for the ground troops, but supported these forces with significant over-the-horizon capabilities, coordinated by special operations forces. Coalition forward observers could direct air and missile attacks against the Taliban, thereby negating their advantage in armor and artillery.

The Taliban made a significant tactical mistake when fighting the coalition-backed Northern Alliance during Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S.-led military campaign. The Taliban fought from fixed, fortified positions. Given their advantage over the Northern Alliance, the tactic made sense, and in past battles it could have been the right decision. However, by entrenching and concentrating their forces, the Taliban provided the allies with an opportunity to destroy their armor and artil-

lery through precision-guided aerial attacks. The power of coalition airstrikes undermined confidence among the Taliban, leading many to desert or surrender. By December 2001, the Taliban's conventional forces had been defeated, or had retreated across the border to Pakistan, or had simply stopped fighting and returned to their villages.

The Taliban shifted tactics and launched an insurgency from bases in Pashtun areas of Pakistan. In the initial years after their fall from power, the Taliban would winter in Pakistan and then launch offensives in the spring. Although its numbers would alternate through the years, the Taliban maintained an estimated 10,000–12,000 fighters. The spring offensives were designed to undermine the regime's authority. The Taliban continued to face difficulties in holding territory and began to engage in terrorist attacks, including kidnappings, suicide bombings, and other attacks on both civilian and government targets. The Taliban also began to work with other antiregime groups and became increasingly involved in the drug trade. The cultivation of opium poppies became a major source of income for the organization.

By 2005, the Taliban had been able to re-establish a presence in provinces throughout the country, but had their greatest success in areas in and around Kandahar and Helmand. In response to the growth of the Taliban, the coalition engaged in a troop surge, adding an additional 33,000 U.S. troops, along with additional contributions from other allies. The surge failed to stem the rise of the Taliban, which increasingly drew foreign fighters as recruits. By 2015, it was estimated that the Taliban controlled or contested 70 of the 398 districts in Afghanistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Armored Vehicles; Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); 9/11, War on Terror, and

Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Terrorism; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001).

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Taliban Insurgency

A military insurgency waged by the Taliban against coalition and Afghan government forces began in 2002. The Taliban movement emerged in the chaos of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, led in part by young religious scholars trained in religious schools on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The name “Taliban” is taken from the plural of the Arab word *talib* (“student”). Taliban leadership is drawn from the Pashtun, the largest ethnic population in Afghanistan. Taliban leaders rely on support from the large Pashtun strongholds in Pakistan, including the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and urban areas with large Pashtun populations (Karachi, Quetta). By the late 1990s the Taliban had established political control over more than 90 percent of Afghanistan, but because of its harsh

Islamist rule—which included mass public executions, bans on music, and the destruction of ancient Buddhist religious statues at Bamiyan—it was recognized diplomatically only by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates.

In the late 1990s the Taliban provided sanctuary and support for the al Qaeda organization, which had aided them in their battle against the Soviets. They received in return not only financial contributions but also military leadership and trained troops. After al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, when the Taliban leadership refused to turn over those responsible, a coalition of forces headed by the United States actively intervened in Operation Enduring Freedom in December 2001 to aid the Northern Alliance in defeating the Taliban and drive it from power. By mid-2002, however, surviving Taliban leaders were regrouping, taking control in many locations, and reestablishing themselves in others.

The insurgency and the revival of the Taliban as both a military and political force would not have been possible without chaos in Afghanistan and access to sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan, particularly the vital logistics base of Quetta and the loosely governed areas of FATA. The Quetta *shura* (council) provides leadership for Taliban military and political efforts in Afghanistan. This base could not have been maintained without the support of Pakistani officials and former officials. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services have been actively supporting militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir for almost 30 years and are skilled at providing assistance in ways that are difficult to link directly to official sources.

Taliban forces are composed of ethnic Pashtuns from Afghanistan and western Pakistan and include some Afghan refugees

who were in Pakistan. There are also a small number of foreign volunteers. The Taliban comprise forces loyal both to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and *Tehrik-i Taliban-Pakistan* (Pakistan Taliban, TTP). There is also a collection of allies and affiliated groups. The best-known allied forces include al Qaeda, *Hezb-e Islami* (led by veteran militant Gulbuddin Hekmetyar), and the Haqqani network (led by Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani). They have been funded largely by Afghanistan's drug trade, particularly in Helmand Province, and contributions from the Muslim world, often collected as *zakat* (alms or charity) at mosques throughout the world.

Insurgent efforts are organized in three theaters straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (the Taliban itself prefers to speak of five fronts, creating a separate Kabul region and an overall military commander). The eastern front includes portions of FATA and the NWFP on the Pakistan side and the Afghan provinces of Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman, and Nangarhar. *Hezb-e Islami* is active in this theater along with other allied groups including *Lashkar-e Taiba*, best known for the November 26, 2008, terrorist assault on Mumbai, India. The central or southeastern front extends from Bajaur in FATA down into Baluchistan on the Pakistani side and includes the Afghan provinces of Khowst, Paktia, and Paktika. The Haqqani network has been very active here, as have large numbers of foreign fighters. The southern front is primarily manned by Taliban forces and includes the Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan, and Zabol.

U.S. and multinational forces in Afghanistan have faced considerable difficulty operating against the Taliban and its allies, particularly when those forces are located on Pakistani soil. Pakistani military cooperation with the coalition has been most forthcoming

in the FATA, where the TTP has waged operations against the Pakistani government, and much rarer in Baluchistan, where the Taliban central and southern fronts appear to enjoy considerable freedom of movement and logistic support.

The Taliban insurgency began making significant strides in 2003–2004 in traditional Taliban strongholds in southern Afghanistan, particularly in the vicinity of Kandahar and in Helmand Province. Taliban forces initially infiltrated across from bases in Pakistan but gradually developed base areas inside Afghanistan itself. The limits of the Taliban's capabilities, however, were demonstrated by its inability to disrupt the Afghan presidential elections in October 2004. Operations were governed mainly by the weather. Attacks peaked in December and January and then declined until March or April as full-time cadres retreated to Pakistan for the winter and local forces stood down. Since the winter of 2005–2006, however, winter operations have increased in number.

The Taliban's reach and influence grew sharply over the next few years. An increasing emphasis on creating parallel political structures to compete with the Afghan government became apparent by early 2006, when Taliban leadership announced the appointment of separate political leaders for all districts. By 2006 the Taliban claimed to operate local judiciaries in numerous provinces in southern and southeastern Afghanistan. The surge in Taliban confidence and capability prompted an influx of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troop reinforcements to assist the Afghan government, although differing levels of commitment and rules of engagement handicapped the overall counterinsurgency effort. A Taliban offensive launched in 2006 ended indecisively. The Taliban had proved that it was much



Despite their overthrow by U.S.-led forces in December 2001, the Taliban continued to fight against the coalition, using Soviet-era weapons such as AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, and dressed as civilians. (AP Photo/Allauddin Khan)

stronger than most analysts had suspected, but it also proved incapable of defeating the Afghan government or its coalition partners.

Taliban efforts increasingly targeted local police forces, allowing it to establish a more permanent local presence. In 2007 alone, more than 900 Afghan police were murdered. The Taliban also stepped up suicide attacks in Afghanistan, from 21 in 2005 to more than 130 in 2006 and 2007, before declining, falling to 65 in 2013, and then rising again to 124 in 2014. The TTP and Taliban allies unleashed powerful attacks against the Pakistani government in the last six months of 2007, and fighting continued in the FATA throughout 2008. In late 2008 U.S. political

and military leaders committed substantial reinforcements to the Afghan theater, and following his November 2008 election victory, President Barack Obama endeavored to reinvigorate the coalition effort to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, in part by increasing U.S. troop strength there by 33,000. However, these forces were withdrawn by 2012, as the coalition began negotiations with the Afghan government to turn over security operations. In December 2014, Operation Enduring Freedom officially ended, although the NATO-led coalition agreed to maintain some 13,000 troops in Afghanistan to support the Afghan National Army.

There are many explanations for the resurrection of the Taliban as a powerful force

in Afghanistan, despite its woeful record of governance when it held power from 1996 to 2001. First, the Taliban has been able to expand because of the inability of the current Afghan regime of Hamid Karzai to govern effectively, compounded by the failure to develop effective local police and security institutions in the years after the Taliban's initial defeat. Second, there has been a lack of Pashtun participation in the Afghan regime. Third, there are close connections between the current Afghan government and first the United States and more recently NATO and other international forces, which delegitimize the Afghan regime in the eyes of the Afghan population. The continued presence of international forces in Afghanistan allowed the Taliban to portray itself as fighting against foreign occupation. Fourth, there was a shift of U.S. focus from Afghanistan to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, launched in March 2003. Fifth, some within the Pakistani Army and the Pakistani government wished to reinstall a Taliban government in Afghanistan. This accusation is made somewhat more credible by both persistent Pakistani efforts to encourage negotiations with the Taliban and the presence of thousands of Taliban fighters in Baluchistan, the NWFP, and the FATA. The United States and its coalition partners will have to wage a much larger struggle on a much larger front if they hope to defeat the resurgent Taliban. They will also have to engage the Pakistani government more aggressively to fight the Taliban insurgency in the border areas.

Timothy D. Hoyt

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Blair, Tony; Bush, George W.; Civilian Casualties; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Humanitarian Aid Operations; Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Iraq War (2003–); Narcoterror-

ism; Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Obama, Barack; Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Taliban; Taliban, Forces and Tactics; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–); United States, Relations with Afghanistan; Warlords.

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Tanai, Shahnawaz (1950–)

Shahnawaz Tanai was a member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and an Afghan general in the Marxist regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Tanai, an ethnic Pashtun, was born in the town of Dargai, located in the Paktia Province of Afghanistan, in 1950. He entered the military during the reign of the last Afghan king, Mohammed Zahir Shah. Tanai had an undistinguished career, rising to the rank of senior captain. He was one of a number of Afghan military officers who were recruited by the PDPA during the regime of Mohammed Daoud Khan. Tanai was a member of the more radical, hardline wing of the PDPA, known as the *Khalq* ("Masses"), after the name of the faction's newspaper.

After the overthrow of Daoud during the Saur Revolution in 1978, Tanai moved rapidly up the ranks. He became chief of staff of the army in 1986 and was then appointed minister of defense two years later, despite his inability to develop an effective strategy to suppress the mujahideen. The defense minister became estranged from Afghan president Mohammed Najibullah over a variety of issues, including the latter's efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with the mujahideen instead of a military victory.

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Tanai became increasingly convinced that Najibullah was following the wrong strategy to win the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001). On March 6, 1990, Tanai launched a failed coup against the president. The defense minister had secretly gained the support of mujahideen leader Gulbuddin al-Hurra Hekmatyar and his *Hezb-e Islami* (“Islamic Party”) forces despite their deep ideological disagreements. The rebels captured Bagram Air Base and attempted to take control of key government offices and facilities. However, they garnered only marginal support from the rest of the military and the coup was defeated. Tanai and some of his closest supporters were able to flee from Bagram into Pakistan where he urged members of Khalq to join Hekmatyar's forces.

Tanai remained in exile in Pakistan through the 1990s. He returned to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. He founded a new political group, *Da Afghanistan Da Solai Ghorzang Gund* (“The Afghanistan Peace Movement”) and emerged an advocate for Pashtun rights.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Taraki, Nur Muhammad (1917–1979)

Nur Muhammad Taraki was one of the founders of the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and president of Afghanistan from 1978 to 1979. His murder was one of the events that precipitated the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. An ethnic Pashtun from the Ghilzai clan, Taraki was born on July 15, 1917, in Ghazni. As a youth, Taraki worked in India where he became interested in communism and Marxist ideology. When he returned to Afghanistan, Taraki became a well-known author and journalist, often writing about social and economic injustice. He served in a variety of minor government posts, including a brief period as a staff member in the Afghan Embassy in the United States.

On January 1, 1965, Taraki and 27 others founded the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Taraki was elected the first general secretary of the party, which emerged as a pro-Soviet, opposition group. The PDPA quickly split into two main factions, each named after their respective newspapers. Taraki's *Khalq* (“Masses”) wing supported a Soviet-style overthrow of the monarchy and its replacement by a socialist government. The *Parcham* (“Banner”) wing was led by Babrak Karmal and advocated a slow, gradual transition to socialism, with an emphasis on democratic change. Over the next decade, each faction

worked to expand and gain ascendancy. Khalq received considerable support from Moscow, and Taraki developed an extensive series of relationships with Soviet officials. Meanwhile, Khalq also had considerable success in infiltrating the military. Taraki supported the 1973 coup that overthrew the Afghan monarchy.

In March 1977, the Soviets mediated a reconciliation between Khalq and Parcham in an effort to create a unified opposition to Mohammed Daoud Khan. Taraki and Karmal signed a unity accord and began working on a plan to overthrow Daoud and seize power. It was agreed that Taraki would become Afghan president when Daoud was deposed. On April 17, 1978, a prominent Parcham, Mir Akbar Khyber, was assassinated. Daoud began to arrest PDPA leaders, and Hafizullah Amin launched the planned coup, which became known as the Saur Revolution. Daoud was killed and Taraki was installed as president, with Karmal as his deputy. Afghanistan was renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Taraki was eager to implement a series of economic and social changes to pave the way for the establishment of a socialist regime. However, Karmal and the Parcham members of the DRA government opposed some of the president's initiatives. In July, Taraki began a broad purge of Parcham supporters in the government and military (for example, Karmal was appointed Afghanistan's ambassador to Czechoslovakia). The government then endeavored to enhance women's rights and reduce the power of the clerics, while implementing a major redistribution of land. The land programs confiscated territory from large landowners, often tribal or clan chieftains, and redistributed the territory to poorer Afghans. It proved highly unpopular, and along with Taraki's other reforms, alienated the traditional leaders in rural areas. By the

early months of 1979, a growing insurgency spread across the nation.

Meanwhile, Taraki and Amin became caught up in a power struggle. Taraki endeavored to create a cult of personality along the lines of Joseph Stalin or Mao Zedong. He was referred to as the "Great Leader" and praised as a great intellectual and visionary. Amin was able to secure the support of the majority of the military. As the mujahideen revolt spread, Taraki tried to loosen Amin's grip on the army, but in March was forced to name his rival prime minister. The Soviets advised Taraki to eliminate Amin, but the attempt failed. On September 14, 1979, Amin arrested Taraki, who was reportedly killed on or about October 8. Amin seized power, but was overthrown by the Soviets in December in Operation Storm 333 (the invasion of Afghanistan), which marked the beginning of the 10-year occupation of the country.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghanistan, Ethnic Groups; Amin, Hafizullah; Brezhnev, Leonid; Gromyko, Andrei; Karmal, Babrak; Khan, Mohammed Daoud; Khyber, Mir Akbar; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Operation Storm 333 (1979); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Saur Revolution (1978–1979); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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Tarzi, Mahmud (1865–1933)

Mahmud Tarzi was a noted Afghan intellectual and political figure who oversaw negotiations that ended the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) and resulted in independence for his country. Tarzi was born on August 23, 1865, in Ghazni into wealth and power as a member of the royal Mohammadzai clan (his father, Ghulam Muhammad Tarzi, was ruler of Kandahar and Baluchistan and a relative of Afghan emir Dost Mohammad). Following the rebellion of Ayub Khan, Afghan ruler Abdur Rahman Khan exiled about 150 members of the Tarzi family in 1882 to India. The clan eventually settled in Syria, then part of the Ottoman Empire, where the young Tarzi came under the influence of a circle of modern, secular elites. Tarzi became fluent in a number of languages, including French and Turkish, and traveled extensively throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. He wrote *Travel Across Three Continents in Twenty-Nine Days*, an account of his journeys, in 1890 (it was not published until 1914).

The Tarzis were allowed to return to Afghanistan after Habibullah Khan came to power in 1901. The future diplomat grew close to Habibullah. He was appointed chief of translation for the monarch in 1905. Tarzi's daughter, Soraya Tarzi, married the emir's son, and future monarch, Amanullah Khan, in 1913.

Tarzi emerged as the leader of the liberal faction within the government, advocating for modernization and Western reforms. He also became known as a writer and translator. Beginning in 1911, Tarzi published the

biweekly *Siraj al-Akbar Afghaniyah*. The newspaper continued until 1919, and was well known as a source of progressive intellectual discourse and anticolonialist thought. Tarzi would subsequently be known as the “father” of Afghan journalism. He supported the emir's reform efforts, arguing for a gradual adoption of a European school system, including prohibitions against religious schools, the madrasahs. Tarzi also argued for women's rights, especially in education and the workforce.

During World War I, Tarzi supported Habibullah's efforts to keep Afghanistan neutral. After Habibullah was assassinated in 1919, Amanullah became emir and appointed his father-in-law foreign minister. Tarzi led negotiations with the British over independence following the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. The resultant treaty established the Durand Line as the border between British India and Afghanistan, while Kabul gained control over its foreign policy and became a fully independent nation. In 1922, Tarzi became the nation's ambassador to France, although he returned to again assume the duties of foreign minister two years later.

In 1927, Tarzi resigned from the government and traveled to Switzerland for medical treatment. In 1929, Amanullah was overthrown and Tarzi and his family went into exile in Istanbul. He died on November 23, 1933 as a result of liver cancer.

Charlie Carlee

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Khan, Abdur Rahman; Khan, Amanullah; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Tarzi, Soraya (1899–1968)

Soraya Tarzi was the queen consort of King Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan during his 10-year reign (1919–1929). She promoted women's rights and cultural reform and became noted as the most significant feminist leader in the country's history. Tarzi was born on November 24, 1899, in Damascus where her family was living in exile. Tarzi's father, the noted intellectual and liberal leader Mahmud Tarzi, introduced his daughter to Western ideas on education, government, and culture. When Habibullah Khan secured the throne in 1901, he invited exiled Afghan leaders, such as Tarzi, to return. The Afghan king's son, Amanullah, met Soraya at court and eventually the two were married during the summer of 1913.

Habibullah was assassinated in 1919, and his son eventually succeeded him. While the new, reformist king endeavored to implement economic and military reforms, his queen advocated for social modernization. They had an unusually close relationship for the period. Soraya was the only wife of Amanullah, who became the first known Afghan ruler with a monogamous marriage. Both the king and queen actively denounced polygamy and endeavored to suppress it. The monarchs attempted to modernize Afghanistan in the face of significant resistance from conservatives and religious leaders. While the reforms were popular among the elite in Kabul and a few other cities, they were viewed with hostility and suspicion in the countryside.

Soraya accompanied her husband in public and did not wear a veil, a trend she encouraged among the wives of other public officials. Amanullah even appointed his wife minister of education. She established the first school for young girls in the country and worked to provide scholarships for older girls to study abroad.

In 1927, the royal couple embarked on a grand tour of Europe and the Middle East. They were warmly received and granted honorary degrees from Oxford University in 1928, an audience with the pope, and meetings with the leaders of countries ranging from Egypt to Italy to Germany to Great Britain. However, while they were out of the country, resistance to their reform efforts galvanized into an insurgency. After their return in 1929, Jalalabad fell and the army deserted the king. Amanullah was forced to abdicate and go into exile in India. The royal family eventually moved to Italy where they remained. Soraya died in Rome on April 20, 1968.

Tom Lansford

See also: Khan, Amanullah; Khan, Habibullah; Tarzi, Mahmud; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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Terrorism

While terrorism has arisen in a variety of cultures and historical periods, much of the world's attention on this phenomenon in recent decades has centered on the Middle

East, where the United States has assumed the mantle of leadership in what President George W. Bush has referred to as “the war on terrorism.”

Middle Eastern terrorism emerged in Western consciousness during the 1970s, primarily through the rise of secular leftist and nationalist groups among Palestinian exiles, which targeted Israelis and their supporters both within and outside of Israel. Some (such as Yasir Arafat’s Fatah organization and George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) were part of broader political movements within the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization, while others (such as Abu Nidal’s Fatah faction) operated outside the PLO. Palestinian nationalists were inspired in part by the success of the Algerian revolution, which used terror as a tactic to free that North African nation from French colonialism in 1962, and by the case of Israel, which won independence from Britain in 1948 in part through the efforts of terrorist groups led by future prime ministers Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir. Without a recognized government or territory, terrorism appeared to many Palestinians to be a more realistic option than conventional or guerrilla warfare.

The rise of Palestinian terrorism was concomitant with the rise of Palestinian nationalism, where successive betrayals and defeats by Arab governments had led Palestinians to take leadership in their own national struggle. The use of such high-profile tactics as airline hijackings and embassy takeovers helped call attention to the plight of the Palestinian people, most of whom were living under Israeli military occupation or in forced exile in refugee camps in neighboring Arab states. Though such tactics led the West to belatedly recognize the Palestinians as a distinct people with national aspirations, it also gave Israel and the United

States the excuse to thwart these goals on the grounds that the nationalist movement was led by terrorists.

The fratricidal Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) brought to the fore a number of ethnic-based militias that utilized terror, including the right-wing Phalangists, based in the Maronite Christian community, and—following the 1982 Israeli invasion and subsequent U.S. intervention—Shiite Islamic groups, some of which coalesced into the Hezbollah movement.

Turkey has been subjected to widespread terrorism by extreme leftist and extreme rightist groups, particularly during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Also during this period, Armenian terrorists would periodically assassinate Turkish diplomats in retaliation for the 1915 genocide and the refusal of Turkey’s government to acknowledge their culpability. Kurdish nationalists, under the leadership of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), engaged in a series of terrorist attacks in Turkey through the 1990s in an effort to secure greater autonomy.

Leftist and Islamic groups used terror on a limited scale against the shah’s repressive regime in Iran during the 1970s. During the early 1980s, following the shah’s ouster in a largely nonviolent revolution and the subsequent consolidation of power by hardline Islamists, there was an upswing in terrorism that included assassinations of top officials of the revolutionary government.

In recent decades, the failure of secular nationalist and leftist movements in the Middle East has given rise to Islamic groups, some of which have engaged in terrorism. Many were Arab veterans of U.S.- and Pakistani-backed mujahideen groups fighting the communist Afghan government and its Soviet backers during the 1980s. This period saw the beginning of a tactic (which had previously been utilized primarily by Hindu

Sri Lankan Tamils) in which assailants, carrying explosives in a vehicle or strapped to themselves, would blow themselves up along with their targets, a phenomenon that became known as suicide bombings.

Several autocratic Arab regimes, long accused of corruption and abandonment of Islamic values, have become targets of Islamic radicals. Egypt was a hotbed of such movements throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, with terrorists targeting government officials (including President Anwar Sadat), wealthy Egyptian elites, and foreign tourists. Conservative monarchies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, along with their Western supporters, became targets of radical Islamists during this period as well. Algeria became the site of the most deadly acts of terrorism in the region beginning in the early 1990s, when the radical Armed Islamic Group (GIA) arose following a military coup that short-circuited scheduled national elections. During the 1990s, when the PLO's renunciation of terrorism and peace talks with Israel failed to end the occupation, Palestinian Islamic groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, later joined by a renegade Fatah faction known as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, commenced a suicide bombing campaign against Israel.

The ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime by invading U.S. forces in 2003 has resulted in Iraq's becoming a major center of terrorism. Though much of the Iraqi resistance has targeted U.S. and Iraqi government forces, there have also been widespread bombings against civilians by both Iraqi and foreign terrorists. Foreign Islamic terrorists, willing to die for their cause, have also flocked to Iraq and in particular have been responsible for wide-scale suicide bombings that have claimed many civilian casualties.

The late 1990s saw the emergence of the Islamist al Qaeda network, led primarily by

Saudi exiles such as Osama bin Laden, who have targeted a number of Arab and Western targets, particularly the United States. Chief among their grievances have been U.S. support for Arab dictatorships; the American-led sanctions, bombings, and invasion of Iraq; U.S. support for Israel; and the ongoing U.S. military presence in the heart of the Islamic world. Al Qaeda's financial resources and sophisticated organization have taken terrorism to unprecedented levels, most dramatically illustrated by the devastating September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States that killed more than 3,000 people. Subsequent attacks by al Qaeda-related groups killed hundreds more in Madrid, London, Casablanca, Riyadh, Jakarta, Bali, and elsewhere.

Most governments and peoples of the Middle East categorically oppose terrorism. The taking of innocent human life is proscribed under Islam just as it is under Christianity and Judaism. However, a number of radical Middle Eastern states—such as the Islamist military government in Sudan, the Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi, the Baathist government of Syria, the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Saddam Hussein's former regime in Iraq—have provided or continue to provide funding and logistical support for terrorist groups.

Such activities have contributed to these governments' international isolation, although the United States has at times exaggerated the extent of support these regimes have provided terrorists in order to further advance other policy goals. U.S. forces bombed Libya in 1985, Iraq in 1993, and Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 because of their governments' alleged support for terrorism, although some of these airstrikes resulted in widespread civilian casualties themselves. In 2001, the U.S.-led airstrikes played a decisive role in the ouster of the

Taliban government in Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary for al Qaeda. Some intelligence and military officers and other officials in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are believed to have quietly supported Islamist terrorists, although top government leaders largely support antiterrorism efforts.

In general, terrorism by nonstate actors arises from those who are too weak to engage in more conventional forms of armed struggle or are motivated by the sheer frustration of their situation. Some individuals who enlist with radical Islamist groups may also be motivated in part by the perceived glory of martyrdom. Supporters of such terrorism justify such actions as a means of inflicting damage on political entities and societies as a whole that are seen as carrying out mass violence through government forces too strong to confront directly.

For example, Israel's occupation and colonization of Palestinian territory seized in the Six-Day War in 1967, the ongoing repression, and rejection of demands for a full withdrawal in return for security guarantees—combined with Israel's overwhelming military power and the large-scale military, financial, and diplomatic support from the world's only remaining superpower—have led some Palestinians to support suicide bombing as a means of convincing Israel that the costs of holding onto the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip are higher than withdrawal. However, such violence has actually hardened the attitudes of Israelis and their American backers, as it appears to reinforce their assumption that the Palestinians' actual goal is not just ending the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the destruction of Israel itself.

The terrorism of previous decades in the Middle East, like terrorism practiced by leftist and nationalist movements elsewhere, was based upon the idea of “propaganda of the

deed,” inspiring popular struggle and demoralizing their opponents. In this regard, it was almost uniformly unsuccessful, particularly as enhanced security measures made successful terrorist operations more difficult.

Suicide bombing not only was easier to carry out, since the terrorists were willing to kill themselves in the process, but Islamist groups were able, despite Islamic prohibitions against suicide and killing innocent people, to take advantage of the exalted role of martyrdom among Muslims to gain recruits and popular support. Such terrorist operations, with their potential for inflicting enormous casualties, appear to also be designed to provoke a disproportionate reaction from governments with superior armed forces, resulting in large-scale civilian casualties and thereby increasing support for their extreme anti-Western ideology. A number of strategic analysts have argued that the U.S. response to 9/11, particularly the invasion of Iraq, has actually strengthened al Qaeda by leading increasing numbers of alienated young Muslims to adopt bin Laden's view of a holy war between Islam and the West.

Some groups, such as al Qaeda, function primarily to promote their causes through terrorism. Others, like Hamas, carry out civilian functions, such as running health clinics and schools and providing social services—as well as supporting an armed wing involved in terrorism. Some have evolved into political parties. For example, since the mid-1990s, Hezbollah has largely refrained from attacks against civilians, has restricted its armed activities primarily toward Israeli occupation forces, and has competed in Lebanese parliamentary elections.

In 2014, a new Sunni terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), emerged from the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq. ISIS, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or simply the

Islamic State, was able to defeat Iraqi security forces and capture large swaths of territory, first in Iraq and then in Syria after proclaiming a new Islamic caliphate. ISIS became known for horrific and grisly atrocities, many of them broadcast on social media, and its efforts to recruit foreign fighters. ISIS committed a series of escalating terrorist attacks in Europe, including the November 13, 2015, strikes in Paris that killed 130, including 7 ISIS terrorists. A U.S.-led coalition, and later Russia, began conducting airstrikes on ISIS in 2015. ISIS has endeavored to create affiliates around the world, including in Afghanistan, where its fighters have battled Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents.

Most contemporary Middle Eastern terrorist groups have emerged out of situations where there has been widespread social displacement through war or uneven economic development. Virtually all have emerged in situations where legal nonviolent means of political change have been suppressed. The disproportionate level of terrorism in the Middle East appears to be less a result of anything inherent within Arab culture or within Islam than a consequence of the systematic denial by governments to allow the manifestation of basic rights, including the right of self-determination. Many experts believe that, because the primary supporters and arms providers of most of these repressive Middle Eastern governments are Western powers such as the United States, it appears that the threat from terrorism is unlikely to be suppressed through military means alone.

Stephen Zunes

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Cruise Missile Strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998); Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); Narcoterrorism; 9/11,

War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Omar, Mullah Muhammed; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Taliban; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Wahhabism; Zawahiri, Ayman al-.

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Tirah Campaign (1897–1898)

The North-West Frontier of India was ablaze in Pathan tribal hostilities in 1897. The British sent many punitive expeditions to suppress these tribal revolts. The Tochi Field Force was sent to quell the Isazais in the Tochi Valley, and the Mohmand Field Force was organized to suppress hostile Mohmands. The Malakand Field Force conducted operations against the Swatis, Utman Khels, Mamunds, and Salarzais, and the Buner Field Force punished the rebellious Bunerwhals.

The Afridis had been receiving a subsidy from the Indian government for many years to safeguard the strategic Khyber Pass. On August 23, 1897, hostile Afridis and Orakzais attacked and seized the forts at the

Khyber Pass. Four days later, with overwhelming strength, Orakzais attacked the British posts on the Samana Ridge, about 30 miles south of the Khyber Pass and the southern boundary of the Tirah region, and close to Peshawar.

To punish the rebellious tribes and discourage any further hostilities to the south, especially in Waziristan, it was decided to form the Tirah Field Force and invade Tirah, the homeland of the Afridis and Orakzais. It was initially difficult to assemble a sufficient number of men due to other ongoing punitive operations. On October 10, 1897, however, under the command of General Sir William S. A. Lockhart, the Tirah Field Force was assembled at Kohat and prepared to advance. Numbering 34,506 British and Indian officers and troops, with 19,934 non-combatant followers and 71,800 transport animals, the Tirah Field Force was the largest British Army expedition to deploy to the field in India since the Indian Mutiny.

The Tirah Field Force consisted of two divisions, plus support and reserve elements. The 1st Division was commanded by Major General W. P. Symons, with its 1st Brigade commanded initially by Colonel (later General Sir) Ian S. M. Hamilton, then by Brigadier General R. Hart, V.C., and the 2nd Brigade commanded by Brigadier General A. Gaselee. Major General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs commanded the 2nd Division, which consisted of Brigadier General F. J. Kempster's 3rd Brigade and Brigadier General R. Westmacott's 4th Brigade. The lines of communication were commanded by Lieutenant General Sir A. P. Palmer, and the Rawalpindi Reserve Brigade by Brigadier General C. R. Macgregor. There were also two mobile columns (the Peshawar Column, commanded by Brigadier General A. G. Hammond, V.C., and the Kurram Movable Column, by Colonel W. Hill) to provide flank security and

support. Support elements included 10 field and mountain artillery batteries totaling 60 guns, and the first machine-gun detachment deployed to the North-West Frontier.

The Tirah Field Force strategy was to advance north, subjugate the Tirah region, then move farther northeast to recapture the Khyber Pass. The Tirah area, however, was basically unknown to the British, and the combined strength of the Afridis and the Orakzais was estimated at around 40,000–50,000.

The British advance began on October 11, 1897. Seven days later, routes over the Samana Ridge were reconnoitered, and fighting broke out almost immediately. The 5,000-foot-high Dargai Heights, key terrain dominating the area, were seized by the British on October 18 with casualties of 10 killed and 53 wounded. It was decided not to hold the Dargai Heights and the British evacuated the position.

After more units and supplies, including ammunition, had arrived, the Dargai Heights were again attacked on October 20, 1897. The Pathans had reinforced their positions on the Heights, and a British artillery barrage failed to dislodge the tribal warriors. Gurkhas led the attack, but were pinned down by accurate rifle fire. At about noon, the 1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders—with bayonets fixed and the regimental bagpipes playing “Cock o’ the North”—led a five-battalion assault. Before the British reached the summit, the tribesmen fled. The second capture of Dargai cost the British 36 killed and 159 wounded, and was the only set-piece battle of the campaign.

A pause in the hostilities ensued as the 1st Division and transport, traveling on bad roads, rejoined the leading 2nd Division. The advance continued on October 28, 1897, and the next objective was the 6,700-foot Sampagha Pass. The Tirah Valley was



In addition to the three major Anglo-Afghan wars, the British fought a number of campaigns in an effort to stabilize the frontier region between their Indian colonies and Afghanistan. Pictured is a British camp during the Tirah Campaign (1897–1898). (Popperfoto/Getty Images)

reached after little resistance on November 1, 1897. The following eight days were spent gathering supplies and reconnoitering the area. The Orakzais were showing signs of submission although there was constant harassment and sniping from the Zakha Khels, a powerful Afridi clan. Lockhart retaliated by launching a scorched earth campaign, leveling villages, destroying crops, and felling orchards. On November 11, Orakzai tribal chiefs agreed with peace terms to return all captured weapons to the British, surrender 300 of their own breech-loading rifles, pay a 30,000-rupee (£10,000) fine, and forfeit all allowances and subsidies.

British units continued operating to eliminate resistance throughout November 1897, but the Zakha Khels engaged in frequent hit-and-run engagements, especially against vulnerable support and transport elements.

The Afridis, as a tribe, had not submitted fully to the British, but with the approach of winter, the British began their 40-mile march through the Bara Valley to the Khyber Pass on December 7, 1897. Each division marched on a separate route. In snow and frigid temperatures, the British continued. The 2nd Division was harried the entire way and fought numerous rear-guard actions. After having been separated, the Tirah Field Force's two divisions converged at the Indian frontier town of Barkai on December 14.

Lockhart did not feel he had totally accomplished his mission. On December 22, 1897, the 1st Division marched to the Bazar Valley, the home of the Zakha Khels, and the Peshawar Column advanced to the Khyber Pass. (This latter operation is frequently called the Bazar Valley Expedition.) By January 1, 1898, three British brigades held

the Khyber Pass, while two additional brigades blockaded the Afridi territory. The British fought a few engagements, destroyed Afridi villages, and captured Afridi cattle and sheep. The last of the Afridi clans submitted to British demands in April 1898, signaling the end of the Great Pathan Revolt. From October 12, 1897, to April 1898, the British suffered 1,150 total casualties (287 killed, 853 wounded, and 10 missing).

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Afghanistan, Border Disputes; Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Khyber Pass; Lockhart, Sir William; Malakand Field Force (1897).

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Tomsen, Peter (1940–)

Peter Tomsen was the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan during the period of the Soviet withdrawal and the initial onset of the Afghan Civil War (1989–1992). Tomsen was born in Cleveland, Ohio, on November 19, 1940, and grew up in Cincinnati. He earned a master's degree in public and international affairs from the University of Pittsburgh in 1964. Tomsen

then joined the Peace Corps and served in Nepal for two years, working with Tibetan refugees. Upon his return to the United States, he joined the Foreign Service in 1967. He had a distinguished and active career over the next three decades. From 1969 to 1970, he served in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, before being posted as the political officer at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. Tomsen served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1977 to 1979, and then headed the State Department's section on India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives from 1983 to 1985. The diplomat was the deputy chief at the U.S. Embassy in China when President George H. W. Bush appointed him a special representative to the government of Afghanistan in 1989.

Tomsen was given the rank of ambassador and tasked with a difficult assignment. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the U.S. policymakers assumed that the pro-Soviet regime of Mohammed Najibullah would collapse. The envoy was supposed to pave the way for relations with whatever successor regime would emerge. However, the Najibullah government showed surprising resilience against the various mujahideen factions battling it for control of the country. Part of the reason for the regime's continuation was the transition of the mujahideen rebellion from an anti-Soviet insurgency into a broader civil war. Najibullah endeavored to implement a policy of national reconciliation to bring together disparate factions in the country, with some minor successes. The result was that some mujahideen groups joined government forces in fighting other factions. Complicating the situation was the continued monetary backing for antigovernment mujahideen groups by Persian Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, and concurrent support from Pakistani intelligence. Tomsen argued strongly for U.S. backing for Ahmed Shah Massoud, whom he perceived

as the most pro-Western of the major mujahideen leaders. However, Pakistan backed Massoud's principal rival, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Since most U.S. assistance flowed through Pakistan, Hekmatyar was consequently the primary beneficiary of outside arms and monetary aid.

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended economic support for the Najibullah regime by Moscow and left the government with few resources. Tomsen tried to convince policymakers in Washington to support a broad peace initiative and power-sharing agreement, but by this point, official U.S. policy had become avoiding involvement in the civil war. Najibullah's government collapsed in April 1992. An interim government emerged with Burhanuddin Rabbani as president. With the fall of the Afghan regime, Tomsen was transferred back to Washington and became the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, a post he held until 1995.

Tomsen retired from the Foreign Service in 2000. He subsequently became well known as a writer and commentator on Afghanistan and West Asian affairs. Tomsen published a well-received book, *The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failure of Great Powers*, in 2011.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Massoud, Ahmed Shah; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Rabbani, Burhanuddin; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Tora Bora, Battle of (2001)

The Battle of Tora Bora was a failed offensive by U.S.-led coalition forces, code-named Jawbreaker, to capture Osama bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda leaders in a remote, mountainous region of Afghanistan in December 2001. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States led a coalition that included antiregime fighters to depose the Taliban government and destroy the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. By December, the Taliban had been overthrown and bin Laden and the remnants of his al Qaeda militants had retreated to Tora Bora, a cave complex in the White Mountains, southwest of Jalalabad, near the border with Pakistan. Tora Bora had originally been used as a base for the mujahideen during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), and it had an elaborate system of caves and tunnels. Estimates on the number of militants at the complex vary widely, ranging from 300 to 1,000, however, there were likely about 700–800 fighters at the beginning of the offensive.

Coalition elements included approximately 50–100 U.S., British, and German special operations forces and about 2,500 anti-Taliban Northern Alliance fighters. The coalition forces were supported by extensive airpower and Soviet-era tanks. At the beginning of December 2001, coalition aircraft began a heavy bombing campaign against the complex. On December 3, the special operations forces were deployed and the Northern Alliance forces assaulted positions in the lower elevations. Despite the aerial bombardment, the Northern Alliance forces made slow progress, hampered by disputes

over command and tactics. One consequence was that the perimeter of the complex was never completely sealed, and the southern route from Tora Bora to Pakistan remained open during much of the battle.

Meanwhile, intelligence, including radio chatter, emerged on bin Laden's location within the complex. U.S. Special Operations Forces officers tried unsuccessfully to organize a frontal assault to clear the remaining caves and capture or kill the al Qaeda leader on December 12. Instead, Northern Alliance militia leaders agreed to a truce, which they argued would result in the surrender of the remaining al Qaeda fighters. During this lull, bin Laden was believed to have escaped from his initial position in the caves to a more secure spot. It would be the closest the coalition came to killing or capturing the al Qaeda leader until 2011. Fighting resumed later in the day and continued until December 17 when the last cave was captured. It was reported that bin Laden fled across the border to Pakistan during the final days of fighting. Over the next month special operations forces and intelligence officers combed through Tora Bora searching for information and the bodies of senior al Qaeda leaders. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative Gary Berntsen led an unsuccessful effort to find bin Laden after the battle.

Al Qaeda losses during the battle were estimated to be about 200 killed, with an unknown number of wounded. The majority of the militants escaped to Pakistan where they launched subsequent attacks back into Afghanistan. No coalition forces were killed in Jawbreaker, although there were a number wounded. The battle marked the end of the first phase of the Afghan War. After the action, reports were critical of the fighting prowess of the Northern Alliance troops and their motivation, and of the failure of the coalition to deploy more U.S. or allied troops

to ensure the destruction of the al Qaeda forces.

Tom Lansford

See also: War (2001–); Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Northern Alliance; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Taliban.

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Transport and Logistics

Transport and logistics have been a challenge for military forces throughout Afghanistan's history. The country's rugged terrain and poor infrastructure made it difficult to transport troops and supplies in all of the nation's conflicts. These challenges have been magnified by the propensity of Afghan tribes to engage in guerrilla warfare and utilize tactics that destroyed military transport and roads.

Until the 20th century, military transport in Afghanistan meant primarily horses and mules, either carrying individual loads or pulling carts or wagons. Successive armies utilized pack animals to carry supplies and soldiers into battle when invading Afghanistan

or defending Afghan territory from foreigners. Sure-footed ponies and mules could be used to travel dangerous mountain paths, but their cargo capacity was limited. Most pack animals could carry approximately 30 percent of their body weight. For instance, depending on its size, an average mule could transport 150–200 pounds (68–90 kg). Mules were preferred to horses; they were tougher and better able to navigate the Afghan terrain. The carts and wagons used were generally wide-beamed with oversized wheels. During the Second Anglo-Afghan War, light carts with two oversized wheels, such as the Heyland cart or Phelp's cart, were usually drawn by one horse or mule and could carry 400–600 pounds (181.4–272 kg) under ideal conditions for short periods. Heavier wagons were pulled by oxen and could transport up to 960 pounds (435 kg).

Pack or draft animals were a less than ideal means of transport for several reasons. They needed fodder. This meant that fodder had to be brought with the army, thereby reducing overall cargo capacity, or forage areas had to be found along the route. The terrain typically resulted in limited forage depending on the region of Afghanistan. Pack and draft animals were also vulnerable to attack. During the First (1839–1842) and Second (1878–1880) Anglo-Afghan Wars, the marauders constantly raided Anglo-Indian supply trains in an effort to capture or kill pack animals and secure their supplies. In response, the Anglo-Indian forces had to detail a significant portion of their cavalry to protection for their supply trains. By the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), Anglo-Indian forces had begun to use motorized vehicles, ranging from armored cars to trucks. Rough terrain and poor roads plagued the vehicles, which had to carry fuel with them. The result was that both sides continued to make extensive use of pack or draft animals.

During the 20th century, successive Afghan governments endeavored to expand the country's road and rail system with limited success. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, they found only three major paved roadways in the country, the 300-mile (482.8 km) highway from Termez in the north to Kabul, the Kabul to Jalalabad road, and the highway from the western border to Herat to Kandahar. During the invasion, the first and third aforementioned roads served as routes for the advancing troops. Under normal circumstances, Soviet logistics doctrine called for supply depots to be within 6.2–18.6 miles (10–30 km) of the battlefield. However, because the Soviets and their Afghan allies only controlled 25–30 percent of the country, operations had to be carried out with columns carrying much more of their own supplies than would normally be the case or being resupplied by air (mainly by helicopters). Meanwhile, the combination of poor roads, rugged terrain, and poor weather resulted in repeated delays and necessitated large resupply convoys of up to 300 trucks, which would travel more than 300–400 miles (482.8–643.7 km) over a two-week period. The convoys were often targeted by mujahideen for rocket or rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. Drivers were awarded medals for every 20 trips they completed.

During the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), combatants relied on leftover Soviet-era vehicles or converted civilian transport, including pickup trucks, motorcycles, and commercial vans. When the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, the Taliban regime lacked significant transport. The U.S.-led coalition created a logistics hub from Bagram air field and transported significant equipment by air. However, some coalition special forces rode into battle on horses in the early days of the invasion.

As the coalition increased in size and the scope of its operations expanded, it was forced to rely on supply convoys from Pakistan. These columns faced the same threats as had the Soviets from mines or RPG attacks. However, the use of suicide bombers escalated the threats. For instance, in March 2012 a Taliban suicide bomber attacked a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply convoy killing 17. Days later another attack on a convoy left 1 NATO soldier and 5 Afghan security guards dead, along with 14 militants and 10 civilians. Pakistan suspended permission for the NATO convoys in 2010 and 2011 following coalition airstrikes that killed Pakistani civilians. In response, NATO created new supply routes from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; British Colonial Army, Forces and Tactics; Cavalry and Cavalry Tactics; Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Special Operations Forces.

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United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan

The history of the relationship between the United Kingdom and Afghanistan dates to the era of European imperialism that unfolded between the 18th and 20th centuries. The British Empire was drawn to Central and South Asia and the countries situated in those neighboring regions of the developing world primarily for economic reasons, emphasizing the Indian subcontinent as a rich source of natural resources and a hub for trade throughout Asia. Its engagement in Afghanistan to the north, on the other hand, was driven by more by geopolitics and security, given the need to safeguard investments in the United Kingdom's vast (and extraordinarily valuable) Indian territorial possessions. As is the norm for any imperial power, the United Kingdom had to strike strategic balances based on the predominant threats to the national interests it deemed most vital, whether associated with economic, political, or security matters. With respect to Central and South Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, that meant struggling with Russia in a "Great Game" to control geographically rugged Afghanistan for use as a buffer to safeguard British India.

Ahmad Shah Durrani unified Afghanistan in 1747. He continued traditions of Muslim control over Afghanistan that have origins in the conquests of Arab Muslim forces in the region in the seventh century, which were part of the initial wave of expansion following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632. By the start of the 18th century, Islam

retained a central role in Afghanistan's cultural identity, one that helped to link its myriad ethnic tribes and their cultures and histories. At that temporal juncture, as the Mughal Empire that occupied parts of both Afghanistan and India from the early 16th to early 18th centuries fell rapidly into decline, Great Britain set its sights on imperial expansion into both Central and South Asia. It began with the economic initiatives of the East India Company, which established Fort St. William along the Ganges River in 1696, leading to the construction of the city of Calcutta, now known as Kolkata, in the western Indian Bengal region.

Great Britain built an economically productive, if not consistently politically stable and secure, colonial empire in India and saw in Afghanistan an opportunity to expand its imperial power and influence regionally and further enhance its prestige at the international level. A successful offensive against the flagging Mughal regime left the East India Company in position to appoint William Hastings as its lord governor of India in 1774, a position that transitioned to British governmental control in 1858. While still consolidating its control over India, Britain elected to pursue the creation of a Central Asian buffer zone, at the heart of which lay Afghanistan. The British then clashed with Russia in a geopolitical "Great Game" for control over both Afghanistan and the broader region, a game neither won, in large part because of fierce tribal resistance. Ultimately, neither was able maintain a long-term grasp on any part of Afghanistan for long, as illustrated by insurgencies that produced the Anglo-Afghan

Wars of 1839–1842 and 1879–1880. Following the latter conflict, the British adapted their tactics, installing Emir Abdur Rahman Khan as leader of the kingdom of Afghanistan and providing subsidies to maintain influence there in the future.

Afghanistan remained a focal point for Great Britain so long as it retained its Indian colonial empire. That ended with a British withdrawal and the ensuing division of the territory it no longer controlled into the newly independent states India and Pakistan in 1947. That division came primarily along religious lines, with Hinduism the predominant faith in the former country and Islam the nearly exclusive one practiced in the latter. Over the course of much of the Cold War, Afghanistan was a relatively stable country, albeit one overshadowed by the principal powers of Central and South Asia, most notably China, India, Iran, Pakistan and the Soviet Union. That regional calm was broken by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and a decade of mujahideen resistance supported by the United States, Pakistan, and Arab fighters from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states, which culminated in Moscow's withdrawal in 1989. From that point, Afghanistan descended rapidly into chaos as rival mujahideen and other tribal factions hardly paused before switching from attacking the Soviets to fighting one another. For their part, the West (the United Kingdom certainly included) and the broader international community stood by rather than intervene. By the mid-1990s, a group of Muslim students educated in Pakistani religious schools (madrasahs) had emerged as a source of order in Afghanistan. Known then and since as the Taliban, this group imposed an extreme variant of Sunni Islam, known by some as Wahhabism and others as Salafism, on the population and provided safe haven to the

transnational terrorist organization al Qaeda. That group's terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, drew American-led intervention in Afghanistan that forced the Taliban regime from power and set the stage for both counterterrorism and nation- and state-building efforts that continue in that country at present.

In the aftermath of the removal from power of the Taliban regime through the American prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the fall of 2001, an initiative in which British forces participated from the outset in a supporting role, an immediate need arose for an outside military force presence to focus on providing as secure an environment as possible for the management of the nation- and state-building project that followed. That presence came in the form of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with the vast majority of its members drawn from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which took over formal leadership of ISAF in August 2003. The United Kingdom consistently provided the largest non-American contingent in ISAF since that entity was established and had a collective 2,837 forces from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, British Army, and Royal Air Force deployed to Afghanistan when ISAF's formal mission came to a conclusion, concurrent with a U.S. drawdown that reduced the American force presence there to 9,800, down from a high of 100,000 in May 2011.

The rationale for the establishment of ISAF was a straightforward, sensible one designed to provide for a division of labor in military responsibilities, such that the United States focused on counterterrorism generally and the hunt for al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden specifically, while ISAF handled the security component of nation- and state-building efforts therein, which included a

significant emphasis on counterinsurgency operations. As the United States pursued bin Laden, unsuccessfully over both the short and longer terms during President George W. Bush's two terms in office, ISAF deployed 10,000 forces, all but exclusively in the capital of Kabul, before NATO assumed a leadership role, expanding the number of deployed troops to 30,000 and the geographic range across Afghanistan's ethnically and tribally diverse regions. ISAF was built through force contributions from 42 countries, including 28 NATO member states. As with the United States, the United Kingdom's participation in military operations in Afghanistan entailed significant costs, including 453 deaths and 616 injuries among British forces.

Like the United States, the United Kingdom maintains a follow-on presence among the Western contingent still participating in efforts to counter the ongoing Taliban insurgency and train Afghan military and security forces. In fact, one can draw broad parallels

between the challenges the British and their American and other NATO allies continue to face in Afghanistan and those the United Kingdom grappled with when it initially encountered stiff (and ultimately successful) resistance to its "Great Game"—driven intervention there in the 19th century. In addition to the Taliban, which has gained strength since the interconnected U.S. and ISAF drawdowns, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria continues to gain members and sympathizers in Afghanistan. Consequently, overall, when considering the future of Afghanistan (and, more pointedly, the relationship between Kabul and London), it remains prudent to draw insights from the aforementioned challenges of both the recent and distant past.

Robert J. Pauly Jr.

See also: Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809); Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Raj, British (1858–1947).

Related Primary Document

U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, "Statement on Military Action in Afghanistan," October 7, 2001

Speaking from his Downing Street office on October 7, 2001, British prime minister Tony Blair delivered the following speech regarding the United Kingdom's role in U.S.-led strikes against Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon near Washington, D.C.

As you know from the announcement by President Bush [George W. Bush], military action against targets inside Afghanistan has begun. I can confirm that UK forces are engaged in this action. I want to pay tribute at the outset to Britain's armed forces. There is no greater strength for a British prime minister and the British nation at a time like this than to know that the forces we are calling upon are amongst the best in the world. They and their families are, of course, carrying an immense burden at this moment and will be feeling deep anxiety, as will the British

people. But we can take great pride in their courage, their sense of duty and the esteem with which they are held throughout the world.

No country lightly commits forces to military action and the inevitable risks involved. But we made it clear following the attacks upon the United States on September 11 that we would take part in action once it was clear who was responsible. There is no doubt in my mind, nor in the mind of anyone who has been through all the available evidence, including intelligence material, that these attacks were carried out by the Al Qaeda network, masterminded by Osama bin Laden. Equally it is clear that his network is harbored and supported by the Taliban regime inside Afghanistan.

It is now almost a month since the atrocity occurred. It is more than two weeks since an ultimatum was delivered to the Taliban to yield up the terrorists or face the consequences. It is clear beyond doubt that they will not do this. They were given the choice of siding with justice or siding with terror; and they chose to side with terror.

There are three parts, all equally important, to the operation in which we are engaged: military, diplomatic, and humanitarian.

The military action we are taking will be targeted against places we know to be involved in the Al Qaeda network of terror or against the military apparatus of the Taliban. This military plan has been put together mindful of our determination to do all we humanly can to avoid civilian casualties. I cannot disclose, obviously, how long this wave of action will last, but we will act with reason and resolve. We have set the objectives to eradicate Osama bin Laden's network of terror and to take action against the Taliban regime that is sponsoring him.

As to the precise British involvement, I can confirm that last Wednesday [October 3] the U.S. government made a specific request that a number of UK military assets be used in the operation which has now begun, and I gave the authority for these assets to be deployed. They include the base at Diego Garcia, reconnaissance and other aircraft, and missile-firing submarines. The missile-firing submarines are in use tonight; the air assets will be available for use in the coming days.

The United States are obviously providing the bulk of the force required and leading the operation. But this is an international effort. As well as the UK, France, Germany, Australia, and Canada have also committed themselves to take part in it.

On the diplomatic and political front, in the time I have been prime minister I cannot recall a situation that has commanded so quickly such a powerful coalition of support, and not just from those countries involved in military action, but from many others in all parts of the world. That coalition has, I believe, strengthened, not weakened, in the 26 days since the atrocity occurred. And this is no small measure due to the statesmanship of President Bush, to whom I pay tribute tonight. The world understands that whilst of course there are dangers in action, the dangers of inaction are far, far greater: the threat of further such outrages, the threats to our economies, the threat to the stability of the world.

On the humanitarian front we are assembling a coalition of support for refugees in and outside Afghanistan, which is as vital as the military coalition. Even before September 11, 4 million Afghans were on the move. There are 2 million refugees in Pakistan and one-and-a-half million in Iran. We have to act for humanitarian reasons to alleviate the appalling suffering of the Afghan

people and to deliver stability so that people from that region stay in that region. Britain, of course, is heavily involved in that humanitarian effort.

So we are taking action, therefore, on all those three fronts: military, diplomatic, and humanitarian.

I also want to say very directly to the British people why this matters so much directly to Britain. First, let us not forget that the attacks of September 11 represented the worst terrorist outrage against British citizens in our history. The murder of British citizens, whether it happens overseas or not, is an attack upon Britain. But even if no British citizen had died, it would be right to act. This atrocity was an attack on us all, on people of all faiths and people of none. We know the Al Qaeda network threatened Europe, including Britain, and indeed, any nation throughout the world that does not share their fanatical views. So we have a direct interest in acting in our own self-defense to protect British lives.

It was also an attack not just on lives but on livelihoods. We can see since the 11th of September how economic confidence has suffered, what all that means for British jobs and British industry. Our prosperity and standard of living, therefore, require us to deal with this terrorist threat.

We act also because the Al Qaeda network and the Taliban regime are funded in large part on the drugs trade—90% of all heroin sold on British streets originates from Afghanistan. Stopping that trade is again directly in our interests.

I wish to say finally, as I've said many times before, that this is not a war with Islam. It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of Muslims, to hear bin Laden and his associates described as Islamic terrorists. They are terrorists pure and simple. Islam is a peaceful and tolerant religion and the acts of these people are wholly contrary to the teachings of the Koran.

These are difficult and testing times, therefore, for all of us. People are bound to be concerned about what the terrorists may seek to do in response. I should say there is at present no specific credible threat to the UK that we know of, and that we have in place tried and tested contingency plans which are the best possible response to any further attempts at terror.

This, of course, is a moment of the utmost gravity for the world. None of the leaders involved in this action want war. None of our nations want it, we are a peaceful people. But we know that sometimes to safeguard peace we have to fight. Britain has learned that lesson many times before in our history. We only do it if the cause is just, but this cause is just. The murder of almost 7,000 innocent people in America was an attack on our freedom, our way of life, an attack on civilized values the world over.

We waited so that those responsible could be yielded up by those shielding them. That offer was refused. We have now no choice so we will act and our determination in acting is total. We will not let up or rest until our objectives are met in full.

Thank you.

Source: Blair, Tony. *Statement on military action in Afghanistan*. October 7, 2001. UK National Archives. Available online at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040621031906/http://number10.gov.uk/page1615>. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) was launched on March 28, 2002, to help in the reconstruction and economic development of Afghanistan. UNAMA was created in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1401 and was designed to support the December 2001 Bonn Agreement. In addition to upholding the tenets of the Bonn Agreement, UNAMA was charged with supervising humanitarian relief, recovery, and reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. To support the Bonn Agreement, UNAMA was also tasked with helping the government of Afghanistan achieve a stable democratic process, providing strategic and political counsel to Afghan leaders, and aiding in the elimination of illegal drug cultivation and trade.

UNAMA is housed within the UN's peace-keeping operations division and maintains

approximately 1,550 personnel, of whom almost 80 percent are Afghan nationals. UNAMA is headquartered in Kabul, with more than a dozen regional offices throughout the country. Since 2002, UNAMA has been headed by special representatives of the secretary-general, beginning with Lakhdar Brahimi (2002–2004), and currently Nicholas Haysom (2014–). The secretary-general's special representative is aided by two deputies, who supervise political and economic/social development issues. As part of its mission, UNAMA played a central role in national elections in 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010, and 2014. In an attempt to ensure that the Afghan government evolves into a stable, effective governing force on its own, UNAMA has not taken an active role in policymaking, instead acting as an arbiter and counselor when needed.

UNAMA has come under physical attack on several occasions by extremists who deplore a Western presence in Afghanistan. In 2003 the Kandahar office was bombed, resulting in the death of a UN worker. In 2004 three UN officials charged with supervising elections were kidnapped and held for more than a month. Sporadic violence and attempted violence against UNAMA personnel have occurred throughout the nation, and the incidents began to increase in number as the Taliban insurgency gained ground in 2007. On October 28, 2009, suicide bombers attacked a guesthouse in Kabul, killing 5 UN employees and 3 other people in a furious two-hour battle. This led to the relocation of some 600 of its 1,100 staffers in the country to safer locations and temporary withdrawal of the remaining 500 from the country.

The Afghan government took the lead in elections scheduled for 2009 and 2010, which proved controversial amid allegations of voter fraud and corruption on the part of the Hamid Karzai regime, but UNAMA

monitored the process and provided the Kabul government with support upon request. On March 20, 2008, UN Security Council Resolution 1806 extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan for an additional year, until March 23, 2009. The UNAMA's mission was similarly extended repeatedly for an additional year, most recently in March 2015. However, in 2012, 10 field offices were closed, leaving UNAMA with active offices in 13 provinces across the country and liaison sites in Islamabad and Tehran. Meanwhile, UNAMA provided assistance for the 2014 presidential elections. The inauguration of President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani marked the first democratic transition of power in the country.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Bonn Agreement (2001); Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf; Karzai, Hamid; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Taliban.

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United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–)

In response to al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush presidential administration launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001, which targeted the Taliban regime that harbored al Qaeda in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001.

Using a combination of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assets and U.S. Special Forces on the ground and targeted airstrikes to support the opposition Northern Alliance, the United States used OEF to drive the Taliban from power in December 2001. From that point forward, first for the Bush administration from 2001 to 2009 and then for the Barack Obama administration from 2009 to 2016, the American military commitment to Afghanistan has featured two related, if not always fully interconnected, components: the hunt for al Qaeda leaders, most notably Osama bin Laden, in the context of the global war on terrorism; and the provision of as secure an environment as possible for the conduct of nation- and state-building efforts, supported largely by an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led for all but the first two years of its existence by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The U.S. military presence in Afghanistan started with a handful of special operations forces teams tasked with coordinating with Northern Alliance forces and helping to direct American airstrikes against Taliban positions as the opening stage of OEF unfolded. Within one year of the start of OEF, the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan had risen to 10,000, a figure that grew as high as 33,000 during Bush's time in office. Concurrent with the American deployment increases came a progressively more substantial ISAF presence, one capped at 10,000 through 2003, at which point NATO assumed command and expanded the scope of its operations beyond the capital of Kabul and immediate vicinity to Afghanistan's diverse and often remote provinces, where villagers were subject to the authority and brutality of Taliban insurgents and/or local warlords. With that expansion in areas of geographic responsibility came a tripling of the size of ISAF to 30,000, with force

contributions from 42 countries, including 28 NATO members.

The most significant mission for American military forces under the Bush administration was to capture or kill members of al Qaeda, with bin Laden the principal target. After cornering bin Laden and other al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in the Tora Bora Mountains in December 2001, the United States failed to deploy sufficient assets to finish the job. Instead, bin Laden and a core group of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters slipped across Afghanistan's northeastern border into Pakistan, where they regrouped and carried on, with the former continuing to spread its ideology and plan future terrorist attacks and the latter building an insurgent network to oppose the Washington-supported government of President Hamid Karzai in Kabul. From 2001 to 2008, the American focus remained primarily on counterterrorism tactics targeting al Qaeda, although varying numbers of U.S. forces were also tasked with supporting ISAF, especially on counterinsurgency initiatives.

At the heart of American and ISAF counterinsurgency efforts was the use of provincial reconstruction teams, which were deployed to forward operating bases in regions struggling to maintain security and order amidst regular Taliban attacks. They often served dual purposes: first, provide services such as medical care and schools for villagers to build relationships that could reduce levels of existing and potential future local support for the Taliban and al Qaeda; second, use those relationships to gather intelligence to put to use in operations against both groups. U.S. Special Operations Forces, including Navy Sea Air and Land (SEAL) teams and Army Ranger units, have played prominent roles in operations targeting terrorist group leaders for capture or elimination. They have also helped trained Afghan security forces to undertake

comparable missions, under both Bush and Obama.

The most significant shift in the American military approach to Afghanistan from Bush to Obama was the latter's decision to focus more on the war on terrorism broadly and the hunt for bin Laden specifically rather than on the U.S. commitment to nation- and state-building efforts in Iraq. Obama progressively drew down American force levels in Iraq from 2009 to the endpoint of full withdrawal in December 2011, while increasing the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan from 30,000 at the start of 2009 to a high of 100,000 in 2011. Those changes in force levels reflected the Obama administration's assessment that a strategy focusing on the adversaries responsible for 9/11 made more sense than maintaining the Bush administration's emphasis on Iraq. Ultimately, that calculation produced one particularly important result: the elimination of bin Laden in a May 2011 SEAL raid on the Abbottabad, Pakistan compound where the al Qaeda leader had been hiding.

Bin Laden's death, while encouraging for the American public, especially given the casualties sustained on 9/11 and those lost in the U.S.-led war on terror since, also contributed to a decision by the Obama administration to wind down its military commitment to Afghanistan as well as Iraq. The U.S. deployment level in Afghanistan plunged from its 2011 high of 100,000, in advance of a nearly complete December 2014 withdrawal that allowed for a follow-on force of 9,800 tasked primarily with training the Afghan military. ISAF, too, wound down its mission in Afghanistan after 2014, leaving only 7,000. Both maintained those sizes at the start of 2016, with decisions on further reductions (or increases) to be left to Obama's successor in the White House.

Robert J. Pauly Jr.



One of the main goals of the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan was the capture or death of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Pictured is an aerial view of bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where the terrorist leader was killed by a U.S. Special Forces raid in May 2011. (Department of Defense—CNP/Newscom)

See also: Bush, George W.; Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Obama, Barack; Taliban; United States, Relations with Afghanistan.

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United States, Relations with Afghanistan

Relations between the United States and Afghanistan have been characterized by long periods of neglect on the part of successive administrations in Washington, followed by times of significant interest and intervention, primarily during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989) and the post–September 11, 2001, era. The United States did not open formal relations with Afghanistan until the 1920s when an Afghan delegation visited Washington. In 1934, the United States

conferred diplomatic recognition on Afghanistan and appointed its ambassador in Tehran to also represent the country in Kabul. During World War II, the United States opened a legation in Kabul to help counter German influence in the country and ensure the nation remained neutral in the conflict.

After the end of World War II, successive Afghan governments sought to strengthen relations with the United States and to secure military and economic assistance. A full U.S. ambassador was appointed to Afghanistan, and an embassy was constructed in Kabul. However, growing ties between the United States and Pakistan led the administrations of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower to refuse military aid. Truman denied two formal requests from the Afghans for military aid in 1951, and Eisenhower denied a similar appeal in 1954. The United States did provide limited economic assistance through loans for infrastructure projects from the U.S. Import-Export Bank. The most significant endeavor was the Helmand Valley Project, which included the construction of a hydroelectric dam and irrigation improvements and cost more than \$110 million over a two-decade period. Vice president Richard M. Nixon traveled to Afghanistan in 1953, and Eisenhower visited the country in 1959. Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah paid a state visit to the United States in 1963. None of the visits resulted in substantial new assistance for Afghanistan.

Denied significant aid from the United States, Afghanistan increasingly turned to the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. The Soviet Union also became Afghanistan's main trade partner. As the Soviets increased their presence and influence in Afghanistan in the 1960s, little was done by Washington to challenge Moscow's role. Pakistan remained the key ally of the United States in the region. Tensions between Islamabad

and Kabul over border disputes prevented deeper ties between the United States and Afghanistan.

In 1978, the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) overthrew the government of Dost Mohammad Khan. Dost Mohammad had initiated an effort to reduce his nation's dependency on the Soviet Union and had reached out to the United States and moderate Arab nations in a new bid for security and economic aid. The coup placed Afghanistan firmly in the Soviet orbit. There was a dramatic increase in the number of Soviet military advisers. On February 14, 1979, U.S. ambassador Adolf "Spike" Dubs was killed when Afghan security forces stormed a hotel room where he was being held during a kidnapping. In protest of the handling of the botched rescue attempt, the United States declined to appoint a new ambassador (the embassy itself would be closed in 1989) and cut aid.

When the Soviet invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Moscow and suspended any remaining assistance programs with Kabul. (See the State Department statement protesting the Soviet invasion below, in the Related Primary Document section.) It also began to support antiregime rebels or mujahideen. U.S. financial and military assistance was coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and funneled through Pakistan. U.S. support steadily increased during the 1980s, reaching more than \$600 million annually by the late 1980s. With bases in Pakistan and funding from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf states, the mujahideen were able to prevent the PDPA from consolidating control over the countryside and to inflict growing casualties on the Soviets and their PDPA allies. Officially, the United States sought a negotiated Soviet withdrawal from the country, but the

administration of Ronald W. Reagan was also driving for a broad defeat for the Soviets. One result was that the United States continued to supply funding to the mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The end of the Cold War brought an end to U.S. support and interest in Afghanistan.

The United States avoided involvement in the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001). Its embassy remained shuttered. It did recognize the governing coalition of Burhanuddin Rabbani as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, even after the Taliban seized power in 1996. The administration of Bill Clinton provided some limited humanitarian and economic assistance to the Taliban during the 1990s, but also initiated missile strikes on al Qaeda terrorist facilities in the country following the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. In May 2001, the George W. Bush administration provided \$43 million to the Taliban for drug eradication programs.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks dramatically recast the U.S. role in Afghanistan. The Bush administration gave the Taliban regime an ultimatum to turn over al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and cease support for terrorism or face invasion. When the Taliban refused to surrender bin Laden, the United States led a coalition that included traditional allies such as Great Britain and France and the Afghan anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The United States relied on the Northern Alliance for the majority of the group forces in the campaign against the Taliban and provided airstrikes and missile attacks, directed by special operations forces. Despite the initial small size of its troop deployment (U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled around 9,700 by the end of 2002), the United States and its coalition overthrew the Taliban and its al Qaeda allies by December 2001. The United States thus became the dominant military power in Afghanistan and would remain so through 2016.

U.S. military strength in Afghanistan peaked at about 100,000 troops, before declining to less than 10,000 in 2016. In 2014, the two countries agreed to a new security framework whereby the United States would maintain troops in Afghanistan to promote stability.

The December 2001 Bonn Conference created an interim Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai. The United States recognized the new regime and restored diplomatic relations. In addition to efforts to suppress the Taliban, the United States undertook a broad campaign to rebuild the country's infrastructure and promote economic development. In 2004, the two countries signed a bilateral trade and investment agreement. The United States steadily increased aid to Afghanistan, although the majority of the assistance was military support. From 2002 to 2014, the United States provided approximately \$100 billion in aid to Afghanistan. It also led efforts to secure additional assistance from other nations. However, the inability of the U.S.-led coalition and Afghan security forces to suppress the Taliban-led insurgency undermined recovery programs. In 2012, the United States designated Afghanistan a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally. In 2014, the NATO-led coalition formally ended its combat role and turned security operations over to the Afghan military.

Relations between the United States and Afghanistan deteriorated in the early 2010s. The administration of President Barack Obama increasingly accused the Karzai administration of corruption, while the Afghan president condemned mounting civilian casualties caused by U.S. military action. Karzai refused to sign a bilateral security agreement with the United States that would have allowed U.S. forces to remain in Afghanistan past a planned withdrawal in 2016. After the election of Ashraf Ghani as president in September 2014, relations improved.

The new president signed the bilateral accord, and the United States pledged to keep 9,800 troops in Afghanistan for training and support operations (these troops are in addition to the 7,000 NATO troops).

Tom Lansford

See also: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Dubs, Adolf “Spike”; Helmand Valley; Helmand Valley Project; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Reagan Doctrine; World War II and Afghanistan (1939–1945).

Related Primary Document

U.S. State Department, Statement on Afghanistan, December 26, 1979

On the eve of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and other countries were aware of the buildup of military personnel and equipment. The U.S. State Department reported on the Soviet deployments the day before the Soviets deposed Afghan president Hafizullah Amin and took over the country. Through the buildup, Amin and other Afghan leaders believed the Soviets were increasing their military presence to help fight the mujahideen.

On December 25–26, there was a large-scale Soviet airlift into Kabul International Airport, perhaps involving over 150 flights. The aircraft include both large transports (AN-22s) and smaller transports (AN-12s). Several hundred Soviet troops have been seen at the Kabul airport and various kinds of field equipment have been flown in. I cannot give you an estimate of numbers.

The Soviet military buildup north of the Afghan border is continuing, and we now have indications that there are the equivalent of five divisions in Soviet areas adjacent to Afghanistan. It appears that the Soviets are crossing a new threshold in their military deployments into Afghanistan. We believe that members of the international community should condemn such blatant military interference into the internal affairs of an independent sovereign state. We are making our views known directly to the Soviets.

Source: U.S. Department of State. *American Foreign Policy, 1977–1980*. Washington, DC: Department of State, 1983, p. 809.

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Urgun, Siege of (1983–1984)

The Siege of Urgun was a battle between the pro-Soviet government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and mujahideen resistance fighters that began in July 1983 and lasted until January 1984. The battle was a DRA victory. In 1983, the mujahideen increased efforts to capture and control territory by launching larger offensives from bases in Pakistan. Urgun, close to the Pakistan border in the Paktika District in east-central Afghanistan, was chosen as a potential base for future operations and a mujahideen district capital. The town had the added benefit of an airport and was close to the strategically important towns of Khost and Ghazni.

In July 1983, about 800 mujahideen from various factions began encircling the government garrison, which consisted of 900 troops of the DRA's 21st Mountain Regiment. The DRA troops were spread out with companies deployed in a series of posts around the outskirts of the area, including the airport, and the main body stationed in an old fortress, commonly known as the Octagonal Fort. The mujahideen planned to attack in two phases: a series of strikes to capture the DRA outposts, and then a main attack on the Octagonal Fort. The mujahideen offensive began in August as the insurgents began to cut off the outposts from the main base. The DRA positions were heavily fortified, with bunkers, trenches, and mines, and the troops had machine guns, artillery support, and some tanks. When the main garrison attempted to resupply an outpost 2.5 miles (4 km) from the fort on September 18, the mujahideen were able to destroy one tank, disable another, and capture a third. The captured tank was then used to breach the walls of the post, and the insurgents captured more than 240 DRA troops. Subsequent attacks left the main garrison

surrounded, although DRA forces still held the airfield. The garrison could only be resupplied by air, with armored vehicles moving back and forth between the garrison and the airport.

Although not all of the outposts were captured, the insurgents launched their main attack on Urgun at the beginning of January 1984. Using the captured tank, the insurgents were able to advance into the town, but a DRA counterattack drove them back with support from Soviet and DRA aircraft. On January 16, a DRA relief column of armored vehicles and tanks broke through the mujahideen lines and ended the siege. Casualties on both sides were estimated to be 200–400 killed or wounded (Soviet claims put the mujahideen casualties at 600 killed). The siege highlighted the difficulty the mujahideen faced in capturing entrenched positions that were supported by airpower.

Tom Lansford

See also: Armored Vehicles; Mujahideen; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics.

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Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich (1908–1984)

Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov was a Soviet arms industry manager, minister of the defense industry (1953–1957), and defense

minister (1976–1984) during the invasion and initial occupation of Afghanistan. Born on October 17, 1908, in Samara, Ustinov served in the Soviet Red Army during 1922–1923, attended a technical institute in Makarov, and joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1927. Following work as a fitter, he was selected for the Leningrad Military-Mechanical Institute, graduating in 1934 as an artillery designer. He worked for three years at the Naval Artillery Research Institute in Leningrad before moving to the Bolshevik Arms Factory, where he was director during 1938–1941.

Named people's commissar for armaments in 1941, Ustinov directed the production of small arms and artillery during World War II and oversaw the relocation of arms factories beyond the Urals during the German invasion. He remained in this post (renamed minister of armaments after the war) until 1953. He received the rank of colonel general of engineering artillery in 1944 and was named a full member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1952. Appointed minister of the defense industry in 1953, he served until 1957, when he joined the Council of Ministers, becoming deputy chair the next year and first deputy chair in 1963. During this time, he played a major role in the modernization of Soviet forces. Following Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, Ustinov was appointed to the Defense Council and became a candidate member of the Presidium (Politburo). In 1965 he became the Central Committee secretary responsible for armaments. Over the next decade, he continued his involvement in the expansion of Soviet defense production.

In April 1976 Ustinov was named defense minister following the death of Andrei Grechko and held that post until his death in 1984. As minister, Ustinov oversaw the continued

growth of Soviet ground forces and the integration of air-assault helicopter brigades into the force structure, although economic decline beginning in the late 1970s would lead to a leveling off in defense procurement. He was reluctant to support détente, only grudgingly accepted the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) negotiations, and was a strong advocate of intervention in Afghanistan. Ustinov argued in April 1979 that the Soviet Union had to invade Afghanistan or the pro-Moscow regime would fall to Islamic rebels. He disregarded advice from his general staff, which argued that Afghanistan could become the Soviet Union's "Vietnam." Ustinov would subsequently oversee the invasion and initial occupation of the country. His strategy, which concentrated Soviet troops in strategic urban areas, proved to be a mistake, allowing the mujahideen to gain control of rural areas throughout Afghanistan.

Abandoning his traditional abstention from political battles, he supported Yuri Andropov over Konstantin Chernenko to succeed Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, but supported Chernenko following Andropov's death in February 1984. In ill health for many years, Ustinov died in Moscow on December 20, 1984.

Steven W. Guerrier

See also: Andropov, Yuri; Brezhnev, Leonid; Chernenko, Konstantin; Cold War (1947–1989); Mujahideen; Reagan, Ronald W.; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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V

Varennikov, Valentin (1923–2009)

Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov was a Soviet general who played a leading role in planning the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and later commanded Soviet forces in the country. Varennikov was born into a Cossack family in Krasnodar, near the Black Sea. He was commissioned in the Soviet Army in 1942 and fought in World War II. The young officer was wounded three times and decorated for valor. After the war, he was promoted to command a mechanized division, and then a corps. In 1979, he was appointed first deputy chief of staff of the army. Although initially opposed to intervention in Afghanistan, preferring a political settlement, Varennikov helped plan the invasion and strategy for the first years of the invasion, along with Marshal Sergey Sokolov.

As the war in Afghanistan became a stalemate, Varennikov was given command of Soviet forces in 1984. He was charged with developing new tactics to subdue the mujahideen. The World War II veteran sought to make Soviet forces more aggressive and have them undertake more operations outside of established garrisons. In 1986, he was recalled from Afghanistan to lead recovery efforts in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. He subsequently returned to Afghanistan where he negotiated the mechanics of the Soviet withdrawal with UN and Pakistani officials after the 1988 Geneva Accords.

Upon his return to the Soviet Union in 1989, Varennikov was named commander of all Soviet ground forces. He joined other mil-

itary officers in the failed attempt to overthrow Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. Varennikov was arrested, but ultimately acquitted in 1994 when the Russian supreme court ruled he had only followed the orders of his superiors. The following year Varennikov was elected to the Duma as a member of the Communist Party. He died on May 6, 2009.

Jack Covarrubias

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Geneva Accords (1988); Gorbachev, Mikhail; Mujahideen; Operation Storm 333 (1979); Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; Sokolov, Sergey; Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich; Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986).

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Victory Organization (*Sazman-i Nasr*)

The Victory Organization (*Sazman-i Nasr*) was a Hazara mujahideen group during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). The group was established after the 1978 Saur Revolution installed a pro-Soviet regime under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The organization launched a guerrilla campaign against the government. Muhammad Hussain Sadeqi was the original leader of

the organization, which was initially based in Iran and provided support by Tehran. After the Soviet occupation in 1979, the group emerged a major mujahideen force in Hazarajat.

The Victory Organization was one of the Tehran Eight, a coalition of Shi'a mujahideen groups, supported by Iran, that fought the Soviets during the occupation. Comprised of ethnic Hazaras, the organization was one of the more radical of the eight groups. It sought to defeat not only the Soviets and the PDPA government, but also to cast off the yoke of Pashtun control and create an autonomous region for the Hazaras and other Shi'a groups. One result was that the organization fought not just the Soviets, but also other, non-Hazara mujahideen formations.

The overall anti-Soviet efforts of the Shi'a groups were coordinated by a *shura*, or Islamic council, composed of representatives from the various mujahideen groups. However, the Victory Organization and other hardline factions rose in rebellion against the shura. The Victory Organization later joined the newly formed Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan*) in 1988.

Tom Lansford

See also: Hazaras; Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan*); People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Vitkevich, Ivan Viktorovich (1806–1839)

Ivan Viktorovich Vitkevich was a Lithuanian officer in the Russian Army whose mission to Kabul in 1838 precipitated the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Vitkevich was born Jan Prosper Witkiewicz in Polish Lithuania (his name was later Russified to Ivan Viktorovich Vitkevich). Vitkevich was exiled with five companions in 1822 for their participation in the “Black Brothers,” an anti-Russian nationalist organization. Vitkevich was sent to Orsk, Orenburg, where he served as an enlisted soldier. During his service, Vitkevich studied languages, and eventually he was assigned as an interpreter after impressing the governor of Orenburg, V. A. Perovsky. He excelled in his new duties and was commissioned an ensign in 1833.

Perovsky dispatched the young officer to Bukhara (in present-day Uzbekistan) in 1835 as part of an expedition to gather intelligence and open commercial relations with Emir Nasrullah Khan, the ruler of Bukhara. Although no formal agreement was finalized, the mission was judged to be a success by Perovsky. While in Bukhara, Vitkevich met Hussein Ali, an emissary of Afghan emir Dost Mohammad. The young diplomat accompanied Ali to Orenburg, and then went on to Saint Petersburg in 1836, serving as an interpreter. While in Saint Petersburg, Russian foreign minister Karl Nesselrode ordered Vitkevich to accompany Ali back to Afghanistan with a letter from the czar. Meanwhile, Vitkevich was promoted to the rank of captain. When Ali fell ill, Vitkevich was authorized to proceed on his own to Tehran, and then on to Afghanistan if the Russian minister to Persia (Iran) thought it appropriate. The captain was tasked with negotiating a trade treaty with Dost Mohammad and with trying to convince the Afghan

leader to join in a regional anti-British coalition. Vitkevich was not authorized to promise any direct military assistance to the Afghans, but his instructions were vague.

Vitkevich journeyed to Tehran and then on to Kandahar and then Kabul, arriving in December 1837. He surprised both Dost Mohammad and the resident British envoy, Sir Alexander Burnes. Vitkevich offered the Afghans considerable support, including financial backing, in exchange for resisting British influence. British concerns with Russian interference led the governor of India, Lord George Auckland, to demand Dost Mohammad reject the Russians and force Vitkevich to leave Afghanistan. Concurrently, in London, the British government demanded the recall of Vitkevich. He returned to Herat in June 1838 and then traveled to Saint Petersburg, where he was censured for exceeding his orders and offering more to the Afghans than the Russians were willing to

provide. On May 9, 1839, Vitkevich committed suicide, after burning his papers and notes.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842); Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of; Burnes, Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”); Dost Mohammad; Great Game, The; Surrani, Shuja Shah; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan.

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W

Wahhabism

Wahhabism is a fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam that is embraced by the Taliban. Wahhabism has its origins in the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). Wahhab advocated a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and condemned a variety of common practices of the period, including the veneration of shrines, tombs, and other religious sites. Wahhab also argued that those who did not accept his vision of Islam were heretics. In 1745, Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud, the founder of the Saud dynasty, formed an alliance and the Saudi royal family has embraced and advocated Wahhabism ever since.

In the 1970s, the Saudi government and various religious groups within the country began to provide monetary support to establish Wahhabi mosques and schools around the world in an effort to promote the sect. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Saudi funding for religious schools in Pakistan greatly expanded Wahhabism among the mujahideen, especially those who would form the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and al Qaeda (Osama bin Laden claimed to be an adherent of Wahhabism).

The Taliban developed a version of Wahhabism that was even more puritanical and strict than that practiced in Saudi Arabia or the other predominately Wahhabi state, the more moderate Qatar. The Taliban have targeted non-Wahhabi Muslims. For example, while in power, the group waged a relentless campaign against the predominately Shi'a

Hazara ethnic group. In addition, the Taliban instituted strict laws that prohibited women from engaging in activities outside of the home and required them to be completely covered in public by wearing the burqa. The Taliban outlawed music, television, and movies, as distractions from Islam. They also instituted a penal code that required extraordinary punishments, including death and amputation, for moral transgressions. Although the majority of these restrictions were repealed after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the group has been able to reinstate many of its strict codes through fear and intimidation during the ongoing insurgency. For instance, the Taliban has targeted shops that sell music CDs or DVDs. The group has imposed punishments on Afghans who defy Wahhabi conventions in areas under their control. The Taliban have also undertaken a campaign against religious symbols, especially those that are non-Islamic. In March 2001, the Taliban destroyed the two Buddhas of Bamiyan that had been built in the sixth century. The destruction of the two statues, the larger of which was 53 meters (173.9 feet) tall and the smaller, 35 meters (114.8 feet), led to international condemnation.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Saudi government began to reduce its support to extremist Wahhabi groups. Militant Wahhabis have been deported, and funding for external groups has been reduced. Meanwhile, other extremist groups, claiming to be based on Wahhabism, including the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, have emerged.

Tom Lansford

See also: Bin Laden, Osama; Buddhas of Bamiyan; Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, DAESH); Madrasahs; Taliban.

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Wanat, Battle of (2008)

The Battle of Wanat on July 13, 2008, was an engagement between U.S. forces and the Taliban in the eastern Nuristan Province of Afghanistan. U.S. troops won the battle, but only after a lengthy, bloody struggle with the insurgents. The battle resulted in the greatest loss of life among U.S. soldiers in a single attack since Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001.

As part of a strategy to interdict Taliban supply routes from Pakistan, the U.S.-led coalition began establishing small outposts along paths frequently used by the insurgents. These Combat Outposts (COP) were located near larger facilities that could provide artillery fire and other support. They provided the coalition with a way to expand its presence and disrupt Taliban operations. The COPs were not meant to be permanent facilities. They were built quickly with fabric gabions filled with sand and rocks. The barriers created a wall around the COP and provided protection from small arms fire. The COPs often had cargo containers, transported by helicopters, to store supplies or ammunition.

U.S. forces had a COP, dubbed Bella, north of Wanat on the Waygal River. In July 2008, the United States launched Operation Rock Move, which involved the evacuation of Bella and the establishment of a Vehicle

Patrol Base in Wanat, closer to the main base in the area, Camp Blessing. The new COP was named Kahler in honor of a former platoon sergeant, Matthew Kahler. It was five miles from Camp Blessing. An advance patrol reached the site on July 8, and the next day helicopters brought a cargo container with heavy equipment to begin construction of the base. An observation post was established on a ridge to the east of the facility to provide coverage of the surrounding valley. Code-named Topside, the post was about 70 meters away from the main compound.

Kahler was poorly situated. Several areas of the nearby village of Wanat were on higher ground, providing potential enemies the ability to fire down into the base. There were other areas that could not be easily observed from within the base, giving an attacking force the ability to get close without being detected. There were gaps in the walls that were protected only with barbed wire. Engineers and heavy construction equipment were supposed to be dispatched to the site to complete construction of the base, but did not arrive before the Taliban attacked.

On July 13, 2008, the garrison consisted of 48 U.S. troops, including soldiers from the 2nd Battalion of the 503rd Airborne Infantry Regiment, six combat engineers, and three Marine advisers who were deployed along with 24 Afghan Army soldiers of the 3rd Kandak Battalion. The COP was commanded by Captain Matthew Myer. Just after 4:00 in the morning, Taliban forces launched a well-coordinated assault on Kahler and Topside. There were an estimated 200–300 Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. The attackers used mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to destroy the COP's heavy weapons in their initial strikes. Within moments of the first shots, the Taliban had destroyed the COP's heavy mortar and a rocket launcher mounted on a Humvee.

There were nine soldiers at Topside under the command of Sergeant Ryan Pitts. In the initial attack, two of the soldiers at the outpost were killed and the other seven wounded. Pitts received shrapnel wounds in his legs and left arm, but coordinated the defense of the post, allowing his wounded comrades to withdraw to Kahler. Alone, Pitts continued to hold off the Taliban and remained in radio contact to guide airstrikes. For his actions, he would later receive the Medal of Honor.

At Kahler, the Taliban were able to penetrate the outer defenses. The coalition soldiers had numerous weapon malfunctions with their M-4 assault rifles in addition to the loss of their heavy weapons. Nonetheless, with aerial strikes by helicopters, along with artillery support, the coalition forces were able to defeat the Taliban. The insurgents withdrew soon after 6:00 am. Nine U.S. soldiers were killed and 27 wounded. Four Afghan Army troops were wounded. Taliban casualties were estimated to be 40–50 killed and an equal number wounded.

The attack, which almost succeeded, prompted questions about the U.S. strategy, weapons, mainly the M-4, and the command decisions about the placement of the COP and its garrison. An investigation in 2008 led to reprimands of several senior officers, but the official censures were withdrawn in 2010.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afghan War (2001–); 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014); Rifles, Light Arms, and Machine Guns; Taliban, Forces and Tactics; United States, Forces and Tactics (2001–).

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Warburton, Sir Robert (1842–1899)

Sir Robert Warburton was an Anglo-Indian soldier and political official who served in Afghanistan for most of his career. Warburton was born on July 11, 1842. He was the son of a British officer who had been captured in Kabul in 1842 and later escaped with the aid of an Afghan noblewoman, the niece of Dost Mohammad, whom he married. Warburton's mother instilled in her son a deep appreciation and understanding of Afghan culture, which would be important later in his career. In 1856, Warburton was sent to Britain for his education, and studied at the Royal India Military College and the Royal Military Academy. In 1861, he was commissioned as a cadet and sent to India as a second lieutenant the following year. Warburton was posted to a succession of artillery units and served in the Abyssinian War (1867–1868) where he impressed senior officers with his ability to lead native troops. After the campaign, he was appointed a political officer in the Punjab where he served with Sir Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari. After Cavagnari was appointed envoy to Afghanistan, he asked for Warburton to serve as an assistant, but the request was denied. Warburton instead was named the political officer for the Khyber region. He served with distinction during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), where he was attached to the Anglo-Indian column commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Samuel ("Sam")

Browne. He was forced to return to Britain following an illness (described as “Peshawar fever” or malaria) in 1880 and remained for two years before resuming his position in the Khyber. Meanwhile, in 1881, he was promoted to the rank of major.

Over the next few years, he was instrumental in raising and training the Khyber Rifles, one of eight frontier units created to help supervise the border between India and Afghanistan. The Rifles were recruited from among the Afridi tribe. Warburton was the first commandant of the Rifles, a position he held until his retirement in 1898. In addition, Warburton worked to enlarge and improve the Khyber Pass and enhance the safety of the notoriously dangerous passage. His knowledge of Afghan languages and customs helped him win the trust and confidence of the border tribes, and he was well respected by local leaders. Warburton often traveled with no weapons as a sign of his trust of the tribes. In 1887, Warburton became a lieutenant colonel. For his service, he was knighted as a Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire in 1890. Three years later, he was promoted to colonel. Warburton served in the Tirah Campaign in 1898 and then retired. He wrote a popular memoir of his experiences, *Eighteen Years in the Khyber*, which was published posthumously. He died in Britain on April 22, 1899.

Tom Lansford

See also: Afridi (Khyber) Tribe; Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880); Browne, Sir Samuel (Sam); Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N.; Dost Mohammad; Frontier Corps; Khyber Pass.

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Wardak, Abdul Rahim (1945–)

General Abdul Rahim (Raheem) Wardak was a prominent mujahideen leader who served as minister of defense and was a senior security adviser to Afghan president Hamid Karzai. Wardak held a variety of bureaucratic posts in the government of Afghanistan following the collapse of the regime of Mohammed Najibullah in 1992.

Wardak was born a Pashtun in the Wardak province of Afghanistan in 1945. He graduated from Habibia High School in Kabul, Afghanistan, a prominent school for the children of the elite. He attended the Afghan Military Academy (currently the Afghan National Security University) and received advanced military training in the United States and Egypt. Prior to his 1978 defection to the Afghan resistance movement, he served as an instructor at the Afghan Military Academy, deputy director of foreign relations in the ministry of defense, and an attaché in the embassy in India.

During the 1980s Wardak served as chief of staff for the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan headed by Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, a member of the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen—otherwise known as the Peshawar Seven. In this role he testified before the U.S. Congress and was wounded in action against Soviet and Soviet-supported Afghan forces. When the regime of Mohammed Najibullah was overthrown in 1992, Wardak became a member of the Kabul Defense and Security Council and chief military adviser to the Afghan interim government. During the years of the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001) he fought in Khost, Kunar, Kabul, and Nangarhar. After the fall of the Taliban, Wardak continued to

rise in the political bureaucracy serving as director of disarmament, director of reform of the national army, and deputy minister of defense under Field Marshal Mohammed Fahim during the Afghan Transitional Administration (2002–2004). Wardak was appointed minister of defense by Hamid Karzai on December 23, 2004, after the first popular election of the post-Taliban era.

Minister Wardak's primary focus was on capacity building of the Afghan National Army and the then continued insurgency by former Taliban sympathizers. Speaking in 2007, Wardak identified the need to restructure the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police coupled with long-term reconstruction and development as the key to securing the peace within Afghanistan. However, the surge in violence during his tenure and his presumed pro-American stance during a time of allegations of corruption and incompetence for the Karzai government made Wardak vulnerable to political attack. The Afghan Parliament passed a vote of "no confidence" against Wardak resulting in his resignation on August 7, 2012.

General Wardak served the government of Afghanistan through 40 years of internal violence and played an integral part in the formation of the current government of Afghanistan. His tenure as minister of defense is noted for its close cooperation with the American military and the rebirth of the Afghan National Army, which grew from 50,000 to close to 200,000 under his guidance. He was awarded the prestigious Ghazi Amanullah Khan Medal on August 12, 2012. Wardak has written numerous works including the books *Fundamentals of War*, *Geopolitics*, and *Afghan Military History*. Although he originally announced himself a contender for the presidential election held in April 2014, he pulled out of the race in March.

Brian Carriere

See also: Afghan Army, History, Forces, and Tactics; Afghan Civil War (1989–2001); Afghan War (2001–); Gailani, Pir Sayyid Ahmad; Karzai, Hamid; Mujahideen; Najibullah, Mohammed; National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*).

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Warlords

In Afghanistan, warlords traditionally have been military leaders who often served as the de facto government of provinces and cities, usually organized by ethnic or tribal affiliation, but sometimes by ideology, as with the mujahideen and Taliban. A warlord system has variously comprised the collection of taxes and customs duties, the maintenance of private armies and fiefdoms, and the exploitation of the criminal, or underground, economy.

Historically, Afghanistan has been the meeting point of the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Over the course of numerous invasions it evolved into a nation comprising numerous ethnic groups including Persians, Pashai, Baluchs, Chahars, Tajiks, Turkmen, Aimaks, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Arabs, Nuristani, Kirghiz, and Hazaras. Of these groups, the Pashtun emerged as the most dominant both numerically and politically. They represent about 50 percent of the total population; politically they have constituted the royal family and have often

held power. The Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group, comprising some 25 percent of the population.

Afghan warlords emerged following the end of the British protectorate in 1919. In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 the king of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, who ascended the throne in 1919, marked the country's independence by signing a treaty of aid and friendship with Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin and declaring war on Britain. In response, the British Royal Air Force bombed the Afghan capital of Kabul, and the British government conspired with conservative religious groups and landowning communities who had grown contemptuous of Amanullah's attempts at secularization and reform. This gave birth to the warlords.

In 1929, Amanullah abdicated following an uprising and civil unrest, and the warlords then competed in earnest for power. The turn of events that led to the abdication of Amanullah marked the first, but not final, instance in which disgruntled religious and landowning factions would collaborate with Western or Soviet powers to achieve change in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's new king, Mohammed Nadir Shah, commenced an ill-fated reign that was cut short four years later with his assassination in 1933. Mohammed Zahir Shah succeeded to the throne. He ruled for 40 years before he was deposed by his cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan, in 1973, whereupon Afghanistan was formerly declared a republic. In the meantime, warlords played a sizable role in Afghanistan, especially at the provincial and municipal levels.

From the early 20th century on, the significant role of the warlords in determining the political and religious orientation of Afghanistan indicates not only the deep-rooted nature of warlordism in the country, but also an enduring determination to vie for power

both internally and with external intervening powers. Nevertheless, warlords of both the mujahideen beginning in the 1980s and the Taliban in the 1990s have demonstrated a willingness to court both Western and Soviet powers to serve national and personal interests. While the "Great Game" in the late 19th century had rendered Afghanistan a buffer between British and Russian interests, the end of the 20th century brought a proactive mobilization of the warlords.

The most recent contingent of warlords flourished during the ongoing civil war and Soviet occupation (1979–2001) and amidst the ensuing breakdown of central authority. As young military commanders usurped traditional governance structures and bodies of authority, such as the village *shura* or *jirga*, the warlords provided rudimentary public services while exhibiting predatory behavior toward local communities.

While the years 2001 and 2002 provided a period of uncertainty for Afghan warlords, especially after the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Bonn Agreement of 2001 consolidated the position of the warlords not only in their fiefdoms, but also within the newly restored power and authority of the state. Yet far from stabilizing the nascent government, led by President Hamid Karzai, the co-option of the warlords hindered state progress in the realms of reform and modernization. While nepotism has threatened the legitimacy of the government, the warlords have, in the eyes of the wider population, become synonymous with the destruction of the state, rather than its renewal. Notable warlords in Afghanistan include Abdul Rashid Dostum, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Mullah Mohammed Omar, Pasha Khan Zadran, Abdul Malik Pahlawan, and the sole female warlord, Bibi Ayesha.

Despite the seemingly negative implications that have arisen from the assimilation



One of the enduring problems in Afghanistan has been the inability of the central government to exert control over regional warlords such as General Abdul Malik Pahlawan, who fought alongside the Taliban in the 1990s. (AP Photo/B.K.Bangash)

of Taliban warlords into the Afghan state, their involvement has been endorsed by the international community, most notably the United States, which has favored the formation of alliances with regional commanders to preserve security and stability until the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are trained and equipped.

Nevertheless, the strategy of placing warlords in government has so far lacked the degree of success that had been anticipated by both Afghanistan and international observers. A significant obstacle has been ongoing competition between the warlords. Between 2002 and 2003, the forces of Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of the predominantly Uzbek political group *Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan* (National Islamic Movement of

Afghanistan) and Atta Mohammad Nur, a key figure in the Tajik-dominated *Jamiat-e Islami* (Islamic Society), clashed in northern Afghanistan, despite the fact that both Dostum and Mohammad were prominent allies of the government. While the hostilities between the two groups had been quelled through the intervention of the central government and international community, skirmishes continue to persist. In October 2006, fighting between two Pashtun clans in Herat killed 32 people and injured many more.

The integration of warlords into the Afghan government has also borne negative security implications. Just as warlords are able to stand in elections, they also find other avenues of political influence open to them. For example, the parliament's standing committees are being dominated by former jihadi commanders, often to the detriment of more qualified individuals. Moreover, the warlords have gained further protection since the passing of a motion on February 1, 2007, that guaranteed immunity to all Afghans who had fought in the civil war, thereby preventing further prosecution of commanders for their involvement in war crimes. Some prominent warlords were subsequently appointed to senior positions. For instance, Atta Mohammad Nur became governor of Balkh in 2012. Several warlords ran in the 2014 presidential elections as either presidential or vice presidential candidates, including Gul Agha Sherzai and Mohammed Mohaqeq.

Luisa Gandolfo

See also: Bonn Agreement (2001); Dostum, Abdul Rashid; Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin; Islamic Society (JIA) (*Jamiat-e Islami*); Karzai, Hamid; Khan, Amanullah; Mujahideen; National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-e Milli Islami Afghanistan*); Omar, Mullah Mohammed; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Wilson, Charles Nesbitt (1933–2010)

A U.S. congressman from Texas who played a key role in orchestrating U.S. military assistance for the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet occupation of their country, Charles Nesbitt Wilson was born in Trinity, Texas, on June 1, 1933. Wilson, known as Charlie, briefly attended Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas, before accepting an appointment in 1952 to the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis. Commissioned in the U.S. Navy upon graduation in 1956, Wilson spent several years as a gunnery officer on a destroyer.

In 1960 while still on active duty in the U.S. Navy, Wilson felt drawn to public service after working as a volunteer on John F. Kennedy's presidential campaign. Taking leave from the navy, Wilson ran for and won election to the state legislature and served there for the next 12 years, establishing a reputation as a liberal Democrat who supported abortion rights, Medicaid, and the Equal Rights Amendment. In 1972 Wilson overcame a drunk driving arrest to win election to

the U.S. House of Representatives from the Second Election District. He managed to maintain his seat by balancing his liberal views on domestic policy with a hawkish foreign policy stance.

Wilson was an early strong supporter of Israel and visited the Jewish state during the Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War in October 1973. In the late 1970s he also took up the cause of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle Nicaraguan government, which was embroiled in a guerrilla war with the leftist National Liberation Front (FSLN, Sandinistas) for control of the country. Wilson pressured Congress into restoring the multimillion-dollar U.S. aid package to Somoza's government, which had been cut by President Jimmy Carter's administration because of the Nicaraguan dictator's poor human rights record.

In 1976 Wilson was appointed to the powerful Appropriations Committee, and he soon also secured a seat on its Foreign Operations Subcommittee. After being reelected for a fourth term in 1980 he gained a spot on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, which controls the purse strings of both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pentagon. Around that time he became involved in the plight of Afghanistan, which was experiencing a Soviet military occupation following an invasion of that country in late December 1979.

In October 1982 Wilson took a trip to Pakistan and visited Afghan camps outside Peshawar, the center of Afghan resistance. The camps, then filled with more than 2 million Afghans who were barely surviving with little food and no running water, inspired the congressman to do everything he could to support the mujahideen in their fight against the Soviet Union. On his return to the United States, Wilson, who had a much-deserved reputation as a hard-partying womanizer

with the nickname “Good-Time Charlie,” now used his longtime political connections to substantially increase U.S. financial aid to the Afghan rebels.

In a most unusual role for a congressman from eastern Texas, during the course of the next several years Wilson worked closely with CIA operative Gust Avrakotos to supply the mujahideen with some \$5 billion in weapons to take down the vaunted Soviet war machine. Perhaps the most crucial of these weapons was the Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM) that the CIA began shipping to the mujahideen in 1986. Up to that point, Soviet aerial supremacy in the form of jet fighters and helicopter gunships had devastated the Afghan rebels and provided vital logistical support to Soviet forces. The Stinger missiles forced Soviet aircraft to fly higher to avoid being shot down, greatly minimizing their effectiveness. That same year the Soviet Union began pulling troops out of Afghanistan, and by February 1989 all Soviet military forces had left the country.

The CIA recognized Wilson’s key role in Afghanistan by bestowing on him its Honored Colleague award, marking the first time the award had been given to someone outside the agency. Wilson served in Congress for 12 terms until he retired in January 1997. For the next eight years he worked as a lobbyist on Capitol Hill, with Pakistan as his primary client. In 2003 George Crile published the book *Charlie Wilson’s War*, chronicling the Texas congressman’s involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War. The book was followed four years later by a movie of the same name that featured Tom Hanks in the title role.

In retirement, Wilson defended the U.S. government’s support for the rebels in Afghanistan and said that the real mistake was the U.S. decision to abandon Afghanistan and not help rebuild that country following

the Soviet departure. Wilson believed that had the United States done so, Afghanistan would not have become a haven for the al Qaeda terrorist organization. Wilson died of cardiopulmonary arrest at his home in Lufkin, Texas, on February 10, 2010, at the age of 76.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Bearden, Milton; Carter, Jimmy; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Cold War (1947–1989); Mujahideen; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Women, Role in Combat

Coalition forces during the operations in Afghanistan included both men and women. When the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001, the U.S. government had strict policies concerning the role of women in combat. Women were forbidden from being assigned to units whose primary mission included direct ground combat. This excluded women from serving in the infantry, special operations forces, artillery, armor, and air defense artillery.

Since the 1990s, women in the U.S. military have served in combat aircraft and

aboard naval vessels. During the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, female service members were deployed in combat support operations that placed them in hostile environments even though they could not officially assume combat roles. For instance, women serving in convoys often came under fire as did those deployed at support bases. By 2016, 44 U.S. female service members had been killed in Afghanistan. In December 2015, the United States ended its ban on women in the remaining combat arms units.

Social norms of the Afghan tribal culture prevent direct contact of unmarried men and women. This became a hindrance as units were often only able to get some of the intelligence necessary because Afghan women would not speak to troops. As a part of the effort to gather intelligence holistically from the villages that the combat units liberated, military commanders were encouraged to assign women soldiers to operational units to allow them to gather information from the women of villages. These units were designated as Cultural Support Teams and proved successful in gathering intelligence that otherwise could not have been obtained.

Other members of the coalition had women mixed into their combat units in Afghanistan. Since 1994, a European Community Equal Treatment Directive required that European nations reexamine the issue of women's exclusion from combat every eight years. Many of these countries had removed all or almost all of their exclusions of women from combat positions. ISAF members France, Canada, Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Germany, Australia, Turkey, and Romania allowed women varying roles in combat units.

The Taliban and other insurgency groups do not use women in combat because of cul-

tural norms. However, in 2011, the Taliban began using a limited number of women suicide bombers. Reports from the region have indicated that the Taliban and al Qaeda have recruited and trained a growing number of women for terrorist attacks.

Jorge Brown

See also: Afghan War (2001–); Coalition, Forces and Tactics (2001–); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

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World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918)

During World War I (1914–1918), Afghanistan found itself in the midst of a new Great Game, albeit with different actors. Wartime allies Great Britain and Russia sought to keep Afghanistan neutral, while Germany and the Ottoman Empire endeavored to convince Afghan leader Habibullah Khan to enter the conflict on the side of the Central Powers. Habibullah ultimately chose to maintain Afghan neutrality for economic and strategic reasons, despite significant support for the Ottoman Empire among both elites in Afghanistan and the populace.

The 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention confirmed that Afghanistan was part of the British sphere of influence; however, in the document, London pledged to respect

the territorial integrity of the Afghan state. In order to maintain influence over the country, the British provided Habibullah an annual subsidiary of £400,000 million, part of which the monarch used to support reforms and modernization programs, including efforts to develop industrial capabilities and professionalize the military. When World War I broke out, Habibullah declared Afghan neutrality in order to continue his reform efforts. In addition, the Afghan ruler believed that war would exacerbate internal divisions within the country and that the Afghan Army and militias could not fight both the British in the east and the Russians in the north.

During the war, Germany sought to undermine the war efforts of the allies, Great Britain, France, and Russia (the Triple Entente), by destabilizing their colonies. For instance, the Germans supported Indian independence. Part of this strategy involved drawing Turkey into an alliance with the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) in order to threaten the British in India and the Russians in Central Asia. On October 28, 1914, the Turks attacked Russian ports on the Black Sea. Moscow subsequently declared war. Turkish sultan Mehmed V declared that the conflict was a holy war, or jihad, against the allies in an effort to prompt uprisings among Muslims within the empires of the Triple Entente. The German government became particularly interested in bringing Afghanistan into the war as a means to threaten India and force the British to redeploy forces to the region.

Within Afghanistan, the call for holy war combined with the lingering resentment toward the British, created rising discontent with the regime and growing calls for war. While Habibullah remained convinced that neutrality was the best course, his brother and prime minister, Nasrullah Khan, led a

faction that agitated for an alliance with Germany and Turkey. Habibullah's son Amanullah Khan was also a leading figure in the pro-war faction.

In order to entice Afghanistan into the war, a Turko-German dispatched a diplomatic mission expedition to the country in 1914. However, the expedition was unable to cross Iran and was abandoned. A second mission was commissioned in 1915, led by two German officers, Oskar Niedermayer and Werner von Hentig, and included Indian nationalists. The Niedermayer–von Hentig expedition evaded Russian and British patrols in Iran and reached Afghanistan in August 1915, arriving in Kabul on October 2. The Germans were able to meet with Habibullah and present an invitation from Kaiser Wilhelm II to join the Central Powers in the war against the Triple Entente. In return for Afghan participation in the conflict, Germany would recognize the full independence of Afghanistan and provide arms and ammunition. Concurrently, a Turkish member of the expedition delivered a message to the Afghan king from the Turkish sultan, calling on him to join the jihad against the Triple Entente. Habibullah was reluctant to commit to war without stronger assurances of support and questioned the ability of the Central Powers to provide troops or munitions, given the Russo-British presence in Iran. The British were aware of the German mission and undertook a variety of steps to counter the German overtures, including having King George V send a handwritten note to Habibullah.

Habibullah remained noncommittal on entry into the war, but agreed to a friendship accord between Afghanistan and Germany as part of an effort to blunt growing pressure from Nasrullah's pro-war group. In the draft Afghan-German Friendship Treaty, signed on January 24, 1916, Germany was to recognize

Afghan independence and provide military advisers, 100,000 rifles, 300 artillery guns, as well as a fund of £10 million to be used to support modernization. If Afghanistan entered the war, Germany pledged to defend its territory. However, Habibullah signed the accord as a delaying tactic. He insisted that it would not be valid until signed by the kaiser. When a messenger left with the draft, he was detained so that the treaty never made it to Berlin.

The German expedition left Kabul in May 1916. Habibullah remained neutral through the war, even following the Russian Revolution in 1917 when there was a renewed call among political elites to attack Russia while it was weakened. Following the war, resentment against Habibullah culminated in a coup in which the emir was assassinated on February 20, 1919, and Nasrullah assumed the throne for a week before being deposed by Amanullah.

Tom Lansford

See also: Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919); Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; Great Game, The; Khan, Amanullah; Khan, Habibullah; Khan, Nasrullah; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan; World War I and Afghanistan, Turko-German Missions (1914–1918).

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World War I and Afghanistan, Turko-German Missions (1914–1918)

During World War I, Germany and its ally Turkey undertook two diplomatic missions to Afghanistan as part of a broader effort to convince Afghan emir Habibullah Khan to declare war on Great Britain. Neither of the expeditions succeeded, but the second mission resulted in a draft treaty of friendship between Germany and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the missions did fan the drive for complete independence for Afghanistan from British influence.

After World War I commenced, the German government launched a series of initiatives to undermine British control of India. They encouraged Indian nationalists through monetary and political support. Germany also supported its ally Turkey's call for holy war against the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France, and Russia. Turko-German leaders were particularly interested in bringing Afghanistan into the war on the side of the Central Powers as a means to force both Britain and Russia to redeploy forces to southwest Asia. However, Emir Habibullah Khan declared his country neutral when the conflict began.

In order to convince Habibullah to join the Central Powers, a Turko-German diplomatic mission was planned in 1914. Disputes between the Turks and Germans over leadership of the effort led to it being cancelled. The following year, a second expedition was launched, this time under two German officers, Oskar Niedermayer and Werner von Hentig, with Kazim Bey representing Turkey. Exiled Indian nationalist figure Raja Mahendra Pratap was named the nominal leader of the mission, but von Hentig was the real authority. The mission managed to evade Russian and British patrols

while crossing through Iran and arrived at the Afghan border in August 1915 before traveling to Kabul.

While in the Afghan capital, the mission met with Habibullah, who deftly avoided commitments and employed a series of delaying tactics. The Germans gave the emir a letter from the kaiser and assurances that Berlin would recognize Afghan independence and provide arms and advisers if Afghanistan would enter the war. They also relayed Turko-German support for any future Afghan territorial conquests in Russian-controlled Turkmenistan or Britain's Indian colonies. While Habibullah was noncommittal, his prime minister and brother, Nasrullah Khan, emerged as the leader of an influential pro-war faction among Afghan elites. Under pressure from anti-British and anti-Russian elements, Habibullah agreed to a friendship treaty whereby Germany pledged to provide 100,000 rifles and 300 artillery pieces, along with military advisers and a £10 million fund to modernize the Afghan military and industrial base. Under the accord, Germany also recognized Afghan independence. Although he signed the treaty, Habibullah insisted that the kaiser also sign in order for the agreement to be binding. When the accord was sent to Berlin, the messenger was intercepted and detained so that the draft never left Afghanistan. Niedermayer and von Hentig began negotiating with anti-Habibullah factions over a possible coup, but their actions were relayed to the emir by British intelligence. Habibullah ordered the Germans out of Afghanistan. They departed on May 22, 1916. Although the missions failed to bring Afghanistan into World War I, they served to undermine support for Habibullah. The Afghan leader was assassinated as part of a coup on February 19, 1919.

Tom Lansford

See also: Great Game, The; Khan, Amanullah; Khan, Habibullah; Khan, Nasrullah; World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918).

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World War II and Afghanistan (1939–1945)

Afghanistan remained neutral during World War II (1939–1945), as it had during World War I (1914–1918). However, economic and diplomatic ties between Afghanistan and Germany led to British diplomatic efforts to ensure neutrality and military preparations to protect India. During the 1930s, Afghan prime minister Mohammad Hashim Khan, the oldest uncle of King Mohammed Zahir Shah, endeavored to reduce Afghanistan's economic and security dependence on Great Britain. Hashim turned to regional states, including Iran and Turkey, negotiating a series of agreements, including the Treaty of Saadabad (1937), a nonaggression pact between Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. Meanwhile, Hashim attempted to improve relations with Germany as a counterweight to both Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Trade between Afghanistan and Germany increased substantially after 1935, and German firms initiated a number of large infrastructure programs in the country. Concurrently, a

German military mission was established to train the Afghan Army. Afghanistan also received military assistance from Germany's ally, Italy. Throughout this period, Hashim continued to seek military aid from the British, who Afghan officials were convinced remained the best guarantee against an invasion or intervention by the Soviets. However, because of continuing border clashes, the British were unwilling to supply significant weaponry.

When World War II began, several prominent Afghans, including the economics minister, Abdul Majid, advocated entry into the conflict, but Hashim and the majority of the government favored neutrality. A formal declaration of neutrality was promulgated in August 1940. Inside Afghanistan, the Germans undertook a series of largely unsuccessful covert operations to encourage the border tribes to attack British India. Following the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the British accelerated plans to deploy troops to Afghanistan if the Germans were able to defeat the Soviets. The British and the Soviets began to pressure the Afghans to expel the Germans and Italians.

Allied concerns over German influence in Iran prompted an Anglo-Soviet invasion in August 1941. The Allied troops quickly overran Iran, divided the country into two spheres of influence, and replaced the shah with the crown prince. The invasion heightened concerns over direct intervention by

the British or the Soviets and ended any significant efforts to play the British against the Soviets, at least until after the war. When the allies formally demanded the expulsion of the Germans and Italians in October 1941, the Afghans complied. Since Afghanistan was officially neutral, Germany and Italy maintained a diplomatic presence until 1943, when the majority of those personnel were also expelled. Relations were opened with other Allied powers, including the United States and China. One result was increased trade between the United States and Afghanistan. In addition, the end of the war led to negotiations with the Soviet Union, which culminated in a June 1946 accord to fix the boundaries between the two countries.

Tom Lansford

See also: Great Game, The; Khan, Mohammad Hashim; Russia (Soviet Union), Relations with Afghanistan; United Kingdom (Great Britain), Relations with Afghanistan; United States, Relations with Afghanistan; World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918); Zahir Shah, Mohammed.

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Y

Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich (1924–)

A Soviet general and defense minister who oversaw the final period of the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, Dmitry Timofeyevich Yazov was known for his personal bravery and dedication to his soldiers. Yazov rose from the ranks to become a marshal of the Soviet Union. He was dismissed from the military after he participated in the 1991 coup against Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev.

Yazov was born on November 24, 1924, in Siberia. In 1941, he was conscripted into the Red Army, but commissioned a lieutenant in the infantry the following year. By the end of the war, he was a captain, commanding an infantry company. Through the early years of the Cold War, Yazov served in a variety of posts, including colonel of a regiment in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. He subsequently commanded a division, corps, and then the Fourth Army.

From 1980 to 1984, Yazov led the Central Asian Military District, where he emerged as a critic of the military's ongoing campaign in Afghanistan. Confronted with a growing insurgency, Yazov contended that Soviet troops were ill prepared for the tactics or conditions they faced in the mountainous country. He advocated, unsuccessfully, for better training and equipment for the troops. During his tenure at the Central Asian District, Yazov met and made a deep impression on Gorbachev. After Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union, Yazov was appointed deputy defense minister in January

1987. Following a purge of senior military officers and officials in May of that year, Yazov became defense minister. Once in office, Yazov oversaw the final phase of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the military withdrawal from the country.

As defense minister, Yazov worked with Gorbachev to reform the Soviet military. Older, senior officers were replaced with younger reformers, and a broad effort was undertaken to promote officers with combat experience to administrative posts within the military bureaucracy. Yazov was less supportive of Gorbachev's disarmament initiatives, and he became isolated from the political reformers surrounding the Soviet leader, including Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. By 1991, Gorbachev had become increasingly disenchanted with the aging marshal, especially following international criticism of the Soviet Union's military suppression of pro-democracy activists in the Baltic states.

On August 19, 1991, Yazov and seven other senior Soviet leaders launched a coup against Gorbachev. Yazov oversaw the deployment of anti-Gorbachev troops in Moscow, but failed to rally the bulk of the Soviet military. The coup collapsed partially as a result of units refusing to join the rebels and partially because of the unwillingness of officers to attack civilians who had rallied around Russian president Boris Yeltsin. The insurrection collapsed on August 22. Yazov was arrested along with the other coup leaders. He was stripped of his post, tried, and convicted of treason, but released from prison in 1994 after he received an amnesty. In 1998, Yazov was appointed a consultant

to the Russian defense ministry on international cooperation.

Tom Lansford

See also: Gorbachev, Mikhail; Shevardnadze, Eduard; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

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Z

Zahir Shah, Mohammed (1914–2007)

Mohammed Zahir Shah was the last king of Afghanistan. Born in Kabul, Afghanistan, on October 16, 1914, Zahir Shah was a member of one of the two Pashtun lines that had ruled Afghanistan for two centuries. Educated in France at the Pasteur Institute and the University of Montpellier, he became king (shah) on November 8, 1933, when his father, King Mohammed Nadir Shah, was killed in his presence during an awards ceremony in Kabul. For the next two decades, Zahir Shah reigned but did not rule, in effect ceding power to his paternal uncles.

Zahir Shah resumed direct rule in 1963. The next year he introduced a constitutional monarchy and broadened participation in government. Other changes included greater rights for women, including education. Such changes, particularly the latter, were not popular in his conservative Islamic country.

Zahir Shah ruled directly for a decade. Although the country was at peace, many faulted the king for the poor state of the economy, and a leftist political opposition movement gained momentum. Political unrest and a severe drought resulted in a military coup in 1973 while Zahir Shah was in Italy receiving medical treatment for an eye problem. The army placed in power his cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan, whom the king had dismissed as prime minister a decade earlier. Rather than see his country swept up in civil war, Zahir Shah abdicated.

Zahir Shah remained in exile in Italy, and in 1991 he escaped an assassination attempt.

He could only watch as his country was torn apart by political unrest, the Soviet invasion in 1979, and then a decade-long war. The radical Islamic student militia known as the Taliban took control of the country in 1996, remaining in power until 2001 when American-led coalition forces drove them out. On the return of democracy to Afghanistan, many called for a restoration of the monarchy, but by now the king was in his eighties and frail. He returned to Afghanistan in 2002 after three decades in exile, but rejected the idea of becoming king. He announced that he was willing to become head of state as president if that was asked of him. However, that did not occur, and he vowed not to challenge Hamid Karzai for that position. The new Afghan constitution granted Zahir Shah the title of “father of the nation,” and many Afghans affectionately referred to him simply as “Baba” or “grandfather.” He died in Kabul on July 23, 2007, following a prolonged illness.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Khan, Mohammed Daoud; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Shah, Mohammed Nadir; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban.

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Zawahiri, Ayman al- (1951–)

Leader of the terrorist al Qaeda organization and former leader of the Egyptian organization Islamic Jihad, Ayman al-Zawahiri was born in Cairo, Egypt, on June 19, 1951, to a family of doctors and scholars (his father was a pharmacologist and chemistry professor) Zawahiri joined the Muslim Brotherhood at age 14. Soon he had become an Islamist militant. Following the execution by the Egyptian government of Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb in 1966, Zawahiri and several of his schoolmates established an underground cell with the aim of overthrowing the Egyptian government. Zawahiri vowed “to put Qutb’s vision into action.” His cell eventually merged with others to form the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

A good student, Zawahiri received an undergraduate degree in 1974 from Cairo University. He served as a surgeon in the Egyptian Army for three years. He completed a master’s degree in surgery in 1978 and set up a clinic. That same year he married.

In the late 1970s Islamic Jihad became active and came under attack by the Egyptian state security forces. After the arrest and torture of many of its members by the Egyptian security services, certain army members of the Islamic Jihad, including Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli, assassinated Anwar Sadat on October 8, 1981, and then carried out actions intended to bring down the government. This attempt failed in the face of security forces and army opposition. Zawahiri and hundreds of members of Islamic Jihad and the *Gamaat Islamiyya*, an umbrella group, were jailed as coconspirators in the assassination of Sadat. After serving three

years in prison, Zawahiri and many of his coconspirators were released in 1984.

Zawahiri subsequently went to Peshawar, Pakistan, and there joined the *Maktab al-Khidmat* (Jihad Service Bureau), under the leadership of Dr. Abdullah Azzam and supported by Saudi financier Osama bin Laden. By the time of the final Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan in 1989, bin Laden had broken with his mentor Azzam over the nature of the jihad. The rift that developed between the two men was ideologically motivated. Bin Laden and Zawahiri wanted to export the jihad worldwide beyond Afghanistan and Palestine, and Azzam, who dissented from this plan, was killed.

In the early 1990s Zawahiri and bin Laden traveled first to Egypt and later to Sudan, where they established training camps at the behest of Sudanese leader and Islamist thinker Hassan al-Turabi. Zawahiri merged Islamic Jihad with bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization after issuing a joint fatwa on February 23, 1998. Zawahiri was subsequently instrumental in planning the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 as well as the planning for the attacks on September 11, 2001. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Zawahiri went into hiding, releasing videos and speeches periodically to incite others to engage in the jihad against the United States. He also published *Knights under the Prophet’s Banner* (December 2001), which outlined al Qaeda’s ideology.

After the March 2003 Anglo-American-led invasion of Iraq, Zawahiri’s speeches and writings took on an apocalyptic tone. In a July 2005 letter he framed the jihad in Afghanistan as a vanguard for the ultimate establishment of an Islamic state in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and neighboring states on the Arabian Peninsula; multiple public statements by Zawahiri have since repeated this

point. In his video response to Pope Benedict XVI's remarks on Islam in September 2006, Zawahiri called Benedict a "charlatan" because of his remarks on Islam. However, the term used by Zawahiri to refer to the pope as a "charlatan and deceiver" was the theological term *al-Dajjal*. In Islamic theology and tradition, al-Dajjal refers to the Antichrist who will return just prior to the Day of Judgment. Zawahiri is known to have been influenced by the Saudi thinker Safar al-Hawali's book *The Day of Wrath*, which predicted that the world would end in 2012.

In 2009, Zawahiri became the operational head of al Qaeda as bin Laden's role continued to evolve as the ideological leader of the group. Following bin Laden's assassination in May 2011, Zawahiri emerged as his successor. Since that time, Zawahiri has opposed negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. He also disavowed any connections with the terrorist group Islamic State and condemned some of their extreme tactics.

While the Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy, West Point, is careful to note that the impact of Zawahiri's ideology is considered "totally insignificant," among most Islamist thinkers he still remains a potent figure in the Muslim world. Although his precise whereabouts are unknown, Zawahiri is believed to be living in the mountainous region along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Ojan Aryanfard

See also: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Mujahideen; 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–); Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Taliban; Terrorism.

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Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986)

During their occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviets and Afghan government forces fought two battles to destroy a major mujahideen supply facility at Zhawar in Paktia Province near the border with Pakistan. The first offensive in 1985 was a defeat, but the second resulted in a Soviet military victory. As the anti-Soviet insurgency spread in the early 1980s, the Soviets attempted to deny the mujahideen food and support from the rural population, forcing the insurgents to increasingly rely on supplies from Pakistan. The mujahideen built a series of large and relatively sophisticated logistics facilities. One of the largest was Zhawar. An estimated 20 percent of all supplies and munitions coming from Pakistan flowed through the base.

At Zhawar, the rebels built 11 tunnels into Sodyaki Ghar Mountain, some more than 500 m (547 yards) deep. The base had barracks, a medical facility, and even a mosque among its more than 40 caves. It was heavily defended by the Zhawar Regiment, some 500 strong and armed with artillery, rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, and even two T-55 tanks that had been captured from Afghan government forces. Additional mujahideen forces protected the approaches to the facility. The overall mujahideen commander in the area was Jalaluddin Haqqani.

At the beginning of September 1985, Afghan government forces launched an offensive to capture Zhawar, backed by Soviet



The Battles of Zhawar (1985–1986) demonstrated the difficulties faced by the Soviets during their occupation of Afghanistan. Their enemy, the mujahideen, proved to be tough, resourceful opponents who exploited the weaknesses of Soviet and Afghan government troops and used the caves and rugged terrain of the area to great advantage. (AP Photo/Barry Renfrew)

airpower. The attack was a surprise (Haqqani was on a pilgrimage to Mecca) and the government forces initially made rapid progress. Haqqani returned on September 4 just as the government troops launched their main attack. Over the next 10 days, government forces drove to within a kilometer of the main base at Zhawar, but were finally pushed back when the two mujahideen T-55s led a counterattack. Meanwhile, mujahideen reinforcements flooded into the battle. The government troops withdrew. The battle was a major victory for the mujahideen, who lost 106 killed and 321 wounded. Government and Soviet losses were unknown, but estimated to be much heavier than those of the

mujahideen (and included the loss of a Soviet helicopter).

In February 1986, Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced plans for a phased withdrawal of Soviet troops. Meanwhile, a second, larger offensive was planned against Zhawar. The campaign was designed as a test of the ability of Afghan government troops to fight the mujahideen.

On February 28, 1986, more than 12,000 troops, including 2,000 Soviets, began a new attack on Zhawar (the Soviets were initially deployed in a supporting role). The force slowly moved forward over the next month. The Afghan government forces planned an aerial assault by an elite air assault unit to

break through the mujahideen defenders, but when the attack was launched on April 2, the first wave of troops was mistakenly dropped in Pakistan where they were captured by mujahideen. The second, and main, wave were able to land in their designated drop zones, but were overrun after three days of fighting. The mujahideen captured 530 of the Afghan commandos. The failure of the airborne assault prompted Soviet general Valentin Varennikov to take command of the offensive.

A new attack was launched on April 17, spearheaded by Soviet troops, with additional aerial support. The Soviets were able to overrun the mujahideen positions. Haqqani was wounded in the attack, and the mujahideen abandoned their positions, along with the two tanks, on April 19. The government and Soviet troops spent just five hours in Zhawar. They detonated explosives in the caves and tunnels, placed mines in the area, and then withdrew, fearing a counterattack by the insurgents.

The mujahideen returned the following day, and although some were killed by mines, they found that the Soviet demolition efforts had done relatively little damage. The mujahideen were able to recover some weapons and ammunition, along with other supplies, while rebuilding the facility. By the middle of May, Zhawar was in operation once again. Mujahideen casualties were 281 killed and 363 wounded. Soviet and government losses were higher, including the 530 captured commandos. They also shot down 24 helicopters and 2 combat jets. The battles highlighted the inefficiency of the Afghan government forces and the inability of Kabul to hold contested territory for any length of time.

Tom Lansford

See also: Airborne Units and Tactics; Antiaircraft Missiles; Armored Vehicles; Gorbachev, Mikhail; Haqqani, Jalaluddin;

Mujahideen; Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989); Soviet Union, Forces and Tactics; Varennikov, Valentin.

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Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad (1924–1988)

Muhammad Zia ul-Haq was a general who seized power in Pakistan in 1978 and ruled as president until his death in 1988. He was responsible for the massive support given to the mujahideen by Pakistan during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). Zia was born on August 12, 1924, in the British-ruled Punjab Province. He studied at St. Stephens College and then the Royal Indian Military Academy at Dehru-Dun. Zia was commissioned in the colonial army in May 1945. The future general saw service during the final months of World War II in the Pacific Theater. After the partition of India in 1947, Zia became part of the Pakistani Army and rose quickly through the ranks, becoming a lieutenant general in 1975 and then general a year later, despite his lack of seniority.

In July 1977, Zia launched a carefully planned coup against Pakistani prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The country was placed under martial law and Bhutto was eventually executed on April 4, 1978. A devout Muslim, Zia appealed to religious conservatives and pledged to restore Islamic values and law in

Pakistan. During his rule, aspects of sharia, Islamic holy law, replaced secular codes. Among the changes was the implementation of harsh penalties, including amputation, flogging, and stoning, for some crimes.

After the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Zia forged stronger links with the United States. He was viewed by the administration of President Ronald W. Reagan as a staunch ally in the global fight against communism. Zia was a fervent anticommunist because of Soviet repression of religion. The Pakistani leader was also concerned that the Soviets would escalate the conflict in Afghanistan and use the strife as an excuse to annex Pakistani territory. Pakistan was already home to bases for the antigovernment Afghan mujahideen, and Zia agreed to funnel weapons, funds, and other resources to the militants. In return, the United States increased military and economic aid to Pakistan. Not content with general support for the insurrection, under Zia, the Pakistani intelligence services began to infiltrate the mujahideen and garner influence over the larger and better-organized groups. Pakistani influence among the mujahideen would continue long after Zia died.

Zia also sought to acquire nuclear weapons and devoted considerable resources to his nation's atomic program, although his actions created controversy with the United States and other Western powers. In an effort to legitimize his rule to domestic and foreign critics, Zia relaxed martial law in 1985 and simultaneously appointed Mohammad Khan Junejo as prime minister. In May 1988, Zia dismissed the Junejo government and announced new elections. On August 17, Zia died in a plane crash along with senior Pakistani military officers and Arnold Lewis Raphael, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan.

Tom Lansford

See also: Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; Cold War (1947–1989); Gul, Hamid; Mujahideen; Pakistan, Relations with Afghanistan; Reagan, Ronald W.

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Index

Numbers in **bold** indicate a main entry.

- Abdullah, Abdullah, 174, 291, 311
- Abdullah, Abdullah Ahmed, 157, 158
- Abdullah, Mullah-i-Lang, 265
- Abdullah Mohammad, Fazul, 157
- Academi, 413, 414
- Acheson, Dean G., 182
- Afghan Army, history, forces, and tactics,
1–4
 - Afghan National Army (ANA), creation
of, 3
 - artillery, 1–2
 - basic infantry unit, 1
 - battalions, 1
 - Battle of Jalalabad, 3
 - cavalry regiments, 1
 - during the Cold War, 2
 - Daoud Khan, Mohammed, 2
 - Dost Mohammad, Emir, 1
 - during the First Anglo-Afghan War
(1839–1842), 1
 - “green-on-blue” violence, 3
 - historical characterizations of, 1
 - household guard, 2
 - modernization of, 1, 2
 - Northern Alliance, 3
 - overview of, 1–4
 - People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA), 2
 - Rahman, Abdur Khan, 1
 - roots of, 1
 - Royal Military College, 2
 - during the Second Anglo-Afghan War
(1879–1881), 1
 - Sher Ali Khan, Emir, 1
 - size of, 1, 3
 - during the Soviet occupation (1979–
1989), 2–3
 - Soviet Union and, 2–3
 - strategy used by Soviet and Afghan
forces, 3
 - the Taliban, 3
 - during the Third Anglo-Afghan War
(1919), 2
 - uniforms, 1
- Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), **4–6**
 - from 1989 to 1992, 4–5
 - from 1992 to 1996, 5
 - Battle of Jalalabad, 4
 - casualties, 5
 - consequences of, 5–6
 - Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 4, 5
 - final phase of, 5
 - Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin al-Hurra, 4, 5
 - Kabul and, 5
 - Massoud, Ahmed Shah, 4–5
 - the mujahideen, 4
 - Najibullah, Mohammed, 4, 5
 - Northern Alliance, 4, 5
 - overview of, 4–6
 - Pashtun Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*), 4

- Peshawar Accords, 5
- phases of, 4
- photograph of Taliban tanks entering Kabul, 6
- Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 5
- the Taliban, 5
- Afghan Constitution Commission, 84
- Afghan High Peace Council, 377
- Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), 84
- Afghan National Army (ANA)
 - armored vehicles of, 60
 - Barno, David W., 71
 - casualties, 10
 - combat experience of, 9
 - creation of, 3
 - “green-on-blue” violence, 3
 - Islamic State, 9, 223
 - Marja, Battle of, 283
 - strength of, 123
 - the Taliban and, 3
 - training of, 9, 71
- Afghan War (2001–), 7–10
 - Afghan Civil War and, 7
 - al Qaeda, 7
 - Battle of Tora Bora, photograph of, 8
 - beginning of, 7
 - Bonn Agreement, 7
 - casualties in, 10
 - corruption within the Afghan government, 9
 - formal ending of Operation Enduring Freedom, 9
 - Islamic State fighters, 9
 - NATO command of military operations in, 9
 - Northern Alliance, 7
 - number of insurgents in Afghanistan, 10
 - Obama, Barack, 9
 - Operation Anaconda, 8
 - Operation Enduring Freedom, 7
 - overview of, 7–10
 - the Taliban, 7, 8, 9
 - U.S. troop strength in, 8
 - U.S.-led coalition of forces, 7–8
 - U.S.-led coalition of forces, military goals of, 9–10
- Afghanistan, border disputes, **10–12**
 - Afghanistan–Uzbekistan Friendship Bridge, 11
 - countries bordering, 10
 - Durand Line, 10
 - Durand Line, geographic divisions of, 10
 - overview of, 10–12
 - Pashtun challenge to the border, 11
 - Pashtuns and, 10–11
 - purpose of, 11
 - Russian encroachment, 10
 - side effects, 11
 - size of Afghanistan, 10
 - Tajik–Afghan border, 11
 - Tajikistan, 11
 - Tribal Agencies, 11
 - tribal rebellion, 11
 - Uzbekistan, 11
- Afghanistan, climate and geography, **12–14**
 - climate defined, 12
 - Hadley Cell, 12
 - Hindu Kush foothills, 13
 - latitude range of, 12
 - overview of, 12–14
 - production of opium poppies, 13
 - Rigestan Desert, 12
 - semiarid steppes, 13
 - semipermanent pressure systems, prevailing winds, and storms, 13
 - temperatures, 12–13
 - topography and, 13
- Afghanistan, ethnic groups, **14–18**
 - Durrani tribe, 14
 - geography and, 14
 - Ghilzai tribe, 14, 16
 - Hazaras, 16–17
 - Kirghiz, 16
 - map of, 15
 - overview of, 14–18
 - Pashtunization of the state, 14
 - Pashtuns, 14

- Tajiks, 16
- Turkmen, 16
- Uzbeks, 17
- Afghanistan, nationalism, **18–19**
 - Anglo-Russian rivalry and, 18–19
 - the Constitutionalists, 18
 - development of, 18
 - the Feringhee, 18
 - overview of, 18–19
 - Pashtun code (Pashtunwali), 18
 - rural nature of the nation, 18
 - during the Soviet occupation, 19
 - Tarzi, Mahmud, 18, 19
 - tribal divisions and, 18
 - the Young Afghans, 19
- Afghanistan Security Service Department
 - (*Afghanistan Da Gatay Satanay Edara*—AGSA), 433
- Afghan-Pakistani border raids (2002–), **19–20**
 - Durand Line, 19
 - in July 2011, 19–20
 - in May 2007, 19
 - NATO and, 20
 - Operation Enduring Freedom and, 19
 - overview of, 19–20
 - Pashtuns and, 19
- Afghan-Sikh Wars (Durrani-Sikh Wars) (1748–1837), **20–22**
 - Battle of Amritsar (also known as the Battle of Gohalwar), 20
 - Battle of Attock, 21
 - Battle of Jamrud, 22
 - Battle of Multan, 21
 - Battle of Nowshera, 21
 - Battle of Sirhind, 21
 - Durrani, Ahmad Shah, 20, 21
 - Jandiala (Jundeala), 21
 - at Lahore, 20, 21
 - overview of, 20–22
 - Sikhs, 20–21
 - Singh, Maharaja Ranjit, 21
 - Third Battle of Panipat, 21
 - Timur, 21
 - Wadda Ghalughara (the second Sikh holocaust), 21
- Afghan-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (1931), **22–23**
 - clauses of, 22–23
 - consequences of, 22–23
 - formal name of, 22
 - overview of, 22–23
 - trade and, 22
- Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (1921), **23–24**
 - agreements of, 23
 - Britain and, 23
 - consequences of, 23–24
 - date signed, 23
 - definition of, 23
 - effective date of, 23
 - overview of, 23–24
 - plebiscite on Panjdeh, 24
 - ratification of, 23
 - Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) and, 23
- Afridi (Khyber) tribe, **24–25**
 - Afridi, Haji Ayub, 25
 - Afridi battalion, 25
 - after World War II, 25
 - during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), 24
 - Khyber Rifles, 24
 - overview of, 24–25
 - during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), 24
 - during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), 25
 - the Taliban and, 25
 - during the Third Afghan War (1919), 24–25
 - Tirah Expedition (1897–1898), 24
 - Treaty of Gandamak, 24
- Afridi, Haji Ayub, 25
- Afshars, 417
- Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), 207
- Ahmadzay, Ahmad Shah, 244
- airborne units and tactics, **25–27**

- Afghan Army airborne units, 26
- capture of Kabul, 25
- casualties, 26
- main transport helicopter, 26
- Operation Anaconda, 26
- Operation Enduring Freedom, 26, 26–27
- Operation Rhino, 26
- during Operation Storm 333, 25
- overview of, 25–27
- parachute assaults, 26
- Second Battle of Zhawar, 26
- Soviet tactics, 25–26
- special operations forces, 26
- Spetsnaz (Soviet special forces), 25
- suppression of the mujahideen, 26
- aircraft, types and tactics, **27–30**
 - Afghan Air Force, 27, 28
 - air bases, 27
 - B-52 Stratofortress, 28
 - Boeing B-1 Lancer, 28
 - Boeing CH-47 Chinook, 29
 - Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker, 29
 - civilian casualties, 29
 - coalition fixed-wing aircraft, 29
 - critical importance of aircraft, 27
 - Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt, 29
 - Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), 28, 29
 - Lockheed AC-130 gunship, 29
 - MiG-21 Fishbed, 28
 - Mil Mi-6 Hook, 28
 - Mil Mi-8 Hip, 28
 - Mil Mi-24 Hind, 28
 - during Operation Enduring Freedom, 28–29
 - in Operation Storm 333, 27
 - overview of, 27–30
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 27–28
 - Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot, 28
 - the Taliban, 28
 - in the Third Anglo-Afghan War, 27
 - UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, 29
 - UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter,
 - photograph of, 30
- Akbar Khan, 87, 231, 232
- Akhtar, A. R., 212
- Akhtar, Qari Saifullah, 194
- al Qaeda, **30–33**
 - 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., 5
 - Afghan War (2001–), 7
 - al-Qaeda fi Bilad al-Rafi dhayn*, 32
 - al-Qaeda fi Jazirat al-Arabiyya*, 32
 - Azzam, Sheikh Abdullah, 30, 77
 - bin Laden, Osama, 30, 31, 32, 77
 - bombings of the U.S. embassies, 31
 - credo of, 31
 - date established, 30
 - definition of, 30
 - Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 31
 - Global War on Terror, 32
 - ideology of, 32
 - majlis al-shura*, or consultative council of, 32
 - membership of, 33
 - Mubarak assassination attempt, 31
 - Mujahideen Services Bureau and, 30–31
 - Operation Enduring Freedom, 338, 340
 - overview of, 30–33
 - practice of *takfir*, 31
 - September 11, 2001 attack on the U.S., 32
 - the Taliban, 31, 443
 - upper-echelon leadership of, 32–33
 - U.S. Navy *Cole* attack, 32
 - Zawahiri, Ayman al-, 32, 33, 497–498
- Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 452
- Al-Azhar University system, 277
- Ali Khan, 166
- Ali Masjid, Battle of (1878), **33–34**
 - Ali Masjid, description of, 33
 - Anglo-Indian forces, columns of, 33–34
 - Browne, Samuel (“Sam”), 33
 - casualties in, 34
 - consequences of, 33
 - description of, 34
 - MacPherson, H. T., 34

- overview of, 33–34
- Peshawar Field Force, 33
- Tytler, J. A., 33
- Amin, Hafizullah (1929–1979), **34–36**
 - date and place of birth, 34
 - death of, 35
 - education of, 34
 - as foreign minister, 35
 - Khalq Faction and, 34
 - Operation Storm 333, 25, 35
 - overthrow of Daoud, 35
 - overview of, 34–36
 - Parcham Faction and, 35
 - People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and, 34–35, 236, 359
 - presidency of, 34, 35
 - Saur Revolution, 35, 185–186
 - significance of, 34
 - Soviet removal of, 35
 - Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 448
- Anderson, Marc, 438
- Andropov, Yuri (1914–1984), **36–37**
 - Communist Youth League (Komsomol), 36
 - date and place of birth, 36
 - death of, 36
 - diplomatic career of, 36
 - his rule of the USSR, 37
 - KGB and, 36, 37
 - overview of, 36–37
 - on the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and, 36
 - in the Politburo, 36
 - during the Prague Spring (1968), 36
 - significance of, 36
 - during World War II, 36
- Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809), **37–38**
 - date signed, 38
 - Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 38
 - main purpose of, 38
 - overview of, 37–38
 - Shuja Shah, 38
 - significance of, 37–38
 - terms of, 38
- Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1905), **38–39**
 - alternative name for, 38
 - Habibullah Khan, diplomatic victory of, 39
 - overview of, 38–39
 - purpose of, 38–39
 - terms of, 39
- Anglo-Afghan War: First (1839–1842), **40–43**
 - Army of Retribution, 43
 - British “Army of the Indus,” 40
 - British cantonment, 40, 42
 - British march to Kabul, 40
 - British retreat from Kabul, 42, 43
 - capture of Ghazni, 40
 - characterized by British military miscalculations, complacency, and incompetence, 40
 - consequences of, 43
 - Cotton, Willoughby, 40
 - Dost Mohammad and, 40
 - East India Company, 40
 - Elphinstone, William G. K., 40
 - ending of, 43
 - Gandamak massacre, 42
 - Ghazni fortress, 40
 - the Great Game and, 40
 - Macnaghten, William H., 42
 - map of, 41
 - overview of, 40–43
 - Pollock, George, 43
 - Sale, Robert, 40
 - Sale’s brigade, 42
 - Shuja Shah, 40
 - strength of forces in, 40
- Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880), **43–47**
 - at Ahmad Khel, 46
 - Ayub Khan, 46
 - Battle of Kandahar, 46–47
 - Battle of Peiwar Kotal, 44
 - British occupation of Kabul, 46
 - Browne, Samuel, 44

- Burrows, G. R. S., 46
- Cavagnari, Pierre L. N., 44, 45
- Cavagnari mission massacre, 45
- cavalry, 45
- fort of Ali Masjid, 44
- the Great Game and, 43–44
- illustration of Anglo-Indian cavalry
 - charge, 45
- Kabul Field Force, 45–46
- Kandahar Field Force, 44, 45
- Kandahar relief mission, 46
- Kurram Valley Force, 44, 45
- Maiwand attack, 46
- outcome of, 46–47
- overview of, 43–47
- Peshawar Valley Field Force, 44, 45
- Rahman, Abdur, 46, 47
- Roberts, Frederick S., 44, 45–46, 47
- Sher Ali Khan, Emir, 44
- Sherpur Cantonment attack, 46
- start of, 44
- Stewart, Donald M., 44, 46
- Treaty of Gandamak, 45
- Yakub Khan, 44, 46
- Anglo-Afghan War: Third (1919), **47–49**
 - Afghan Army versus Anglo-Indian Army, 48
 - Afghan war plan, 48
 - Amanullah Khan, 48
 - casualties in, 49
 - Durand Line, 49
 - Habibullah Khan, 47
 - Khyber Rifles, 48–49
 - Nasrullah Khan, 47
 - outcome of, 47
 - overview of, 47–49
 - Pashtun uprising, 48
 - Roos-Keppel, George, 48
 - siege at Thal, 49
 - Treaty of Gandamak, 47
 - Treaty of Rawalpindi, 49
 - Waziris suppression, 49
- Anglo-Marri Wars (1840, 1880, and 1917–1918), **49–51**
 - Balochs, 50
 - Bolan Pass, 50
 - British expedition against the Marris, 50
 - Bugti, Ghulam Hussain Masori, 50
 - effects of, 282
 - Fort Gunbaz, 50
 - Fort Hurrand attack, 50
 - Fort Munro, 50
 - at Harab, 50
 - intertribal rivalries, 50
 - MacGregor, Charles, 50
 - major combat operations of, 50
 - the Marri, 49–50
 - Marris attacks, 50
 - Meherullah, Sardar Khan, 50
 - overview of, 49–51
 - Third Anglo-Marri War, 50
- Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission, **51–52**
 - creation of, 51
 - date established, 51
 - members of, 51
 - overview of, 51–52
 - Panjdeh region, 51
 - purpose of, 51
 - settlement in, 51
- Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, **52–55**
 - consequences of, 52
 - contents of, 53
 - date signed, 53
 - Izvolksy, Alexander, 53
 - Nicolson, Arthur, 53
 - overview of, 52–55
 - precipitating events, 52–53
 - related primary document: the Anglo-Russian Convention (Entente), August 31, 1907, 54
 - supplement to, 53
 - on Tibet, 53
 - Triple Entente and, 53
 - zones in, 53
- antiaircraft missiles, **55–56**
 - Blowpipe surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, 55–56

- CIA and, 55, 56
- current status of, 56
- FIM-92 Stinger, 56
- funding of, 55
- importance of, 55
- mujahideen and, 56
- Operation Enduring Freedom and, 56
- overview of, 55–56
- rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), 55
- SA-7, 55, 56
- the Taliban, 56
- Anwari, Sayed Hussein, 218
- Arghandab, Battle of (1987), **56–57**
 - casualties, 57
 - consequences of, 57
 - description of, 57
 - overview of, 56–57
 - significance of, 56
- armored vehicles, **57–61**
 - BMP-1, 58
 - BMP-1, photograph of, 59
 - BMP-2, 58
 - BTR-70, 59
 - CIA and, 58
 - Humvees, 60
 - IEDs and, 60
 - importance of, 57
 - Leopard 1, 60
 - M1A2 Abrams, 60
 - M1117 Commando, 60
 - M1117 Guardian, 60
 - Operation Enduring Freedom and, 59–60
 - overview of, 57–61
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 58
 - Soviet motor rifle division and, 58
 - T-62, 58
 - T-62M, 58
 - the Taliban, 59–60
 - Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) and, 57
- Arnold, James R., 509
- artillery, cannons, and mortars, **61–63**
 - Afghan Army and, 61–62
 - at the Battle of Maiwand, 61
 - camel gun (*zamburak*), 61
 - D30 howitzer, 62
 - importance of, 61
 - M119 howitzer (105 mm), 62
 - M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, 63
 - M777 howitzer (105 mm), 62
 - the mujahideen and, 62
 - Operation Enduring Freedom and, 62
 - overview of, 61–63
 - rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), 62
 - smoothbore cannons, 61
 - Soviet military aid and, 62
- Aryanfard, Lieutenant Colonel Ojan, 509
- Auchinleck, Sir Claude (1884–1981), **63–64**
 - date and place of birth, 63
 - death of, 64
 - Distinguished Service Order to, 63
 - education of, 63
 - expedition against the Mohmands, 63–64
 - during the First World War, 63
 - military career of, 63–64
 - overview of, 63–64
 - during the Second World War, 64
 - significance of, 63
- Auckland, Sir George Eden, Earl of (1784–1849), **64–66**
 - “Auckland’s Folly,” 65
 - barony of, 64
 - created Earl of Auckland, 65
 - date and place of birth, 64
 - death of, 65
 - Dost Mohammad and, 65, 139
 - education of, 64
 - government service of, 64, 65
 - overview of, 64–66
 - Shuja Shah and, 65
 - significance of, 64
 - Simla Manifesto, 65
- Avitabile, Paolo (1791–1850), **66**
 - as “Abu Tabela,” 66
 - date and place of birth, 66
 - death of, 66
 - as governor of Wazirabad, 66

- marriage of, 66
 - as mercenary, 66
 - military service of, 66
 - overview of, 66
 - significance of, 66
- Avrakotos, Gust, 489
- Awakened Youth movement, 261, 358
- Ayub Khan, 46, 237
- Azzam, Sheikh Abdullah Yussuf, 30, 31, 77, 334, 498
- Baghdad Pact, **67–68**
 - as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 67
 - countries signing, 67
 - Daoud Khan, Mohammed, 67
 - dissolution of, 67–68
 - Eisenhower, Dwight D., 67
 - goals of, 67
 - Iraq and, 67
 - overview of, 67–68
 - Pakistan and, 67
 - renaming of, 67
 - Truman, Harry S., 67
- Bagram Air Base, **68–69**
 - local climate and, 68
 - location of, 68
 - Northern Alliance and, 68
 - Operation Enduring Freedom and, 68
 - overview of, 68–69
 - significance of, 68
 - during the Soviet invasion of 1979, 68
- Bahdur Shah II, 296
- Baines, Melodee M., 509
- Baker, Ralph Martin, 509–510
- Bala Hissar (“High Fort”), **69–70**
 - Babur, Zahir-ud-din Muhammad, 69
 - construction of, 69
 - expansion of, 69
 - location of, 69
 - as a military academy, 69
 - overview of, 69–70
 - rebuilding of, 69
 - during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 69
 - significance of, 69
 - Timur Shah, 69
- Balochs, 50
- Barakzai (sons of Barak), **70–71**
 - Barakzai, Fateh Khan, 70
 - definition of, 70
 - Dost Mohammad Khan, 70
 - Durrani, Shuja Shah, 70
 - dynasty, 70
 - Fateh Khan, 70
 - Nadir, Mohammad, 70
 - overview of, 70–71
 - Sher Ali Khan, 70
 - Zahir Shah, 70, 71
- Barno, David W. (1954–), **71–72**
 - Afghan National Army (ANA) and, 71
 - combating insurgency, 71
 - education of, 71
 - military career of, 71
 - overview of, 71–72
 - retirement of, 72
 - security for the 2004 presidential elections, 71–72
 - significance of, 71
- Battle of
 - Ali Masjid (1878), 33–34
 - Amritsar (Battle of Gohalwar) (1757), 20
 - Arghandab, 56–57
 - Attock (1813), 21
 - Damghan (1729), 133–134, 206
 - Dargai Heights (1897), 134
 - Gandamak, 42, 87, 164–166, 254
 - Ghazni (1839), 175–176
 - Ghaznigak (1888), 246
 - Gulnabad (1722), 186–187
 - Jalalabad (1989), 3, 4, 227–228
 - Jamrud (1837), 22, 229–230, 253
 - Kandahar, 46–47, 236–237, 393
 - Karnal (1739), 418
 - Maiwand (1880), 61, 236, 257, 277–279
 - Multan (1818), 21
 - Nowshera (1823), 21
 - Panipat (1761), 147, 350–351
 - Panipat, First Battle, 295

- Panipat, Second Battle (1556), 296
 Panipat, Third Battle (1761), 21, 110
 Parwan, 253
 Peiwar Kotal, 44
 Peiwar Kotal (1878), 357–358
 Qala-i-Jangi (2001), 373–377
 Saragarhi (1897), 408–409
 Sherpur (1879), 419–420
 Sirhind (1764), 21
 Takur Ghar (2002), 437–438
 Tora Bora (2001), 458–459
 Tora Bora (2001), photograph of, 8
 Wanat (2008), 482–483
 Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986), 499–501
 Zhawar, Second Battle, 26
 Bazar Valley Expedition, 456
 Bearden, Milton (1940–), **72–73**
 CIA career of, 72–73
 date and place of birth, 72
 education of, 72
 the mujahideen and, 72
 overview of, 72–73
 as Pakistan station chief, 72–73
 retirement of, 73
 Ruskoi, Alexander, and, 402
 significance of, 72
 Stinger antiaircraft missiles, 72
 writings of, 73
 Beauchamp, Michael K., 510
 Bergdahl, Bowe, 184, 194, 204
 Berntsen, Gary (1958–), **73–74**
 advocating for action against al Qaeda, 73
 bin Laden, Osama, 73–74, 459
 CIA and, 73–74
 covert operation of, 73
 date and place of birth, 73
 memoirs of, 73, 74
 overview of, 73–74
 political career of, 74
 retirement of, 74
 significance of, 73
 U.S. embassy bombing in Tanzania, 73
 Bey, Kazim, 492
 Bhau, Sadashivrao, 350
 Bhutto, Benazir (1953–2007), **74–75**
 arrest of, 74
 the assassination of, 75
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 74
 corruption conviction of, 75
 date and place of birth, 74
 education of, 74
 exile of, 75
 father of, 74
 military coup against, 74
 Musharraf, Pervez, 302
 opposition to the U.S. support for the Afghan mujahideen, 74
 overview of, 74–75
 as prime minister, 74–75
 significance of, 74
 strides toward reform, 74–75
 the Taliban, 75
 Zardari, Ali, 75
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali (1928–1979), **75–76**
 accomplishments of, 75
 conviction and execution of, 76
 date and place of birth, 75
 education of, 75
 father of, 75
 as foreign minister, 75
 overview of, 75–76
 Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and, 75
 political career of, 75–76
 as prime minister, 75–76
 significance of, 75
 Biden, Joseph, 330
 bin Laden, Osama (1957–2011), **76–80**
 aerial view of bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 471
 in Afghanistan, 79
 al Qaeda leadership, 30, 32, 77, 79
 al Qaeda terrorist bases in Afghanistan, 7
 attacks on the United States, 79
 attacks on U.S. embassies, 127
 Azzam, Sheikh Abdullah Yussuf, 30, 31, 77, 498

- bin Ladin (Arabic convention concerning), 76
- combat experience of, 77
- communications in military operations, 126
- date and place of birth, 76
- education of, 76–77
- events profoundly influencing, 77
- father of, 76
- formal name of, 76
- Harkay ul-Mujahideen* (HuM), 194
- jihad, call for, 79
- killing of, 9, 79, 126
- marriage of, 76
- Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh, 79
- Mujahideen Services Bureau, 77
- Muslim Brotherhood and, 77
- the name Osama, 76
- Omar, Mullah Mohammed, 334–335
- Operation Enduring Freedom, 340
- organizational skills of, 77
- overview of, 76–80
- Pakistan, relations with Afghanistan, 348–349
- photograph of, 78
- religious training, 77
- resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan, 77
- reward for, 157
- Saudi government rebuffs of, 78
- significance of, 76
- in Sudan, 78
- the Taliban and, 79
- terrorist activities of al Qaeda and, 78
- United States, forces and tactics (2001–), 470
- vocal opposition to Saudi government policy, 78
- wealth of, 76, 78
- Zawahiri, Ayman al-, 498
- Blaber, Peter, 437
- Black Mountain Expeditions (1888–1891), 160
- Blackwater Worldwide, 414
- Blair, Tony (1953–), **80–81**
 - after the attacks of September 11, 2001
 - against the U.S., 80
 - apology for “mistakes,” 81
 - the Blair Doctrine, 80
 - criticism of, 81
 - date and place of birth, 80
 - domestic successes of, 81
 - education of, 80
 - full name of, 80
 - intervention in Afghanistan, 80
 - invasion of Iraq and, 81
 - overview of, 80–81
 - political career of, 80
 - as prime minister, 80–81
 - significance of, 80
 - weapons of mass destruction claim, 81
- Blood, General Sir Bindon (1842–1940), **81–83**
 - autobiography of, 83
 - Blood, Col. James, and, 82
 - Buner Field Force, 82
 - Chitral Relief Force, 82
 - Churchill, Winston L. S., and, 82
 - combat experience of, 82
 - commands of, 82
 - date of birth, 81
 - education of, 82
 - Malakand Field Force, 82
 - overview of, 81–83
 - significance of, 81
- Bolan Pass, **83–84**
 - control of, 84
 - description of, 83
 - during the First Anglo-Afghan War, 83
 - invasions of Afghanistan and, 83
 - location of, 83
 - overview of, 83–84
 - during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 84
 - significance of, 83
- Bonn Agreement (2001), **84–85**
 - accomplishments of, 84–85
 - Afghan Constitution Commission, 84
 - Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) and, 84

- date of, 84
- International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 85
- judiciary commission, 84
- Karzai, Hamid, 84
- Loya Jirga, 271, 272
- overview of, 84–85
- purpose of, 84
- Bose, Subhas, 380
- Brahimi, Lakhdar, 468
- Brezhnev, Leonid (1906–1982), **85–86**
 - Brezhnev Doctrine, 85, 86, 342
 - date and place of birth, 85
 - détente with the U.S., 85–86
 - as General Secretary of the Communist Party, 85
 - invasion of Afghanistan, 86, 342, 425
 - the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 85
 - Khrushchev, Nikita, and, 85
 - overview of, 85–86
 - SALT II Treaty, 85
 - significance of, 85
 - during World War II, 85, 342
- Brezhnev Doctrine, 85, 86, 425
- British Cantonment, Kabul, **86–87**
 - British surrender of, 87
 - Burnes, Alexander, murder of, 87
 - deficiencies of, 86
 - description of, 86–87
 - inflation and shortages caused by, 87
 - location of, 86–87
 - overview of, 86–87
 - siege of, 87
 - significance of, 86
- British Colonial Army, forces and tactics, **87–90**
 - Anglo-Indian cavalry, 89
 - artillery, 89
 - basic formations of, 89
 - colonial units of, 88
 - column formation, 89
 - commissions, purchasing of, 88
 - defeats during the First Anglo-Afghan War, 88
 - East India Company, 88
 - infantry tactics in the 1800s, 89
 - khaki uniforms, 89
 - line formation, 89
 - Madras European Regiment, 88
 - military academies, 88
 - organization of the British Army, 88–89
 - overview of, 87–90
 - “Queen’s Army” troops, 88
 - regular forces, 88–89
 - Sepoy regiment, first, 88
 - square formation, 89
- Brown, Jorge, 510
- Browne, Sir Samuel (Sam) (1824–1901), **90**
 - Battle of Ali Masjid, 33, 90
 - commands of, 90
 - date and place of birth, 90
 - death of, 90
 - overview of, 90
 - Peshawar Valley Field Force and, 44, 90
 - promotions of, 90
 - “Sam Browne” belt, 90
 - significance of, 90
 - the Victoria Cross, 90
 - wording of, 90
- Brydon, William, 164, 229, 232, 233
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1928–), **90–91**
 - academic positions of, 91
 - accomplishments of, 91
 - citizenship of, 91
 - date and place of birth, 90–91
 - education of, 91
 - as a foreign policy adviser, 91
 - on the Global War on Terror, 91
 - Iranian hostage crisis, 91
 - as national security advisor, 91
 - overview of, 90–91
 - significance of, 90–91
- Buddhas of Bamiyan, **91–92**
 - attacks on, 92
 - the Bamiyan Valley, 92
 - overview of, 91–92
 - “Salsal” statute, 92
 - “Shahmama” statue, 92

- significance of, 91–92
- Taliban destruction of, 92, 481
- Wahhabism, 481
- Bugti, Ghulam Hussain Masori, 50
- Burnes, Sir Alexander (“Sekundar”) (1805–1841), **92–93**
 - date and place of birth, 92
 - Dost Mohammad, 64
 - explorations of, 92
 - fame of, 93
 - and the Great Game, 93
 - language proficiency of, 92
 - Macnaghten, Sir William Hay, 275
 - memoir of his adventures, 92
 - Metcalfe, Charles, 289
 - Mohan Lal, 290
 - murder of, 93
 - nickname of, 92
 - overview of, 92–93
 - reprimand of, 65
 - significance of, 92
 - Simla Manifesto, 93
- Burrows, G. R. S., 46, 278
- Bush, George H. W. (1924–), **93–94**
 - on Afghanistan, 94
 - date and place of birth, 93
 - as director of the CIA, 93
 - education of, 93
 - ending of the Cold War, 178
 - on German reunification, 94
 - humanitarian causes, 94
 - invasion of Panama, 94
 - Kuwait sovereignty and, 94
 - military service of, 93
 - overview of, 93–94
 - political career of, 93, 94
 - as president of the U.S., 94
 - significance of, 93
 - as U.S. ambassador, 93
 - as vice president of the U.S., 93
- Bush, George W. (1946–), **94–102**
 - Afghan War (2001–), 7
 - “axis of evil” speech, 95
 - Brzezinski, Zbigniew, on, 91
 - Bush Doctrine, 95
 - date and place of birth, 94
 - domestic issues, 95, 96
 - education of, 94
 - family of, 94
 - Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, 183
 - invasion of Iraq, 95–96
 - Iraq War (2003–), 215–216, 217
 - National Guard and, 94
 - Operation Enduring Freedom, 95
 - overview of, 94–102
 - political career of, 94–95
 - post-presidency, 96
 - as president of the United States, 95
 - related primary document: President George W. Bush discusses progress in Afghanistan, Global War on Terror, February 15, 2007, 96–102
 - September 11, 2001 attack on the U.S., 95
 - significance of, 94
 - “troop surge,” 96
 - U.S. economic assistance to, 473
 - weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 95
- Bush Doctrine, 215
- Calland, Albert M., III, 432
- Carlee, Charlie, 510
- Carter, Jimmy (1924–), **103–107**
 - accomplishments in foreign affairs, 103
 - American hostages in Iran, 103
 - Camp David peace accords, 103
 - the Carter Doctrine, 103
 - CIA and, 112
 - date and place of birth, 103
 - education of, 103
 - full name of, 103
 - human rights advocacy, 103
 - military service of, 103
 - Nobel Peace Prize to, 103, 104
 - overview of, 103–107
 - political career of, 103–104
 - post-presidency of, 104

- related primary document: President Jimmy Carter, “Speech on Afghanistan,” January 8, 1980, 104–107
- response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 103, 124
- significance of, 103
- writings of, 104
- Carter Doctrine, **107–108**
 - American hostages in Iran, 108
 - consequences of, 108
 - definition of, 107
 - overview of, 107–108
 - reorientation of foreign policy, 107–108
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 108
 - State of the Union message (1980)
 - quoted, 107
- Cavagnari, Major Sir Pierre L. N. (1841–1879), **108–109**
 - British mission to Afghanistan, 109
 - characteristics of, 109
 - date and place of birth, 108
 - death of, 109
 - education of, 108
 - massacre of his mission, 109, 168
 - military career of, 108–109
 - mission of, 109
 - overview of, 108–109
 - significance of, 108
 - start the Second Afghan War, 109
 - Treaty of Gandamak, 44–45, 109, 169
- cavalry and cavalry tactics, **109–112**
 - Afghan cavalry, 110
 - Anglo-Indian cavalry, 110–111
 - best cavalry units, 110
 - cavalry troops of Emir Ahmad Shah Durrani, 110
 - during the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars, 111
 - heavy cavalry units, 110
 - horse and equipment purchasing, 110, 111
 - khaki uniforms, 111
 - light cavalry units, 110–111
 - during Operation Enduring Freedom, 111
 - overview of, 109–112
 - reforms of, 110
 - during the Soviet occupation, 111
 - sowars*, 111
 - tactics of, 111
 - during the Third Anglo-Afghan War, 111
 - Third Battle of Panipat (1729), 110
 - use of cavalry, 110
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), **112–114**
 - aid to the mujahideen, 112–113, 125
 - antiaircraft missiles, 55, 56
 - armored vehicles, 58
 - Bearden, Milton (1940–), 72–73
 - Berntsen, Gary, 73–74, 113
 - cruise missile strikes, 113
 - cruise missile strikes on al Qaeda
 - facilities, 113
 - Karzai, Hamid (1957–), 239
 - Northern Alliance and, 113
 - Operation Cyclone, 112
 - overthrow the PDPA government, 113
 - overview of, 112–114
 - under President Ronald W. Reagan, 112
 - roots of, 112
 - Schroen, Gary, 113
 - significance of, 112
 - during the Soviet occupation, 112
 - Spann, Johnny “Mike,” 113
 - training Afghan militia forces, 113
 - U.S. relations with Afghanistan, 472
 - Wilson, Charles Nesbitt, 489
- Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 124, 348
- Chagai Militia, 160
- Chamberlain, Sir Neville Bowles (1820–1902), **114–115**
 - bravery of, 114
 - as commander of the Madras Army, 114
 - date and place of birth, 114
 - death of, 114
 - education of, 114
 - family of, 114
 - marriage of, 114

- military career of, 114
 - overview of, 114–115
 - promotions of, 114
 - significance of, 114
 - wounding of, 114
- Chapman, John A., 438
- Chaudhry, Iftikhar Muhammad, 302
- Chernenko, Konstantin (1911–1985),
 - 115–116**
 - on the Afghan insurgency, 115
 - Communist Youth League (Komsomol) and, 115
 - date and place of birth, 115
 - death of, 116
 - domestic agenda of, 115
 - Gorbachev, Mikhail, 115
 - head of propaganda for Moldova, 115
 - as leader of the Soviet Union, 115–116
 - Massoud, Ahmed Shah, 115
 - overview of, 115–116
 - significance of, 115
- China
 - Bhutto, Zulfi kar Ali, 75
 - investment in Afghanistan, 211
 - Khyber Pass, 268
 - mujahideen and, 185, 297
 - Ottawa Convention, 270
 - on Soviet assistance to India and Afghanistan, 348
 - Treaty of Nanking (1842), 368
 - Wakhan Corridor, 11
- Chitral Scouts, 160
- chronology, xxix–xliii
- Churchill, Sir Winston (1874–1965),
 - 116–117**
 - in the Anglo-Boer War, 116–117
 - date and place of birth, 116
 - death of, 117
 - education of, 116
 - fame of, 117
 - family of, 116
 - with the Malakand Field Force, 116
 - overview of, 116–117
 - significance of, 116
- The Story of the Malakand Field Force* (1898), 82
 - in the Sudan campaign, 116
 - 31st Punjab Infantry and, 116
 - with the Tirah Field Force, 116
- civil military operations, **117–119**
 - coalition forces model of, 118
 - definition of, 117
 - Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and, 117
 - early civil military operations, 117
 - humanitarian operations, 118
 - Karzai, Hamid, 118
 - overview of, 117–119
 - Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 118
 - Soviet model of, 117
 - terminology from the Vietnam War, 117
- civilian casualties, **119–120**
 - between 2001 and 2015, 120
 - in 2015, 120
 - causes of, 119
 - collateral damage from military owners, 119
 - Doctors without Borders (Médecins sans Frontières) and, 120
 - historic trend in, 119
 - on July 6, 2006, 120
 - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) protocol concerning, 119–120
 - number killed during 10-year occupation, 119
 - overview of, 119–120
 - during the retreat from Kabul (January 1842), 119
 - during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 119
 - during the Siege of Kabul, 119
 - during the Soviet occupation, 119
 - U.S. attempts to minimize, 119–120
- Clinton, Bill (1946–), **120–122**
 - airstrikes against Iraq, 121
 - al Qaeda, 121
 - Battle of Mogadishu, 121

- charitable foundation of, 121
- cruise missile attacks on al Qaeda, 73
- date and place of birth, 120
- domestic accomplishments of, 121
- education of, 120
- foreign and national security policy
 - record, 121
- formal name of, 120
- as governor of Arkansas, 120
- marriage of, 120
- Operation Infinite Reach, 128
- overview of, 120–122
- as president of the United States, 120–121
- related primary document: President Bill Clinton’s address to the nation on August 20, 1998, after the cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan, 128–130
- Rwandan genocide, 121
- scandal and, 120, 121
- significance of, 120
- terrorist strikes, 121
- U.S.humanitarian and economic assistance to, 473
- Clinton, Hillary Rodman, 120, 121
- coalition, forces and tactics (2001–), **122–124**
 - Afghan security forces, performance of, 122
 - coalition casualties, 123
 - components of the coalition, 122
 - countries contributing to the, 123
 - division of labor in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, 122
 - “green-on-blue” violence, 123
 - International Security Assistance Force (ISA), 122
 - major challenges, 122
 - major combat operations, 122
 - NATO and, 123
 - overview of, 122–124
 - provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), 123
 - Resolute Support Mission (RSM), 123
 - role of the coalition troops, 122
 - Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 122, 123
 - special operations forces, 122
 - troop surge, 123
 - use of combined arms with integrated air and land components, 122
- Cohen, William, 128
- Cold War (1947–1989), **124–125**
 - Afghanistan and, 124, 125
 - Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 124
 - CIA in Afghanistan, 125
 - Daoud Khan, Mohammed, 124
 - definition of, 124
 - Geneva Accords, 125
 - Gorbachev, Mikhail, 125
 - the mujahideen, 124, 125
 - overview of, 124–125
 - Pakistan and, 124, 125
 - People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 124, 125
 - Reagan Doctrine, 125
 - Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 124
 - U.S. reaction to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 124–125
- Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 317
- Commons, Matt, 438
- communications in military operations, **125–127**
 - in Afghanistan, 126
 - al Qaeda, 126
 - bin Laden, Osama, 126
 - counterterrorism operations, 126
 - couriers, 126
 - earliest communication techniques, 125–126
 - electronic telegraph, 126
 - during the “Great Game,” 126
 - importance of, 125
 - innovations in communications, 126
 - Internet-based social media networks, 126

- overview of, 125–127
- Conolly, Arthur, 179, 435
- Constitutionalists, 18
- Cordovez, Diego (1935–2014), **127**
 - as ambassador to the UN, 127
 - date and place of birth, 127
 - death of, 127
 - education of, 127
 - as foreign minister for Ecuador, 127
 - Geneva Accords and, 127
 - overview of, 127
 - significance of, 127
 - as an undersecretary for political affairs, 127
- Cotton, Willoughby, 40
- Covarrubias, Jack, 510
- Crile, George, 489
- Croze, Brad, 438
- cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998), **127–131**
 - casualties in, 128
 - Cohen, William, on, 128
 - cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (1998), 127
 - defense of, 128
 - Operation Infinite Reach, 128
 - overview of, 127–131
 - precipitating events, 127–128
 - reason for, 127
 - related primary document: President Bill Clinton’s address to the nation on August 20, 1998, after the cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan, 128–130
 - results of, 128
- Cultural Support Teams, 490
- Da Afghanistan Da Solai Ghorzang Gund* (“The Afghanistan Peace Movement”), 447
- Damghan, Battle of (1729), **133–134**
 - description of, 133
 - Durrani, Ahmad Shah, 133
 - Hotak dynasty, 133
 - Nadir Shah, 133
 - overview of, 133–134
 - precipitating events, 133
 - results of, 133
 - significance of, 133
- Dargai Heights, Battle of (1897), **134**
 - casualties in, 134
 - description of, 134
 - Lockhart, William, 134
 - overview of, 134
 - precipitating events, 134
 - significance of, 134
- Dawn of Knowledge (*Subh-i Danish*) movement, 297
- DeHart, Bruce J., 510
- Deobandi school, **135**
 - attempted suppression of, 135
 - growth of, 135
 - influence of the Pakistani Deobandi madrasahs, 135
 - overview of, 135
 - popularity of, 135
 - on Shiites, 135
 - significance of, 135
 - the Taliban and, 135
 - teachings of, 135
- Disraeli, Benjamin (1804–1881), **135–136**
 - accomplishments of, 136
 - as chancellor of the exchequer, 136
 - date and place of birth, 135
 - death of, 136
 - election to Parliament, 136
 - foreign policy challenges of, 136
 - and the Great Game, 135, 136
 - overview of, 135–136
 - political career of, 135–136
 - as prime minister, 136
 - reputation of, 136
 - Second Anglo-Afghan War, 136
 - significance of, 135
 - war against the Zulus, 136
- Dobbins, James (1942–), **136–137**
 - accomplishments of, 137
 - as a career diplomat, 136–137

- date and place of birth, 136
- education of, 136
- overview of, 136–137
- RAND Corporation and, 137
- significance of, 136
- as special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, 137
- as U.S. ambassador to the European Union (1991–1993), 137
- Doerr, Paul, 510
- Dost Mohammad (1793–1863), **137–140**
 - accomplishments of, 137
 - ally to the British, 140
 - appellation of, 138
 - Auckland, Lord, 139
 - the Barakzai, 70
 - civilian reforms, 139
 - consolidation of power, 138, 139
 - control of the city of Kabul, 138
 - date and place of birth, 137
 - death of, 140
 - father of, 137
 - First Anglo-Afghan War, 139
 - illustration of, 138
 - internecine war and, 137–138
 - military reforms, 1, 138, 139
 - overview of, 137–140
 - Painda Khan, 137
 - restoration to the throne, 139
 - Sepoy (Indian) Rebellion, 140
 - significance of, 137
 - surrendered to the British, 139
 - treasury of, 138–139
- Dostum, Abdul Rashid (1954–), **140–142**
 - allegiances of, 140
 - Bai incident, 141
 - as a communist union boss, 140
 - date and place of birth, 140
 - Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf, 174
 - government opposition to, 141
 - Hamdard, Juma Khan, 141
 - Karzai, Hamid, and, 141, 142
 - Massoud, Ahmed Shah, 4
 - Mazare-Sharif University and, 141
 - National Front of Afghanistan (*Jabhe Melli*), 311
 - National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan*), 141, 312, 313
 - overview of, 140–142
 - as a regional militia commander, 140
 - reputation of, 140, 141
 - secular fiefdom of, 141
 - self-imposed exile of, 141
 - significance of, 140
 - Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (Rashid), 141
 - and U.S. Special Forces, 141
- drone strikes, **142–143**
 - advantages of, 142
 - al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 143
 - Bush administration on, 142
 - collateral damage, 142, 143
 - definition of, 142
 - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 142, 143
 - Obama, Barack, 142, 143
 - overview of, 142–143
- Dubs, Adolf “Spike” (1920–1979), **143–144**
 - alternative name for, 143
 - consequences of the killing of, 144
 - date and place of birth, 143
 - education of, 143
 - kidnapping of, 143–144
 - killing of, 144, 472
 - military career of, 143
 - overview of, 143–144
 - significance of, 143
 - as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, 143
 - U.S. foreign service career of, 143
- Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer (1850–1924), **144–145**
 - agreement with Emir Khan, 10
 - as British ambassador, 145
 - date and place of birth, 144

- death of, 145
- Durand Line, 144, 145, 146
- education of, 144
- father of, 144
- as foreign secretary of the government of India, 144
- Indian civil service and, 144
- as minister to Persia, 145
- overview of, 144–145
- Panjdeh Crisis, 144
- Pathan uprising of 1897, 145
- political boundary between India and Afghanistan, 144
- during the Second Afghan War, 144
- significance of, 144
- Durand Line, 146–147**
 - Afghans and, 146
 - Article 5 of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919 and, 146
 - criticism of, 145
 - current status of, 146
 - date established, 146
 - Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer, 144, 145, 146
 - Khan, Abdur Rahman, 246
 - legality of, 146
 - length of, 146
 - location of, 146
 - overview of, 146–147
 - Pashtun population and, 19
 - Pashtuns and, 146
 - Pathan uprising of 1897, 145
- Durrani, Ahmad Shah (ca. 1722–1772), 147–148**
 - Battle of Panipat, 147
 - clan of, 147
 - conquests of, 147
 - date and place of birth, 147
 - death of, 147
 - decline of the Durrani Empire, 147
 - father of, 147
 - imprisonment of, 133
 - invasion of India, 147
 - the name “Durrani,” 147
 - overview of, 147–148
 - Pashtunization, 354
 - reputation of, 148
 - as ruler of Afghanistan, 20, 147
- Durrani, Mahmud Shah (1769–1829), 148–149**
 - Barakzai dynasty, establishment of, 148
 - date of birth, 148
 - death of, 148
 - exile of, 148
 - father of, 148
 - first reign of, 148
 - grandfather of, 148
 - overthrow of, 148
 - overview of, 148–149
 - second reign of, 148
 - significance of, 148
 - Timur Shah and, 148
- Durrani, Shuja Shah (1785–1842), 149–150**
 - alliance with the British, 149
 - Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809), 149
 - assassination of, 149, 254
 - Barakzai clan, 149
 - Battle of Ghazni, 175, 176
 - British subsidy of, 38
 - capture of, 149
 - Dost Mohammad and, 149
 - Koh-i-Nor diamond, 149
 - overthrow of, 149
 - overview of, 149–150
 - Popalzai tribe, 366
 - as a puppet of the British Empire, 40, 237
 - significance of, 149
- Durrani, Timur Shah (ca. 1748–1793), 150–151**
 - accomplishments of, 150
 - Barakzai tribe and, 150
 - date and place of birth, 150
 - death of, 150
 - overview of, 150–151
 - Qizil-Bash troops as bodyguard, 150
 - as ruler of the Durrani Empire, 150
 - significance of, 150

- Sikh Empire and, 150
- sons of, 150
- Durrani, Zaman Shah (ca. 1770–1844),
 - 151–152**
 - blinding of, 151
 - capture of, 151
 - Fateh Khan, execution of, 151
 - father of, 151
 - imprisonment of, 151
 - invasion of the Punjab, 151
 - overview of, 151–152
 - plot against, 151
 - primary concern of, 151
 - rule of, 151
 - significance of, 151
- Durrani Empire (1747–1818), **152–153**
 - area of, 152
 - Battle of Panipat (1761), 152
 - Dost Mohammad, 152
 - Durrani, Ahmad Shah, 152
 - Durrani, Shuja Shah, 152
 - Durrani, Timur Shah, 152
 - Durrani, Zaman Shah, 152
 - founder of, 152
 - the Ghilzai, 152
 - lines of Durranis, 152
 - Mahmud Shah Durrani, 152
 - Mohammadzai, 152
 - name of, 152
 - overview of, 152–153
 - Sadozai clan, 152
- Dyer, Reginald, 49
- Dyncorp International, 413
- East India Company, 40
- Edwardes, Herbert Benjamin, 360, 361
- Edwards, Richard M., 510
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 67, 124, 472
- Elles, Edmond, 292
- Ellis, Ted, 511
- Elphinstone, Mountstuart (1779–1859),
 - 155–156**
 - An Account of the Kingdom of Cauba* (Elphinstone), 155
 - Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809), 38, 155
 - as British Resident to Ragojee Bhonslia, 155
 - college in Poona, 155
 - death of, 156
 - design of British administrative rule in British-controlled India, 155
 - diplomatic career of, 155–156
 - as envoy to the King of Afghanistan, 155
 - espionage and intelligence-gathering, 155
 - as lieutenant-governor of Bombay, 155
 - overview of, 155–156
 - significance of, 155
- Elphinstone, William George Keith (1782–1842), **156–157**
 - accolades of, 156
 - commands of, 156
 - death of, 156
 - family of, 156
 - his command in Afghanistan, 156
 - Khan, Mohammad Akbar, 254
 - military career of, 156
 - overview of, 156–157
 - promotions of, 156
 - retreat from Kabul, 156, 231, 232
 - sack of the British residency, 42
 - significance of, 156–157
 - surrender of, 156
- embassy bombings (1998), **157–158**
 - Abdullah, Abdullah Ahmed, 157, 158
 - al Qaeda, 157
 - casualties, 157
 - date of the attacks, 157
 - description of, 157
 - locations of, 157
 - Mohammad, Fazul Abdullah, 157
 - Odeh, Mohammed Sadeek, 157
 - overview of, 157–158
 - results of, 158
 - reward for bin Laden, 157
 - sanctions on the Taliban, 157
 - truck bombs, 157
 - U.S. economic sanctions against Afghanistan, 157

ethnic groups of Afghanistan, 324, 485
 Evans, M. Annette, 511

Facebook, 126

Fahim, Mohammad Qasim, 16

Fahrer, Chuck, 511

Farhang, Mier Mihammad Siddiq, 238

Fateh Khan, 137, 138

Feringhee, the, 18

First Mahsud Scouts, 160

Florentia, Julia, 406

Franks, Tommy (1945–), **159–160**

- commands of, 159
- criticism of, 159
- date and place of birth, 159
- date commissioned, 159
- education of, 159
- invasion of Afghanistan and, 159
- during the invasion of Iraq, 159
- memoirs of, 159
- military career of, 159
- overview of, 159–160
- during the Persian Gulf War, 159
- retirement of, 159
- significance of, 159
- unorthodox strategy of, 159

Frontier Corps, **160–161**

- Barrett, W. C., 160
- British officers and, 160
- Chagai Militia, 160
- Chitral Scouts, 160
- counternarcotics operations in
 - Baluchistan, 161
- date formed, 160
- division of, 161
- expansion of, 161–162
- FC Baluchistan (FC Baluchistan)
 - command, 161
- FC Northwest Frontier Province (FC
 - NWFP) command, 161
- First Mahsud Scouts, 160
- Khyber Jezailchis, 160
- Khyber Rifles, 160
- Kurram Militia, 160

Nawab Sir Mohammad Aslam Khan, 160

overview of, 160–161

Pishim Scouts, 160

reorganization of, 160

Second Mahsud Scouts, 160

South Waziristan Scouts, 160

Third Afghan War (1919), 160

Tochi Scouts, 160

U.S. aid to, 161

uses of, 160, 161

during World War II, 160

Zhob Militia, 160

Gailani, Pir Sayyid Ahmad (1932–),

163–164

in the Afghan parliament, 163

Bonn Summit, 163

date and place of birth, 163

education of, 163

exile of, 163

father of, 163

interim mujahideen government
 and, 163

Karzai, Hamid, 163

marriage of, 163

National Islamic Front of Afghanistan
 (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*), 163, 223,
 311, 312

overview of, 163–164

Peshawar Seven, 163, 311–312

significance of, 163

U.S.- Soviet peace proposal, 163

Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 421

Gandamak, Battle of (1842), **164–166**

Army of Retribution, 165

the British square, 164

Brydon, William, 164

description of, 164

diary of Lady Florentia Sale, 165

overview of, 164–166

related primary document: the Battle
 of Gandamak on January 13, 1842,
 as described by Lady Florentia Sale,
 165–166

- retreat of Army of the Indus from Kabul, 164
- significance of, 164, 165
- Souter, Thomas, 164
- Gandamak, Treaty of (1879), **166–170**
 - Ali Khan, 166
 - Cavagnari, Sir Pierre Louis Napoleon, 168, 169
 - date signed, 167
 - on foreign policy, 167, 168
 - illustration of signing of, 167
 - overview of, 166–170
 - provisions of, 167
 - related primary document: Treaty of Gandamak, May 26, 1879, 168–170
 - Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), 166
 - significance of, 166
 - territorial concessions, 167
 - Yakub Khan, 166, 167, 168
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 380
- Gandolfo, Luisa, 511
- Gates, Robert Michael (1943–), **170–171**
 - in academia, 171
 - CIA career of, 170–171
 - controversy and, 171
 - date and place of birth, 170
 - as Defense Secretary, 171
 - as director of the CIA, 171
 - education of, 170
 - military service of, 170
 - Obama, Barack, and, 331
 - overview of, 170–171
 - in public service, 171
 - significance of, 170
- Geary, Brent M., 511
- Geneva Accords (1988), **171–174**
 - Afghan- Pakistani noninterference accord protocol, 172
 - bilateral agreements, 172
 - date signed, 171
 - displaced persons, 172
 - Najibullah regime, 172
 - overview of, 171–174
 - related primary document: Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, April 14, 1988, 173–174
 - return of refugees, 172
 - separate instruments of, 172
 - significance of, 125, 172
 - on Soviet withdrawal, 125, 172
- George V (King), 491
- “German Faction,” 250
- Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf (1949–), **174–175**
 - Abdullah Abdullah and, 17, 175
 - as an anthropologist for the World Bank, 174
 - Bonn Agreement (2001) and, 174
 - as chair of the Transition Coordination Commission, 174
 - as chancellor of Kabul University, 174
 - date and place of birth, 174
 - Dostum, Abdul Rashid, and, 311
 - education of, 174
 - as finance minister, 174
 - Kerry, John, 175
 - overview of, 174–175
 - as president of Afghanistan, 175
 - runs for presidency, 174–175
 - significance of, 174
 - as a special adviser for the UN’s envoy to Afghanistan, 174
 - teaching posts of, 174
 - U.S. citizenship, renouncing of, 174
- Ghazni, Battle of (1839), **175–176**
 - Bolan Pass, 175
 - casualties, 176
 - commanders in, 175
 - description of, 175–176
 - First Anglo-Afghan War, 175
 - Hyder Khan, 175
 - Keane, John, 175, 176
 - overview of, 175–176
 - results of, 176
 - Sale, Robert, 176
 - Shuja Shah, 175, 176
 - significance of, 175

- Ghilzai, **176–177**
 alternative names for, 176
 the Durrani and, 176
 Hotak, Mir Wais, 176
 languages of, 176
 as nomadic, 177
 origins of, 176
 overview of, 176–177
 prominent warlords of, 177
 and the resurgent insurgency movement, 176
 revolt against Mohammed Daoud Khan's government, 176
 rulers of Afghanistan and, 176
 significance of, 176
 Sunni Islam (of the Hanafi school), 177
 the Taliban, 356
 Taliban movement and, 177
- Gladstone, William, 351, 352
- Global War on Terror, 32
- Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–), **177–179**
 Andropov, Yuri, 177
 Chernenko, Konstantin, and, 115
 Communist Party and, 177
 controversy and, 178
 coup against, 178
 date and place of birth, 177
 education of, 177
 ending of the Cold War, 178
 foreign policy of, 177–178
 full name of, 177
 as leader of the Soviet Union, 177–178
 overview of, 177–179
 perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), 177
 photograph of, 178
 reforms of, 177
 resignations of, 178
 significance of, 177
 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 177–178
 Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich, and, 495
 Yeltsin, Boris, 178
- Gorgin Khan, 186
- Government of India Act (1919), 380
- Government of India Act (1935), 380
- Great Game, the, **179–181**
 Anglo-Afghan War: Second (1878–1880), 43
 Anglo-Russian Convention (1907), 54
 border between Afghanistan and Rus, 180
 British absorption of Indian states, 179
 British exploration in Afghanistan, 179
 British officers participating in early stages of, 179
 definition of euphemism, 52, 179
 Durand Line, 180
 First Anglo-Afghan War, 179
 First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), 40
 Gandamak, Battle of (1842), 179
 “Great Game” term, 179
 overview of, 179–181
 Panjeh Crisis, 180
 peak of, 180
 Punjab, annexation of, 179
 Russian expansion in Central Asia, 179
 Second Anglo-Afghan War, 180
 “the tournament of shadows,” 179
 United Kingdom (Great Britain), relations with Afghanistan, 463, 465
 Younghusband, Francis, 180
 “green-on-blue” violence, 3, 123
- Gromov, Boris (1943–), **181–182**
 date and place of birth, 181
 education of, 181
 as first deputy defense minister, 181
 full name of, 181
 as governor of Moscow, 181
 Hero of the Soviet Union award to, 181
 Khost, Sieges of (1980–1989), 265
 military career of, 181
 Operation Magistral, 181
 overview of, 181–182
 promotions of, 181
 reputation of, 181
 significance of, 181

- withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, 181
- Gromyko, Andrei (1909–1989), **182–183**
 - on Afghanistan, 182, 183
 - Berlin crisis and, 182
 - as chair of the Supreme Soviet, 183
 - Cuban missile crisis, 182
 - date and place of birth, 182
 - death of, 183
 - education of, 182
 - on Korea, 182
 - overview of, 182–183
 - retirement from public life, 183
 - significance of, 182
 - as Soviet Foreign Minister, 182
 - Stalin, Josef, and, 182
- Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, **183–184**
 - Bergdahl, Bowe, 184
 - Bush, George W., 183
 - controversial aspects of, 184
 - early days of, 183
 - growth of, 184
 - high-profile detainee release, 184
 - information extraction techniques, 184
 - Obama, Barack, 184
 - overview of, 183–184
 - purpose of, 183
 - U.S. Congress and, 184
- Guerrier, Steven W., 511
- Gul, Hamid (1936–2015), **184–185**
 - arrest of, 185
 - criticism of, 185
 - date and place of birth, 184
 - death of, 185
 - education of, 184
 - leadership of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 185, 212
 - military career of, 184–185
 - overview of, 184–185
 - significance of, 184
- Gulabzoy, Sayyed Mohammad (1951–), **185–186**
 - as ambassador to Moscow, 186
- Amin, Hafizullah, and, 185–186
 - date and place of birth, 185
 - ethnic Pashtun, 185
 - gang of four, 186
 - as interior minister, 186
 - military service of, 185
 - as minister of communication, 186
 - overview of, 185–186
 - People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime and, 185, 186
 - the Sarandoy (“Defenders of the Revolution”) and, 186, 409
 - significance of, 185
 - Soviet invasion and, 186
 - Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 186
- Gulnabad, Battle of (1722), **186–187**
 - consequences of, 187
 - description of, 187
 - Gorgin Khan, 186
 - overview of, 186–187
 - precipitating events, 186–187
- Gundi Mulla Sahibdad village, 237
- Gundigan village, 237
- Gupta, Sangeeta, 511
- Hadley Cell, 12
- Haidar, Ghulam, 361
- Haig, Alexander (1924–2010), **189–190**
 - combat duty of, 189
 - death of, 190
 - education of, 189
 - infamous quote of, 189
 - military career of, 189
 - mismanagement of the Falklands crisis, 189
 - overview of, 189–190
 - post-government service, 190
 - resignation of, 190
 - as secretary of state, 189
- Hamdard, Juma Khan, 141
- Haq, Abdul (1958–2001), **190–191**
 - after the 9/11 terrorist strikes, 190–191
 - assassination of his wife and son, 190

- business interest of, 190
- date and place of birth, 190
- execution of, 191
- family of, 190
- Massoud, Ahmad Shah, 190
- overview of, 190–191
- as a peace negotiator, 190
- as police commissioner, 190
- reputation of, 190
- significance of, 190
- wounding of, 190
- Haqqani, Jalaluddin (1939–2014?), **191–192**
 - Battle of Zhawar, 192
 - date and place of birth, 191
 - education of, 191
 - Haqqani Network, 192
 - Hezb-e Islami Khalis and, 191–192
 - his capture of Khost, 192
 - honorific title of, 191
 - as minister of justice, 192
 - overview of, 191–192
 - photograph of, 191
 - reported death of, 192
 - significance of, 191
 - suspicion of treason, 191
 - the Taliban and, 192
- Haqqani Network, **192–194**
 - Afghan Taliban regime and, 193
 - area of operations, 193
 - Bergdahl, Bowe, 194
 - bin Laden, Osama, 193
 - CIA and, 193
 - Haqqani, Jalaluddin, 192–193
 - Haqqani, Sirajuddin, 192
 - improvised explosive device attacks, 193
 - kidnappings of, 194
 - offensive operations in the “Zadran Arch,” 193
 - overview of, 192–194
 - Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and, 193
 - Rohde, David, 194
 - Serena Hotel attack, 193
 - significance of, 192
 - support for, 193
 - Taliban insurgency and, 444
- Harkat ul-Ansar* (HuA), 194
- Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami* (Islamic Jihad Movement or HuJI), 194
- Harkay ul-Mujahideen* (HuM), **194–195**
 - bin Laden, Osama, 194
 - establishment of, 194
 - Harkat ul-Ansar* (HuA), 194
 - HuM and HuJI merger, 194
 - Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and, 194
 - Jaish-e Mohammed* (Army of Muhammad), 194
 - Khalil, Fazlur Rehman, 194
 - leaders of, 194
 - overview of, 194–195
 - purpose of, 194
 - as a terrorist organization, 194
- Harlan, Josiah (1799–1871), **195–196**
 - date and place of birth, 195
 - daughter of, 195
 - death of, 195
 - marriage of, 195
 - military adventures of, 195
 - overview of, 195–196
 - practice of medicine, 195
 - as prince of Ghor, 195
 - Shuja Shah and, 195
 - significance of, 195
 - during the U.S. Civil War, 195
- Hawzah al-Ilmiyya* (the certified Islamic scholars), 277
- Haysom, Nicholas, 468
- Hazara Uprisings (1888–1901), **196–197**
 - consequences of, 196
 - definition of, 196
 - first uprising, 196
 - overview of, 196–197
 - second uprising, 196
 - third uprising, 196
- Hazaras, **197–198**
 - during the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, 198

- cycle of poverty of, 197
- Dari language, 197
- definition of, 197
- discrimination and persecution of, 197
- overview of, 197–198
- Pashtunization and, 197
- population of Afghanistan, 197
- religion, 197
- resettlement and brutal suppression of, 197
- revolt against the taxes, 197
- during the Soviet invasion, 197–198
- the Taliban and, 198
- Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin (1947–), **198–199**
 - Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), 4, 5
 - arrest and expulsion of, 198
 - capture of Kabul (1992), 199
 - date and place of birth, 198
 - education of, 198
 - in exile, 199
 - Hezb-e Islami* (Islamic Party), formation of, 198, 212, 219–220, 223, 224
 - insurgent network within Afghanistan, 199
 - Kabul, Siege of (1996), 233
 - network of, 198–199
 - overview of, 198–199
 - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and, 198
 - Peshawar Accords (1992), 362
 - as prime minister, 199
 - significance of, 199
 - the Taliban, 199
 - terrorist designation, 199
- Helmand Valley, **199–200**
 - Arghandab River, 199
 - the “breadbasket” of Afghanistan, 199
 - canal building in, 200
 - crops grown in, 200
 - description of, 199
 - early inhabitants of, 200
 - Helmand Province, 200
 - Helmand River, 199
 - Helmand Valley Project, 200
 - during Operation Enduring Freedom, 200
 - opium and, 200
 - overview of, 199–200
- Helmand Valley Project, **200–201**
 - Arghandab Dam, 201
 - cost overruns and operational problems, 201
 - description of, 200
 - Helmand Valley Authority (HVA), 201
 - Kajaki Dam, 201
 - loans for, 201
 - Mahmud Khan, Shah, 200
 - Morrison-Knudson Afghanistan (MKA), 200–201
 - Morrison-Knudson Company, 200
 - overview of, 200–201
 - success of, 201
 - U.S. Import-Export Bank and, 472
- Hentig, Werner von, 491, 492, 493
- Herat, Siege of (1837–1838), **201–202**
 - city of Herat, 202
 - definition of, 201
 - description of, 202
 - McNeill, John, 202
 - overview of, 201–202
 - Pottinger, Eldred, 202
 - precipitating events, 201–202
 - Simonich, Ivan, 202
 - strength of forces, 202
 - Yar Mohammed Khan, 201
- Herat, Uprising (1979), **202–203**
 - aerial bombing campaign, 203
 - casualties and, 203
 - consequences of, 203
 - definition of, 202
 - Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and, 202, 203
 - description of, 203
 - implementation of reforms, 203
 - overview of, 202–203
 - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and, 202, 203
 - precipitating events, 202–203
 - Saur Revolution (1978), 202–203
 - suppression of, 203

- heroin, 344
- Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan (HIA), 219
- Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), 219, 245
- Hezb-e Islami Khalis (HIK), 219, 244–245
- Hezb-e Wahdat, 224
- Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Mardum-e Afghanistan* (“People’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan”), 291
- Holbrooke, Richard, 331
- Holt, David Harms, 511
- hostages and kidnapping, **203–205**
 - after the fall of the Taliban, 204
 - Babader Fortress uprising, 204
 - Bergdahl, Bowe, 204
 - during the First Anglo-Afghan War, 203–204
 - involving Afghans, 204
 - Islamic State and, 204
 - kidnapping as a tactic, 204
 - lucrative nature of kidnappings, 204
 - Mastrogiacomio, Daniele, 204
 - as a new phenomenon in Afghanistan, 203
 - overview of, 203–205
 - during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), 204
 - traditional code of Pashtunwali, 203
- Hotak, Abdul Aziz, 205
- Hotak, Ashraf, 133, 206
- Hotak, Hussain, 206
- Hotak, Mahmud, 205
- Hotak, Mir Wais (1673–1715), **205**
 - date and place of birth, 205
 - death of, 205
 - the Ghilzai family and, 205
 - overthrow of Persian rule, 205
 - overview of, 205
 - significance of, 205
 - unification of Afghan tribes, 205
- Hotak dynasty, 133
- Hotaki, Mahmud, 205–206
- Hotaki, Shah Ashraf, 206
- Hotaki Empire (1709–1738), **205–206**
 - Battle of Damghan (1729), 206
- Hotak, Abdul Aziz, 205
- Hotak, Hussain, 206
- Hotak, Mir Wais, 205
- Hotaki, Mahmud, 205–206
 - overview of, 205–206
 - significance of, 205
- Hoyt, Timothy D., 511
- Hueston, Harry Raymond, 512
- humanitarian aid operations, **206–208**
 - after the 9/11 attacks, 207–208
 - Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), 207
 - duration of humanitarian crisis, 206
 - funding of, 207
 - humanitarian daily rations (HDRs), 208
 - nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 207
 - Operation Salam, 206
 - overview of, 206–208
 - provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), 208
 - during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), 206
 - the Taliban, 207
 - UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), 208
 - UN efforts, 206–207
 - UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), 207
 - U.S. military and, 207–208
- Husayn, Shah Sultan, 186
- Hyder, Vic, 437, 438
- Hyder Khan, 175
- improvised explosive devices (IEDs), **209–210**
 - definition of, 209
 - effectiveness of, 209
 - history of, 209
 - overview of, 209–210
 - types of, 209
 - U.S. casualties and, 209
 - U.S. suppression of, 209

- Inayatullah Khan, 236
- India, relations with Afghanistan, **210–212**
- Afghan mujahideen infighting, 211
 - al Qaeda, 211
 - bilateral interactions, 211
 - Britain and, 210
 - the Cold War, 210–211
 - division of British India, 210
 - economic interactions, 211
 - external actors in, 210
 - the “Great Game,” 210
 - International Security Assistance Force, 211
 - Mughal Empire, 210
 - multilateral interactions, 211
 - overview of, 210–212
 - Pakistan, 210
 - parallel between their respective histories, 210
 - Russia/Soviets and, 210
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), 211
 - Trans-Afghanistan pipeline, 211
 - 21st-century Afghan-Indian relationship, 211
 - Wahhabism/Salafism, 211
- Indian National Army, 380
- Indian National Congress, 379
- information extraction techniques, 184
- Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan, **212–213**
- Afghan Pashtun community, 212
 - Akhtar, A. R., 212
 - autonomy of, 212
 - date founded, 212
 - definition of, 212
 - Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), 212
 - Gul, Hamid, 212
 - Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*), 212
 - involvement in Afghanistan, 212
 - overview of, 212–213
 - Pashtun mujahideen and, 212
 - during the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), 212
 - the Taliban, 212, 213
- International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), **213–214**
- Bonn Agreement (2001), 85
 - coalition, forces and tactics (2001–), 122
 - combat missions, 341
 - drawdown of, 213
 - India, relations with Afghanistan, 211
 - Iraq War (2003–), 9
 - Nation Building and Economic Development in Afghanistan (2001–), 308
 - NATO and, 213
 - Obama, Barack, and, 213
 - overview of, 213–214
 - purpose of, 213
 - rationale for the establishment of, 213
 - rules of engagement, 213–214
- Iran (Persia), relations with Afghanistan, **214–215**
- after the U.S.-led coalition toppled the Taliban, 215
 - Battle of Damghan, 214
 - Britain and, 214
 - Burhanuddin Rabbani, coalition government of, 215
 - Durrani, Ahmad Shah, 214
 - Hazaras of Afghanistan, 214, 215
 - Herat, siege of, 214
 - Hotak, Mir Wais, 214
 - Iranian Revolution (1979), 214–215
 - overview of, 214–215
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989), 215
 - the Taliban, 215
- Iran-Contra scandal, 386, 388
- Iraq War (2003–), **215–218**
- antiwar coalition, 216
 - Bush, George W. (1946–), 215–216, 217
 - the Bush Doctrine, 215
 - casualties, 217
 - consequences of, 9, 215

- insurgency and, 216–217
- International Security Assistance Force (ISA), 9
- invasion plan, 216
- overview of, 215–218
- photograph of, 217
- rise of the Islamic State in Iraq, 217–218
- shift from Afghanistan to Iraq, 216
- strength of coalition forces, 216
- troop surge (Bush administration), 217
- troop surge (Obama administration), 217
- UN Resolution 1441, 216
- U.S. Congress approval of, 216
- weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 215, 216
- Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, 223
- Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*), **218–219**
 - during the Afghan Civil War, 218
 - Anwari, Sayed Hussein, 218
 - following the fall of the Taliban, 218
 - as a formal political party, 218
 - Muhsini, Asef, 218
 - overview of, 218–219
 - purpose of, 218
 - recruits of, 218
 - “Tehran Eight,” 218
- Islamic Movement of Mohammadi Scholars (*Harakat-e Islami-e Jamiat-e Ulam-e Mohammadi*), 293
- Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*), **219–220**
 - date founded, 219
 - factions of, 219
 - founder of, 219
 - Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin al-Hurra, 198, 212, 219, 223
 - Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan (HIA), 219
 - Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), 219, 220
 - Hezb-e Islami Khalis (HIK), 219
 - Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen, 223
 - Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, 224
 - overview of, 219–220
 - Sazman-i Jawanan-i Musulman* (“Muslim Youth”), 219
 - strength of, 220
 - wings of, 219
 - Islamic Party Khalis (*Hezb-e Islami Khalis*), 223
 - Islamic Revolutionary Movement (*Harakati Inqilabi Islami*), **220–221**
 - anti-PDPA groupings in Pakistan, 220
 - decline in membership, 220
 - Mohammadi, Ahmad Nabi, 220
 - Mohammadi, Mohammad Nabi, 220
 - Muhammad, Qalam u Din, 221
 - name change, 220–221
 - National Understanding Front of Afghanistan (*Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli-ye Afghanistan*), 221
 - overview of, 220–221
 - People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 220
 - purpose of, 220
 - significance of, 220
 - Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan (*Harakati Inqilabi Islami*), 223
 - Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*), **221–222**
 - definition of, 221
 - influence of, 222
 - Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*), 223
 - location of, 221
 - Massoud, Ahmad Shah, 221
 - opposition to the PDPA, 221
 - origin of, 221
 - overview of, 221–222
 - Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 221, 222
 - Rabbani, Salahuddin, 222
 - the Taliban and, 221–222
 - United Front/Northern Alliance, 222
 - Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, DAESH), **222–223**

- alternative names for, 222
- atrocities attributed to, 222
- caliphate declaration, 222
- definition of, 222
- epicenter of Islamic State activity, 222
- the Hazaras and, 223
- hostages and kidnapping, 204
- Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 9, 126
- Khadim, Mullah Abdul Rauf, 222
- Khan, Hafiz Saeed, 222
- number of fighters in Afghanistan, 222–223
- origin of, 222
- overview of, 222–223
- significant battles of, 222
- the Taliban and, 223
- U.S. response to, 223
- Wahhabism, 481
- Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (*Ittihad-i-Islami Barye Azadi Afghanistan*), 223, 411, 412
- Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*), **223–224**
 - definition of, 223
 - Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin al-Hurra, 223, 224
 - infighting between the mujahideen, 224
 - Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, 223
 - Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah, 223, 224
 - National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*), 311–312
 - origins of, 223
 - overview of, 223–224
 - Peshawar Seven, 311–312
 - the Taliban, 224
- Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan*), **224–225**
 - date established, 224
 - fragmentation of, 225
 - main factions of, 225
 - Northern Alliance and, 224
 - overview of, 224–225
 - significance of, 224
 - size of, 224
 - “Tehran Eight,” 224
- Izvolsky, Alexander, 53
- Jackson, Donna R., 512
- Jafari Islam, 418
- Jagdalak Pass, **227**
 - alternative spellings, 227
 - during the First Anglo-Afghan War, 227
 - Jalalabad village, 227
 - location of, 227
 - overview of, 227
 - during the retreat from Kabul, 227
 - during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 227
- Jaish-e Mohammed* (Army of Muhammad), 194
- Jalalabad, Battle of (1989), **227–228**
 - casualties, 228
 - consequences of, 228
 - description of, 228
 - the mujahideen, 228
 - outcome of, 227
 - overview of, 227–228
 - precipitating events, 227–228
 - Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), 227–228
- Jalalabad, Siege of (1842), **228–229**
 - breaking of, 229
 - British capture of Jalalabad, 228–229
 - casualties, 229
 - description of, 229
 - outcome of, 228
 - overview of, 228–229
 - Sale, Robert “Fighting Bob,” 229
 - starvation and, 229
 - strength of forces, 229
- Jamrud, Battle of (1837), **229–230**
 - commanders in, 229
 - consequence of, 230
 - description of, 230

- overview of, 229–230
- precipitating events, 230
- significance of, 229
- Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) for Afghanistan, 370
- Kabul, retreat from (1842), **231–233**
 - actions of Akbar Khan, 231–232
 - armament in, 231
 - Brydon, William, 232, 233
 - consequences of, 233
 - description of, 232–233
 - Elphinstone, William George Keith, 231, 232
 - European women and children in, 232
 - frostbite, 231
 - Ghilzai tribesmen and, 231, 232
 - hostage taking, 232
 - illustration of, 232
 - at the Khurd Kabul pass, 232
 - organization of retreat force, 231
 - overview of, 231–233
 - terms of retreat, 231
 - at the village of Gandamak, 233
 - weather and, 231
- Kabul, Siege of (1996), **233–234**
 - air link, 234
 - evacuation of Kabul, 234
 - execution of Mohammed Najibullah, 234
 - forces involved in, 233
 - humanitarian aid, 234
 - international support, 234
 - Jalalabad, taking of, 234
 - Kunar, taking of, 234
 - Massoud, Ahmad Shah, 233, 234
 - overview of, 233–234
 - precipitating events, 233–234
 - Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 233
 - the Taliban, 233–234
 - Taliban arms and funding, 234
- Kabulov, Zamir (1954–), **235**
 - as ambassador to Afghanistan, 235
 - Bonn Conference, 235
 - date and place of birth, 235
 - diplomatic career of, 235
 - education of, 235
 - KGB and, 235
 - overview of, 235
 - significance of, 235
 - as a special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, 235
 - the Taliban and, 235
- Kahler, Matthew, 482
- Kalakani, Habibullah (Bacha-i Saqao) (ca. 1891–1929), **235–236**
 - Amanullah Khan, 236
 - date and place of birth, 235
 - execution of, 236
 - fame and stature, 236
 - as guerrilla commander, 236
 - Inayatullah Khan, 236
 - at Kabul, 236
 - as king, 236
 - military service of, 235
 - Nadir Shah, 236
 - overview of, 235–236
 - reforms of Amanullah and, 236
 - significance of, 235
- Kandahar, Battle of (1880), **236–237**
 - Ayub Khan, 237
 - Battle of Maiwand (1880), 237
 - description of, 237
 - Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, 237
 - outcome of, 236
 - overview of, 236–237
 - precipitating events, 236–237
 - Roberts, Frederick, 237
 - significance of, 237
 - strength of forces, 237
- Karim, Abdul, 266
- Karmal, Babrak (1929–1996), **237–239**
 - in Afghan politics, 237
 - birth name of, 237
 - date of birth, 237
 - as deputy chair of the Revolutionary Council, 238
 - election to the National Assembly, 238
 - exile of, 238

- Farhang, Mier Mihammad Siddiq, 238
 father of, 237
 his tenure in office, 238
 imprisonment of, 237
 Khyber, Mir Akbar, 237, 267
 Najibullah, Mohammad, 238
 overview of, 237–239
 People's Democratic Party of
 Afghanistan (PDPA), 238, 358,
 359, 360
 as president of the Democratic Republic
 of Afghanistan, 237
 pro-Soviet Marxist ideology, 237
 restructuring of the PDPA, 238
 Saur Revolution, 238
 significance of, 237
 Karzai, Abdul Ahad, 251
 Karzai, Hamid (1957–), **239–243**
 achievements of, 240
 Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), 84
 assassination attempts against, 240
 as chair of the Interim Administration of
 Afghanistan, 240
 CIA and, 239
 criticism of the U.S., 241
 current positions of, 240–241
 date and place of birth, 239
 as deputy foreign minister, 240
 as director of foreign relation, 239
 as director of information for the
 National Liberation Front, 239
 Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 141, 142
 education of, 239
 as elected president, 240
 family of, 239
 Gailani, Pir Sayyid Ahmad, 163
 Grand Council (Loya Jirga), 240
 as interim president, 240
 Khan, Jan Mohammed, 250, 251
 Loya Jirga, 240
 Obama, Barack, 241
 on opium poppy production, 240
 the ouster of Soviet forces from his
 homeland, 239
 overview of, 239–243
 photograph of, 239
 Popalzai, 366
 Popalzai subclan of the Durranis, 14
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
 and, 118
 related primary document: Afghanistan
 President Hamid Karzai. “State-of-the-
 Nation Speech.” Radio Afghanistan
 (Dari and Pashto). Kabul, Afghanistan,
 April 8, 2003, 241–243
 relationship with the U.S., 240–241
 significance of, 239
 the Taliban and, 240, 241
 U.S. criticism of, 241
 Kazemi, Syed Mustafa (1959–2007),
 243–244
 during the Afghan Civil War (1989–
 2001), 244
 Bonn Conference, 244
 date and place of birth, 243
 Hazara Islamic Unity Party of
 Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami*
 Afghanistan), 243
 killing of, 244
 the mujahideen and, 243
 National Islamic Empowerment Party
 (*Hizb-i Iqtedar-i-Milli-Islami*), 244
 overview of, 243–244
 significance of, 243
 United National Front (*Shuray*
 Mottahed-e Melli-e), 244
 Keane, John, 175, 176
 Kerry, John, 175, 291
 Khadim, Mullah Abdul Rauf, 222
 khaki uniforms, 89
 Khalid Sheikh, Mohammed, 79
 Khalil, Fazlur Rehman, 194
 Khalili, Karim, 16
 Khalis, Mohammad Yunus (1919–2006),
 244–245
 date and place of birth, 244
 death of, 245
 education of, 244

- Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin al-Hurra, 244
- Hezb-e Islami Khalis (HIK) and, 244–245
- Islamic Party Khalis (*Hezb-e Islami Khalis*), 223, 244
- overview of, 244–245
- religious title of, 244
- reputation of, 244
- significance of, 244
- the Taliban, 245
- Khalq Faction, 34
- Khan, Abdur Rahman (ca. 1844–1901), **245–247**
- Battle of Ghaznigak (1888), 246
- border disputes with Russia, 246
- British support of, 246
- date and place of birth, 245
- date proclaimed emir, 46
- death of, 246
- Durand Line, 246
- exile of, 245
- family of, 245
- Ghilzai rebellions, 246
- Hazaras, revolt of, 246
- Khan, Mohammad Afzal, 245
- Khan, Sher Ali, 245
- military campaigns, 246
- military improvements, 246
- modernization of Afghanistan, 246
- modernization of the Army, 1
- overview of, 245–247
- Panjdeh Crisis (1885), 246, 352
- Pashtunization, 354
- reign of, 246
- resettlement of Pashtuns, 14
- Russian endorsement of, 246
- significance of, 245
- sobriquet of, 245
- Treaty of Gandamak and, 246
- Khan, Amanullah (1892–1960), **247–249**
- abdication of the throne, 248
- Afghan foreign policy and, 247–248
- date and place of birth, 247
- date crowned emir, 247
- death of, 249
- from emir to king, 248
- exile of, 249
- as governor of Kabul, 247
- Khan, Habibullah, 247
- Khost Rebellion (1924–1925), 265–266
- marriage of, 247
- modernization of Afghanistan, 248
- overview of, 247–249
- photograph of, 248
- preemptive war on Great Britain, 247–248
- reforms of, 248
- reign of, 247–248
- relations with the Soviet Union, 248
- significance of, 247
- Soviet subsidy to, 248
- Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919), 248
- warlords, emergence of, 486
- during World War I, 247
- Khan, Ayub, 257
- Khan, Habibullah (1872–1919), **249–250**
- Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1905), 39, 250
- assassination of, 250
- date and place of birth, 249
- education and, 249–250
- father of, 249
- the “German Faction,” 250
- Habibia School, 250
- Khan, Abdur Rahman, 249
- knighthood of, 250
- modernization of Afghanistan, 249–250
- overview of, 249–250
- relationship with Britain, 250
- significance of, 249
- during World War I, 47, 250, 490, 491, 492, 493
- Khan, Hafiz Saeed, 222
- Khan, Hassan A., 512
- Khan, Inayatullah, 249
- Khan, Jan Mohammed (d. 2011), **250–251**
- arrest and imprisonment of, 251
- as governor of Oruzgan, 250, 251
- Karzai, Abdul Ahad, 251

- Karzai, Hamid, 250, 251
 killing of, 251
 overview of, 250–251
 reputation of, 251
 significance of, 250
 during the Soviet occupation, 251
 wounding of, 251
- Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar (1890–1988),
251–252
 as an advocate for nonviolence, 251–252
 arrest and imprisonment of, 252
 date and place of birth, 251
 death of, 252
 education of, 251
 opposition to the British rule, 251
 opposition to the Soviet invasion, 252
 overview of, 251–252
 Pashtun autonomy and, 252
 Red Shirts, 251–252
 “Servants of God” (*Khuda-I
 Khidmatgaran*) movement, 251–252
 significance of, 251
 title of “Pride of the Afghans” (*Fakhr-i
 Afghan*), 252
- Khan, Liaquat Ali, 347
- Khan, Mir Masjidi (d. 1841), **252–253**
 battle of Parwan, 253
 date and place of birth, 252
 death of, 253
 during the First Anglo-Afghan War,
 252–253
 at Khwajah Khizri, 253
 overview of, 252–253
 significance of, 252
 wounding of, 253
- Khan, Mohammad Akbar (1816–1845),
253–254
 Anglo-Indian Army of Retribution, 254
 assassination of, 254
 Battle of Gandamak, 254
 at the Battle of Jamrud, 253
 date of birth, 253
 Elphinstone, William, 254
 father of, 253
 as “Hero of Jamrud,” 253
 as leader of Afghan resistance to British
 occupation, 253–254
 Macnaghten, William Hay, 254
 overview of, 253–254
 siege of Kabul, 253–254
 significance of, 253
- Khan, Mohammad Hashim (1885–1953),
254–255
 birth date of, 254
 Khan, Shah Mahmud, 255
 Nadir, Mohammed, 254
 overview of, 254–255
 as prime minister, 254–255
 relationship with Germany, 255
 relationship with the U.S., 255
 significance of, 254
 Treaty of Saadabad, 255
 during World War II, 255, 493
- Khan, Mohammad Ismail (1946–), **255–256**
 date and place of birth, 255
 education of, 255
 Ghani, Mohammed Ashraf, 256
 as governor of Herat, 256
 overview of, 255–256
 provincial militia of, 256
 resistance to the PDPA regime, 255–256
 significance of, 255
 during the Soviet occupation, 256
 the Taliban and, 256
 United National Front, 256
- Khan, Mohammad Yakub (ca. 1849–1923),
256–257
 abdication of the throne, 257
 arrest and imprisonment of, 257
 as crowned ruler of Afghanistan, 257
 date of birth, 256
 death of, 257
 exile of, 257
 father of, 256
 intrigues against Sher Ali, 256–257
 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 256
 overview of, 256–257
 Sher Ali Khan, Emir, 256

- significance of, 256
- Treaty of Gandamak and, 256, 257
- Khan, Mohammed Daoud (1909–1978), **258–259**
 - Amin, Hafizullah, 35
 - autocratic style of, 258
 - Awakened Youth movement, 358
 - Baghdad Pact and, 67
 - Cold War (1947–1989), 124
 - coup against, 259
 - date and place of birth, 258
 - dismissal of, 258
 - economic aid, 258
 - five-year plans of, 258
 - as interior minister, 258
 - Khyber, Mir Akbar, 259
 - killing of, 259
 - modernization of the army, 258
 - overview of, 258–259
 - Pashtunistan crisis and, 258
 - PDPA and, 259
 - photograph of, 258
 - as president, 259
 - significance of, 258
 - social reforms, 258
 - Soviet military support, 2, 259
 - warlords, 486
 - during World War II, 258
- Khan, Nasrullah, **259–260**
 - arrest of, 260
 - assassination of Habibullah, 260
 - date and place of birth, 259
 - death of, 260
 - father of, 259
 - “German Faction,” 250
 - Khan, Habibullah, 247, 259, 260
 - overview of, 259–260
 - pro-German faction of the Afghan government, 247
 - reign of, 260
 - significance of, 259
 - during World War I, 259, 491, 492
- Khan, Shah Mahmud (1888–1959), **260–262**
 - date of birth, 260
 - death of, 261
 - Helmand Valley project, 261
 - the “Liberal Parliament,” 261
 - Nadir Shah and, 260–to 261
 - overview of, 260–262
 - Pashtunistan issue, 261
 - as prime minister, 261
 - reforms of, 261
 - relationship with the U.S., 261
 - significance of, 260
 - Zahir Shah and, 261
- Khan, Sher Ali (ca. 1825–1879), **262–263**
 - Barakzai dynasty, 70, 262
 - date of birth, 262
 - death of, 262
 - father of, 262
 - foreign policy of, 262
 - internal dissension to, 262
 - Khan, Abdur Rahman, 245, 262
 - Khan, Mohammad Afzal, 262
 - Khan, Mohammad Azam, 262
 - Khan, Mohammad Yakub, 262
 - neutrality of, 262
 - overview of, 262–263
 - relationship with the British, 262
 - Russian diplomatic mission, 262
 - Second Anglo-Afghan War, 262
 - seeking Russian assistance, 44
 - significance of, 262
- Khistmand, Sultan Ali (1935–), **263–264**
 - arrest and imprisonment of, 263
 - attempted reforms of, 264
 - date and place of birth, 263
 - education of, 263
 - exile of, 264
 - Marxism and, 263
 - memoirs of, 264
 - as minister of planning, 263
 - overview of, 263–264
 - Parcham* (“Banner”) wing of the PDPA, 263
 - as prime minister, 263–264

- resignations of, 264
- significance of, 263
- Khost, sieges of (1980–1989), **264–265**
 - description of, 264–265
 - DRA's recruitment of tribal militias, 265
 - Gromov, Boris, 265
 - lifting of, 265
 - location of Khost, 264
 - offensive against Zhawar, 265
 - overview of, 264–265
 - population of Khost, 264
 - problems of the mujahideen, 265
 - strength of forces in, 264
- Khost Rebellion (1924–1925), **265–266**
 - Abdullah, Mullah-i-Lang, 265, 266
 - airplanes, use of, 266
 - effects of, 266
 - Karim, Abdul, 266
 - Khan, Amanullah, 265–266
 - leaders of, 265
 - Loya Jirga, 265, 266
 - Mangal tribes, 265
 - overview of, 265–266
 - Rashid, Mullah Abdul, 265
 - reform addressing women, 265–266
 - suppression of, 266
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 85
- Khyber, Mir Akbar (1925–1978), **266–267**
 - arrest and imprisonment of, 267
 - assassination of, 238, 259, 266, 267
 - date and place of birth, 266–267
 - education of, 267
 - Karmal, Babrak, 267
 - Marxist ideology, 267
 - overview of, 266–267
 - the *Parcham* newspaper, 267
 - Parcham wing of the PDPA, 267
 - Saur Revolution (1978), 267
 - significance of, 266
- Khyber Jezailchis, 160
- Khyber Pass, **267–268**
 - alternative spellings of, 267
 - current control of, 268
 - current use of, 268
 - description of, 268
 - historic use of, 268
 - importance of, 268
 - location of, 267–268
 - majority ethnicities of region, 268
 - overview of, 267–268
 - size of, 268
 - as a strategic point, 268
- Khyber Rifles, 24, 48–49, 160
- Koh-i-Nor diamond, 149
- Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB), 433
- Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), 451
- Kurram Militia, 160
- landmines, **269–270**
 - in Afghanistan, 269
 - concept of humanitarian mine action, 269
 - definition of, 269
 - detonation of, 269
 - improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 269, 270
 - legacy mine contamination, 269
 - NATO Counter-IED Action Plan, 269
 - number of landmines in Afghanistan, 269
 - Ottawa Convention, 270
 - overview of, 269–270
 - proliferation of IEDs, 269
 - removal and medical support for landmine victims, 270
 - as “sleeping weapons,” 269
 - Soviet butterfly mine, 269
 - during the Soviet occupation, 269
- Lansford, Tom, 509
- Lashkar-e Taiba*, 444
- Lawrence, John, 361
- legal system of Afghanistan, 321
- Leitch, Keith, 512
- “Liberal Parliament,” 261
- Lindh, John Walker, 375
- Lockhart, Sir William (1841–1900), **270–271**
 - campaigns of, 270
 - as commander in chief, India, 271
 - commands of, 270

- death of, 271
- military career of, 270–271
- overview of, 270–271
- significance of, 270
- Tirah Campaign (1897–1898), 270–271, 455
- Tirah Field Force, 134, 270, 455
- Lopez, Clare M., 512
- Loya Jirga, **271–272**
 - in Afghanistan, 271
 - Bonn Agreement, 271, 272
 - drafting of a constitution, 272
 - emergency Loya Jirga of 2002, 272
 - Karzai, Hamid, 240
 - overview of, 271–272
 - “peace” Jirga, 272
 - political future of Afghanistan and, 272
 - security agreement with the U.S., 272
 - during the Soviet occupation, 271
 - translation of, 240, 271
 - in the 20th century, 271
 - women and, 272
- Lumsden, Peter, 352
- Luttrell, Marcus, 343
- Lytton, Edward Robert Bulwer, First Earl of
 - Lytton (1831–1891), **272–273**
 - as ambassador to France, 273
 - British invasion of Afghanistan, 273
 - date and place of birth, 273
 - death of, 273
 - as a diplomat, 273
 - education of, 273
 - as Lord Lytton, 273
 - overview of, 272–273
 - significance of, 272–273
 - title of earl, 273
- MacGregor, Charles, 50
- Macnaghten, Sir William Hay (1793–1841), **275–276**
 - Burnes, Alexander (“Sekundar”), 275
 - date of birth, 275
 - on Dost Mohammad, 65, 275
 - Elphinstone, George Keith, 275–276
 - father of, 275
 - in Kabul, 275
 - killing of, 42, 276
 - knighthood of, 275
 - language proficiency, 275
 - as a magistrate, 275
 - overseeing intelligence operations, 275
 - overview of, 275–276
 - relations between the British and the Sikhs, 275
 - Roberts, Sir Abraham, and, 391
 - on Shuja Shah, 275
 - significance of, 275
- MacPherson, H. T., 34
- Madras European Regiment, 88
- madrasahs, **276–277**
 - Al-Azhar University system, 277
 - criticism of Islamic education, 276
 - funding of, 276
 - halaqat*, 276
 - Hawzah al-Ilmiyya* (the certified Islamic scholars), 277
 - Islamic terrorism and, 277
 - jihadists and, 276–277
 - kuttab*, 276
 - mosques and, 276
 - overview of, 276–277
 - reforms, 277
 - in Saudi Arabia, 277
 - subjects taught, 276
 - the Taliban and, 276
 - translation of, 276
- Maharaj, Shivaji, 282
- Mahsud tribe, 49
- Maiwand, Battle of (1880), **277–279**
 - Burrows, G. R. S., 278
 - Burrows’s brigade, 278
 - casualties, 278
 - description of, 278
 - illustration of, 279
 - mutiny, 278
 - outcome of, 278
 - overview of, 277–279
 - precipitating events, 277–278

- significance of, 277
- strength of forces, 278
- Majid, Abdul, 494
- Malakand Field Force (1897), **279–281**
 - Blood, Bindon, 280
 - Chakdara Fort, 280
 - Churchill, Winston L. S., 279–281
 - commanders of, 280
 - components of, 280
 - description of operations, 280–281
 - Meiklejohn, W. H., 280
 - overview of, 279–281
 - punitive operations, 454
 - The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War* (Churchill), 279–281
 - Tochi Field Force, 280
- Mankoff, Jeffrey, 512
- Mansour, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad, 335, 440
- Maratha Empire (1674–1818), **281–282**
 - Anglo-Maratha Wars (1775–1818), 282
 - date founded, 282
 - duration of, 282
 - Durrani Empire and, 282
 - expansion of, 282
 - founder of, 282
 - initial Maratha kingdom, 282
 - Maharaj, Shivaji, 282
 - Maratha Confederation, 282
 - overview of, 281–282
 - Sambhaji, 282
 - Shahuji, 282
- Marja, Battle of (2010), **282–283**
 - criticism of, 283
 - description of, 283
 - Marja, town of, 282
 - objective of, 283
 - Operation Moshtarak, 282
 - outcome of, 283
 - overview of, 282–283
 - population and size of Marja, 282
 - strength of forces, 283
 - the Taliban and, 283
- Massoud, Ahmad Shah (1953–2001), **283–285**
 - assassination of, 7, 190, 284
 - Chernenko, Konstantin, 115
 - consequences of his death, 285
 - exile in Pakistan, 284
 - Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*), 221
 - Kabul, Siege of (1996), 233, 234
 - as minister of defense, 284
 - Northern Alliance and, 284, 285
 - overview of, 283–285
 - resistance to the communist takeover of Afghanistan, 284
 - significance of, 283–284
 - sobriquet of, 283–284
 - the Tajiks and, 16
 - the Taliban, 284, 285
 - value of, 285–286
 - victories of, 4–5
- Massoud, Ahmad Zia, 311
- Mastrogiacomio, Daniele, 204
- Mazare-Sharif University, 141
- Mazari, Abdul Ali (1947–1995), **285–286**
 - alliance with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 286
 - date and place of birth, 285
 - death of, 286
 - education of, 285
 - Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, 285
 - overview of, 285–286
 - significance of, 285
 - the Taliban and, 286
 - Tehran Eight (*Shuray-e Eatelaf*), 285
 - Victory Organization and, 285
- McCain, John S., 330
- McChrystal, Stanley (1954–), **286–287**
 - criticism of Barack Obama, 331
 - date and place of birth, 286
 - education of, 286
 - forced resignation of, 286
 - his command of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, 286–287
 - his criticism of the Obama national security staff, 287
 - memoirs of, 287

- military career of, 286–287
 - overview of, 286–287
 - significance of, 286
- McNeill, Dan K. (1946–), **287–289**
 - Bagram Air Force Base prison and, 288
 - date and place of birth, 287
 - education of, 287
 - International Security Assistance Force–Afghanistan (ISAF), 287–288
 - military commands of, 287–288
 - overview of, 287–289
 - promotions of, 287, 288
 - significance of, 287
 - on the Taliban insurgency, 288
- McNeill, John, 202
- Mead, Karen, 512
- Meherullah, Sardar Khan, 50
- Metcalfe, Charles (1785–1846), **289**
 - baronetcy of, 289
 - birthplace of, 289
 - at the court of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 289
 - death of, 289
 - education of, 289
 - father of, 289
 - full name of, 289
 - government positions of, 289
 - Moorcroft, William, 289
 - overview of, 289
 - significance of, 289
- Mikaberidze, Alexander, 512
- Ministry of State Security (*Wizarat-i Ettela at-i Daulati* —WAD), 433
- Mir Wais, 186
- Mohammadi, Ahmad Nabi, 220
- Mohammadi, Mohammad Nabi, 220, 223
- Mohan Lal (1812–1877), **290**
 - biography of Dost Mohammad, 290
 - Burnes, Sir Alexander, 290
 - date and place of birth, 290
 - death of, 290
 - government service of, 290
 - overview of, 290
 - significance of, 290
 - writings of, 290
- Mohaqeq, Mohammed (1955–), **291**
 - birthplace of, 291
 - education of, 291
 - government positions of, 291
 - in the legislature, 291
 - National Front of Afghanistan (*Jabhe Melli*), 311
 - overview of, 291
 - political group of, 291
 - on radio and television, 291
 - significance of, 291
 - during the Soviet occupation, 291
 - the Taliban, 291
 - as a vice presidential candidate, 291
- Mohmand campaigns, **291–293**
 - Afghan Civil War and, 293
 - Durand Line and, 292
 - the haji of Turangzai, 292
 - history of, 292
 - Mohmand Campaign (1897–1898), 292
 - Mohmand Campaign of 1935, 292
 - neutrality of, 293
 - overview of, 291–293
 - rebellions of Pashtun tribes, 292
 - revolt against king Amanullah Khan, 292
 - Saidullah Khan, 292
 - significance of, 291–292
 - Soviet occupation and, 293
- Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah (1926–2016), **293–294**
 - arrest and imprisonment of, 293
 - chair of the Loya Jirga, 294
 - date and place of birth, 293
 - education of, 293
 - Islamic Movement of Mohammadi Scholars (*Harakat-e Islami-e Jamiat-e Ulam-e Mohammadi*), 293
 - National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*), 223, 224, 293, 313
 - opposition to the Taliban, 294
 - overview of, 293–294
 - as the president of an interim Afghan government in exile, 294, 362
 - shura, 293–294

- significance of, 293
- during the Soviet occupation, 293
- speaker of the upper chamber of the
 - Afghan parliament, 294
- Moorcroft, William (1767–1825), **294–295**
 - date and place of birth, 294
 - death of, 295
 - East India Company stud operations, 294
 - explorations of, 294–295
 - mother of, 294
 - overview of, 294–295
 - significance of, 294
 - veterinary medicine and, 294
- Morelock, Jerry D., 512
- Morgan, Gregory, 512–513
- Mughal (Mogul) Empire (1526–1857), **295–297**
 - Akbar the Great, 296
 - Aurangzeb, 296
 - Babur, Zahir-ud-din Muhammad, 295–296
 - Bahdur Shah II, 296
 - Dara Shikoh, 296
 - defeat of Rajput, 295
 - First Battle of Panipat, 295
 - founding of, 295
 - fragmentation of, 296
 - Humayun, 296
 - Jahangir, 296
 - last Mughal ruler, 296
 - location of, 295
 - Muhammad Shah, 296
 - overview of, 295–297
- Muhsini, Ayatollah Asef (1936–), **297**
 - Bonn Conference, 297
 - date and place of birth, 297
 - Dawn of Knowledge (*Subh-i Danish*) movement, 297
 - education of, 297
 - Islamic Movement of Afghanistan and, 218
 - opposition to the Soviets, 297
 - opposition to the Taliban, 297
 - overview of, 297
 - as presidential advisor, 297
 - significance of, 297
 - subjugation of women, 297
- mujahideen, **297–300**
 - appeal for arms and animation, 299–300
 - countering Soviet offense, 298, 299
 - definition of, 297
 - in early skirmishes with the Soviet army, 298
 - and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 300
 - Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, 298
 - leadership, 298
 - major Sunni mujahideen factions, 298
 - membership, 298
 - mobilization, 298
 - nationalism, 298
 - at the onset of the Soviet War, 298
 - overview of, 297–300
 - photograph of, 299, 500
 - Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance, 299–300
 - Shi’a mujahideen factions, 298
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 298
 - Sunni mujahideen factions, 298
 - tactics of, 298
 - training and funding of, 297–298
- Mujahideen Services Bureau, 30–31, 77
- mullah, the term, 334
- Murphy, Michael, 343
- Musharraf, Pervez (1943–), **300–303**
 - Bhutto, Benazir, 302
 - Chaudhry, Iftikhar Muhammad, and, 302
 - Chaudhry’s “abuse of power,” 302
 - coup of October 12, 1999, 301
 - criticism of, 300, 302
 - date and place of birth, 300
 - education of, 300
 - his trial for high treason, 302
 - in the Kargil War, 300
 - military career of, 300–301
 - Nawaz Sharif, Muhammad, 314
 - Operation Enduring Freedom and, 301

- overview of, 300–303
- photograph of, 301
- relationship with the U.S., 301, 302
- relinquishing his command of the army, 301, 302
- resignation as president, 302
- Sharif, Nawaz, and, 300–301
- significance of, 300
- state of emergency declaration, 302
- the Taliban, 301, 302
- talks with India, 302
- on terrorism, 301
- U.S. drone attacks, 302
- Muslim League, 302, 379
- Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), 314
- Myer, Matthew, 482
- Nadiri, Sayyid Mansur (1936–), **305**
 - date and place of birth, 305
 - family of, 305
 - National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan, 305
 - overview of, 305
 - in Parliament, 305
 - persecution and repression of, 305
 - political career of, 305
 - as sayyed of Kayan, 305
 - significance of, 305
 - during the Soviet occupation, 305
 - the Taliban, 305
- Najibullah, Mohammed (1947–1996), **305–307**
 - Afghan Politburo membership, 306
 - education of, 305
 - hanging and mutilation of, 306
 - Karmal, Babrak, 238
 - overthrow of his regime, 306
 - overview of, 305–307
 - parents of, 305
 - political career of, 306
 - as president, 306
 - resignation as president, 306
 - Revolutionary Council member, 306
 - as ruthless running the secret police, 306
 - significance of, 305
 - the Taliban, 306
- narcoterrorism, **307–308**
 - Afghanistan and, 307
 - direct violence and, 307
 - drug interdiction efforts in countries other than Afghanistan, 307
 - drug lords, 307
 - Helmand Province, 308
 - opium crop (in tons), 308
 - overview of, 307–308
 - as a primary source of income, 307
 - smuggling routes, 307
 - suppression of, 308
 - the Taliban, 307
- nation building and economic development in Afghanistan (2001–), **308–310**
 - development markers, 309
 - education markers, 309
 - gross primary education enrollment, 309
 - Human Development Index (HDI)
 - composite score for health, education, and living standards, 309
 - institutionalization, 309
 - International Security Assistance Force, 308
 - nation building defined, 308
 - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 309
 - outline for reconstruction, 308
 - overview of, 308–310
 - population of Afghanistan, 308
 - reconstruction trajectory for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 308
 - Sen, Amartya, on economic development, 308
 - State Fragility Index (SFI), 309
 - troop surge, 308–309
 - United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan, 308
- National Fatherland Front (*Jabha-yi Milli-yi Padarwatan*), **310**
 - challenges to, 310
 - membership, 310

- as the National Front of the Republic of Afghanistan, 310
- overview of, 310
- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and, 310
- renaming of, 310
- significance of, 310
- National Front of Afghanistan (*Jabhe Milli*), **310–311**
 - Abdullah, Abdullah, 311
 - competition with the National Coalition, 311
 - creation of, 311
 - Ghani, Ashraf, 311
 - goals of, 311
 - leaders of, 311
 - overview of, 310–311
 - significance of, 310
- National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*), **311–312**
 - Bonn Conference, 312
 - date established, 311
 - definition of, 311
 - Gailani, Pir Sayyid Ahmad, 163, 223, 311, 312
 - goal of, 311
 - overview of, 311–312
 - Peshawar Seven and, 311–312
 - political support of, 312
 - the Taliban, 312
- National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan*), **312–313**
 - Bonn Conference, 313
 - Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 312, 313
 - founder of, 312
 - Ghani, Ashraf, 313
 - overview of, 312–313
 - political support of, 313
 - significance of, 312
 - the Taliban, 312
- National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Najat-i Milli*), **313–314**
 - in Afghanistan, 313
 - founder of, 313
 - Loya Jirga, 313
 - Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah, 293, 313
 - new political coalition, formation of, 314
 - operational fronts of, 313
 - overview of, 313–314
 - Peshawar Seven, 223, 313
 - Rabbani, Burhanuddin, opposition to, 313
 - significance of, 313
 - support for, 313
 - the Taliban, 313
- National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (*Hezb-e Paiwand Milli Afghanistan*), 305
- National Understanding Front of Afghanistan (*Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Milli-ye Afghanistan*), 221
- Nawab Sir Mohammad Aslam Khan, 160
- Nawaz Sharif, Muhammad (1949–), **314–315**
 - criticism of the U.S., 314
 - current status of, 314
 - date and place of birth, 314
 - education of, 314
 - family business of, 314
 - Musharraf, Pervez, and, 314
 - overview of, 314–315
 - Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and, 314
 - as prime minister, 314–315
 - wealth of, 314
- Nesselrode, Karl, 179, 478
- Nicolson, Arthur, 53
- Niedermayer, Oskar, 492, 493
- 9/11, War on Terror, and Afghanistan (2001–), **315–321**
 - drone strikes, 318
 - Horn of Africa, 317–318
 - killing of bin Laden, 318
 - Operation Enduring Freedom, 316–317
 - overview of, 315–321
 - Pakistan and, 318

- Philippines and, 318
- related primary document: President George W. Bush Address announcing airstrikes on Afghanistan, October 7, 2001, 318–320
- Somalia and, 317
- Sudan and, 317
- terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, 315–316
- Nixon, Richard M., 472
- nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
 - and private volunteer organizations (PVOs), **321–322**
 - civil society organizations (CSOs), 321
 - criticism of, 322
 - definition of, 321
 - development of current civil society in Afghanistan, 321
 - the Law on NGOs, proposed amendments to, 322
 - Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 322
 - Law on Social Organizations, 321
 - Law on Volunteerism, 322
 - legal system of Afghanistan, 321
 - number of NGOs registered in Afghanistan, 321
 - overview of, 321–322
 - pending legislative initiatives effecting, 322
 - Procedure of Establishment and Registration of Associations, 322
 - programs of, 321
 - tax incentives, 322
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), **322–324**
 - Afghan War (2001–), 9
 - Afghan-Pakistani border raids (2002–), 20
 - civilian casualties from air attacks, 119–120
 - critical assessment of NATO's performance in Afghanistan, 323
 - financial support to Afghanistan, 324
 - International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 322, 323
 - invocation of Article V of, 322–323
 - nation building and economic development in Afghanistan (2001–), 309
 - Operation Enduring Freedom and, 323
 - overview of, 322–324
 - Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 323
 - Regional Command (RC), 323
 - Resolute Support Mission (RSM), 322, 324
 - UN Security Council Resolution 1510, 323
- Northern Alliance, **324–325**
 - Afghan Army, history, forces, and tactics, 3
 - Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), 4, 5
 - Afghan War (2001–), 7
 - alternative names for, 324
 - assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud, 325
 - components of, 285
 - core of, 16
 - dissolution of, 325
 - ethnic groups in Afghanistan, 324
 - evolution of, 325
 - fighting between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, 324
 - formation of, 7, 222
 - Omar, Mohammed, 324
 - Operation Enduring Freedom, 325, 338, 340
 - overthrow of the Taliban government, 349
 - overview of, 324–325
 - purpose of, 324
 - September 11 attacks on the U.S., 325
 - significance of, 324
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 324
 - the Taliban (Islamic students), 324–325
- North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), 347
- Nott, Sir William (1782–1845), **325–326**

- capture of Ghazni, 326
- commands of, 326
- court-martial of, 325
- date and place of birth, 325
- death of, 326
- in Kandahar, 326
- knighthood of, 326
- marriages of, 326
- military career of, 325–326
- overview of, 325–326
- promotions of, 326
- significance of, 325
- Nur, Atta Mohammad (1965–), **326–327**
 - date and place of birth, 326
 - Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 327
 - as governor of Balkh, 327
 - as a mujahideen leader, 326–327
 - overview of, 326–327
 - significance of, 326
 - the Taliban, 327
- Obama, Barack (1961–), **329–333**
 - on Afghanistan, 9, 331–332
 - Biden, Joseph, 330
 - Chicago voter registration, 329
 - date and place of birth, 329
 - Democratic National Convention speech, 329
 - drone strikes, 142, 143
 - education of, 329
 - father of, 329
 - foreign policy objectives of, 329
 - on foreign relations, 331
 - grandparents of, 329
 - Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, 184
 - Harvard Law Review* presidency, 329
 - health care plan of, 331
 - Holbrooke, Richard, 331
 - as Illinois state senator, 329
 - International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 213
 - on the Iraq War, 329, 330
 - Iraq War (2003–), 217
 - Karzai, Hamid, 241, 329–333
 - as lawyer, 329
 - McCain, John S., 330
 - McChrystal, Stanley, 331
 - mother of, 329
 - Obama, Barack, pole
 - overview of, 329–333
 - parents of, 329
 - as president of the United States, 331–332
 - presidential race of 2008 and, 330–331
 - related primary document: President Barack Obama, “Remarks at the State Department,” January 22, 2009, 332–333
 - relationship with Afghan president Hamid Karzai, 331–332
 - significance of, 329
 - Taliban insurgency, 445
 - troop surge in Afghanistan, 308–309, 331
 - at the University of Chicago School of Law, 329
 - as U.S. senator, 329–330
- Odeh, Mohammed Sadeek, 157
- Omar, Mullah Mohammed (1959–2013), **333–336**
 - alternative names for, 333
 - bin Laden, Osama, 334–335
 - bombing of his home, 335
 - date and place of birth, 333
 - death of, 335
 - as *emir al-muminin* (commander of the faithful), 334
 - Ghilzai tribe, 16, 177, 366
 - as the head of the Supreme Council of Afghanistan, 334
 - the mujahideen and, 334
 - as Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahid, 333
 - as Mullah Omar, 333
 - mullah term, 334
 - overview of, 333–336
 - Pashtuns and, 333–334
 - significance of, 333
 - as a spiritual leader, 334

- statements of, 335
- the Taliban movement and, 16, 324, 334, 335
- U.S. bounty for, 335
- wounding of, 334
- Operation Anaconda (2002), **336–337**
 - casualties in, 337
 - countries participating in, 336
 - description of, 337
 - ending date of, 337
 - intelligence errors, 336–337
 - location of, 336
 - overview of, 336–337
 - plan for, 337
 - purpose of, 8, 336
 - SEALs rescue attempt, 337
 - significance of, 26
 - starting date of, 336
 - Takur Ghar, Battle of (2002), 437
 - terrain of, 336
- Operation Cyclone, 112
- Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014), **337–341**
 - airborne units and tactics, 26–27
 - aircraft, types and tactics, 28
 - al Qaeda, 338, 340
 - bin Laden, Osama, 340
 - camouflage and concealment techniques, 340
 - consequences of, 340–341
 - current status of, 341
 - date formally ended, 9, 337, 341
 - death toll, 340
 - description of, 338–340
 - duration of, 337
 - ground campaign, first phase of, 338, 340
 - initial air attacks, 338
 - International Security Assistance Force, 341
 - at Kandahar, 340
 - logistics of, 338
 - map of, 339
 - at Mazar-e-Sharif, 340
 - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, 323
 - Northern Alliance, 338, 340
 - Operation Anaconda, 341
 - Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, 341
 - overview of, 316–317, 337–341
 - photograph of, 338
 - purpose of, 7, 337–338
 - refugees, 341
 - start date of, 338
 - the Taliban, 340, 443
- Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, 341
- Operation Infinite Reach, 128
- Operation Jawbreaker, 432
- Operation Red Wings, 416
- Operation Red Wings II, 416
- Operation Rhino, 26
- Operation Rock Move, 482
- Operation Salam, 206
- Operation SMILES, 318
- Operation Storm 333 (1979), **341–342**
 - airborne units and tactics, 25
 - aircraft, types and tactics, 27
 - Amin, Hafizullah, 35, 341, 342
 - Brezhnev, Leonid, 342
 - casualties, 341
 - date started, 342
 - description of, 342
 - KGB and, 342
 - number of Soviet personnel in, 342
 - outcome of, 341
 - overview of, 341–342
 - plan for, 342
 - purpose of, 341
 - Sokolov, Sergey, 424
- Operations Red Wings I, II, and Whalers (2005), **342–343**
 - location of, 343
 - Operation Red Wings I, 343, 416
 - Operation Red Wings II, 343, 416
 - Operation Whalers, 343
 - overview of, 342–343
 - purpose of, 343
- opium poppy production, **343–345**

- in Afghanistan, 343–344
- annual worth of, 344
- British attempt to suppress, 344
- heroin, 344
- Iran and, 344
- limitation of, 344
- major shift in the Afghan drug trade, 344
- the mujahideen and, 344
- overview of, 343–345
- production increase, 344
- rise in production of, 344
- the Taliban and, 344
- Orzechowski, Matthew, 513
- Ottawa Convention, 270
- Painda Khan, 137
- Pakistan, relations with Afghanistan, **347–349**
 - al Qaeda's September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., 349
 - anti-Pakistan posture of Afghanistan, 347
 - assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, 347
 - bin Laden, Osama, 348
 - bombing of an Afghan village, 347
 - Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 348
 - China, 348
 - crossborder Afghan-sponsored tribal incursions, 348
 - current status of, 349
 - declaration of a nonalignment foreign policy by India, 348
 - economic blockade of Afghanistan (1951), 347–348
 - Northern Alliance, 349
 - North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), 347
 - one-unit system and Pakistan, 348
 - origins of antagonistic relations, 347
 - overview of, 347–349
 - Pashtuns, 347
 - resistance against the Soviet Union, 348
 - South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 348
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 348
 - the Taliban, 348, 349
 - U.S. retaliatory cruise missile strikes, 349
 - U.S. sanctions of Pakistan, 348
- Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and, 314
- Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 75
- Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, 433
- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 451
- Palin, Sarah, 330
- Panipat, Battle of (1761), **350–351**
 - Ahmad Shah, 350
 - Bhau, Sadashivrao, 350
 - consequences of, 350
 - description of, 350
 - Maratha Empire, 350
 - overview of, 350–351
 - precipitating events, 350
 - Timur Shah, 350
- Panjdeh Crisis (1885), **351–352**
 - consequences of, 352
 - defusing of, 351
 - description of, 351
 - Gladstone, William, 351, 352
 - Khan, Emir Abdur Rahman, 352
 - Lumsden, Peter, 352
 - overview of, 351–352
 - precipitating events, 351
 - roots of, 351
 - significance of, 180
 - terms of the agreement ending, 351–352
- Panjshir Campaigns (1980–1985), **352–354**
 - casualties, 353
 - cease-fire, 353
 - definition of, 352
 - flaws in Soviet military strategy, 352
 - last troop withdrawal, 354
 - Massoud, Ahmed Shah, 353
 - the mujahideen, its tactics, 352, 353
 - offensive of April 1984, 353
 - offensive of June 1985, 353
 - offensive of May 1982, 353

- offensive of September 1981, 353
- offensive of September 1984, 353
- overview of, 352–354
- Panjshir Valley, description of, 352
- population decline, 353
- Soviet military strategy, 352
- Tajik mujahideen, 353
- Pashtun Islamic Party (*Hezb-e Islami*), 4
- Pashtunization, **354**
 - alternative term for, 354
 - definition of, 354
 - de-Pashtunization, 354
 - Durrani, Ahmad Shah, 354
 - Khan, Abdur Rahman, 354
 - the Musahiban (1929–1973) and, 354
 - origin of, 354
 - overview of, 354
 - Pashtun, 354
 - the Taliban, 354
- Pashtuns (Pushtuns), **355–356**
 - areas of, 355
 - dominance of, 485–486
 - Durand Line, 146
 - Durrani, 355, 356
 - factions of, 334
 - Ghilzai, 355, 356
 - infighting of, 333
 - Islamic lunar calendar and, 355
 - location of, 333
 - main tribes of Pashtuns, 355
 - origin of, 355
 - original name of, 355
 - overview of, 355–356
 - Pashtun code (Pashtunwali), 18, 355
 - Pashtunization, 355, 357
 - percentage of Afghan population, 333
 - sedentarization, 355
 - the Taliban, 11, 443
 - tribal history and tradition, 355
 - unification, 11
- Pashtunwali (Pukhtunwali), **356–357**
 - concept of badal, 357
 - concept of imandari, 356
 - concept of itbar, 356–357
 - concept of nanawatay, 357
 - concept of sabat, 356
 - concept of tarr, 357
 - concept of teega, 357
 - concept of zamaka, 356
 - ghundi (balance of power), 356
 - intent of, 356
 - a Jirga, 357
 - overview of, 356–357
 - Pashtun culture and, 356
 - Pashtunization and, 357
 - practice of, 356
 - traditions of, 356
 - translation of, 356
- Patton, Joy, 513
- Pauly, Robert J., Jr., 513
- Pavlovski, Ivan G., 425
- Peiwar Kotal, Battle of (1878), **357–358**
 - casualties, 358
 - consequences of, 358
 - description of, 357–358
 - overview of, 357–358
 - Roberts, Frederick S., 357, 358
 - significance of, 357
- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), **358–360**
 - Amin, Hafizullah, 359
 - Awakened Youth movement, 358
 - definition of, 358
 - formation of, 358
 - infiltration of the military, 2
 - initial support for, 359
 - Karmal, Babrak, 358, 359, 360
 - Khalq* (“Masses”) faction of, 359
 - main factions of, 359
 - overview of, 358–360
 - Parcham* (“Banner”) faction of, 359
 - popular revolt against its rule, 359
 - roots of the party, 358
 - Soviet Operation Storm 333, 359–360
 - Soviet use of, 124
 - Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 358, 359, 447
 - Taraki and Amin dispute, 359

- Peshawar, Treaty of (1855), **360–361**
 accomplishments of, 361
 addendum to, 140
 date signed, 361
 Edwardes, Herbert Benjamin, 360, 361
 Haidar, Ghulam, 361
 Herat and, 361
 Lawrence, John, 361
 overview of, 360–361
 precipitating events, 360–361
 Qajar, Nasir al-Din Shah, 361
 during the Sepoy Rebellion, 361
 signees, 361
 terms of, 360, 361
- Peshawar Accords (1992), **362–363**
 articles of, 362
 date signed, 362
 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 362
 Mojaddedi, Sibghatullah, 362
 overview of, 362–363
 purpose of, 362
 Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 362
 results of, 362
 significance of, 362
- Peshawar Seven, 163, 311–312
- Petraeus, David (1952–), **363–364**
 in Afghanistan, 363
 after leaving public service, 364
 as CIA director, 363
 date and place of birth, 363
 education of, 363
 extramarital affair of, 363
 in Iraq, 363
 military career of, 363
 mishandling classified information, 363–364
 overview of, 363–364
 significance of, 363
- Pishim Scouts, 160
- Pitts, Ryan, 483
- Pollock, Sir George (1786–1872), **364–365**
 advance on Kabul, 365
 commands of, 364
 date and place of birth, 364
 death of, 365
 education of, 364
 honors to, 365
 at Jagdalak Pass/Tezin Pass, 365
 at Jalalabad, 364
 at the Khyber Pass, 364
 military career of, 364–365
 overview of, 364–365
 in retirement, 365
 Siege of Jalalabad, 43, 229
- Popalzai, **365–366**
 Abdalis tribe, 366
 Barakzai rivalry, 366
 contemporary, well-known members of, 366
 Karzai, Hamid, 366
 overview of, 365–366
 Shuja Shah, 366
 significance of, 365–366
- Pottinger, Eldred (1811–1843), **366–367**
 date and place of birth, 366
 death of, 367
 East India Company and, 366
 at Herat, 202, 366–367
 honors to, 367
 Khan, Mohammad Akbar, negotiation, 87
 at Kohistan, 367
 overview of, 366–367
 retreat from Kabul and, 367
 significance of, 366
 wounding of, 367
- Pottinger, Sir Henry (1789–1856), **367–368**
 British sovereignty over Hong Kong, 368
 at Cutch, 367
 date and place of birth, 367
 death of, 368
 diplomacy of, 368
 education of, 367
 first commercial mine, 367
 governorships of, 368
 memoir of, 367
 military service of, 367

- overview of, 367–368
- in the Second Anglo-Maratha War, 367
- significance of, 367
- Treaty of Nanking and, 368
- Pratrap, Raja Mahendra, 492
- precision-guided weapons, **368–370**
 - criticism of, 370
 - “dumb bombs” configurations, 369
 - future of, 370
 - GBU (guided bomb unit) weapons, 369
 - GPS/ inertial guided cruise missiles, 369
 - GPS-guided bombs, 369, 370
 - guidance kits, 369
 - Hellfire missile, 370
 - Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
 - kits, 369
 - Operation Desert Storm and, 369
 - Operation Enduring Freedom and, 368–369
 - overview of, 368–370
 - PGMs employed in Afghanistan, 369–370
 - precision-guided munitions (PGMs), 369
 - purpose-built stand-off weapons, 370
 - significance of, 368
 - standard warheads, 369
 - success of, 368
 - tactical use, 369
- provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), 123, 208
- psychological operations in Afghanistan, **370–371**
 - effectiveness of, 371
 - 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), 371
 - initial psychological operations (PSYOP)
 - campaign, objectives of, 370
 - Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) for Afghanistan, 370
 - leaflets and portable radios, 371
 - legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan (GIROA), 371
 - mass surrenders of Taliban forces, 371
 - message dissemination, 370–371
 - overview of, 370–371
 - radio broadcasts, 371
 - tactical PSYOP teams, 371
 - Taliban PSYOP campaign, 371
 - weaknesses in message design and approval process, 371
- Qajar, Nasir al-Din Shah, 361
- Qala-i-Jangi, Battle of (2001), **373–375**
 - air strikes during, 374, 375
 - casualties, 375
 - controversy concerning, 375
 - definition of Qala-i- Jangi, 373
 - description of battle, 373–375
 - Lindh, John Walker, 375
 - location of, 373
 - Northern Alliance forces, 374, 375
 - overview of, 373–375
 - photograph of, 374
 - precipitating events, 373
 - as prison, 373
 - reasons for the uprising, 373
 - significance of, 373
 - Spann, Johnny “Mike,” 373, 374
 - Tyson, Dave, 373, 374
- Qizil-Bash, **375–376**
 - definition of, 375–376
 - during the First Anglo-Afghan War, 376
 - headwear of, 376
 - languages of, 376
 - location of, 376
 - overview of, 375–376
 - as a pejorative term, 376
 - population in Afghanistan, 376
 - during the Soviet occupation, 376
- “Queen’s Army” troops, 88
- Quetta *shura* (council), 443
- Rabbani, Burhanuddin (1940–2011), **377–378**
 - Afghan High Peace Council and, 377
 - anti-Soviet coalition, 377
 - education of, 377
 - former students of, 377

- Jamiat-e Islami* (Islamic Society) and, 223, 377
- killing of, 377
- Northern Alliance and, 222, 377
- overview of, 377–378
- as president of Afghanistan, 377
- significance of, 377
- during the Soviet invasion, 377
- Rabbani, Mullah Muhammed (1955–2001), **378**
- date and place of birth, 378
- death of, 378
- education of, 378
- formation of the Taliban, 378
- as a guerrilla fighter, 378
- as head of the Supreme Council of the Taliban, 378
- Mullah Omar, relationship with, 378
- overview of, 378
- significance of, 378
- UN compound raid, 378
- Rabbani, Salahuddin, 222
- Raj, British (1858–1947), **379–380**
- Bose, Subhas, 380
- British East India Company, 379
- creation of two states, 380
- definition of, 379
- destabilizing impact of Afghanistan, 379
- Durand Line, 380
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 380
- Government of India Act (1919), 380
- Government of India Act (1935), 380
- importance of India, 379
- independence of India, 380
- India Office, creation of, 379
- Indian National Army, 380
- Indian National Congress, 379
- Japanese expansion into Burma, 380
- major regions of, 379
- Malakand Field Force, 379
- minor provinces, 379
- Muslim League, 379
- nationalism within, 379
- overview of, 379–380
- protection of India, 379
- regions or “presidencies” of, 379
- Russia and, 379
- Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), 379
- Sepoy Rebellion (1857–1858), 379
- Third Anglo-Afghan War, 380
- Tirah Campaign (1897–1898), 379
- translation of, 379
- during World War I, 380
- during World War II, 380
- Ranjit Singh, Maharaja (1780–1839), **380–382**
- date and place of birth, 381
- dealings with the British, 381
- death of, 382
- military career of, 381
- overview of, 380–382
- Shukerchakias Sikhs, 381
- significance of, 380–381
- the Sikhs, 381
- as a strategic thinker, 381
- Tripartite Treaty, 381
- Rashid, Mullah Abdul, 265
- Raugh, Harold E., Jr., 513
- Rausch, John David, Jr., 513
- Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919), **382–385**
- Afghan friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, 383
- agreements in, 382
- date signed, 382
- discussions leading to, 382–383
- Durand Line, 382, 383
- duration of, 383
- new terms of, 383
- overview of, 382–385
- related primary document: The Treaty of Rawalpindi (Treaty of Peace between Governments of India and Afghanistan), August 8, 1919, 383–385
- revisions of, 383
- significance of, 382
- Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), 382

- Reagan, Ronald W. (1911–2004), **385–387**
 during the Afghan conflict, 386
 Alzheimer's disease, 387
 budget deficits, 385
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 112
 death of, 387
 education of, 385
 as governor of California, 385
 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 386
 Iran-Contra scandal, 386
 military spending, expansion of, 386
 overview of, 385–387
 political career of, 385
 popularity of, 386
 as president of the U.S., 385–386
 radio and film career, 385
 Reagan Doctrine, 125, 386
 Reaganomics, 385
 relationship with Soviet Union, 385–386
 significance of, 385
 sobriquet of, 386
 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 386
 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 386
 support for the mujahideen, 386
 U.S. economic reforms, 385
- Reagan Doctrine, **387–388**
 core elements of, 387
 formal propagation of, 387
 Granada invasion, 387
 Iran-Contra scandal, 388
 manifestations of, 387–388
 mujahideen, support and funding for, 387–388
 overview of, 387–388
 Reagan, Ronald W. and, 387
 significance of, 387
 Stinger missiles, 388
- Red Shirts, 252
- Resolute Support Mission (RSM), 123, 324
- Richards, Sir David (1952–), **388–389**
 autobiography of, 389
 baronetcy of, 389
 commands of, 388
 date and place of birth, 388
 education of, 388
 International Security Assistance Force and, 388
 knighthood of, 388
 military career of, 388
 overview of, 388–389
 reputation of, 388
 significance of, 388
 on the Taliban, 388
 views on the Middle East, 389
- rifles, light arms, and machine guns, **389–391**
 AK-47s, 390
 Barrett M82 sniper rifle, 390
 Beaumont-Adams percussion revolver, 390
 Brown Bess musket, 389
 coalition sniper weapons, 390
 Dragunov sniper rifle, 390
 Enfield Mark I revolver, 390
 jezail, 389
 L115A3 sniper rifle, 390
 Lee-Enfield Mark I, 389
 M4 carbine, 390
 M9 Beretta, 390
 M16 rifle, 390
 M24 Sniper Weapon System (SWS), 390
 M240 main machine gun, 391
 M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), 391
 M870 pump-action, 12-gauge shotgun, 390
 Makarov 9 mm semiautomatic pistol, 390
 Martini-Henry .455 caliber rifle, 389
 NATO standard 5.56 mm round assault rifles, 390
 overview of, 389–391
 pistols, 390
 Pulemyot Kalashnikova (PK) 7.62 mm, 391

- Pulemyot Kalashnikova (PK) variants, 391
 during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 389, 390
 shotguns, 390
 sniper rifles, 390
 during the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), 390
 Vickers machine gun, 390
 Webley .455 caliber revolver, 390
- Roberts, Neil C., 437
- Roberts, Sir Abraham (1784–1873), **391–392**
 Auckland's dismissal of, 391
 combat experience of, 391
 commands of, 391, 392
 date and place of birth, 391
 death of, 392
 his concerns about the British position in Afghanistan, 391, 392
 Macnaghten, William, and, 391
 military career of, 391–392
 overview of, 391–392
 public works department, 391
 significance of, 391
- Roberts, Sir Frederick Sleigh (Lord) (1832–1914), **392–394**
 abdication of Mohammad Yakub Khan, 393
 Anglo-Boer War, 393–394
 combat experience of, 392, 393
 as commander in chief, India, 393
 commands of, 392, 393
 criticism of, 393
 date and place of birth, 392
 death of, 394
 as an earl, 394
 education of, 392
 father of, 392
 as hero, 393
 at Kabul, 393
 Kabul Field Force command, 393
 Kandahar, Battle of (1880), 46–47, 236, 237, 393
 Kurram Valley Force, 44, 45–46, 419
 memoirs of, 393
 overview of, 392–394
 Peiwar Kotal, Battle of (1878), 357, 358
 Second Anglo-Afghan War, 392–393
 at Sherpur, 393
 Sherpur, Battle of (1879), 419–420
 significance of, 392
 in South Africa, 393–394
 Victoria Cross to, 392
- Rodionov, Igor (1936–2014), **394–395**
 commands of, 394
 date and place of birth, 394
 date commissioned, 394
 death of, 394
 election to the Soviet Parliament, 394
 General Staff Academy, 394
 as minister of defense, 394
 overview of, 394–395
 significance of, 394
 Soviet 40th Army and, 430
- Rohde, David, 194
- Roos-Keppel, George Olaf (1866–1921), **395–396**
 as chief commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province of British India, 395
 combat experience of, 395
 date and place of birth, 395
 death of, 395–396
 Islamia College in Peshawar, 395
 as Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India, 395
 as Knight Grand Commander, 395
 overview of, 395–396
The Pashto Manual (Roos-Keppel), 395
 Pashtun language and, 395
 reputation of, 395
 significance of, 48, 395
 Third Anglo-Afghan War and, 395–396
 World War I and, 395
 Zakka Khel clan suppression, 395
- Royal Military College, 2
- Rumsfeld, Donald (1932–), **396–399**

- blunders of, 398
- Bush Doctrine and, 398
- business career, 396–397
- criticism of, 398
- date and place of birth, 396
- as director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, 396
- division of labor in Afghanistan, 122
- education of, 396
- full name of, 396
- government service of, 396
- his role in the post–September 11, 2001, Global War on Terror, 398
- honors to, 396
- memoirs of, 398
- military service, 396
- Nixon, Richard M., and, 396
- overview of, 396–399
- photograph of, 397
- political career of, 396
- as presidential envoy, 397
- resignation as secretary of defense, 398
- as secretary of defense, 397–398
- significance of, 396
- as U.S. ambassador to NATO, 396
- Russia (Soviet Union), relations with
 - Afghanistan, **399–402**
 - Afghan neutrality, 400
 - Amin, Hafizullah, killing of, 400
 - Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission, 399
 - Durand Line, 399
 - First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), 399
 - Friendship Treaty, 400
 - Geneva Accords (1988), 400
 - occupation of Panjdeh, 399
 - overview of, 399–402
 - People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 400
 - related primary document: The Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, December 5, 1978, 401–402
 - Russian territorial expansion, 399
 - Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), 399
 - Siege of Herat (1837–1838), 399
 - Soviet economic and military assistance, 400
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 400
 - strategic imperative in, 399
 - Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), 399–400
 - treaty of “Friendship” and “Neighborliness,” 400
 - U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and, 400
 - during World War I, 399
 - during World War II, 400
- Rutskoi, Alexander (1947–), **402–403**
 - air force career of, 402
 - Bearden, Milton, 402
 - CIA purchase of his aircraft, 402
 - combat missions of, 402
 - date and place of birth, 402
 - education of, 402
 - as governor of Kursk, 403
 - Hero of the Soviet Union, 402–403
 - misrepresentation of his candidacy paperwork, 403
 - overview of, 402–403
 - Pakistani forces capture of, 402
 - relationship with Boris Yeltsin, 403
 - significance of, 402
- Saakashvili, Mikheil, 422
- Sadat, Anwar, 452, 498
- Safavid Empire, 186, 187
- Saidullah (“Mullah Mastun”) (d. 1917), **405–406**
 - credibility of, 405
 - death of, 405
 - his attack on Malakand., 405
 - his invisible spiritual army, 405
 - his killing of his brother, 405

- initial attack of, 405
- jihad against the British, 405
- Khan, Abdur Rahman, 405
- nicknames of, 405
- overview of, 405–406
- significance of, 405
- as a wandering cleric, 405
- Saidullah Khan, 292
- Salafism, 211
- Sale, Florentia (1790–1853), **406–407**
 - date and place of birth, 406
 - daughter Alexandrina, 406
 - death of, 407
 - family of, 406
 - Florentia, Julia, 406
 - as Florentia Wynch, 406
 - her diary of her captivity, 406, 407
 - as hostage of Akbar Khan, 406
 - A Journal of the First Afghan War* (Sale), 407
 - marriage of, 406
 - negotiating release of the hostages, 406
 - overview of, 406–407
 - related primary document: The Battle of Gandamak on January 13, 1842, as described by Lady Florentia Sale, 165–166
 - retreat from Kabul (1842), 406
 - Sale, Robert, 176, 229, 406, 407
 - significance of, 406
 - wounding of, 406
- Sale, Sir Robert Henry (“Fighting Bob”) (1782–1845), **407–408**
 - Army of the Indus, 407
 - at the Battle of Mudki (1845), 407
 - combat experience of, 407
 - date of birth, 407
 - death of, 407
 - at Jalalabad, 407
 - overview of, 407–408
 - significance of, 407
 - wife and daughter, capture of, 407
- Sambhaji, 282
- Saragarhi, Battle of (1897), **408–409**
 - casualties, 408
 - description of battle, 408
 - Fort Lockhart, 408
 - Fort Sangar, attack on, 408
 - Fort Saragarhi, description of, 408
 - Orakzais and Afridis, 408
 - overview of, 408–409
 - precipitating events, 408
- Sarandoy (“Defenders of the Revolution”), **409–410**
 - desertion, 410
 - disbandment of, 410
 - factions in, 409
 - formation of, 409
 - growth of, 409
 - Gulabzoy, Sayyed Mohammad, 409
 - overview of, 409–410
 - PDPA rivalries and, 409
 - purpose of, 409
 - significance of, 409
 - Soviet advisors with, 409
- Sasso, Claude R., 513
- Saur Revolution (1978–1979), **410–411**
 - Amin, Hafizullah, 410
 - Karmal, Babrak, 410, 411
 - Khan, Mohammed Daoud, 410
 - Khyber, Mir Akbar, 410
 - overview of, 410–411
 - People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 267, 410, 411
 - precipitating events, 410–411
 - results of, 163, 202–203, 238
 - Taraki, Nur Mohammad, 410, 411
- Sayaf, Abdurab Rasul (1949–), **411–412**
 - alternative spelling of, 411
 - arrest of, 411
 - date and place of birth, 411
 - Dawa’a al- Jihad* (“The Call of Jihad”), 411
 - education of, 411
 - Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (*Ittihad-i-Islami Barye Azadi Afghanistan*), 223, 411, 412
 - madrasahs of, 411

- in mainstream Afghan politics, 412
- Northern Alliance and, 412
- overview of, 411–412
- as a professor at Kabul University, 411
- Sazman-i Jawanan-i Musulman*, or the Muslim Youth and, 411
- significance of, 411
- Tanzime Dahwat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan* (“The Islamic Mission Organization of Afghanistan”), 412
- Yousef, Ramzi Ahmad, 411
- Sazman-i Jawanan-i Musulman* (“Muslim Youth”), 219, 411
- Schroen, Gary (1941–), **412–413**
 - as a CIA operations or field officer, 412
 - as the CIA station chief for Pakistan, 412
 - First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (Schroen), 413
 - Northern Alliance, negotiations with, 113, 413
 - overview of, 412–413
 - September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, 412–413
 - significance of, 412
 - surveillance of bin Laden, 412
- Second Mahsud Scouts, 160
- security firms and defense contractors, **413–414**
 - Academi, 413
 - accountability and discipline of, 414
 - Afghan population view of, 414
 - Blackwater Worldwide, 414
 - casualties among, 413
 - Dyncorp International, 413
 - funding, 413
 - mercenaries and, 413
 - number of Department of Defense contractors in Afghanistan (2015), 414
 - overview of, 413–414
 - percentage of State Department contracts to, 413
 - personnel of, 413
 - public perceptions of contractors in the post-9/11 world, 414
 - roles of in Afghanistan, 414
 - Xe, 414
- Sen, Amartya, 308
- Sepoy (Indian) Rebellion, 140, 361
- September 11, 2001 attack on the U.S., 5, 32
- “Servants of God” (*Khuda-I Khidmatgaran*) movement, 251–252
- Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance, 299–300
- Shah, Mohammed Nadir (1883–1933), **414–415**
 - Amanullah Khan, 415
 - arrest of, 414
 - assassination of, 415
 - the Barakzai, 70
 - Damghan, Battle of (1729), 133
 - date and place of birth, 414
 - as emir, 415
 - Hashim Khan, 254
 - Kalakani, Habibullah, 236, 415
 - overview of, 414–415
 - reputation of, 414
 - significance of, 414
 - during the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), 414–415
- Shah, Mohammed Zahir, 486
- Shah, Mullah Ahmed (1970–2008), **415–416**
 - Afghan Civil War and, 415
 - alternative name for, 415
 - date and place of birth, 415
 - fame of, 415
 - as a hero, 416
 - killing of, 416
 - Operation Red Wings, 416
 - Operation Red Wings II, 416
 - Operation Whalers, 416
 - overview of, 415–416
 - significance of, 415
 - Taliban and al Qaeda, association with, 415–416
 - wounding of, 416

- Shah, Nadir (1698–1747), **416–419**
 the Afshars, 417
 Ahmadlu, Baba Ali Beg Kusa, 417
 Battle of Karnal (1739), 418
 birth name of, 416
 campaign into India, 418
 date and place of birth, 416
 dealings with other tribal groups,
 417–418
 defeat of the Ottoman forces, 419
 foreign conquests of, 418
 illustration of, 417
 Jafari and, 418
 marriages of, 417, 418
 murder of, 419
 overview of, 416–419
 palace coup against Tahmasp, 418
 problems in the northwestern region of
 Iran, 418–419
 Quli, Riza, 417, 419
 restoration of the Safavids to power, 418
 seizure of Kalat, 417
 as shah of Iran, 418
 Shiism, 417
 siege of Isfahan, 417
 significance of, 416
 sons of, 417
 as Tahmasp Quli Khan, 418
 taxation and, 419
- Shahuji, 282
- Sharif, Nawaz, 300–301
- Sherpur, Battle of (1879), **419–420**
 casualties, 420
 description of, 419–420
 Kabul Field Force, 419
 overview of, 419–420
 precipitating events, 419
 results of, 420
 Roberts, Frederick S., 419–420
 significance of, 419
 strength of forces, 419
- Shevardnadze, Eduard (1928–2014),
420–422
 assassination attempts, 422
- Central Committee of the Communist
 Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
 and, 421
- Communist Party membership, 420
 on corruption, 421
 date and place of birth, 420
 democratization of Eastern Europe, 421
 education of, 420
 as first secretary of the Georgian
 Communist Party, 421
 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 421
 human rights, crackdown on, 421
 liberalization, policy of, 421
 memoirs of, 422
 as minister of foreign affairs, 421–422
 as minister of internal affairs of Georgia,
 420–421
 Order of Lenin to, 421
 overview of, 420–422
 as president of the Republic of Georgia,
 422
 reforms of, 421
 resignation of presidency, 422
 significance of, 420
 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
 and, 421
- Shiism, 417
- Shukerchakias Sikhs, 381
- Shultz, George (1920–), **422–423**
 in academia, 422
 criticism of Barack Obama, 423
 date and place of birth, 422
 education of, 422
 government positions of, 422
 Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty
 (1987), 422
 military action of, 422
 overview of, 422–423
 as secretary of labor, 422
 as secretary of state, 422–423
 as secretary of the treasury, 422
 significance of, 422
- Shutargardan Pass, **423–424**
 elevation of, 423

- Kabul Field Force and, 423
 - during the late 16th century, 423
 - overview of, 423–424
 - during the Second Anglo- Afghan War, 423
 - significance of, 423
- Sikhs, 21, 381
- Simla Manifesto, 65
- Simonich, Ivan, 202
- Simpson, Larry, 513
- Singh, Amrita, 513
- Singh, Maharaja Ranjit, 21, 65
- Sokolov, Sergey (1911–2012), **424**
 - date and place of birth, 424
 - death of, 424
 - Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's (DRA) military and, 424
 - dismissal of, 424
 - Hero of the Soviet Union to, 424
 - invasion of Afghanistan and, 424
 - military career of, 424
 - as minister of defense (Soviet), 424
 - Operation Storm 333 and, 424
 - overview of, 424
 - significance of, 424
 - Soviet 40th Army, 430
- Souter, Thomas, 164
- South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 348
- South Waziristan Scouts, 160
- Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), 227–228
- Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), **424–429**
 - Brezhnev, Leonid, 342, 425
 - Brezhnev Doctrine, 425
 - Carter, Jimmy, 427
 - Carter Doctrine, 427
 - casualties, 428
 - civil war in Afghanistan, 425
 - as a combination of events dating to April 1978, 424–425
 - consequences of, 424
 - costs of, 428
 - domestic criticism of the war, 427–428
 - international consequences of, 424, 427
 - at Kabul, 425
 - Karmal, Babrak, 425
 - map of, 426
 - mujahideen guerrilla warfare, 425, 427
 - overview of, 424–429
 - Pavlovski, Ivan G., 425
 - photograph of Soviet military forces in Kabul (Dec. 31, 1979), 426
 - Reagan, Ronald, 427
 - related primary document: United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution ES-6/2, January 14, 1980, 428–429
 - rise of the Taliban, 428
 - Ustinov, Dmitry, 425
 - withdrawal of Soviet troops, 428
- Soviet Union, forces and tactics, **429–431**
 - Afghan terrain, 430
 - air superiority, 430
 - asymmetric warfare, 430
 - centralized command structure of Soviet forces, 430
 - Geneva Accords (1988), 431
 - helicopters, 430
 - infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 430
 - main battle tanks (MBTs), 430
 - miscalculation of Soviet military leaders, 430–431
 - the mujahideen, 430
 - Operation Storm 333, 430
 - overview of, 429–431
 - shift in Soviet strategy, 430
 - Soviet 40th Army, 430, 431
 - Soviet airborne, 430
 - speed and, 430
 - Stinger antiaircraft, 430
 - strength of forces deployed to Afghanistan, 429–430
- Spann, Johnny “Mike,” 113, 373
- special operations forces, **431–432**
 - Calland, Albert M., III, 432
 - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 432
 - definition of, 431

- Dostum, Rashid, 432
 importance of, 432
 killing of bin Laden, 432
 Operation Jawbreaker, 432
 overview of, 431–432
 SEAL team, 432
 Spetsnaz units, 431
 against the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters,
 431–432
 Task Force Dagger, 432
 Task Force Sword, 432
 U.S. Army ‘s 5th Special Forces Group,
 432
- Spector, Daniel E., 513
 Springer, Paul J., 514
 State Fragility Index (SFI), 309
 State Information Service (KhAD)
 (*Khidamat-i Ittilaat-i Dawlati*),
 432–433
 Afghanistan Security Service Department
 (*Afghanistan Da Gatay Satanay*
 Edara—AGSA), 433
 definition of, 432
 Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
 (DRA), 432
Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti
 (KGB), 433
 Ministry of State Security (*Wizarat-i*
 Ettela at-i Daulati —WAD), 433
 overview of, 432–433
 Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence
 (ISI) Directorate, 433
 Workers’ Security Institution (*Kargarano*
 Amniyati Mu’asasa — KAM), 433
- Stephenson, Alexander D., 514
 Stewart, Sir Donald (1824–1900), **433–434**
 at the Battle of Ahmed Khel, 46, 434
 children of, 434
 date and place of birth, 434
 date commissioned, 434
 death of, 434
 Kandahar, capture of, 44, 434
 Kandahar Field Force (Quetta Army),
 44, 434
 marriage of, 434
 military career of, 434
 overview of, 433–434
 promotions of, 434
 Roberts, Frederick, 434
 Sepoy Rebellion and, 434
 significance of, 433–434
- Stoddart, Charles (1806–1842), **435**
 Conolly, Arthur, 435
 date and place of birth, 435
 death of, 435
 education of, 435
 emir insult, 435
 imprisonments of, 435
 killing of, 435
 military career of, 435
 overview of, 435
 promotions of, 435
 Siege of Herat, 435
 significance of, 435
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),
 386
 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 386
- Tajikistan, 11
- Takur Ghar, Battle of (2002), **437–438**
 Anderson, Marc, 438
 Blaber, Peter, 437
 casualties, 437, 438
 Chapman, John A., 438
 Commons, Matt, 438
 Crose, Brad, 438
 dates of, 437
 description of, 437–438
 forces involved in, 437, 438
 Hyder, Vic, 437, 438
 location of, 437
 Operation Anaconda, 437
 outcome of, 438
 overview of, 437–438
 Roberts, Neil C., 437
 significance of, 437
 Takur Ghar, description of, 437
- Taliban, **438–441**

- Afghan Civil War (1989–2001), 5
 Afghan National Army (ANA) and, 3, 9
 Afghan War (2001–), 7, 9
 Afridi (Khyberlee) tribe, 25
 aircraft, types and tactics, 28
 al Qaeda, 31
 anti-aircraft missiles, 56
 armored vehicles, 59–60
 bin Laden, Osama and, 79
 the Buddhas of Bamiyan, 439
 Buddhas of Bamiyan, 92
 control of Kabul, 3
 Deobandi school, 135
 downfall of, 439–440
 embassy bombings (1998), 157
 emergence of, 439
 estimates of current Taliban military strength, 440
 execution of Mohammed Najibullah, 234
 fighting strength during the October–November 2001 battles with the Northern Alliance, 440
 following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., 198
 “foreign crusaders” (Taliban propaganda), 440
 genesis of, 438
 Ghilzai, 177, 356
 Haqqani, Jalaluddin (1939–2014?), 192
 Hazaras, 198
 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 199
 Herat, capture of, 439
 Hezb-e Islami Khalis (HIK), 245
 human rights violations, 439
 humanitarian aid operations, 207
 insurgency, expansion of, 440
 insurgency tactics, 440
 Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)
 Directorate of Pakistan, 212
 international support for, 439
 Iran (Persia), relations with Afghanistan, 215
 Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Islami*), 221–222
 Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, DAESH), 223
 Islamic theocracy and, 439
 Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (*Ittehad-e Islami Mujahideeni Afghanistan*), 224
 Jalalabad, taking of, 234
 Kabul, Siege of (1996), 233–234
 Karzai, Hamid (1957–), 240, 241
 Khan, Mohammad Ismail (1946–), 256
 Kunar, taking of, 234
 madrasahs, 276, 439
 Mansour, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad, 440
 Marja, Battle of (2010), 283
 Massoud, Ahmad Shah, 190, 284, 285, 440
 Mazari, Abdul Ali, 286
 military victories of, 439
 Musharraf, Pervez, 301, 302
 Najibullah, Mohammed, 306
 narcoterrorism, 307
 National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (*Mahaz-i Milli Islami*), 312
 National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (*Jumbish-i Milli Islami Afghanistan*), 312
 National Liberation Front (*Jabha-i Nijat-i Milli*), 313
 Northern Alliance, 349
 Omar, Mullah Mohammed, 16, 334, 335, 439, 440
 Operation Enduring Freedom, 19
 opium poppy production, 344
 overthrow of, 16
 overview of, 438–441
 Pakistan and, 348, 349
 Pashtunization, 354
 Pashtuns and, 11
 PSYOP campaign, 371
 Rabbani, Mullah Mohammed (1955–2001), 378
 recruitment, 440
 refugee children and, 439
 size of, 3

- Spin Boldak and Kandahar victories, 439
- as Taliban (Islamic students), 324–325, 438
- Taliban, definition of, 438
- terrorist attacks, 440
- terrorist tactics, 440
- in the tribal areas, 440
- U.S. troop surge, 9
- U.S.humanitarian and economic assistance to, 473
- Wahhabism and, 481
- Wanat, Battle of (2008), 482–483
- women and, 439, 481
- women in combat, 490
- Taliban, forces and tactics, **441–443**
 - Afghanistan, is control of, 442
 - air force of, 442
 - armored vehicles, 442
 - coalition airstrikes, 442
 - coalition troop surge, 442
 - countries supplying military aid to, 441
 - defeat of, 442
 - ethnic cleansing, 441
 - formation of the Taliban, 441
 - guerrilla tactics, 441
 - insurgency tactic, 442
 - opium poppy cultivation, 442
 - overview of, 441–443
 - recruits of, 441
 - Soviet tanks, 441–442
 - strength of forces of the Taliban, 441, 442
 - suicide bombings, 441
 - tactical mistake of the Taliban, 442
 - terrorist attacks, 442
- Taliban insurgency, **443–446**
 - al Qaeda and, 443
 - best-known allied forces, 444
 - composition of, 443–444
 - countries recognizing, 443
 - date started, 443
 - explanations for resurrection of, 445–446
 - Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 443, 444, 445
 - fronts of, 444
 - funding of, 444
 - Haqqani network, 444
 - Lashkar-e Taiba*, 444
 - leadership of, 443
 - limits of its capabilities, 444
 - local police forces and, 445
 - the name “Taliban,” 443
 - NATO troop reinforcements, 444
 - North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), 443
 - Obama, Barack, 445
 - Operation Enduring Freedom, 443, 445
 - overview of, 443–446
 - Pakistan and, 444, 445
 - Pashtuns (Pushtuns) and, 443
 - photograph of, 444
 - Quetta *shura* (council), 443
 - revival of the Taliban, 443–444
 - sanctuaries, 443
 - suicide attacks, 445
 - support of, 443
 - support of Pakistani officials, 443
 - Taliban offensive (2006), 444
 - Tehrik-i Taliban-Pakistan* (Pakistan Taliban, TTP), 444
 - winter operations of, 444
- Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (Rashid), 141
- Tanai, Shahnawaz (1950–), **446–447**
 - coup against the president, 447
 - Da Afghanistan Da Solai Ghorzang Gund* (“The Afghanistan Peace Movement”), 447
 - date and place of birth, 446
 - exile of, 447
 - Khalq (“Masses”) and, 446
 - military career of, 446–447
 - as minister of defense, 447
 - overview of, 446–447
 - significance of, 446

- Tanzime Dahwat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan*
 (“The Islamic Mission Organization of Afghanistan”), 412
- Taraki, Nur Muhammad (1917–1979), **447–449**
 Amin, Hafizullah, and, 448
 date and place of birth, 447
 Ghilzai and, 16
 government posts of, 447
 as the “Great Leader,” 448
 killing of, 448
 land programs, 448
 murder of, 447
 overthrow of Daoud, 448
 overview of, 447–449
 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and, 358, 359, 447
 as president of Afghanistan, 448
 reforms of, 448
 relationships with Soviet officials, 448
 Saur Revolution, 448
 significance of, 447
- Tarar, Rafiq, 301
- Tarzi, Mahmud (1865–1933), **449–450**
 as ambassador to France, 449
 clan of, 449
 date and place of birth, 449
 death of, 449
 Durand Line, establishment of, 449
 exile of, 449
 father of, 449
 as the “father” of Afghan journalism, 449
 influence on, 18, 449
 language fluency of, 449
 as the leader of the liberal faction within the government, 449
 overview of, 449–450
 significance of, 449
Siraj al-Akbar Afghaniyah and, 449
 Third Anglo-Afghan War and, 19, 449
Travel Across Three Continents in Twenty-Nine Days (Tarzi), 449
 during World War I, 449
 as writer and translator, 449
- Tarzi, Soraya (1899–1968), **450**
 accomplishments of, 450
 date and place of birth, 450
 death of, 450
 exile of, 450
 grand tour, 450
 overview of, 450
 polygamy, 450
 significance of, 450
 social modernization, 450
- Tehran Eight (*Shuray-e Eatelaf*), 218, 224, 285, 478
- Tehrik-i Taliban-Pakistan* (Pakistan Taliban, TTP), 444
- terrorism, **450–454**
 al Qaeda, 452, 453
 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 452
 Algeria, 452
 Arab culture and, 454
 Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 452
 basis of, 453
 bin Laden, Osama, 452
 Egypt, 452
 Hamas, 453
 Hezbollah, 453
 Hezbollah movement, 451
 Iraq, 452
 Islam and, 452, 454
 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 453–454
 Israel, 451, 453
 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), 451
 Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), 451
 Lebanon, 451, 453
 Middle Eastern terrorism, 450–451
 motivation for, 453
 opposition to, 452
 ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime and, 452
 overview of, 450–454
 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 451

- Palestinian Islamic groups, 452
- Palestinian terrorism, 451, 453
- radical Middle Eastern states and, 452
- reasons for, 454
- suicide bombings, 452, 453
- suppression of, 454
- Turkey, 451
- United States and, 452–453, 454
- United States response to 9/11, 453
- Tibet, 53
- Timur Shah, 350
- Tirah Campaign (1897–1898), **454–457**
 - Bazar Valley Expedition, 456
 - casualties, 457
 - commanders in, 455
 - description of, 455–456
 - forces involved in, 455
 - Lockhart, William S. A., 455, 456
 - Malakand Field Force, 454
 - Mohmand Field Force, 454
 - overview of, 454–457
 - photograph of, 456
 - precipitating events, 454–455
 - Tirah Field Force, 455
 - Tochi Field Force, 454
- Tirah Expedition (1897–1898), 24
- Tochi Field Force, 280, 454
- Tochi Scouts, 160
- Tolppanen, Bradley P., 514
- Tomsen, Peter (1940–), **457–458**
 - date and place of birth, 457
 - education of, 457
 - overview of, 457–458
 - retirement of, 458
 - significance of, 457
 - as U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan, 457–458, 458
 - The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failure of Great Powers* (Tomsen), 458
 - as a writer and commentator, 458
- Tora Bora, Battle of (2001), **458–459**
 - aerial bombardment, 458
 - al Qaeda losses during, 459
- Berntsen, Gary, 459
- bin Laden, Osama, 459
 - codename of, 458
 - description of, 458–459
 - Northern Alliance and, 459
 - number of militants at, 458
 - overview of, 458–459
 - photograph of, 8
 - reason for, 458
 - significance of, 459
 - truce in, 459
- Trans-Afghanistan pipeline, 211
- transport and logistics, **459–461**
 - during the Afghan Civil War, 460
 - carts, 460
 - challenges to in Afghanistan, 459
 - forage, 460
 - motorized vehicles, 460
 - NATO convoys, 460
 - overview of, 459–461
 - oxen, 460
 - pack or draft animals, 459–460
 - paved roadways, 460
 - during the Soviet invasion, 460
 - Soviet logistics doctrine, 460
 - suicide bombers, 460
 - U.S.-led coalition and, 460–461
- Treaty of
 - Afghan-German Friendship Treaty, 491–492
 - Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1809), 37–38, 149
 - Anglo-Afghan Treaty (1905), 38–39, 250
 - Friendship Treaty, 400
 - Gandamak (1879), 24, 45, 47, 109, 136, 144, 166–170, 246, 256, 257
 - Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 386, 422
 - Nanking (1842), 368
 - Neutrality and Non-Aggression, 24. *see also* Afghan-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (1931)
 - Peshawar (1855), 360–361
 - Rawalpindi (1919), 23, 49, 248, 382–385
 - Saadabad (1937), 255, 493

- SALT II, 85
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 386
- Tripartite Treaty, 381
- Tribal Agencies, 11
- Truman, Harry S., 67, 124, 261, 472
- Tucker, Spencer C., 514
- Twitter, 126
- Tyson, Dave, 373
- Tytler, J. A., 33, 34

- UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), 208
- UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), 207
- United Kingdom (Great Britain), relations
 - with Afghanistan, **463–468**
 - during the Cold War, 464
 - the “Great Game,” 463, 465
 - historical overview of, 463–464
- International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 464, 465
- International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), rationale for establishment of, 464–465
- Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 465
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 464
- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 464
 - overview of, 463–468
 - related primary document: U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, “Statement on Military Action in Afghanistan,” October 7, 2001, 465–468
 - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 464
 - the Taliban, 464, 465
- United National Front (*Shuray Mottahed-e Melli-e*), 244, 256
- United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan, 308
- United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), **468–469**
 - Bonn Agreement, support of, 468
 - Brahimi, Lakhdar, 468
 - date launched, 468
 - extended mandate of, 469
 - field offices of, 468, 469
 - Haysom, Nicholas, 468
 - headquarters of, 468
 - leaders of, 468
 - mission extension, 469
 - mission of, 468
 - national elections in 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010, and 2014, 468
 - number of personnel, 468
 - overview of, 468–469
 - physical attacks on, 468
 - secretary-general’s special representatives, 468
 - UN Security Council Resolution 1401 and, 468
 - voter fraud and corruption, 468–469
- United States, forces and tactics (2001–), **469–471**
 - aerial view of bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 471
 - al Qaeda, 470
 - bin Laden, Osama, 470
 - Bush administration and, 470
 - elimination of bin Laden, 470
 - International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 469, 470
 - Obama administration and, 470
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 469
 - overview of, 469–471
 - Taliban, 470
 - U.S. Special Operations Forces, 470
- United States, relations with Afghanistan, **471–474**
 - ambassador to, 472
 - bilateral trade and investment agreement, 473
 - Bonn Conference, 473
 - characteristic of, 471
 - CIA and, 472
 - current status of, 474
 - deterioration of in the early 2010s, 473

- diplomatic recognition on Afghanistan, 472
- dollar amount of aid to Afghanistan (2002 – 2014), 473
- Dubs, Adolf “Spike,” killing of, 472
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., on, 472
- formal relations, 471
- Ghani, Ashraf, 473–474
- Helmand Valley Project, 472
- humanitarian and economic assistance to the Taliban, 473
- Karzai, Hamid, 473
- limited economic assistance, 472
- as a major non–NATO ally with the U.S., 473
- mujahideen, support for, 472
- Nixon, Richard M., 472
- Northern Alliance, 473
- Obama administration, 473
- overview of, 471–474
- People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 472
- Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 472
- related primary document: U.S. State Department, Statement on Afghanistan, December 26, 1979, 474
- September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 473
- Soviet Union and, 472
- the Taliban, 473
- tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, 472
- Truman, Harry S., on, 472
- U.S. embassy, 472, 473
- U.S. Import-Export Bank, 472
- U.S. reaction to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 472–473
- during World War II, 472
- Urgun, siege of (1983–1984), **475**
 - casualties, 475
 - description of, 475
 - duration of, 475
 - forces involved in, 475
 - outcome of, 475
 - overview of, 475
 - reason for, 475
- Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich (1908–1984), **475–476**
 - Brezhnev, Leonid, and, 425
 - Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and, 476
 - date and place of birth, 476
 - death of, 476
 - as defense minister, 476
 - education of, 476
 - overview of, 475–476
 - as people’s commissar for armaments, 476
 - political battles of, 476
 - significance of, 475–476
 - on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 425, 476
 - strategy for Afghanistan, 476
- Uzbekistan, 11
- Varennikov, Valentin (1923–2009), **477**
 - arrest of, 477
 - command of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, 477
 - as commander of all Soviet ground forces, 477
 - date and place of birth, 477
 - date commission, 477
 - death of, 477
 - election to the Duma, 477
 - Gorbachev, Mikhail, attempted overthrow of, 477
 - overview of, 477
 - significance of, 477
 - on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 477
 - Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, 477
 - in World War II, 477
 - wounding of, 477
- Victory Organization (*Sazman-i Nasr*), **477–478**
 - definition of, 477
 - goals of, 478

- Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan and, 478
- as a major mujahideen force, 478
- Mazari, Abdul Ali, 285
- overview of, 477–478
- purposes of, 478
- rebellion against the shura, 478
- Sadeqi, Muhammad Hussain, 477
- support for, 478
- Tehran Eight and, 478
- Vitkevich, Ivan Viktorovich (1806–1839), **478–479**
 - birth name of, 478
 - “Black Brothers” and, 478
 - censure of, 479
 - date and place of birth, 478
 - exile of, 478
 - his offer to the Afghans, 479
 - missions of, 478–479
 - overview of, 478–479
 - significance of, 478
 - suicide of, 479
- Wadda Ghalughara (the second Sikh holocaust), 21
- Wahhabism, **481–482**
 - alternative name for, 211
 - Buddhas of Bamiyan, 481
 - definition of, 481
 - Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, 481
 - origins of, 481
 - overview of, 481–482
 - Saudi royal family and, 481
 - the Taliban and, 211, 481
- Wakhan Corridor, 11
- Wanat, Battle of (2008), **482–483**
 - Bella COP, 482
 - casualties, 483
 - Combat Outposts (COP), 482
 - defeat of the Taliban, 483
 - description of, 482–483
 - Kahler COP, 482, 483
 - Operation Rock Move, 482
 - overview of, 482–483
- Pitts, Ryan, 483
 - purpose of, 482
 - results of, 482, 483
 - Topside observation post, 482, 483
- Warburton, Sir Robert (1842–1899), **483–484**
 - Abyssinian War (1867– 1868), 483
 - as a Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire, 484
 - date of birth, 483
 - death of, 484
 - education of, 483
 - father of, 483
 - the Khyber Rifles and, 484
 - marriage of, 483
 - memoir of, 484
 - mother of, 483
 - overview of, 483–484
 - as political officer for the Khyber region, 483
 - during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 483–484
 - significance of, 483
- Wardak, Abdul Rahim (1945–), **484–485**
 - during the Afghan Civil War, 484
 - at the Afghan Military Academy, 484
 - as chief of staff for the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, 484
 - date and place of birth, 484
 - education of, 484
 - Ghazi Amanullah Khan Medal to, 485
 - as minister of defense, 485
 - overview of, 484–485
 - resignation of, 485
 - rise in the political bureaucracy, 485
 - significance of, 484
 - writings of, 485
- warlords, **485–488**
 - Bonn Agreement and, 486
 - definition of, 485
 - determining the political and religious orientation of Afghanistan, 486
 - emergence of, 486
 - ethnic groups of Afghanistan, 485

- female warlord, 486
- hindering state progress, 486
- hostilities between, 487
- integration into Afghan government, 487
- Khan, Amanullah, 486
- Khan, Mohammed Daoud (1909–1978), 486
- notable warlords, 486
- overview of, 485–488
- Pashtun, dominance of, 485–486
- photograph of General Abdul Malik Phelwan, 487
- populist view of, 486
- predatory behavior of, 486
- proactive mobilization of, 486
- protection of, 487
- Shah, Mohammed Zahir, 486
- strategy of placing warlords in government, 487
- Taliban warlords, 487
- Watanwal, Hasham, 251
- Waziris, 49
- Wilson, Charles Nesbitt (1933–2010), **488–489**
 - Avrakotos, Gust, 489
 - Charlie Wilson's War* (Crile), 489
 - CIA and, 489
 - date and place of birth, 488
 - death of, 489
 - education of, 488
 - foreign policy stance of, 488
 - Honored Colleague award, 489
 - as a lobbyist, 489
 - military service of, 488
 - nickname of, 489
 - overview of, 488–489
 - political career of, 488–489
 - significance of, 488
 - support for the mujahideen, 488, 489
- women, role in combat, **489–490**
 - combat support operations, 490
 - Cultural Support Teams, 490
 - European Community Equal Treatment Directive, 490
 - European nations on, 490
 - intelligence gathering, 490
 - number of U.S. female service members killed in Afghanistan, 490
 - overview of, 489–490
 - the Taliban and, 490
 - U.S. ban on women in direct ground combat, 489, 490
- Workers' Security Institution (*Kargarano Amniyati Mu'asasa* — KAM), 433
- World War I and Afghanistan (1914–1918), **490–492**
 - Afghan-German Friendship Treaty, 491–492
 - Anglo-Russian Convention, 490
 - British subsidy to Habibullah, 491
 - George V (King), 491
 - Khan, Amanullah, 491
 - Khan, Habibullah, 490, 491, 492
 - Khan, Nasrullah, 491, 492
 - neutrality of Afghanistan, 490, 491
 - overview of, 490–492
 - pro-war faction in Afghanistan, 491
 - Turko-German diplomatic missions, 491
- World War I and Afghanistan, Turko-German Missions (1914–1918), **492–493**
 - Bey, Kazim, 492
 - coup possibility, 493
 - friendship treaty, 492, 493
 - Hentig, Werner von, 492, 493
 - Khan, Habibullah, 492, 493
 - Khan, Nasrullah, 492
 - Niedermayer, Oskar, 492, 493
 - overview of, 492–493
 - Pratrap, Raja Mahendra, 492
 - significance of, 493
- World War II and Afghanistan (1939–1945), **493–494**
 - Afghan neutrality, 493, 494
 - Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, 494
 - expulsion of the Germans and Italians, 494
 - formal declaration of neutrality, 494
 - German covert operations, 494

- German military mission in Afghanistan, 494
- invasion of the Soviet Union, 494
- Khan, Mohammad Hashim, 493
- overview of, 493–494
- results of, 494
- Treaty of Saadabad (1937), 493
- Xe, 414
- Yakub Khan, 44, 46, 166–168
- Yar Mohammed Khan, 201
- Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich (1924–), **495–496**
 - commands of, 495
 - coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, 495
 - date and place of birth, 495
 - as defense minister, 495
 - Gorbachev, Mikhail, and, 495
 - military career of, 495
 - overview of, 495–496
 - reputation of, 495
 - significance of, 495
- Yeltsin, Boris, 4, 178
- Younghusband, Francis, 180
- Yousef, Ramzi Ahmad, 411
- “Zadran Arch,” 193
- Zahir Shah, Mohammed (1914–2007), **497–498**
 - abdication of, 497
 - affections for, 497
 - assassination attempt, 497
 - date and place of birth, 497
 - death of, 497
 - direct rule of, 497
 - duration of his reign, 70
 - education of, 497
 - exile of, 497
 - as “Father of the Nation,” 71, 497
 - his return to Afghanistan, 497
 - military coup (1973), 497
 - overview of, 497–498
 - reign of, 497
 - significance of, 497
- Zaman Shah, 137–138
- Zardari, Ali, 75
- Zardari, Asif Ali, 302
- Zawahiri, Ayman al- (1951–), **498–499**
 - acts of terrorism, 498
 - as *amir almu’minin* (commander of the faithful), 32
 - bin Laden, Osama, 498
 - current status of, 499
 - date and place of birth, 498
 - education of, 498
 - Egyptian Islamic Jihad and, 498
 - father of, 498
 - impact of his ideology, 499
 - Knights under the Prophet’s Banner* (Zawahiri), 498
 - Maktab al-Khidmat* (Jihad Service Bureau) and, 498
 - Muslim Brotherhood, 498
 - as operational leader of the al Qaeda, 33, 499
 - overview of, 498–499
 - significance of, 498
 - speeches and writings of, 498–499
 - successor to bin Laden, 499
 - Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy on, 499
 - video response to Pope Benedict XVI’s remarks on Islam, 499
- Zhawar, Battles of (1985–1986), **499–501**
 - on April 17/April 19, 501
 - at the beginning of September 1985, 499–500
 - casualties, 501
 - description of, 499–501
 - on February 28, 1986, 500
 - Haqqani, Jalaluddin, 499, 500, 501
 - the mujahideen, 499, 500, 501
 - overview of, 499–501
 - results of, 499, 501
 - Sodyaki Ghar Mountain base, 499
 - Zhawar logistics facility, 499
 - Zhawar Regiment, 499

Zhob Militia, 160

Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad (1924–1988),

501–502

acquisition of nuclear weapons, 502

coup against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
501

date and place of birth, 501

death of, 502

education of, 501

legitimizing his rule, 502

military career of, 501

overview of, 501–502

Pakistani influence among the
mujahideen, 502

Reagan administration and, 502
rule of, 502

significance of, 501

during World War II, 501

Zuhur, Sherifa, 514

Zunes, Stephen, 514